B.Parvathi Vs State of AP on 7 May, 2020

Posted on September 6, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A reasoned judgment on maintainability of IPC 494 upon the Accused No.2 and the merits of discharge petition filed before Trial Court u/s 227 CrPC. It relies on AP State Amendment of 1992. But unfortunately, this judgment is Partly perverse as it goes against A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011 hence NOT to be relied up on.]

In Page 35,

Earlier the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC is a non-cognizable offence. The Legislative Assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh by way of Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment Act 3 of 1992, amended the first schedule to Central Act 2 of 1974 i.e. the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and made the offence under Section 494 IPC a ‘cognizable’ offence and a ‘non-bailable’ offence. The said Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment Act 3 of 1992 was reserved by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh on the 21.10.1991 for consideration and assent of the President. The Presidential assent was received on 10.02.1992 and the amendment was published on 15.02.1992 in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette Part IV-B (Ext.). Therefore, with effect from 15.02.1992 undoubtedly the offences punishable under Sections 494 and 495 IPC are cognizable offences in the State of Andhra Pradesh. So, the police officer can now register the case under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and can investigate the same under Section 156 Cr.P.C. The bar engrafted under Section 198(1) Cr.P.C. to take cognizance of the case under Section 494 IPC is on the Court and not on the police. So, in view of the fact that it is a cognizable offence, police can register the case on a report lodged with them to that effect and also investigate the case and file final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. Now, the crucial question that arises for consideration is, whether Court can take cognizance of the case on such police report/ charge-sheet filed by the police or not in view of the express bar engrafted under Section 198(1) Cr.P.C. on the Court to take cognizance of the case except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party before it.

Perverse portion of the judgment, that goes against A.Subash Babu Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 21 July, 2011

So, only when an allegation relating to the offence under Section 494 IPC is made by the aggrieved person to the Magistrate, then only the Court can take cognizance of the case. Certainly the Court cannot take cognizance of the case for the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC on a police report/charge-sheet filed by the police. Even though offence under Section 494 IPC is made “cognizable” offence as per amendment Act 3 of 1992, there is no corresponding amendment made to Section 198 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the bar under Section 198 Cr.P.C. still subsists. The legal position in this regard is not res nova and it has been clearly well settled.

B.Parvathi Vs State of AP on 7 May, 2020

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194056755/

Index to Bigamy Judgments under Sections 494 and 495 of IPC is here.

Pasagadula Sai Kiran Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Aug 2022

Posted on August 10, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of AP High Court held that Regional Passport Officer can be directed by Court to issue Police clearance certificate.

From Paras 4 and 5,

4. The learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for the 2nd respondent would submit that the service of issuing a police clearance certificate is a voluntary service being given for the benefit of Indian citizens and there is no underlying duty cast on the 2nd respondent, by virtue of any provision of law or Judgment of the Court, to issue such police clearance certificates. He would further submit that a Writ of Mandamus cannot lie against the 2nd respondent and there is no legal duty cast on the 2nd respondent to undertake such activities. Further, the 2nd respondent cannot give a clean chit to the petitioner and would have to incorporate the details of the aforesaid crime in any certificate that can be issued to the petitioner.
5. In view of the fact that the 2nd respondent has been issuing such certificates to citizens staying abroad, the 2nd respondent cannot take the stand that since it is a voluntary service, there cannot be any direction to the 2nd respondent to issue or not to issue such certificates.

Pasagadula Sai Kiran Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Aug 2022

Gattupalli Ujwal Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 30 Oct 2019

Posted on July 5, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Single bench of AP High Court held as follows based on Sumer Salkan decision here.

In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, issue of red corner notice against the family members of the husband of the victim of an offence punishable under Section 498- A of I.P.C is quashed. However, the Apex Court and the other courts laid down certain guidelines as to when such a red corner notice is to be issued. Based on the guidelines, issued in Sumer Singh Salkan v. Asst. Director and others1, the Delhi High Court observed as follows:
The questions are answered as under:
A. Recourse to LOC can be taken by investigating agency in cognizable offences under IPC or other penal laws, where the accused was deliberately evading arrest or not appearing in the trial court despite NBWs and other coercive measures and there was likelihood of the accused leaving the country to evade trial/arrest.
B. The Investigating Officer shall make a written request for LOC to the officer as notified by the circular of Ministry of Home Affairs, giving details & reasons for seeking LOC. The competent officer alone shall give directions for opening LOC by passing an order in this respect.
C. The person against whom LOC is issued must join investigation by appearing before I.O. Or should surrender before the court concerned or should satisfy the court that LOC was wrongly issued against him. He may also approach the officer who ordered issuance of LOC & explain that LOC was wrongly issued against him. LOC can be withdrawn by the authority that issued and can also be rescinded by the trial Court where case is pending or having jurisdiction over concerned police station on an application by the person concerned.

