Citations:
Other Sources:
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/659fafffe512165a322a69d7
Index of Maintenance Judgments is here.
Category: High Court of Andhra Pradesh Judgment or Order or Notification
Akkala Rami Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 30 Apr 2025
Justice Harinath N has passed this judgment, wherein it was held that,
From Para 36 and 37,
36. The defacto-complainant has been serving as Treasurer of Pastors Fellowship in Pittalavanipalem Mandal. In order to become Pastor one has to essentially convert to Christianity. Evidently the 2nd respondent is a Christian professing Christianity. Having converted to Christianity, the petitioner
cannot continue to be a member of Scheduled Caste community. The caste system is alien to Christianity. Having converted to Christianity and admitting his role as a Pastor in a Church the 2nd respondent could not invoke the provisions of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
37. The SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is a protective legislation introduced for preventing atrocities against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the present case, the 2nd respondent has misused the Protective Legislation though he is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Act. The 2nd respondent had voluntarily converted to Christianity and was admittedly working as a Pastor in a Church for the last 10 years as on the date of incident. Thus, the 2nd respondent cannot be permitted to invoke the provisions of the Protective Legislation.
From Para 40,
40. Considering all this, this is a case where the 2nd respondent has misused the SC ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and filed a false complaint. The argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that the 2nd respondent continues to hold SC Certificate issued by LW.12 is concerned, the same is a matter to be dealt under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 by the appropriate authority under the Act. Mere non-cancellation of the caste certificate by the authority to a person who has converted into Christianity cannot instill the protection granted under the Protective Legislation. The 2nd respondent has ceased to be a Member of the Scheduled Caste Community, the day he had converted into Christianity.
Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025
A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an Order for Maintenance passed without adhering to the guidelines issued by Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha is liable to be set aside.
From Para 6,
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/husband would contend that no disclosure statement was filed by the respondent No.1 herein/wife and without the said statement, it is difficult to estimate the financial expenses of either of the parties to come to a conclusion as to how much amount is to be awarded to the respondent Nos.1 and 2 towards maintenance.
From Para 8,
8. A perusal of entire material on record coupled with the Order and Judgment passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, respectively, goes to show that either of the parties did not file disclosure statement. A disclosure statement in a Domestic Violence Case (DVC) refers to a document where a party involved in the case is required to provide detailed information about their financial assets and liabilities, including income, property ownership, bank accounts, and debt, as per the Court’s Order, usually to help in determining the appropriate maintenance or compensation amount in the case
From Para 10,
10. A plain reading of the above proposition of law, it is evident that while deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the Civil Court/Family Court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. The applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, to enable the Court to take into consideration the maintenance that was already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount and if the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding. In the case on hand, apparently, no disclosure statement was filed. It is mandatory that both husband and wife are supposed to file the disclosure statement before the trial Court. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the case in DVC No.27 of 2016 shall be remanded to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for trial of Prohibition and Excise Offences, Nellore, for fresh disposal.
Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of Maintenance cases under section 12 of DV Act is here.
Meegada Venu Gopala Rao Vs Meegada Usha Rani and Ors on 10 Jul 2024
A single judge of APHC relying on judgment passed in my earlier client case here, set aside the Trial Court Order and remanded the case back.
From Paras 5-7,
5. Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, the learned counsel for petitioner, submits that in similar facts and circumstances, this Court by common order dated 25.04.2024 disposed of Criminal Revision Case Nos.533 and 1098 of 2023 setting aside the impugned order and remitted the matter to the learned trial Court for fresh consideration by following the procedures which were laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and requests for passing the same order. He fairly submits that the revision petitioner would pay maintenance to the minor children, who are respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein, till they attain majority as ordered by the trial Court.
6. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 submits that the revision may be allowed and the matter may be remanded to the learned trial Court.
7. In view of the same, and following the order passed in Criminal Revision Case Nos.533 and 1098 of 2023, dated 25.04.2024, this Criminal Revision Case is disposed of in the following terms:
(i) The impugned order passed in M.C.No.62 of 2018 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kaikaluru for fresh consideration and by following the procedures which were laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(ii) This Court further directs both the parties to submit affidavits disclosing their assets and liabilities, giving complete particulars, in accordance with the directives of the Hon’ble Apex Court as laid down in the case of Rajnesh v. Neha^ before the trial Court. The learned trial Court must ensure strict adherence to these guidelines. If any of the affidavits is found to be lacking in necessary particulars, the learned trial Court shall direct to produce the relevant information from the respective party.
