Akshay Vinod Kulkarni Vs Chief Passport Officer and Anr on 03 May 2021

Posted on June 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single judge bench of Delhi High Court held that without giving any opportunity to the Petitioner, the Passport Office cannot suspend, impound a passport.

From Paras 11, 12 and 13,

11. In the opinion of this court, the shocking part of the present case is that, despite long drawn correspondence the Respondents have not served the passport suspension order or the denial order to the Petitioner. He was shuttled between the RPO-Kozhikode who informed him that it was the Indian Mission in Houston which revoked his passport. It is not even the case of the Respondents that the Petitioner was heard. The passport of the petitioner has been suspended on the basis of a complaint by the wife due to matrimonial disputes for more than two and half years. The correspondence on record reveals that the Petitioner has repeatedly approached various authorities seeking revival of his passport as also for a copy of the denial order, but in vain. Even before this court the Respondents have not filed any affidavit or document on record till date, despite having more than five months to do so. The Indian Mission or the other authorities have not filed a single document to show whether it is a case of revocation of passport or suspension of passport and if so on what grounds was the action taken. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Petitioner has been unable to travel to India. It is the case of the Petitioner that his old mother, who is a widow, lives alone in Bangalore and that he wishes to travel both in the U.S.A. and in India, in relation to his job assignments. It is clear that the Petitioner is suffering immensely both personally and professionally due to the suspension/revocation of his passport. The Petitioner’s appeal has also now been dismissed, without the said orders being made available to him. The submission is that even if the suspension order is stayed, the passport does not come back into operation.
12. In the order in appeal dated 8th May, 2020, which is under challenge in the present petition, the Appellate Forum proceeds on the basis that since the email dated 5th November, 2018 was sent to the Petitioner, it is presumed that the Petitioner was aware of the suspension of his passport. Such a conclusion cannot be arrived at unless and until, the Respondent establishes on record that proper notice was issued and a reply was called for and the Petitioner did not respond to the same.
13. Ld. Counsel for the Respondents now submits that due to the pandemic, the file of this case is also not available and so he could not place any documents on record.
14. The Petitioner cannot be made to live without a passport indefinitely. This Court has given adequate time to the Respondents to file an affidavit/documents on record, however, not a single shred of paper has been placed on record. On merits, whether the suspension/revocation was justified or not would be the subject matter of final adjudication. However, the Petitioner cannot be made to suffer further especially due to the pandemic that is currently raging which may require him to travel to India to meet his mother who is in India, owing to her age etc.

Akshay Vinod Kulkarni Vs Chief Passport Officer and Anr on 03 May 2021

Bharti Bhardwaj Vs Deepak Bhardwaj on 03 Feb 2021

Posted on May 8, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Delhi High Court affirmed the divorce granted to husband because of the mental cruelty caused by the wife relying on landmark decision by Hon,ble Supreme Court.

From Paras 11, 12 and 13,

11. Now, given that matrimonial disputes rarely involve production of concrete evidence in documentary or audio-visual form, and mostly proceed on the relative strength of the opposing allegations made by the parties, the entire process of leading and recording evidence has a significant role to play in establishing one’s case. Thus, notwithstanding her denials in the written statement, the appellant was expected to properly and specifically cross-examine the respondent to prove her allegations of cruelty against him and disprove those he had levelled against her. The importance of properly discharging this function of cross-examination was discussed by the Supreme Court in the following paragraphs of its decision in Rajinder Pershad Vs. Darshana Devi (2001) 7 SCC 69
12. Although the appellant, in the grounds adopted in the appeal, has assailed the reliance of the learned Family Court on the decision in State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (1998) 3 SCC 561 to contend that the same was a criminal case and the precedent arising therefrom could not apply to cross examinations in matrimonial proceedings, which are civil proceedings by nature, there is no merit to this opposition; especially in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Darshana Devi’s case which was a civil proceeding. In fact, the standard of proof in a matrimonial proceeding- which is also in the nature of a civil proceeding is not as strict, as in criminal proceedings. Thus, the case is required to be proved on preponderance of probabilities and not the legal standard of being beyond a reasonable doubt. Keeping in view the aforesaid, it is evident that there was a crucial responsibility placed on the shoulders of the appellant which was to ensure that she challenged the specifics of the allegations raised by the respondent and establish their lack of veracity. Paragraphs 44 to 46 of the impugned judgment clearly show that the appellant had not cross-examined the respondent/husband on these important aspects, and, thus, completely failed to draw out the facts as claimed by her. In fact, even before us, the appellant, other than contending that the onus of proving cruelty rested upon the respondent, has failed to provide any cogent reasons for failing to cross-examine the respondent in support of her own case, or to challenge his allegations of cruelty. It is a settled proposition of law that the Court would normally accept unchallenged and uncontroverted assertions of fact. The failure of the appellant to effectively cross-examine the respondent shows that she neither seriously challenged his version of the factual position, nor established her own version. Therefore, in our view, the Family Court was justified in accepting the unrebutted testimony of the respondent.

