A Full bench of the Apex Court, in an attempt to balance the rights of parties, purportedly in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution, allowed a party to stay in a residence owner by the Parents-in-law.
Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 1023]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71453821/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fe97792814df3882b7c2a16
Single judge bench of Delhi High Court held that the Court has to balance the rights of the aggrieved person and the parents-in-law when the question of residence arises for the aggrieved person while her marital relationship subsists.
From Paras 24 and 25,
24. Admittedly where the parties are residing is a flat, having only three bed rooms, a drawing room and the appellant is in possession of a room in the said flat, then considering there are various complaints filed by them against each other; their relations being not cordial, would it in such circumstances, be appropriate for them to stay together and fight every minute of their existence. In Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) in para No.90 the Court had observed we need to strike a balance between the rights of daughter-in-law and her in-laws.
25. Admittedly, the right of residence under Section 19 of the DV Act is not an indefeasible right of residence in shared household, especially, when the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged father-in-law and mother-in-law. In this case, both being senior citizens of aged about 74 and 69 years and being in the evening of their life, are entitled to live peacefully and not to be haunted by the marital discord between their son and daughter-in-law.
From Para 27,
27. Thus, where the residence is a shared household, it does not create any embargo upon the owner to claim eviction against his daughter-in-law. A strained frictional relationship between the parties would be relevant to decide whether the grounds of eviction exist. I am of the considered opinion, since there exist a frictional relationship between the parties, then at the fag end of their lives it would not be advisable for old parents to stay with appellant and hence it would be appropriate if an alternative accommodation is provided to the appellant as is directed in the impugned order per Section 19(1)(f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act
And finally from Para 28,
28. Thus, there is no force in the appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. The undertaking made at Bar to provide an alternative accommodation to the appellant till her matrimony exists be filed in the form of an affidavit of the respondent within two weeks from today before the learned Trial Court. The execution of decree be postponed till such suitable alternative accommodation is found and the applicant is conveniently shifted therein. The learned Trial Court to impose conditions in case of non-payment of rental including electricity /water charges etc by respondent.
Citations : [2022 SCC ONLINE DEL 594]
Other Sources :
https://caselaw.in/delhi/shared-household-ravneet-kaur-prithpal-singh-dhingra/16/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6217abd79fca1954d2a81a9a
A division bench of Apex Court held that in a case of insurance policy holder dying intestate with some nomination, then the nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them
From Para 4,
4. At the outset it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kesari Devi v. Dharma Devi AIR 1962 All 355 on which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismissing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi High Court in S. Fauza Singh v. Kuldip SinghAIR 1978 Del 276 and Uma Sehgal v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal AIR 1982 Del 36 in all other decisions cited before us the view taken is that the nominee under Section 39 of the Act is nothing more than an agent to receive the money due under a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in the present case and that the money remains the property of the assured during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject to the law of succession applicable to him. The cases which have taken the above view are Ramballav Dhandhania v. Gangadhar NathmallAIR 1956 Cal 275; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd AIR 1970 Cal 513; D. Mohanavelu Mudaliar v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd., Salem6; Sarojini Amma v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Ker 126; Atmaram Mohanlal Panchal v. Gunvantiben AIR 1977 Guj 134; Malli Dei v. Kanchan Prava Dei AIR 1973 Ori 83 and Lakshmi Amma v. Saguna BhagathILR 1973 Kant 827. Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases at some length.
The operative portion of the Judgment:
12. Moreover there is one other strong circumstance in this case which dissuades us from taking a view contrary to the decisions of all other High Courts and accepting the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in the two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination effected under Section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parliament has not chosen to make any amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and compelling reasons to hold that all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The reasons given by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauza Singh case and in Uma Sehgal case do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed by the other High Courts on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Act does not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The amount, however, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them.
Citations : [1983 SCALE 2 869], [1984 AIR SC 346], [1984 SCC 1 424], [1984 SCR 1 992], [1984 SCC TAX 59], [1984 ALR 10 268], [1984 ALJ 194], [1984 BLJR 21], [1984 ACC 2 377], [1984 ACJ 138], [1984 BLJR 32 210], [1984 COMPLJ SC 1 1], [1984 GLH 490], [1984 COMPCAS SC 55 214], [1984 UJ SC 866]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1308094/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac0ce4b014971140de2b
This is such an atrocious case whereby the so-called mother flouts the orders passed by Canadian Courts regd Custody of a minor child and reaches India only to file a 498A IPC case. Crooks!
