Sandeep Walia Vs Monika Uppal on 18 Jul 2022

Posted on October 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. Ms. Sunita Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-wife vehemently opposed the present revision and submitted that the instant case has to be considered from a different perspective. According to her the revisionist-husband is not truthful in his disclosure in affidavit of income filed before the Family Court. She has drawn the attention of this court to various paragraphs to show that the revisionist claiming himself to be jobless is still incurring a monthly expenditure of about Rs.35,210/- per month. She also points out that the revisionist has shown his mother to be dependent on him, however, has not disclosed that she is already getting a pension of Rs.25,000/- per month. She further states that in column No.26, which relates to a number of the bank account, the revisionist has shown only one account of ICICI Bank whereas he is maintaining a different joint account in the State Bank of India, which has been admitted by him in his cross-examination. She also points out that the revisionist in his educational and professional qualification column has mentioned only graduation, whereas, in his cross-examination, he unequivocally admits that he has done one year diploma in Graphic Designing. She also submits that the revisionist is maintaining a motorcycle and a car and is living in a 3-BHK Flat.
8. From the material available on record, including the cross- examination, she points out that there are various credit entries in the account of her husband. He has also invested amount in mutual funds and he is getting regular dividends therefrom.

From Para 12,

12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, as noted above, it can be safely concluded that the petitioner was not truthful in disclosure of his correct income. His employment as a Driver with his own maternal uncle is also highly unreliable. The lifestyle, which the petitioner is maintaining, would clearly demonstrate that he is capable of earning sufficient money to run not only his livelihood but of his wife also. The respondent-wife while placing documents on record has clearly proved that the petitioner is capable of earning a handsome salary. The petitioner also admitted that he had been earning about Rs.30,000/- per month.

Sandeep Walia Vs Monika Uppal on 18 Jul 2022

Citations: [2022:DHC:2655]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Nidhi Jain Vs Ankit Jain on 31 Jul 2025

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that

5. Reliance is placed on settled legal precedents, including the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha Criminal Appeal 730/2020 and the case of Sandeep Walia v. Monika Uppal CRL.REV.P. 179/2019, which recognize that when a husband conceals his income or assets, the court must take into account his true financial status for the determination of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the Petitioner cites the case of Vikas Ahluwalia v. Simran Ahluwalia FAO143/2013 and Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders Civil Appeal Nos. 2120 to 2122 of 1972, where courts have acknowledged that assets are often transferred in matrimonial disputes to avoid paying rightful dues. The Petitioner further asserts that the Respondent’s actions, including domestic violence, illegal retention of stridhan, and filing of frivolous litigations, are part of a larger scheme to deprive her of her legal entitlements.
17. No doubt, the petition was filed way back in the year 2013 and has not been disposed of till date and applications under Section 311 Cr. PC have been preferred at the stage of final arguments. However, power under Section 311 Cr.P.C can be exercised at any stage of enquiry, trial and other proceedings. Such power can be invoked even at the stage of final arguments.
18. Matrimonial litigation, particularly where financial dependency and concealment are alleged, demands a sensitive and pragmatic approach. The documents and witnesses sought to be introduced by the petitioner are not collateral or immaterial but rather, they directly affect the determination of maintenance which is a matter of subsistence. The Family Court ought to have adopted a more purposive interpretation of its enabling powers under Section 311 Cr.P.C., instead of taking a hyper-technical view.
19. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 07.06.2024 is set aside. The petition is allowed. The learned Family Court is directed to permit the petitioner to summon the concerned witnesses with the relevant record. However, it is directed that the remaining proceedings be conducted expeditiously and all out efforts be made to dispose of the case as early as possible and preferably within a period of next three months. Both sides are directed to cooperate with the trial Court in an effort to expeditiously dispose of the petition.

Nidhi Jain Vs Ankit Jain on 31 Jul 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Posted on September 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. First and foremost, it may be noted that the allegation of “arm twisting” the respondent by the petitioners is a fine piece of irony. In fact, if anyone is twisting arms here, it is the respondent herself. Of course, not in the literal sense she claims, but in the far more creative, metaphorical sense of using the criminal process as her personal pressure lever. The oblique motive is hardly a guess i.e. it is either to extract what she calls “maintenance,” which her husband has not paid, or to drag the petitioners all the way from Bijnor to Delhi, making them undergo the harassment and humiliation, until her husband succumbs to her demands on the dotted lines. The reasons are not far to seek as they are lying in plain sight. Let us examine how.