13. When we view this in addition to the fact that in her written statement, the appellant had admitted to having levelled false allegations against the respondent and his family under the DV Act, we find there were plenty of holes in the appellant’s story. Her feeble explanation for this ill-thought out act of falsely implicating the respondent and his family was that the same was not done malevolently, but only with an intention to ensure that the parties were sent to counselling in order to settle their disputes. That

Bharti Bhardwaj Vs Deepak Bhardwaj on 03 Feb 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE DEL 1060]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141653082/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/602426e49fca1968807133e6

https://www.jainodin.com/2021/02/false-dvc-is-mental-cruelty.html

State Vs Sandeep on 29 Sep 2019

Posted on March 28, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

The mafia who engages in sex first but then terms such consensual sex as rape is busted in this case by Delhi High Court.

From Para 14,

14. In view of the above, the Trial Court concluded that the “accused cannot be held guilty for not marrying the prosecutrix because he and his family members were ready for the marriage but the parents of the prosecutrix did not want that their daughter should marry the accused”. Given the testimony of the witnesses, the conclusion that the accused and Ms P did not marry on account of the opposition from the family of the prosecutrix is certainly a plausible view. The only reservation that this Court has to the above conclusion of the trial court is the implicit assumption that the accused was alleged to be guilty of not marrying Ms P. The accused was not on trial for not marrying Ms. P; but on an allegation of committing the
offence of rape.

From Para 16, 17 and 18,

16. The Trial Court reasoned that if the accused had established physical relationship on account of the promise of marriage, she would have disclosed the same to her parents. This Court finds no infirmity with the said reasoning as well. If the accused had induced Ms P to have physical relations on the false promise to marry; she or her mother, on becoming aware, would have disclosed the same to her father.
17. It is important to bear in mind that two consenting adults establishing a physical relationship, is not a crime. Jilting a lover, however abhorent that it may seem to some, is also not an offence punishable under the IPC.
18. In so far as consent to engage in a sexual act is concerned; the campaign ‘no means no’, that was initiated in the 1990’s, embodies a universally accepted rule: a verbal ‘no’ is a definite indication of not giving consent to engage in a sexual act. There is now wide acceptance to more ahead from the rule of ‘no means no’ to ‘yes means yes’. Thus, unless there is an affirmative, conscious and voluntary consent to engage in sex; the same would constitute an offence.

From Para 21,

21. Inducement to have a physical relationship by promising marriage must have a clear nexus with the moment promise of marriage cannot be held out as an inducement for engaging in sex over a protracted and indefinite period of time. In certain cases, a promise to marry may induce a party to agree to establish sexual relations, even though such party does not desire to consent to the same. Such inducement in a given moment may elicit consent, even though the concerned party may want to say no. Such false inducement given with the intention to exploit the other party would constitute an offence. However, it is difficult to accept that continuing with an intimate relationship, which also involves engaging in sexual activity,
over a significant period of time, is induced and involuntary, merely on the assertion that the other party has expressed its intention to get married.

State Vs Sandeep on 29 Sep 2019

Rakhi Sharma Vs State and Ors on 5 Mar 2021

Posted on March 21, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court held that, Appeals can be filed by any ‘affected person’ under MWPSC Act and applicable Rules in Delhi in cases of maintenance and eviction of son, daughter or any legal heir to their property.

