Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Posted on November 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Karnataka HC held as follow with regards to Cruelty and Desertion grounds as found under Hindu Marriage Act 1955.

From Para 9,

9. The Trial Court examined PWs-1 to 3 and RW-1 and perused Ex.P1 and Exs.R1 to R8. The appellants attitude towards the respondent and staying away from him for years together and so also filing a petition for maintenance in Criminal miscellaneous No.95/2007 and partition suit in O.S.No.73/2005, she has not made any efforts to join her husband. On the other hand, the respondent had filed petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and petition was not continued on account of appellants readiness and willingness to join the respondent due to which the respondent had withdrawn the petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Even thereafter the appellant had not joined the respondent. The appellant has not apprised the Trial Court as well as before this Court by producing any material evidence and so also what efforts she has made all these years to join the respondent. The contention of the appellant that she is ready to join her husband is only an afterthought for the reasons that she had ample opportunity of joining the respondent during the pendency of M.C.No.4/2010. Now we are in the year 2019. Even during the period from 30.11.2013, the date on which M.C.No.4/2010 was disposed off, till date she has not shown her willingness to join her husband. If her intention was really to join her husband, both Trial and this Court would have made necessary efforts to refer the matter to the Mediation & Conciliation Centre. Therefore, the attitude of the appellant towards respondent for these many years resulted in failure of marriage among the appellant and the respondent. Once the appellant failed to return to her marital home and remained in her parental house for more than one and half decade amounts to both desertion and cruelty.

From Para 16,

16. The principle is, thus, settled that whether in the facts and circumstances of a given case, the plaintiff has been able to make out a case of grant of divorce on the ground of cruelty would depend upon the nature of pleadings and evidence in that case and there can be no straitjacket formula nor an exhaustive list of instances can be prepared, where cruelty is said to have been committed by one or other party to the marriage. Cruelty can also not be inferred by applying any formula because the said question is to be determined keeping in view the social status of the parties, their financial and other conditions, the atmosphere and the kind of employment or vocation which they carry out would all be important to interfere whether on the given set of allegations it has become difficult for the plaintiff to live with the other side and the behaviour of such degree which amounts to the cruelty.

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://www.legitquest.com/case/renuka-v-sangappa/1a2cde

https://www.lawyerservices.in/Renuka-Versus-Sangappa-2019-12-11

Post Views: 476

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In this short order, the single-judge bench of Justice JK Maheswari held as follows:

In Ground ‘D’ of the Transfer Petition, an apprehension of threat of life merely on receiving notice on the above-mentioned complaint, has been shown. No complaint has been lodged by the petitioner to the authorities concerned or before any Court. Mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground.

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Post Views: 491

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Posted on November 10, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

This is a landmark judgment from the 3-judge full-bench of Supreme Court of India.

From Para 23,

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE SC 315]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/199473647/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/607d22efba0bb01cbed0c0a7

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/m-s-neeharika-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-versus-state-of-maharashtra-and-others

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 984

Hrishikesh Jaiswal Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Others

Posted on November 7, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A NLIU Bhopal student, Hrishikesh Jaiswal, had filed this WP, in-person seeking effective implementation of the Motor Vehicle Rules in the State of Madhya Pradesh.

Notice issued

Hrishikesh Jaiswal Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Others on 25 Oct 2021

Post Views: 659

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Posted on October 27, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 84,

84. Lastly, we would also like to clarify that Section 179 of the Criminal Code permits prosecution of cases in the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence has been committed or consequences have ensued. Section 186 of the Criminal Code relates to cases where two separate charge-sheets have been filed on the basis of separate FIRs and postulates that the prosecution would proceed where the first charge-sheet has been filed on the basis of the FIR that is first in point of time. Principle underlying section 186 can be applied at the pre-charge-sheet stage, that is, post registration of
FIR but before charge-sheet is submitted to the Magistrate. In such cases ordinarily the first FIR, that is, the FIR registered first in point of time, should be treated as the main FIR and others as statements under Section 162 of the Criminal Code. However, in exceptional cases and for good reasons, it will be open to the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, to treat the subsequently registered FIR as the principal FIR. However, this should not cause any prejudice, inconvenience or harassment to either the victims, witnesses or the person who is accused. We have clarified the aforesaid position to avoid any doubt or debate on the said aspect.