Gattupalli Ujwal Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 30 Oct 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/28103125/

Index of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices is here.

R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009

Posted on May 30, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Hon’ble Justice K.C. Bhanu had delivered this judgment.

From Paras 4-5,

(4) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the first respondent/wife had given up her right to seek maintenance as per agreement dated 16. 11. 1998 and therefore, continuation of the proceedings in the maintenance case is nothing but abuse of process of Court.
(5) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that, even a divorced wife is entitled for maintenance; that, the agreement and the divorce were obtained by playing fraud; that, even if any such agreement is there, that will not preclude the first respondent herein from claiming the maintenance. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied upon various decisions, which will be referred to, at appropriate time.

From Para 12,

(12) THE learned Counsel for the first respondent also placed strong reliance on a decision in Bai Tahira v. AH Hussain Fissalli Chothia and another, AIR 1979 sc 362, wherein it is held thus : (Para 10)
“the last defence, based on Mehar payment, merits more serious attention. The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail. The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available. But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual rights. No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right to the divorcee under Section 125 can operate to negate that claim.”

Closure from Paras 14-15,

(14) THEREFORE, from the above decisions, it is clear that, even if there is an agreement which would defeat the provisions of any law, the same cannot be used as a defence in a proceedings under section 125 Cr. P. C.
(15) IN view of the above decisions, it is clear that even if there is such an agreement where under and whereby the parties relinquished her right to maintain, it would not be a bar to file a petition under section 125 Cr. P. C. and therefore, the maintenance case is maintainable and question of quashing the same does not arise.

R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009

Citations : [2009 ALD CRI 1 855]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea70a6607dba369a6ee51e

https://www.lawyerservices.in/R-Rambilas-Versus-Anita-2009-03-16

D.Suryaprakash Venkata Rao Vs State of AP on 06 Dec 2019

Posted on April 27, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of AP High Court held as follows:

Time and again this Court is coming across many cases, wherein the deposit of passport is being ordered by the Courts at the time of granting bail etc. The Hon’ble SupremeCourt of India in Suresh Nanda’s case (1 supra) has very clearly laid down that impounding of passport is not power that is available to the police. The police have a right tomerely seize the passport under Section 102 Cr.P.C., but they do not have the power to retain the passport. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has already clearly held that the retention of a passport for a long time also amounts to impounding of the passport. This is very clearly laid down in the judgment of Suresh Nanda’s case (1 supra). Apart from that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India also clearly held thatafter the passport is seized and if the State was of the opinion that the petitioner was likely to flee the country or that he is at a flight risk, the only option available to the State or theprosecution is to file an appropriate application before the Passport Authorities to impound the passport for the reasonsmentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. The Passport Authorities shall give a notice to the accused and after hearing the accused, they will have to pass an order. Sincethe cancellation of the passport is an order having severe civilconsequences, the accused also has a right of being heardbefore the passport is impounded. The Passport Act, being a special law will prevail over the general law.

Next Para,

In that view of the matter, irrespective of the fact that whether in the present case the issue relates to the voluntary deposit of the passport or deposit pursuant to an order of the Court, the fact remains that neither case is supported by the law. If the counsel made a wrong concession, the same cannot be enure to the benefit of the prosecution. A party should not suffer for any mistake committed by the counsel. If the same is a part and parcel of the lower Courts order, then it is clearly opposed by the law as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Suresh Nanda’s case (1 supra). Therefore, for both these reasons, this Court holds that the condition about the deposit of the passport cannot be imposed by a Court while granting bail or for any other reason. The only option left in such cases, when the passport is seized is to take steps under the Act for cancellation/impounding. Learned Public Prosecutor has stated that the original passport is lost and the accused has applied for a duplicate passport and has flouted the Court
order. Basing on the written instructions received by him, he states that petitioner/A.1 is also liable for contempt of Court. This is also not correct and the order of the Court does not seem to suggest this. As mentioned earlier, neither the Court can impose such a condition nor can the counsel give a
concession and deposit the passport. Even if the passport is deposited pursuant to the concession made by a counsel, the same cannot be retained indefinitely by the Court or the Police till the trial is concluded.
In fact, in the decision of Suresh Nanda (1supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India noticed that under Section 10(a) of the Act, even the Central Government can only retain the passport for four weeks. Thereafter, a further order from Passport Authorities is necessary for retention of the passport.
After clarifying the law on the subject and holding that the impugned order passed by the I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is contrary to law, this Court leaves it open to the prosecution to take such steps as are warranted by law, if they are so advised to cancel the passport of the accused.