From Para 17,

17. The accused no.1 to 5 named in the above police complaint are Harish Yadav, Mangal Singh Yadav, Moorti Devi, Kusum Lata and Chander Pal. None of the petitioners is named therein. A bare perusal of the above makes it abundantly clear that there is not even a whisper of any role attributed to the petitioners, nor any suggestion that they were present at the scene, much less that they caused injury or instigated those who allegedly did during the incident of 18.12.2012. On this ground alone, the belated attempt to drag the petitioners into the proceedings through a subsequent complaint under Section 200 CrPC qua the same incident of 18.12.2012 reeks of pure afterthought on the part of the respondent.

From Para 20,

20. Significantly, it is not even the respondent’s case that her parents and sister were present during the alleged incident. Surprisingly, their depositions have not been placed on record. It is obvious that their evidence, therefore, is nothing but hearsay, dressed up as testimony. It may be reasonably presumed that far from being independent, they merely echoed the complainant’s version, word for word, as dictated and their testimony has minimal probative value.

From Para 28,

28. Before parting, I cannot but note the rather desperate attempt of the respondent’s leaned counsel to dissuade this Court from exercising jurisdiction, on the specious plea of statutory bar. The argument, though dressed in attractive garb, doe not withstand scrutiny. It reminds one of the age-old courtroom maxim: “if you have the facts, hammer the facts; if you have the law, hammer the law; if you have neither, hammer the desk”. Unfortunately for the respondent, in this case, facts do not support her, law does not sustain her case and desk-thumping cannot rescue her. On all three counts, the respondent fails.

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Posted on September 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Delhi High Court that, concealing actual income and withholding the most relevant documents which alone could establish her present financial incapacity should lead to adverse inference against wife.

From Paras 9-11,

9. At the outset, it will be apposite to note that Section 125 of the Cr.P.C is a beneficial provision, premised on a moral obligation of husband and father, and intended to prevent, inter alia, the wife and children from being subjected to the adversities of vagrancy and destitution. It is also trite that proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. are summary in nature and the Court has to take a prima facie view of the dispute between the parties.
10. In the above context, this Court has carefully examined the evidence on record as well as the findings recorded by the learned Family Court. Insofar as the wife’s claim for maintenance is concerned, it emerges that she had admitted in her cross-examination that she is employed in the Education Department at Khekra, Baghpat, though on a temporary basis. She further admitted that her salary slip of December 2016 reflected her salary as Rs. 33,052/- and her income tax return for the year 2017-2018 also disclosed an annual income of Rs. 4,00,724/-, though it is her case that thereafter, her services were terminated by way of judgment dated 25.07.2017 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after which she was working on a temporary basis. While she claimed that her current salary is only Rs. 10,000/- per month, she failed to produce any recent salary slip or Form-16 to substantiate the same, and thus, no recent salary certificate was placed before the learned Family Court despite opportunities given by the learned Trial Court. She also did not offer any plausible explanation in the evidence for withholding recent salary details.
11. The learned Family Court, thus rightly reached to a conclusion that such omission, without any cogent explanation, casts a doubt on the genuineness of her claim and justifies an adverse inference against her. The learned Family Court, therefore, rightly held that the wife had concealed her actual income and withheld the most relevant documents which alone could establish her present financial incapacity. This Court concurs with that view, as the primary ingredient for grant of maintenance to a wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C. – i.e. her inability to maintain herself – has not been satisfactorily proved, in absence of clear and reliable evidence of financial hardship, the claim of the wife becomes speculative and cannot be sustained.

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Posted on September 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows. Few declarations of overruled aspects of Maintenance cases are of interest in this Judgment.

From Para 11 and 12,

Distinction between Interim Relief/Maintenance and Ad-Interim Relief/Maintenance
11. In law, interim relief is a temporary relief granted by the Court after hearing both parties, pending final adjudication of the dispute. It is typically granted upon consideration of pleadings, replies, and after evaluating prima facie rights and urgency. In contrast, ad-interim relief is a provisional relief granted ex-parte or at the initial stage, often before the opposite party is served or has filed a reply. It is essentially an urgent measure granted to prevent irreparable harm, subject to further hearing and confirmation.
12. As far as maintenance is concerned, interim maintenance is an allowance granted to the aggrieved party during the pendency of proceedings and till final adjudication, such as under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or the Domestic Violence Act, generally after considering pleadings and material placed by both parties. Ad-interim maintenance, on the other hand, is a provisional maintenance granted at the preliminary stage, i.e. prior to adjudicating even the interim maintenance, to alleviate urgent hardship being faced by a dependent spouse or child, pending a more detailed consideration of the case. Thus, while both are temporary in nature, the key difference lies in the stage of grant, extent of hearing accorded before the relief is granted, and the prima facie opinion formed by the Court.