From Para 4

4. A large number of writ petitions are filed before this Court challenging orders passed under the Act, as also the Rules. There appears to be some confusion as to which orders are appealable, to which forum and by whom. In order to properly appreciate the scheme of the Act and the Rules thereto, it is necessary to set out the provisions which are applicable separately qua maintenance and eviction proceedings.

From Para 15, 16 and 17,

15. As per the above Rules, a senior citizen can approach the Deputy Commissioner/DM seeking eviction of the son, daughter or any other legal heir from his self-acquired property on account of his non-maintenance and ill-treatment. The term ‘self-acquired property’ has been amended to include ’property of any kind’, vide notification dated 28th July, 2017 numbered F.No.40(405)/AmendmentofRulesMAWPSC2007/DD(SS)/DSW/2015-6/1168411712. Thus, the senior citizen can approach the Deputy Commissioner/DM for eviction from any property over which he/she enjoys rights. The title of the senior citizen is checked. A report is submitted by the concerned SDM after verifying both the title as also the facts pleaded. If the Deputy Commissioner/DM is satisfied, then notice is issued to the children/relatives whose eviction is sought and thereafter orders are passed.
16. Under Rule 22(3)(4), an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate would lie before the Divisional Commissioner, Delhi. Thus, in respect of eviction, the first forum would be the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate. A challenge to the order of the Deputy Commissioner/DM would lie before the Divisional Commissioner.
17. The Act and the various Rules and Notifications thereto are not readily available to litigants, as also lawyers, in the form of a separate publication. This may be one of the causes for confusion in filing multiple writ petitions directly against the first order of the tribunal or, in the case of eviction, from the order of the Deputy Commissioner/DM. The said orders would be appealable as explained hereinabove. Thus, lawyers and the litigating public ought to avail of the remedies available to them under the Act and the Rules, as per the narration above.

Finally, Directions were passed.

18. Since, in most cases, the appellate forum and the period of limitation is not within the knowledge of litigants and sometimes even lawyers, it is directed that the following two sentences be added at the end of every order passed by the initial forum i.e., the Tribunal under Section 7 of the Act or, in eviction cases, the Deputy Commissioner/DM under Rule 23(3) of the Rules as amended on 19th December, 2016:
For maintenance cases:
“The present order would be appealable, under Section 16 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 read with Rule 16 of The Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, to the Appellate Tribunal, presided over by the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned District. The period of limitation for filing of appeal is 60 days.”
For eviction cases:
“The present order would be appealable under Rule 22(3)(4) of The Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, as amended on 19th December, 2016 before the Divisional Commissioner, Delhi. The period of limitation for filing of appeal is 60 days.”

Rakhi Sharma Vs State and Ors on 5 Mar 2021

Citations :

Other Sources :

Laishram Premila Devi and Ors Vs State and Ors on 11 Mar 2021

Posted on March 11, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Single judge bench levied Rs.30,000/- cost for wasting Police’s and Court’s time in false and frivolous cases of Sexual harassment.

From Paras 7, 8 and 9,

7. Unfortunately, it is now becoming a trend to register FIRs alleging offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D IPC either to force a party from withdrawing a complaint instituted against them or to arm twist a party. Offences under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D IPC are serious offences. Such allegations have the effect of tarnishing the image of the person against whom such allegations are made. Allegations regarding these offences cannot be made at a drop of a hat. This practice is an abuse of the process of law. The instant case is a classic example as to how frivolous allegations of Section 354 and 354A have been levelled by the parties against each other. A small fight regarding parking has been escalated by levelling allegation of outraging modesty of women. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that the police force is very limited. Police personnel have to spend time in investigating frivolous cases. They have to attend court proceedings, prepare Status Report etc. The result is that investigation in serious offences gets compromised and accused escape because of shoddy investigation. Time has come to initiate action against persons who file frivolous complaints under Sections 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D IPC etc. only for ulterior purpose. Some of the petitioners in these instant petitions are students who should understand not to take courts and the police for granted and assume that anything and everything can be settled and they can get away by filing false cases.
8. In view of the mutual settlement arrived at between the parties, this Court is satisfied that no useful purpose will be served in prosecuting with the present proceedings. Resultantly, the FIR No.238/2017 and FIR No.239/2017 dated 12.05.2017, under Sections 509, 506, 323, 341, 354, 354A and 34 IPC registered at Police Vasant Kunj(North), New Delhi and the proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed. The parties shall remain bound by the mutual settlement and the undertaking given to the Court.
9. Since the Police has had to spend valuable time in investigating the offence and considerable time has been spent by the Court in the criminal proceedings initiated by the parties, this Court is inclined to impose cost on the petitioners with a warning not to file false and frivolous cases. The petitioners in CRL.M.C. 533/2021 are directed to deposit a sum of Rs.30,000/-(Rupees Thirty Thousand Only) with ‘DHCBA Lawyers Social Security and Welfare Fund’ within three weeks from today and the petitioners in CRL.M.C.534/2021 are directed to deposit a sum of Rs.30,000/-(Rupees Thirty Thousand Only) with ‘DHCBA Lawyers Social Security and Welfare Fund’ within three weeks from today.