D.Suryaprakash Venkata Rao Vs State of AP on 06 Dec 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/130750295/

Busarapu Satya Yesu Babu Vs State of AP and Sake Roja on 05 Nov 2021

Posted on December 1, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A single-judge bench of AP High Court held as follows,

From Para 6, Ground-1

6. On the other hand, respondent No.2 submits that petitioner cannot raise a contention that 16 other complaints were lodged by respondent No.2 that she is habituated in lodging complaints against public servants and others, as it is her personal issue and there is no illegality in the order under revision. She submits that while exercising power under Section 156(3) Courts can forward complaint to Police without issuing notice to the accused. Hence, there is no illegality in the order impugned and this revision is liable to be dismissed. Relied on Priyanka Srivastava and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
7. In the case on hand, the Magistrate has only directed the Station House Officer, I Town Police Station under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation and directed the police to file report by17.06.2021. The Hon’ble Apex Court has consistently held that when the Magistrate applies his mind and order for investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C, he could not be said to have taken cognizance of offence and by doing so, it will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was the primary duty of the police to investigate. In this case, the Magistrate has not taken cognizance, but only referred the matter to the police for investigation. At this juncture, as argued by the learned counsel for petitioner that sanction should have been obtained as the petitioner is a public servant has no legs to stand.

From Para 8, Ground-2

8. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C and directed to submit a report which is an interlocutory order and revision against such an order under Section 397 (2) of Cr.P.C is barred under law. However, after completion of investigation, if Police come to the conclusion that complaint is filed with false allegations, they can as well close the case by referring it as false. The revision is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of its maintainability as it isnot final order and it falls under interlocutory order, which cannot be challenged.

Busarapu Satya Yesu Babu Vs State of AP and Sake Roja on 05 Nov 2021

Bhagwan Premchandani Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 4 Nov 1997

Posted on November 24, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Sri B S A Swamy has passed this reasoned order with regards to mechanical issuing of non-bailable warrants to accused by the trial courts.

From para 3,

3. I have already taken a view that the trial Court can proceed with the case without insisting for the presence of the accused vide Crl.M.P.Nos.4424/97 and 4422/97 dated 29-10-1997. Further, the action of the Magistrate in issuing N.B.W. having dismissed the application filed for dispensing with his presence cannot be appreciated by this Court.
As per Section 73 of the Criminal Procedure Code an N.B.W. can be issued only to secure the presence of any escaped convict, proclaimed offender or the person who is evading the arrest. In the instant case, being summons case, the question of arrest also will not arise. Further, the petitioner filed an application seeking dispensation of his presence on that day for the reasons stated in the affidavit. Instead of allowing the application, the learned Magistrate not only dismissed the application, but also even without giving time for his appearance issued N.B.W. Such conduct on the part of the Magistrate is depricated. The discretion vested in them should be properly exercised to secure the ends of justice but not to penalise or harass an individual with the procedural wrangles of the Court more so without visualising the evil consequences that will flow from the order that is going to be passed. This Court is often coming across with such type of orders passed by the Magistrates. Hence this Court would like lo emphasize that the Magistrates should shed the wrong practice of issuing N.B.Ws. the moment the accused fail to appear in the Court without giving an opportunity to explain the circumstances under which the accused failed to appear in the Court and in the light of the language employed in Section 73 of Criminal Procedure Code an N.B.W. can be issued sparingly that to after coming to the conclusion that there is no other way to secure the presence of the accused. In fact in Ramojt Rao v.V.V. Rajam in Cr.M.P.No.4424/97 dated 29-10-1997 this Court explained the legal position with regard to the appearance of the accused before a Magistrate and held that the Magistrate is having ample power to proceed with the case by dispensing with the presence of the accused even in a warrant case.

Indiankanoon copy:

Bhagwan Premchandani Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 4 Nov 1997

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1025663/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f767e4b014971113fe0e

http://document.manupatra.com/ap/1955-2000/ap1998/a980838.htm

https://www.lawyerservices.in/BHAGWAN-PREMCHANDANI-VERSUS-STATE-OF-A-P-1997-11-04

Index here.

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Posted on October 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment of single bench of AP High court. Useful in my DP3 WP.

