Another dirty judgment, this time from High Court of Delhi.
Category: High Court of Delhi Judgment or Order or Notification
Inder Singh Vs Sumitra on 05 August, 2019
Do you know how to misinterpret laws? Don’t know? Learn from this judgment from Delhi High Court.
From Paras 12-16,
12. Second proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates grant of interim maintenance. Reading of second proviso does not in any manner indicate that making of an application seeking interim maintenance is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance.
13. The Third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates disposal of an application for grant of interim maintenance within a time bound manner.
14. If the second and third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C are read keeping in view the very object of the statute, it shows that there is no requirement stipulated by the statute for making an application for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. and the Court would be empowered to pass an order assessing interim maintenance even in a case where no such application has been filed by the person claiming maintenance. However, where such an application is made, the same would have to be disposed of by the Trial Court within the time stipulated therein.
15. If a narrower interpretation were to be given to the provision i.e. that an application is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance, the same would militate against the very object of the scheme of providing maintenance to a dependant, who is unable to maintain himself/herself, where the person who has sufficient means has refused or neglected to maintain the dependant. (Author: How?)
16. Keeping in view the beneficial object of the statute, it is held that the filing of an application seeking interim maintenance would not be a precondition for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition seeking maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.. It would be open to the trial court to grant interim maintenance, in the facts and circumstances of the case, pending consideration of the application for grant of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.
Have you ever heard the words: misinterpreting, idiotic, biased, pre-judged, cunning? Sounds applicable to this judgment?
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Shome Nikhil Danani Vs Tanya Banon Danani on 11 April, 2019
This judgment from Delhi High Court says, maintenance is payable by husband in both 125 CrPC and later on under PWDV Act 2005.
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Bhupender Singh Mehra Vs State NCT of Delhi and Anr on 8 October, 2010
Shri SN Dhingra ji has held that Magistrate is mandatorily supposed to “to consider the domestic incident report and consider the contents of the application and find out whether the respondents (petitioners herein) had any domestic relationship with the applicant and could be fitted in the definition of the “respondent” as given in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and then only issue notice to them.”
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Vikas Bhutani Vs State & Anr on 17 May, 2019
In this Delhi High Court Judgment, it was held that both orders under 125 CrPC and PWDV Act are to be paid by husband Vikas. Woww
Hope he will get relief in Supreme Court.
Anil Kumar and Ors. Vs Moti Ram and Ors. on 20 November, 1992
Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that Second revision is barred under 397(3) CrPC.
From Para 16,
The bare reading of Sub-Section 3 would how that it does not curtail the remedy but only bars or abrogate the remedy. It curtails the remedy second time. The power of the High Court and the Court of Sessions, so far as revision is concerned, are concurrent. The revisionist has choice to File revision directly in the High Court or in the Sessions Court. Having availed the remedy by filing revision before the Sessions Judge he cannot be permitted to avail second chance, the bar of Sub Section (3) will come in his way. V.R. Krishna lyer, J. in the case of Raj Kapoor Vs. State (Delhi Administration) observed that “In our constitutional order, fragrant with social,justice broader consideration of final relief must govern the juridical process save where legislature interdict plainly forbids that, course”. (underlining is mine). In Raj Kapoor’s case though Supreme Court was not cat tea upon to deal with Sub-Section (3), it was only dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482, particularly where the petitioner instead of invoking the revisional power under Section 39 invoked the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482, particularly where the petitioner instead of invoking the revisional power under Section 39 invoked the inherent power of the High Court. It was in this background the above observations were made which will show that the Court was not unmindful of the fact that whenever legislature interdict plainly or statute bar the availing of remedy in that case, the High Court cannot resort to its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to circumvent the prohibition laid down in the Code.
Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 12 February, 2019
The cunning knife tried to extort money from husband saying he earns in dollars and hence he should pay her interim maintenance under HMA 24 as she just earns in rupees. Hon’ble Delhi High Court has shown the door to the knife.
PS: The husband is working as Vice President in Infineon Technologies at Singapore.
Index of this couple’s cases is here.
Index of Section 24 HMA judgments is here.
Jagdish Prasad Vs State and Others on 23 March, 2009
This is a facepalm experience for the ADJ who said that,
“Mere recording of a finding to the effect that an offence punishable under section 193 of the Penal Code was committed would not answer requirement of section 340 of the Code. When primary question was answered in affirmative then secondary and most effective proposition was to be answered to the effect whether it was expedient in the interest of justice to initiate an action in the matter. No such step was taken by the Trial Court to see that it was expedient in the interest of justice to take such action. In such a situation, order impugned is shrouded with illegality. In cannot be allowed to stand.”
For which, the High Court of Delhi gave a befitting answer, such as from Para 18,
In the considered view of this Court, when the learned MM in the order dated 9th September 2005 observed “I am, therefore, of the opinion that Smt. Veena has committed an offence under Section 193 IPC and she ought to be prosecuted for the same”, the requirement of Section 340 CrPC as explained by the Supreme Court stood satisfied. In other words, the opinion formed by learned MM was obviously only a tentative or a prima facie one. This is plain from the expression “ought to be prosecuted”. Further, the same expression “ought to be prosecuted” also indicates the formation of an opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice that Respondent No.2 should be prosecuted. Therefore, both the requirements of law as explained by the Supreme Court in relation to Section 340 CrPC stood completely satisfied by the order dated 9th September 2005 passed by the learned MM. This Court is, therefore, unable to agree with the conclusion reached by learned ASJ to the contrary.
Rajkumar Indoria Vs NCT Of Delhi, New Delhi on 18 August, 2010
In this judgment from Hon’ble Delhi High Court, it was held that, not every allegation made justify initiation of proceedings under 340 CrPC. There should be another criteria met, which is, that the initiation of 340 CrPC proceedings should be expedient in the interests of justice.
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55726215/