From Para 26 to Para 28,

26. Thus, in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra), it was directed that upon the filing of a maintenance petition, notice shall be issued to the respondent, who shall file a reply, and the pleadings shall be completed. Thereafter, both parties were required to simultaneously file affidavits of income, assets, and expenditure, to facilitate an informed and fair assessment of the claim. It was in this context that the Court permitted the grant of ad-interim maintenance, either on the basis of an admitted document, such as a salary slip already available on record by way of pleadings, or on the basis of admissions contained in the respondent‘s income affidavit. In the absence of any such material, the Court was required to hear both parties before determining any ad-interim amount. Thus, the clear mandate was that an ex-parte ad-interim maintenance order, without hearing the respondent or without there being any material indicating his admitted income, was not to be passed by a court of law.
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that in Rajnesh v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court directed that Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities would be filed by the claimant along with the maintenance petition/interim maintenance application. Similarly, the respondent would file his Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities along with the reply. Thus, the directions issued in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra) stood, in effect, overruled to this extent.
28. Therefore, it can be safely held that once the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities has been filed by both the parties, or even if the respondent has not filed the same along with his reply to the maintenance petition, but there are documents on record showing some admitted income of the respondent, the Court can grant ad-interim maintenance to alleviate the hardship of the claimant, pending its decision on the grant of interim maintenance and determination of its quantum.

From Para 31 and 32,

31. However, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, in the decision in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), observed that a party claiming maintenance, whether as a spouse, partner in a civil union, live-in relationship, or common-law marriage, should file a concise application for interim maintenance, along with an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, as a mandatory requirement. The rationale was to enable the Court to make an objective and informed assessment of the financial capacities of the parties at the interim stage. Thus, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court emphasized that interim maintenance cannot be granted in a vacuum and solely on the basis of guess-work, and must be primarily based on the material placed before the Court through pleadings and affidavits from both sides.
32. Therefore, in view of the directions issued in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), it has now been mandated by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court that a concise and specific application seeking interim maintenance should ordinarily be filed by the claimant, accompanied by the requisite affidavit of assets and liabilities.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Indeed, the distinction between interim and ad-interim maintenance lies in the delay – and that distinction is vital. In Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), the Supreme Court itself noted that applications for interim maintenance should ideally be decided within a period of 4 to 6 months. It is within this interim period before the adjudication of interim maintenance application that the grant of ad-interim maintenance assumes its true significance.
36. Just as interim maintenance is granted as a temporary measure pending adjudication of the main petition for maintenance, ad-interim maintenance, as recognized in judicial precedents, serves as a temporary measure pending adjudication of the application for interim maintenance
37. Thus, where the record already contains some admitted income documents such as salary slips, or where there is unreasonable delay in filing of income affidavits by the respondent, the Court may, in the interest of equity, step in and grant ad-interim maintenance – without there being any specific application for grant of ad-interim maintenance filed by the concerned party. Accordingly, for determining ad-interim maintenance, the procedure laid down in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra) would continue to govern the field, since till date, the observation regarding the same has neither been interfered nor set-aside by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court.

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:5114]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases under Section 125 CrPC here.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Posted on August 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37,

37. Sub-clause (b) to sub-section (5) is rather ambiguously uses the expression “any official” without explaining what is meant by the said term. However, when we read sub-section (4) to Section 65B, the meaning to be given to the expression “any official” emerges. Subclause (b) applies when information is supplied to “any official” in the course of activities carried on by him, i.e., in the course of “official” activities with a view that the said information shall be stored and processed for the purpose of the activities carried on by that officer or official. It is also elucidated that the information could be beyond or otherwise in the course of the said activities. Even in such cases the information is treated as supplied in the course of the activities of the official. We clarify that the word “official”, as used in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 65B, is not intended to mean or be restricted to a person holding an office or employed in public capacity. It connotes, as exemplified by the use of the same expression (albeit in its adjective form) in sub-section (4), a person primarily responsible for the management or the use, upkeep or operations of such device. It would, thus, cover a computer device containing electronic records in the hands or control of a private individual or entity.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Citations: [2015:DHC:9600-DB], [(2015) 11 DEL CK 0089], [2015 SCC Online Del 13647], [MANU/DE/3674/2015]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10902800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e3ede56109277ee476fe