Laishram Premila Devi and Ors Vs State and Ors on 11 Mar 2021

Sujit Kumar Vs Vandana on 08 Aug 2016

Posted on January 19, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court said the follow about HMA 24…

11. The object behind Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is to provide for maintenance, pendente-lite, to a spouse in matrimonial proceedings so that during the pendency of the proceedings the spouse can maintain herself/himself and also have sufficient funds to carry on the litigation so that the spouse does not unduly suffer in the conduct of the case for want of funds.
12. A spouse unable to maintain himself/herself is entitled to maintenance on the principle of equi-status and respect that the spouse would have enjoyed if he/she continued to live with other spouse.
13. The provisions of Section 24 are beneficent in nature and the power is exercised by the Court not only out of compassion but also by way of judicial duty so that the indigent spouse may not suffer at the instance of the affluent spouse. The legislature, in its discretion, has not fixed any guideline regarding ceiling limit of maintenance, pendente-lite, as in the case of Divorce Act or Parsi Marriage Act. The word ‘support’ in Section 24 is not to be narrowly interpreted. It does not mean bare existence. It means that the claimant spouse should have the same comfort as the other. Of course, the Section is not intended to bring about arithmetical equality between the two.
14. The Court while considering the merits of an application for grant of an interim maintenance under Section 24 has to necessarily arrive at prima-facie determination about the earning capacity of the rival claimants. The determination cannot be made with exactitude; it is essentially interim in nature. The Court is called upon to make a summary consideration of amount which the applicant is to be awarded by way of maintenance pendente-lite and litigation expenses in accordance with the financial resources of the parties. Capacity of the other party to earn cannot be taken into consideration – it is only the actual earning of the opposite party on the basis of which relief can be granted. Permanent income and not casual income is relevant. For example if a husband brings on record that the non-applicant wife earns some amount by taking coaching classes for children, this cannot be termed as her permanent income or that the wife has independent permanent source of income. The proceedings being summary, the matter has to be decided on the basis of pleadings supported by affidavits and the documents that may be filed by the parties in support of their case.
15. Where there was sufficient means in the family of the husband on the strength of which the husband got married he has to share the burden to support his wife during the course of annulment of such marriage.

Sujit Kumar Vs Vandana on 08 Aug 2016

Citations : [2016 SCC ONLINE DEL 4397]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/182704867/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/581180f42713e179479e391b

https://indiajusticefoundation.org/sujit-kumar-vs-vandana-delhi-high-court-08-08-2016/

Jiten Bhalla Vs Gaytri Bajaj on 08 Sep 2008

Posted on January 18, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court passed this Judgment, critiquing the conduct of a ADJ in a matrimonial case…

