Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024

Posted on August 30, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37 and 38,

37. From the evidence of the parties, it is evident that there was an unwarranted interference of the parents and the family members of the respondent in the matrimonial life of the appellant, as has been asserted by him. Such parental interference reached an extent of causing immense harassment to the appellant, who was even made to face multiple complaints before the different agencies. The parties are residing separately since 2001 i.e. for about 13 years, during which the appellant has been deprived of his conjugal relationship for no fault of his. It needs no reiteration that the bedrock of any matrimonial relationship is cohabitation and conjugal relationships. For a spouse to be deprived of his wife’s company proves that the marriage cannot survive, and such deprivation of conjugal relationships is an act of extreme cruelty. Such long separation with no effort by the wife to resume matrimonial relationship, is an act of cruelty as is held in the case of Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511.
38. We thus, conclude that the evidence on record proved that there is no chance of reconciliation between the parties and such long separation peppered which false allegations, Police reports and criminal trial can only be termed as mental cruelty. The marital discord between the parties has pinnacled to complete loss of faith, trust, understanding, love and affection between the parties. This dead relationship has become infested with acrimony, irreconcilable differences and protracted litigations; any insistence to continue this relationship would only be perpetuating further cruelty upon both the parties.

Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Sundari Gautam Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Aug 2024

Posted on August 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, a woman can also be an accused under POCSO Act, specifically for the offence of “aggravated penetrative sexual assault‟.

From Paras 25-27,

25. In the opinion of this court, a comparison of the offence defined in section 375 of the IPC (on the one hand) and in sections 3 and 5 of the POSCO Act (on the other) shows that the offences so defined are different. Though the acts that form the gravamen of the offence in section 375 of the IPC are the same as those in sections 3 and 5 of the POCSO Act, the opening line of section 375 specifically refers to a “man” whereas the opening line of section 3 refers to a “person”. The scope and meaning of the word “man” appearing in section 375 of the IPC is not under consideration of this court in the present proceedings. But there is no reason why the word “person” appearing section 3 of the POCSO Act should be read as referring only to a “male‟. It is accordingly held that the acts mentioned sections 3 and 5 of the POCSO Act are an offence regardless of the gender of the offender provided the acts are committed upon a child.
26. On a conjoint reading of the foregoing provisions of the POCSO Act, it is accordingly held that the word „he‟ appearing in section 3 of the POCSCO Act cannot be given a restrictive meaning, to say that it refers only to a „male‟; but must be given its intended meaning, namely that it includes within its ambit any offender irrespective of their gender.
27. As a sequitur to the above, on a prima-facie consideration of the material placed on record along with the chargesheet, in the opinion of this court, the offence of “aggravated penetrative sexual assault‟ is made-out against the petitioner, even though she is a woman; and the petitioner is therefore required to be put to trial for the offences as charged.

Sundari Gautam Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Aug 2024

Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024

Posted on August 3, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. In our view, even though the conclusion reached by the Family Court Judge on this score is correct, i.e., that the divorce petition cannot be rejected in part, arraying a third party to a divorce petition is neither proper nor necessary. A necessary party is one in whose absence no effective decree can be passed, whereas, a proper party enables complete and final adjudication of issues involved in a given lis.
11.1 The alleged adulterer is, to our minds, not a necessary party as a decree can be passed in his/her absence. Likewise, the adulterer is not a proper party since the issue concerning adultery can be adjudicated without making the adulterer a party to the cause. Proof of adultery need not be conflated with who should be arrayed as a party to a divorce action.
11.2 A divorce action is a lis centered around the couple who have entered into matrimony. A third party [who does not claim the status of a spouse]
has no locus to intervene or seek impleadment in such a cause. [Also see Manjul Joshi v. Bhavna Khurana, 2024: DHC:4170-DB].
12. The alleged adulterer (third party) can either be summoned as a witness or other evidence can be placed before the Family Court to prove adultery. Therefore, on this count, we are not in agreement with the counsel for the appellant/wife.

Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024

Index of Divorce judgment is here.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Posted on July 9, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 21.1 and 21.2,

21. Findings
21.1 At the outset, this Court is of the view that having availed the remedy of revision before the Sessions Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C., the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the same point before this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as it would amount to a second revision which is specifically barred by Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. This petition amounts to a second revision petition in the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C.
21.2 Although the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, it has to be used sparingly and cautiously to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The petitioner has also not been able to make out any case of abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Pramod Vs Umesh at Poonam on 01 Mar 2024

Posted on March 28, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Pramod Vs Umesh at Poonam on 01 Mar 2024

Index of Divorce judgements is here.