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179868451/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/amish-devgan-versus-union-of-india-and-others

Post Views: 679

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Posted on October 23, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

In a short order, the Apex Court said this,

Having heard learned counsel for both the sides on merits, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order. In our considered opinion, the interest of justice would be met if the child, Kumari Preksha (aged about 16 years as of now) is awarded maintenance. Since, the petitioner is a working lady with sufficient salary, we decline to award any maintenance in her favour.

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89241961/

Here is the Lower High Court Order:

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 27 May 2016

Post Views: 593

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court declared that, Limitation u/s 468 starts from the date of making the complaint and not on the date the cognizance was taken.

Reasoning

52. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law. If that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the Court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the Court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a Court of Law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of ‘litera legis’. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the Court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.

Conclusion

53. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a Court. We, therefore, overrule all decisions in which it has been held that the crucial date for computing the period of limitation is taking of cognizance by the Magistrate/Court and not of filing of complaint or initiation of criminal proceedings.

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1432851/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae4ae4b0149711413706

Post Views: 635

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that, the defamation has to be filed with in time limitation while also referring to 468, 469 and 470 CrPC.

It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of sub-section (1) of section 468 which prohibits every Court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Citations : [1978 SCC 2 403], [1978 SCR 3 434], [1978 CAR 113], [1978 CRLR SC 158], [1978 SCC CR 215], [1978 AIR SC 486], [1978 AIR SC 786], [1978 AIR SC 986], [1978 SCC CRI 215], [1978 CRLJ SC 764]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/885750/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abcae4b014971140d573

Post Views: 792

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Posted on October 16, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this Judgment regd

After a consideration of the various decisions referred to above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down in English decisions dealing with libel that the actual words alleged to be used must be stated in the indictment cannot be applied on all fours when dealing with the cases of defamation by spoken words under Section 499 I. P. C. it will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to be defamatory are reproduced by the complainant. The actual words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is very brief. But in cases where the words spoken are too many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual words and the entire statements should be reproduced verbatim. The object of having, if possible, the actual words or the statements before the court is to enable it to consider whether those words or the statements are defamatory in nature. That purpose or object will be served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint or evidence in a substantial measure the words of imputation alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or the words placed before the court by the complainant are held to be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will have to lose. Therefore it is to his interest to get a proper adjudication from, the court that as far as possible the words spoken or the statements actually made and which he alleges to be defamatory are before the court. But a complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the actual words spoken or the statements made have not been stated in the complaint. From the point of view of accused also it is necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to meet.

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1946272/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab73e4b014971140c842

Citations:

Post Views: 690

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Posted on October 13, 2021 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment of single bench of AP High court. Useful in my DP3 WP.

From Para 10,

10. As can be seen from the aforesaid Section of law, when small quantity of Ganja is involved in commission of the offence, the imprisonment prescribed is for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. In the instant case, the Ganja involved in commission of the offence is only 600 grams, which is below the 1000 grams. Therefore, as per the aforesaid notification, it is to be held that the Ganja involved in this case is only a small quantity and an offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act is only made out. So, the very registration of F.I.R. for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act, which is relating to commercial quantity, is obviously erroneous. Clause (C) of sub-clause (ii)(b) of Section 20 of the NDPS Act applies only when the Ganja involved is of 20 Kgs. as it is a commercial quantity as per the aforesaid notification. The said offence under Section 20((ii)(b)(C) of NDPS Act relating to possession or illegal transportation of Ganja of a commercial quantity is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. So, when it is found that only a small quantity of Ganja of 600 grams is involved in this case, it is to be held that only an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(A) of the NDPS Act is made out and not an offence punishable under Section 20(ii)(b)(C) of the NDPS Act relating to commercial quantity. So, it is obvious that the police have registered the F.I.R. quoting a wrong section of law.

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/55236845/

Citations:

Post Views: 590

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Renuka Vs Sangappa on 11 Dec 2019

Dinesh Mahajan Vs Vishal Mahajan on 26 Oct 2021

Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 13 Apr 2021

Hrishikesh Jaiswal Vs State of Madhya Pradesh and Others

Amish Devgan Vs Union of India and Ors on 07 Dec 2020

Kusum Bhatia Vs Sagar Sethi on 16 Sep 2019

Japani Sahoo Vs Chandra Sekhar Mohanty on 27 Jul 2007

Surinder Mohan Vikal Vs Ascharaj Lal Chopra on 28 Feb 1978

Balraj Khanna and Ors Vs Moti Ram on 22 Apr 1971

K. Ranjith Vs State of AP on 01 Oct 2021