124. Here in the present case, the Addl.District Judge without recording the evidence and without going into the allegations and counter allegations made by both the parties, has disposed of this application, which is unwarranted, since all the allegations and counter allegations made in the present proceedings require evidence.
125. Now, the question which arises for consideration as to whether present appeal under Section 28 of Act is maintainable or not. Even assuming for arguments sake that appeal is not maintainable, but revision does lie and this appeal can be treated as revision.
126. When admittedly, civil suit was pending, then there was no occasion for Addl.District Judge to have admitted application under Section 151 CPC for consideration and as such, the order of Addl.District Judge in entertaining application under Section 151 CPC, was patently without jurisdiction.
127. Lastly, the Addl. District Judge has made certain observations about the health of the his predecessor.
128. There was no occasion for Sh.V.K.Khanna, Addl.District Judge, to make such observations.
129. It has nowhere been pleaded by the respondent/applicant in application under Section 151 CPC, that predecessor of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge was not keeping good health or the judgment has not been signed by him.
131. A judicial officer has no authority or jurisdiction to comment upon the functioning and working of judicial officer of same rank, about the competency or physical condition of his successor. 132. Whether an Additional District Judge, who is subordinate to this Court, is competent to discharge his judicial functions or not, that is, for this Court to decide. Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge has assumed powers of this Court and has made sarcastic remarks on the functioning, competency and physical condition of his predecessor, Sh.S.C.Mittal, Additional District Judge (since deceased) who was much senior in hierarchy to Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge.
133. A judicial officer, has no business or right to compare the signatures of his predecessor on the judicial proceedings which have been made by him in discharge of his judicial functions. More so, when no pleadings whatsoever in respect thereof, have been made by any of the parties. The conduct of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional Districut Judge in making the above remarks about the physical conditions and functioning of Sh.S.C.Mittal, Additional District Judge, are highly improper and uncalled for.
137. A copy of this judgment be placed before the Inspecting Judges of Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge, for taking appropriate action, against Sh.V.K.Khanna, Additional District Judge for his improper conduct, in making comments against his successor, which are against the judicial ethics and discipline.

Jiten Bhalla Vs Gaytri Bajaj on 08 Sep 2008

Citations : [2008 AD DEL 9 618], [2008 DRJ 106 651], [2008 DMC 2 503], [2008 SCC ONLINE DEL 1032]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/143547006/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090c6de4b01497111771c8

https://www.legitquest.com/case/shri-jiten-bhalla-son-of-shri-rk-bhalla-v-ms-gaytri-bajaj-daughter-of-shri-anil/75C31

A challenge to this Order was dismissed at Supreme Court here.

Kirti Vashisht Vs State and Ors on 29 Nov 2019

Posted on January 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court passed this order based on Lalita Kumari.

16. Learned APP has fairly conceded that as per the contents of the complaint, cognizable offence is made out. Thus, even on the first complaint made to Police Station, Najafgarh, the FIR was supposed to be registered. As per section 154 Cr.P.C., if any information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is received by any Police Station, the said Police Station is duty bound to register the FIR. However, if the crime is not occurred in the jurisdiction of the said Police Station, then after registering the ‘Zero FIR’, the same has to be transferred to the concerned Police Station for investigation, where the offence has been committed. However, neither this happened in the Police Station Najafgarh nor thereafter in Police Station Baba Hari Das Nagar and also nor in Police Station Kapashera as well.
17. It is not in dispute that the provision of ‘Zero FIR‟ came up as a recommendation in the Justice Verma Committee Report, in the new Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 after the heinous ‘Nirbhaya Case’ of December, 2012. The provision says: “A Zero FIR can be filed in any police station by the victim, irrespective of their residence or the place of occurrence of crime.”
18. It is also not in dispute that the practice of ‘Zero FIR‟ is prevalent throughout India from the last many years. Thus, the Police Station of Kapashera, Najafgarh and Baba Hari Das Nagar were also aware about the said practice but none of the Police Stations till date have registered the case on the complaint of respondent no.7 whereas admittedly, cognizable offence has been committed as per the complaint of respondent no.7. Thus, the complainant/respondent no.7 was compelled to run from pillar to post due to inaction of the Police Stations mentioned above.

Kirti Vashisht Vs State and Ors on 29 Nov 2019

Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020

Posted on November 21, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court confirmed the Divorce granted by Trail Court.

Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020

Index is here.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.

From Para 22,

22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).

And then from Para 25,

25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.

Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,

29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.

From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)

30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9

Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification

Akshay Vinod Kulkarni Vs Chief Passport Officer and Anr on 03 May 2021

Bharti Bhardwaj Vs Deepak Bhardwaj on 03 Feb 2021

State Vs Sandeep on 29 Sep 2019

Rakhi Sharma Vs State and Ors on 5 Mar 2021

Laishram Premila Devi and Ors Vs State and Ors on 11 Mar 2021

Sujit Kumar Vs Vandana on 08 Aug 2016

Kirti Vashisht Vs State and Ors on 29 Nov 2019

Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018