Rajesh Aggarwal and Anr Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 12 Mar 2024

Posted on March 20, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. He further submits that cognizance of the charge-sheet filed by the police was taken by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate only against accused no.1, that is, Mr. Yogesh Gupta, and summons were issued to him alone vide order dated 22.12.2020. Later, by an order dated 06.07.2022, summons were issued also against other accused, including the petitioners herein. He submits that this is a procedure unknown to law.
12. He further submits that charges inter alia against the petitioners have been framed on 24.01.2023 in absence of the petitioners inasmuch as the petitioners, due to an inadvertent error, had noted the next date of hearing as 24.02.2023, which is also reflected on the official website of the Courts, and had not appeared on 24.01.2023.

From Paras 17 and 18,

17. In Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors.,(Supra), the Supreme Court highlighted the concern over the misuse of Section 498A of the IPC and in the increasing tendency of the complainant to implicate the relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes.
18. The Supreme Court also placed reliance on the precedents on this issue in Rajesh Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr., (2018) 10 SCC 472; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273; Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., (2010) 7 SCC 667; Geeta Mehrotra & Anr v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 741, and K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 and held that in the absence of any specific and distinct allegations being made against the family members of the husband and where there are only general and omnibus allegations, the FIR registered against such family members is liable to be quashed. It was further held that, in fact, in such cases if the family members are forced to go through the tribulations of trial, it would inflict severe scars upon them and such exercise must be discouraged.

From Para 22, (hehehehe)

21. As clever case of drafting, specific allegations have been made dating back to around 1994-95 against Mr.Vimal Aggarwal, the other maternal uncle of the husband of the respondent no.2 and his wife Ms.Anu Aggarwal. Specific allegations against the petitioners dating back to 18.07.2007 have been made. As noted hereinabove, the complaint has been filed almost 10 years thereafter.

From Para 23,

23. In Mahmood Ali and Others (Supra), the Supreme Court emphasised that the High Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not and, in frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines.

From Para 24,

24. Where the wife is set to implicate the entire family of the husband in a criminal case, it is to be expected that through her lawyer she would get a complaint properly drafted making some specific allegations against each of the family members. If only on such averment, the family members are to face agony of the trial, it would defeat the ends of the justice. In my opinion, therefore, the Court must scrutinise the complaint/FIR to determine whether the allegations are a case of clever drafting or have at least some element of truth in the same. Though the Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial, the Court also cannot be a mere spectator and refuse to exercise the power that is vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., where it finds that the continuation of such proceedings would defeat the ends of the justice and would amount to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the accused and be an abuse of the criminal process.

Rajesh Aggarwal and Anr Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 12 Mar 2024

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Sachin Kumar Daksh Vs Mamta Gola and Anr on 16 Feb 2024

Posted on March 14, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court allowed wife to file fresh affidavit in a 125 CrPC maintenance proceedings, after husband files a 340 CrPC perjury application.

From Para 8,

8. I have given considered thought to the contentions raised.
The maintenance granted to the wife is as a measure of social justice and the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is with an objective to protect women and children from vagrancy and destitution. The Family Courts have been established for adopting and facilitating the conciliation procedure and to deal with family disputes in an expeditious and speedy manner. Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides that nothing in sub-section 1 or sub-section 2 of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 shall prevent a Family Court from laying down its own procedure with a view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the suit or proceedings or at the truth of the facts alleged by one party and denied by another party. Thus, the objective remains to reach at the truth of the facts, which is a guiding star for the proceedings under the Family Courts Act. Even in terms of Section 14 of the Family Court Act, the Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement, information or matter that may in its opinion assists it to deal effectively with the dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Keeping in perspective the aforesaid objective and provisions, the technicalities cannot be permitted to prevail. The learned Family Court after appreciation of the facts correctly permitted the filing of the fresh affidavit instead of amendment of earlier affidavit to enable the parties to bring out any inconsistencies or discrepancies for consideration.

From Para 10, (Perjury proceedings are intact)

10. It may further be observed that any direction by the Trial Court to file a fresh affidavit does not obliterate the earlier affidavit filed by respondent No.1 on record. Appropriate proceedings can always be considered by the Court in accordance with law in case the Court is of the opinion that a false affidavit had been filed in the proceedings by either of the parties. The same does not in any manner adversely impact the application, if any, preferred by the petitioner under Section 340 Cr.P.C.

Sachin Kumar Daksh Vs Mamta Gola and Anr on 16 Feb 2024

Index of Perjury proceedings is here. Index of Maintenance proceedings is here.

Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024

Posted on March 13, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 19 and 20,

19. With regard to Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the pertinent observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah Vs. Prabhavati 1956 SCC OnLine SC 15 are as under:-
“Thus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned : (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.”
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah(Supra) has further observed that once it is found that one of the spouses has been in desertion, the presumption is that the desertion has continued and that is not necessary for the deserted spouse actually to take steps to bring the deserting spouse back to the matrimonial home.