(iii) The learned trial Court shall dispose of M.C.No.62 of 2018 afresh after giving reasonable opportunity to both parties to let in further evidence, if any. It is made clear that the revision petitioner herein, as has been undertaken now shall continue to pay the monthly maintenance to the minor children at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month till they attain majority.
Index is here.
Borugadda Rama Devi and Ors Vs Borugadda Ravi Kumar and Anr on 26 Dec 2018
A single judge of composite APHC held that deserted wife will not get any maintenance.
From Para 5,
5) POINT: As per Section 125 Cr.P.C, any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife who is unable to maintain herself, or his legitimate or illegitimate children whether married or not, or his father or mother, unable to maintain themselves is liable to provide maintenance to them. So far as wife is concerned, she will be entitled to maintenance only when her case does not fall under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C, which reads thus:
“(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.”
The Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Bai Patel v. Shyam Kumar Patel1, has clarified this aspect stating that wife’s right to claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C can be denied only in the circumstances provided under sub-Section (4) of Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Trial Court refused to award maintenance to the 1st petitioner on the ground that the 1st petitioner has voluntarily come out of the matrimonial home but not due to the negligence or refusal of the respondent. Of course the Trial Court awarded maintenance @ Rs.1500/- per month to each of the two children of the 1st petitioner. Hence the instant Criminal Revision Case is filed seeking maintenance to 1st petitioner on one hand and enhancement of the maintenance awarded to the petitioners 2 and 3.
From Para 8,
8) So the facts and evidence would clearly depict that 1st petitioner’s residing away from her husband is not supported by any plausible ground. Her attitude gives an inference that without lawful excuse she remained with her parents. In this factual situation, the 1st petitioner is not entitled to maintenance as laid under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court has rightly refused to grant maintenance to her. The wife who lives separately from the society of her husband without any lawful excuse does not deserve maintenance. It was so held in the case of Anil v. Smt. Sunita4. The decisions in K.Anjaiah Goud’s case (2 supra) and Naredla Sirisha’s case (3 supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioners will not help the cause of 1st petitioner.
The Index is here.
Mummireddygari Prathap Reddy and Ors Vs Mummireddygari Srivani and Ors on 17 Jul 2023
A single judge of AP High Court held that when there is No Shared household, so no domestic relationship so no DVC maintainable on family members.
From Para 7,
7. A perusal of the D.V.C. application would show that the aggrieved woman’s husband and in-laws and the siblings of her husband all are natives of Adapareddypalli Village, Tirupathi Rural Mandal, Chittoor District. By the time the D.V.C. was filed the husband of the aggrieved woman has been working as a Software Engineer at Houstan, Texas, United States of America. Aggrieved woman’s in-laws are living at their native places. Siblings of the aggrieved woman’s husband are also employed and Sri M.Suresh Reddy is working at Bangalore and Sri M.Prasad Reddy working at Hyderabad or Tirupathi. The application in D.V.C. also indicates that subsequent to the marriage the spouses lived for some time at Adapareddypalli Village and thereafter they lived at Mysore of Karnataka State and thereafter they went Abroad and lived together at Houstan, Texas, United States of America. Finally the aggrieved woman and her child came back to India and they have been living with the woman’s parents at Aditya Nagar, Nellore in SPSR Nellore District. D.V.C. was filed at Nellore. All the above facts are not in dispute.
From Paras 9 and 10, (All the respondents, except husband, reside are different locations; No shared household)
9. Coming to the parents and siblings of her husband, at para No.4 of the application, the aggrieved woman states that respondent Nos.4 and 5 therein, who are siblings of her husband, used to visit Adapareddypalli Village during weekends when she was brought by her husband from Mysore to the native place. It is on those occasions, the siblings of her husband used to harass her for money and additional dowry.
10. Coming to her in-laws, the aggrieved person at pares No.5 of her application in D.V.C. mentions that all the cruelty and bad conduct of her husband used to be informed by her to her in-laws, but they used to support their son and all of them together demanded her to bring additional dowry. It is with those allegations, the D.V.C. was filed seeking various reliefs.