From Para 10,

10. As can be seen from the aforesaid Section of law, when small quantity of Ganja is involved in commission of the offence, the imprisonment prescribed is for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. In the instant case, the Ganja involved in commission of the offence is only 600 grams, which is below the 1000 grams. Therefore, as per the aforesaid notification, it is to be held that the Ganja involved in this case is only a small quantity and an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act is only made out. So, the very registration of F.I.R. for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act, which is relating to commercial quantity, is obviously erroneous. Clause (C) of sub-clause (ii)(b) of Section 20 of the NDPS Act applies only when the Ganja involved is of 20 Kgs. as it is a commercial quantity as per the aforesaid notification. The said offence under Section 20((ii)(b)(C) of NDPS Act relating to possession or illegal transportation of Ganja of a commercial quantity is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. So, when it is found that only a small quantity of Ganja of 600 grams is involved in this case, it is to be held that only an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(A) of the NDPS Act is made out and not an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(C) of the NDPS Act relating to commercial quantity. So, it is obvious that the police have registered the F.I.R. quoting a wrong section of law.

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55236845/

Citations:

Abdul Gafaoor Vs Hameema Khatoon and Ors on 15 Sep 2003

Posted on August 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on Supreme Court decision here, a division bench of AP High Court held that, a husband cannot be sentenced indefinitely for breach of maintenance orders.

From Para 3,

3. From bare perusal of this provision, it becomes clear that a person against whom an order under Section 125(3) of the Code is made does not become liable to imprisonment on passing of an order of maintenance, his liability to suffer imprisonment only starts if he fails to respond to a warrant issued under Section 125 (3) of the Code for payment of maintenance. A warrant has to be issued under Section 125(3) of the Code for payment of maintenance, when an application is made by the person who has been held entitled to maintenance under section 125 of the code. When such a warrant is issued for making payment of maintenance, it has to be levied as the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and if this warrant is not responded by making the payment, then the Magistrate can order imprisonment and the imprisonment in no case can exceed one month. Therefore, it is immaterial whether there were arrears of 12 months or of any other duration. The material question is whether a warrant under Section 125(3) been issued or not and in case of one warrant issued under Section 125(3) of the Code, there can only be one imprisonment and the maximum imprisonment would be one month. So in case a person chooses to file an application under Section 125(3) of the Code on every successive month on failure to get maintenance, she may get successive orders of imprisonment if the person against whom the warrant is issued fails to make the payment. But if a person chooses to make an application after several months, then again she will be able to get an order of imprisonment on failure to make the payment which will be only a maximum imprisonment of one month. We are fortified in our view by a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Shahada Khatoon v. Amjad Ali, 1999 SCC (Cri) 1029 : (1999 Cri LJ 5060).

Indiankanoon Version:

Abdul Gafaoor Vs Hameema Khatoon and Ors on 15 Sep 2003 (IK Ver)

Casemine Version:

Abdul Gafaoor Vs Hameema Khatoon and Ors on 15 Sep 2003 (CM Ver)

Citations : [2004 DMC 1 693], [2003 ALD CRI 2 902], [2003 SCC ONLINE AP 894], [2004 AP LJ 1 154], [2004 CRI LJ 1280], [2004 CCR 2 332], [2004 HLR 1 332]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1923858/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f838e4b0149711141ca7

Pitchika Lakshmi Vs Pichika Chenna Mallikaharjuana Rao on 24 Dec 2012

Posted on August 15, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on Supreme Court decision here, which was in turn relied on by a division bench of AP High Court here, a single-judge bench of AP High Court held that, a husband cannot be sentenced indefinitely for breach of maintenance orders.

Pitchika Lakshmi Vs Pichika Chenna Mallikaharjuana Rao on 24 Dec 2012

Citations : [2012 SCC ONLINE AP 446], [2013 CRI LJ 4284], [2014 RCR CRI 5 651], [2014 HLR 1 317], [2013 ALD CRI 1 405], [LQ 2012 HC 8200]

Other Sources :

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8257ea714d5826cf1dd7cb

https://www.legitquest.com/case/pitchika-lakshmi-v-state-of-andhra-pradesh-rep-by-its-public-prosecutor-high-court-of-ap/78BBB

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Category: High Court of Andhra Pradesh Judgment or Order or Notification

B.Parvathi Vs State of AP on 7 May, 2020

Pasagadula Sai Kiran Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Aug 2022

Gattupalli Ujwal Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 30 Oct 2019

R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009

D.Suryaprakash Venkata Rao Vs State of AP on 06 Dec 2019

Busarapu Satya Yesu Babu Vs State of AP and Sake Roja on 05 Nov 2021

Bhagwan Premchandani Vs State of A.P. and Anr on 4 Nov 1997

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Abdul Gafaoor Vs Hameema Khatoon and Ors on 15 Sep 2003

Pitchika Lakshmi Vs Pichika Chenna Mallikaharjuana Rao on 24 Dec 2012