Finally in Paras 23 and 24,

23. Applying the provisions of Section 13(ib) of the Act, we find that merely within two months of marriage between the parties, the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home. Neither she made any complaint against the appellant nor did she file petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking Restitution of Conjugal Rights. No doubt, even appellant has not been able to show before the learned Family Court and even in this Court that he had made any concrete efforts to bring back his wife to the matrimonial home. However, when he approached the court seeking divorce, despite service through publication, the respondent did not appear before the learned Family Court to contest the allegations made by the appellant. The respondent has even abstained herself from appearing before this Court despite service through the SHO concerned. Relevantly, since the marriage in the year 2015 till the year 2023, the respondent has not made any effort to join company of appellant-husband. There is no doubt that respondent has quietly chosen to stay apart from appellant and broken the bond of marriage, though not legally but otherwise.
24. In the light of afore-noted facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that respondent has wilfully deserted the appellant and so, appellant is entitled to get benefit of provision of Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The marriage between the parties is thus, dissolved and a decree of divorce is granted. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.

Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Laxmi and Anr Vs Shyam Pratap and Anr on 28 Apr 2022

Posted on March 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 11-13,

11. The daughter-in-law can claim maintenance from her father-in-law provided he has inherited some estate of her husband. The appellant has failed to disclose any estate of her husband having devolved upon the respondents. Not only this, the respondent No.1 father-in-law has already expired. Now only respondent No.2 mother-in-law survives and the appellants cannot as a matter of right, claim any maintenance from her.
12. Section 22 of the Act provides for maintenance of dependents of the deceased by the heirs of the deceased, but this is subject to the condition that they having inherited the estate from the deceased.
13. As already noted above, no estate has been inherited either by the mother or the sister of the deceased husband of the appellant No.1 from which any maintenance can be claimed by the appellants. There is no infirmity in the impugned order of the learned Family Judge. The appeal is hereby dismissed.

Laxmi and Anr Vs Shyam Pratap and Anr on 28 Apr 2022

Index of judgments under HAMA 1956 are here.

Suresh Tiwari and Anr Vs Madhu Tiwari on 31 Jul 2023

Posted on March 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court, relying on Vimalben and Laxmi decisions, held as follows,

From Paras 4-6,

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent, while not disputing the above submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the respondent has now become aware of certain coparcenary properties in the possession of the petitioners. He submits that, in fact, there are certain properties of the late husband of the respondent which are now being held by the petitioners. He submits that he shall be moving an appropriate application before the learned Family Court to bring on record the above facts.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners disputes the assertions of the learned counsel for the respondent that there are any coparcenary properties held by the petitioner no.1 or that there are any properties of the late husband of the respondent being held by the petitioners.
6. Be that as it may, the Impugned Order, which grants interim maintenance to the respondent, cannot be sustained.

From Paras 8-9,

8. This Court in Laxmi & Anr. (supra) has reiterated that a daughter-in-law can claim maintenance from her father-in-law, provided that the father-in-law has inherited some estate of her husband. In absence of any such disclosure, the daughter-in-law cannot maintain such claim against the father-in-law; in any case, claim cannot be maintained against the mother-in-law.
9. In Satpal (supra), the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court also reiterated that for invoking the provision of Section 19 of the Act, the widowed daughter-in-law has to show that the father-in-law has coparcenary property in his possession. Such claim will not lie against the salary of the father-in-law or against his self-acquired property.

Finally, from Paras 10-11,

10. In the present case, as the petition filed by the respondent stands today, there is no averment of the petitioner no.1 holding any coparcenary property against which the respondent can maintain her claim under Section 19 of the Act. The Impugned Order also does not give any such finding. The Impugned Order, therefore, cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside.
11. As far as the plea of the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent has now become aware of coparcenary property in the possession of the petitioner no.1 and/or that the petitioners are holding properties belonging to the late husband of the respondent, in absence of such averments before the learned Family Court, they cannot be taken cognizance of at this stage by this Court. The respondent shall be free to move an appropriate application in this regard before the learned Family Court, and the same shall be considered by the learned Family Court remaining uninfluenced by any observations made in the present order.

Suresh Tiwari and Anr Vs Madhu Tiwari on 31 Jul 2023

Index of judgments under HAMA 1956 are here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification

Nikhil Wadhawan Vs Priti Wadhawan on 05 Feb 2024

Sundari Gautam Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 09 Aug 2024

Shivi Bansal Vs Gaurav Bansal on 16 Jul 2024

Inderjeet Kaur Kalsi Vs NCT of Delhi and Anr on 27 Nov 2013

Pramod Vs Umesh at Poonam on 01 Mar 2024

Rajesh Aggarwal and Anr Vs State of NCT Delhi and Anr on 12 Mar 2024

Sachin Kumar Daksh Vs Mamta Gola and Anr on 16 Feb 2024

Gaurav Nighawan Vs Shweta on 05 Jan 2024

Laxmi and Anr Vs Shyam Pratap and Anr on 28 Apr 2022

Suresh Tiwari and Anr Vs Madhu Tiwari on 31 Jul 2023