From Para 17,
17. The term shared household is hinged on the concept of intentional residence of the parties in one household. Mere fleeting or casual living does not make one a shared household vide Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahujal and Rajnesh v. Neha2. In this regard, learned counsel for petitioners cited the judgment of the then composite High Court in P.Sugunamma v. State of A.P.3. Referring to a similar situation where relatives of the husband have not been living along with the spouses but living elsewhere with periodical or sporadic visits, it was held that where any person who is so related who has been not living or had not lived together at any point of time with the aggrieved person in a shared household they cannot be said to be in domestic relationship. To the similar effect is the law spelt out by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Prakash Vinayak Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra4. The averments in the application in D.V.C. of the aggrieved person do indicate that since the time of marriage it is the spouses who lived together under one roof at different places at all times and the remaining respondents who are their family members have been living at different other places and in their own respective houses. It is on occasions they paid visits to the spouses. Such occasional visits were only meant for those occasions and they were never intended and could not be intended to be visits making one to think that they are holding shared household. The definition of “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) of the Act, 2005 requires a domestic relationship and domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act, 2005 means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household. The facts mentioned in the application in D.V.C. clearly show that, that domestic relationship is absent between the aggrieved woman on one hand and petitioner Nos.2 to 5 on the other hand. It is in that view of the matter, one has to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for petitioners that without there being any case disclosed by the application in D.V.C. permitting the learned Magistrate to take up further proceedings against them would be abuse of process of Court.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of DV Judgments is here.
Palaparthi Shebha and Anr Vs State of AP and Anr on 16 Jul 2024
A single judge of AP HC held that Interim Order for maintenance has to be effective from the date of petition and not from the date of Order.
Note: Slipper shot to those who think dragging the false cases would tire out the lying bitch. Na na… You will be looted in day light.
From Para 5 and 6,
5. Thus, the learned appellate court agreed with the decision of the learned trial court with reference to the legal need and necessity on part of the husband in maintaining his wife and minor child and also affirmed the quantum of monthly maintenance. However, the learned appellate court modified the trial court’s order only with reference to the date from which the awarded maintenance amounts were to be paid. Learned trial court granted interim maintenance from the date of application i.e., on 24.04.2019. Whereas the appellate court set aside that part of the order and directed the interim maintenance to be paid from 01.04.2022.
6. Aggrieved by that modification, the woman and the child preferred this revision.
From Para 8,
8. Learned counsel for revision petitioners submits that the learned appellate court modified the trial court’s order on facts which were never part of the record and the modification is not inconsonance with the law laid down in Rajnesh V. Neha1. The error requires immediate correction as the effect of the erroneous order would make the revision petitioners to lose Rs.9,90,000/-. Therefore, in this revision, this court may have to interfere.
From Para 11, (Importance of pleading properly)
11. Learned trial court granted interim maintenance to be paid from the date of filing of the petition i.e., on 24.04.2019 and the appellate court modified it and directed the said payments to be from 01.04.2022. Learned appellate court recorded that for a period of nearly three years, there was out spread of corona and salaries were not given to private employees and therefore directing such husband to pay maintenance from the date of petition is improper and hence it modified the said order and granted maintenance to be paid from 01.04.2022. During the course of hearing of this revision, it is undisputed on both sides that as a matter of fact, it was never pleaded by the husband that because of corona pandemic, he lost his job or that he did not receive salaries. Therefore, it is clear that the facts that influenced the reasoning of the appellate court were the facts that were never available on record. Thus, deciding a case based on material that was never part of the record amounts to impropriety requiring interference from this court in terms of Section 397 and 401 of the CrPC.
From Para 13, (This is how Judiciary interprets/trumps the Intent of Legislature)
13. The said provision indicates that the order for payment may be from the date of the order or from the date of the application. A bare reading of the provision allows the discretion of the deciding court to grant the maintenance from either of the dates and that discretion normally has to be exercised based on the specific facts and circumstances as were brought on record by the parties. However, after noticing the realities of life and litigation and taking a pragmatic view and after a great deal of deliberation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rajnesh V. Sneha’s case (mentioned supra 1) at para 109 held that: –
”Even though a judicial discretion is conferred upon the court to grant maintenance either from the date of application or from the date of the order in Section 125(2) CrPC, it would be appropriate to grant maintenance from the date of application in all cases, including section 125 CrPC, 1973. In the practical working of the provisions relating to maintenance, we find that there is significant delay in disposal of the applications for interim maintenance for years on end. It would therefore be in the interests of justice and fair play that maintenance is awarded from the date of the application”
Thus, their Lordships laid down that law stating that awarding maintenance from the date of application was in the interest of Justice and fair play. By virtue of this ruling, the revision petitioners rightly sought interference of this court to rectify the error committed by the appellate court.
Index of DV judgments is here.
Ragimani Gangadhar Vs Ragimani Padmavathi and Anr on 08 Sep 2022
A single judge bench of AP High Court held as follows,
From Para 9,
9. This Court has gone through the said judgment. It did not hold that simultaneous proceedings under different enactments cannot be made. In fixing quantum of maintenance, it would be relevant in bringing to notice of the Court about filing of parallel proceedings for maintenance.