https://vlex.in/vid/kundan-singh-vs-the-654461357

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=998850

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, the petitioner deliberately avoided employment to maximize Interim maintenance claims.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Evidence was adduced showing the petitioner‟s previous employment as an Audit Associate at KPMG Dubai, subsequent work as a Human Resources Manager in her father‟s business, and entrepreneurial venture importing semi-precious jewellery. The respondent referred to her LinkedIn profile confirming her employment history and the learned Principal Judge noted that while the petitioner simply mentioned “Graduate” and “Post Graduate” in her affidavit without specifying details, she concealed her professional qualifications and previous employment history.
30. The learned Principal Judge relied on various precedents holding that prima facie evidence reveals that the petitioner deliberately avoided employment to maximize maintenance claims, referencing the WhatsApp conversation dated 31st December, 2020, i.e., prior to her petition filed on 24th June, 2021. It was further observed that although the petitioner claimed in her petition to be actively seeking employment, she failed to substantiate any job search efforts. The Court below found merit in the respondent’s contention that the petitioner, despite high educational qualifications and work experience, was strategically remaining unemployed.

From Paras 38-40,

38. It is settled that while adjudicating an application for grant of interim maintenance, the Court concerned must be prima facie satisfied whether such case is made out or not.
39. In the instant case, despite the contentions made by the petitioner that she was earlier residing at her maternal home, pursuant to which she started residing with her maternal uncle, who is old and unable to support her, along with the fact that she is unemployed and dispute is existing with respect to her father’s properties, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the petitioner is admittedly a well-qualified and able-bodied person. Furthermore, the whole situation where the petitioner was staying with her parents and now with maternal uncle indicates that she wants to convince the court that she is unable to earn.
40. It is trite to observe that it is the duty of the husband to maintain his wife despite the circumstances, however, for grant of interim maintenance, prima facie satisfaction is necessary to determine whether the wife is genuinely in need of maintenance and the factors leading to such need of maintenance.

From Paras 33-34,

43. Regarding the prima facie evidence of deliberate unemployment, the WhatsApp conversation between the petitioner and her mother, legitimacy of which can be determined at the appropriate stage of trial, wherein the mother advises that employment would jeopardize alimony claims, is particularly telling. This communication, preceding the maintenance petition, strongly suggests a deliberate attempt to remain unemployed to seek maintenance claims.
44. Furthermore, it has been rightly observed by the learned Principal Judge that while the petitioner claims that she cannot sit idle and is trying to search for a job, she has not placed any evidence on record regarding her efforts to secure employment or resume her business activities either before the Court below or before this Court. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the mere assertion of job-seeking, without corroborative evidence, is insufficient to establish genuine efforts at self-sufficiency.

From Paras 46-47,

46. Here, it is imperative to mention that the petitioner’s reliance on Shailja (Supra), regarding the distinction between “capable of earning” and “actual earning”, the facts of the present case are distinguishable. In the present case, there is prima facie evidence suggesting deliberate avoidance of employment by the petitioner.
47. Taking into consideration the observations made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that qualified wives, having the earning capacity but desirous of remaining idle, should now set up a claim for interim maintenance. Section 125 of the CrPC carries the legislative intent to maintain equality among the spouses, provide protection to the wives, children and parents, and not promote idleness. In light of the same, this Court is of the considered view that a well-educated wife, with experience in a suitable gainful job, ought not to remain idle solely to gain maintenance from her husband. Therefore, interim maintenance is being discouraged in the present case as this Court can see potential in the petitioner to earn and make good of her education.

Finally, from Paras 49-50,

49. The petitioner herein has a master’s degree from Australia, she was earning well in a job in Dubai before her marriage, there are certain conversations between the petitioner and her mother which shows the ex facie mala fides on the part of the petitioner etc. The said factors, upon conjoint consideration to award interim maintenance, do not warrant any inclination of this Court. Moreover, this Court encourages the petitioner to actively look for a job to become self-sufficient as she already got wide exposure and is aware of the worldly affairs unlike other women who are not educated and are completely dependent upon their spouses for basic sustenance.
50. This Court is unable to comprehend the fact as to why, despite being able-bodied and well qualified, the petitioner has remained to choose idle since her return to India. Thus, it is held that the learned Principal Judge rightly passed the impugned order holding that the petitioner herein is not entitled to grant of interim maintenance considering the peculiar facts.

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Posted on March 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife.