Further the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha 2, it is held,
“Directions on overlapping jurisdictions: It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. For instance, there is no bar to seek maintenance both under the D.V.Act and Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., or under H.M.A. It would, however, be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. If maintenance is awarded to the wife in a previously instituted proceeding, she is under a legal obligation to disclose the same in a subsequent proceeding for maintenance, which may be filed under another enactment. While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/family court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant.
To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding.”
Citations : 2022 Latest Caselaw 6521 AP
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70415177/
https://www.latestlaws.com/judgements/andhra-high-court/2022/september/2022-latest-caselaw-6521-ap
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=402202795000&Title=RAGIMANI-GANGADHAR-Vs.-RAGIMANI-PADMAVATHI
https://supremetoday.ai/doc/judgement/00200055810
Index of Domestic Violence cases is here.
Kode Narasimha Kumar and Ors Vs State of AP on 10 Nov 2022
A single judge of AP High Court, relying on this case here, held as follows,
From Para 4,
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contents that the marriage between A1 and defacto complainant took place in the year 2016. Thereafter, the defacto complainant filed FCOP.No.1087 of 2019. By an order dated 06.02.2020 in FCOP.No.1087 of 2019, the learned XIV Additional District Judge-cum-Additional Family Court Judge, Vijayawada passed an ex parte decree in favour of the defacto complainant. It is his submission that after obtaining the divorce, the defacto complainant filed the present complaint as against the petitioners on 19.03.2020, when the relation between A1 and defacto complainant as husband and wife is not subsisting.
From Paras 9 and 10,
9. In respect of the offence under Section 498-A IPC, the Hon’ble Apex Court has come to a conclusion that since there is no relation between defacto-complainant and A1 as wife and husband, the proceedings in the above case has been quashed for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
10. In view of the above principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and facts and circumstances of the case, this Court feels that continuation of the proceedings as against the petitioners would amount to abuse of process of law for the reason that A1 and defacto-complainant married separately and are living separately.
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167169919/
Index of Quash Judgments is here.
M.Sreenivasulu and Ors Vs State of AP and Ors on 15 May 2024
AP High Court held that once marriage is declared null and void ab-initio, no criminal proceedings for cruelty u/s 498A IPC are maintainable and on that ground discharge petition filed must be allowed.
From Para 16,
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioners contends that even upon conducting the trial, the ultimate conclusion of the proceedings is anticipated to result in the acquittal of the accused individuals. Consequently, it is asserted that the trial Court, given this foreseeable outcome, should have exercised its discretion to discharge the accused persons from further legal proceedings. In support of their contention, the Petitioners have also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Siva Kumar & ors. V. State Rep., by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and ors7, wherein it held that:
7. Undisputedly, the marriage between the appellant No.1 and PW-1 has been found to be null and void. As such the conviction under Section 498-A IPC would not be sustainable in view of the judgment of this Court in the case Shivcharan Lal Verma’s case supra. So far as the conviction under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the learned trial Judge by an elaborate reasoning, arrived at after appreciation of evidence, has found that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In an appeal/revision, the High court could have set aside the order of acquittal only if the findings as recorded by the trial Court were perverse or impossible.
From Paras 17 and 18,
17. The learned counsel representing the Petitioners ardently asserts that in instances where a marriage is deemed null and void, the pursuit of legal proceedings under sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act becomes untenable. Central to this argument is the delineation of “dowry” as envisaged within the Act, positing it as a demand for property or valuable security intricately intertwined with the institution of marriage. Emphasizing the exhaustive scope of dowry as defined in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, counsel underscores its inclusive nature, encompassing a wide array of assets and properties exchanged directly or indirectly in connection with matrimonial alliances. Furthermore, counsel contends that once a marriage is declared null and void, any purported demand for dowry in relation to said marriage loses legal validity. Notably, in the case of P. Siva Kumar’s case as referred to supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court independently scrutinized the trial court’s decision, despite the nullification of the marriage, to assess the applicability of charges under sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
18. Learned counsel for the Petitioners has apprised the Court of an admission made by the 2nd Respondent herein (wife/Defacto Complainant) during the Family Court proceedings. The order passed in F.C.O.P.No.1275 of 2015 reveals that the wife/Defacto Complainant did not raise any objection to the declaration of the marriage as null and void, but sought leave to contest other allegations pertaining to the recovery of amounts and ornaments through separate proceedings. Additionally, it appears that both parties have reached an amicable compromise, rendering the continuation of the proceedings unnecessary. In light of these circumstances, this Court is inclined to believe that the Petitioners have established a case warranting the allowing of the Revision Case.
Index of Divorce judgments is here.