4. Unfortunately, the trial court has committed a grave and fundamental error in rejecting the suit plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by relying upon the provision of Section 4 and repealed provision of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. When the impugned judgment was passed on 19.12.2016, what was, and is now applicable is the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 which became applicable w.e.f 1.11.2016. As per Section 2(9) of the Amended Act what is a Benami Transaction is stated/specified, and also those transactions which are not benami are are also stated/specified. As per the suit plaint/averments, in the present case the existence of the properties in the name of the respondent/defendant/wife will fall as an Exception to the prohibited benami transaction in view of Section 2(9)(A)(b) Exception (iii) inasmuch as it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife in the present case.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Citations: [2018:DHC:4920], [LAWS(DLH)-2018-8-124], [(2018) 08 DEL CK 0082]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75898278/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b6ed88e9eff430e1391a346

https://lextechsuite.com/Manoj-Arora-Versus-Mamta-Arora-2018-08-07

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=108102076300&Title=MANOJ-ARORA-Vs.-MAMTA-ARORA

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/5102027-manoj-arora-vs-mamta-arora?s=&refine_search=&s_acts=Benami%20Transactions%20(Prohibition)%20Act,%201988

Manoj Arora v. Mamta Arora (2018) 258 Taxman 1 (Delhi)(HC)

Pallavi Mohan Vs Raghu Menon on 12 Sep 2023

Posted on October 30, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 32-33,

32. Clearly Section 28 of the HMA and Section 19 of the Family Courts Act operate in different spheres and apply to orders passed by different forums i.e. District Court and the Family Court respectively.
33. Thus the period of limitation for filing an appeal from an appealable order and decree of the District Court would be ninety days under section 28 of HMA and the period of limitation for filing an appeal from an appealable order and judgment of the Family Court, wherever it has been set up, would be thirty days under section 19 of the Family Courts Act.

Pallavi Mohan Vs Raghu Menon on 12 Sep 2023

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/132852916/

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/limitation-period-for-filing-an-appeal-against-family-courts-order-is-thirty-days-and-delay-in-filing-can-be-condoned-if-sufficient-cause-is-shown-delhi-hc-1494654

The wife went to Supreme Court (Diary No. – 40374/2023; SLP(C) No. 024347 – / 2023)

The husband chose not to file a counter as on 22-03-2024 .

Index of All Divorce Judgments here.

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Posted on October 8, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court help that, HMA 24 is not to equalize the parties. Also highlighted the importance of PPPI (Purchase Power Parity Index) published by World Bank, while computing foreign salary obtained outside India.

From Para 8,

8. The respondent/ husband has explained that as per the PPP (Purchase Power Parity) Index published by World Bank, the dollar cannot be converted into Rupees at the prevailing exchange rate. The dollar has to be multiplied with PPP conversion factor which is Rs.23.22 for India. The salary of the respondent i.e. USD 7134 when multiplied by 23.22 comes to Rs.1,65,651/- per month, which is much less than the income of the wife which is Rs.2.5 lakhs per month. It is asserted that the interim maintenance granted to the child is liable to be reduced.

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. Admittedly, the appellant/ wife as well as the husband are highly qualified and the wife is getting Rs.2.5 lakhs per month while the husband is getting USD 7134 per month which if converted to Indian rupee by applying PPP (Purchase Power Parity) Index, comes to Rs.1,65,651/- per month or if simple exchange rate is applied; it is otherwise equivalent to Rs.5,60,000/-. Though the husband may be earning in dollars, but it cannot be overlooked that his expenditure is also in dollars. He has explained that he has a monthly expense of about USD 7000 and is left with little money for saving. His calculations are duly supported by the documents.
11. We observe that in the present case, where both the spouses are equally qualified and are earning equally, interim maintenance cannot be granted to the wife under Section 24 of the Act. The object of Section 24 of the Act is to ensure that during the matrimonial proceedings under HMA either party should not be handicapped and suffer any financial disability to litigate only because of paucity of source of income. The provision for interim/ pendent lite maintenance has been made only to help either spouse to sail through the litigation expenses and also to ensure that they are able to live comfortably. The proceedings under Section 24 of the Act are not intended to equalize the income of both the spouses or to give an interim maintenance which is commensurate to maintain a similar life style as the other spouse as has been observed by this Court in the case of K.N. vs. R.G MAT. APP.(FC) 93/2018 decided on 12.02.2019.

Finally, from Para 14, (Joint Parental Maintenance…?)

14. Considering the income of the wife and the husband and also appreciating that the responsibility of maintaining the child has to be shared jointly by both the husband and the wife, we find that the interim maintenance in the sum of Rs.40,000/- for the child is liable to be reduced to Rs.25,000/- per month.

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023

Index of Section 24 HMA judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification

Sandeep Walia Vs Monika Uppal on 18 Jul 2022

Nidhi Jain Vs Ankit Jain on 31 Jul 2025

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Pallavi Mohan Vs Raghu Menon on 12 Sep 2023

Anju and Anr Vs Rinku Dahiya on 11 Oct 2023