The Earlier decision from Karnataka High Court’s Division Bench, where a parenting plan was devised by the judges.
Relying on Apex Court’s Surinder Mohan Vikal decision, Calcutta High Court held as follows:
In the instant case, the cause of action arose from the date when First Information Report was registered and not from the date on which the complainant was acquitted from the charge.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50050401/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5faa5a1c4653d02a0b1309ab
Relying on Apex Court’s Surinder Mohan Vikal decision, Delhi High Court held that if any offence is made out in a complaint under Section 500 IPC for defamation, Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. is attracted and cognizance of offence should be taken within a period of three years from the date of occurrence.
Citations : [2011 DLT 182 221], [2012 CRICC 1 85], [2011 RCR CRIMINAL 4 735], [2011 SCC ONLINE DEL 2664], [2011 RCR CRI 4 735]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10503637/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090e0ae4b014971117b1c7
Another misinterpretation of Section 3 of DP… this time from Allahabad High Court.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/44284755/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/60f50c979fca193a50689444
News:
https://lawtrend.in/dowry-prohibition-act-protects-dowry-giver-allahabad-hc/
https://lawsisto.com/legalnewsread/MTA2NzU=/Dowry-Prohibition-Act-Protects-Dowry-Giver-Allahabad-HC
A three-judge full bench of Apex Court held as follows.
The report of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after due inquiry into the matter sets out the factual details of the matter. The report indicates that the contempt petitioner was not only summoned to Akividu Police Station in the name of counseling but was also detained. In the circumstances, there was clear violation of the directions issued by this Court not only in Arnesh Kumar but also in the case in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.
The mere fact that no crime was registered, could not be a defence, nor would it be an escape from the rigour of the decisions rendered by this Court. As a matter of fact, summoning the person without there being any crime registered against him and detaining him would itself be violative of basic principles.
In the circumstances, the Division Bench was not right and justified in setting aside the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal. While setting aside the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court, we restore the decision of the Single Judge.
However, considering the facts and circumstances on record, the substantive sentence of three months as recorded in paragraph 32 of the decision of the Single Judge is modified to 15 days leaving rest of the incidents of sentence completely intact.
The contemnor shall surrender himself before the Registrar of the High Court within two weeks from today.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/136109957/
https://www.legitquest.com/case/ma-khaliq-ors-v-ashok-kumar-anr/1FCF45
https://legiteye.com/detaining-any-person-without-there-being-any-crime-registered-against-him-is-violation-of-basic-principles-supreme-court/
Division Bench decision is here.
Single Judge decision is here.
Final Forum:
Review petition was filed but withdrawn by the contemnor himself.
A single bench decision from Telangana High Court passed these guidelines.
Hence, this Court feels that an alternative mechanism shall be evolved to address the plight of these under-trial prisoners / accused:
- Parties Advocates shall download the order copy from the High Court’s Website along with case details which are available in the case status information
- While filing the memo on behalf of accused for furnishing sureties, the Advocate shall state in the Memo that he / she has downloaded the order copy from the High Court’s Website. The Administrative Officer Chief Ministerial Officer of the Court concerned shall verify the order from the High Court’s Website and make an endorsement to that effect and then shall place the same before the Court.
- The Public Prosecutor shall also obtain necessary instructions in this regard and assist the Court.
- The Presiding Officer, on the same day, shall dispose of the same and dispatch the release order to the jail authorities concerned forthwith through e-mail or any other electronic mode.
- In cases of anticipatory bail, the burden to verify the authenticity of the copy is on the Station House Officer concerned and if necessary, he should obtain necessary instructions from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and complete the process on the same day expeditiously as per law.
- The jail authorities on receipt of the release order shall release the accused forthwith.
- Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate copy of this order to:
- The Principal Secretary for Home Affairs, State of Telangana,
- The Director General of Police, State of Telangana,
- The Director of Prosecution, who, in turn, shall sensitize the police officers Station House Officers / Public Prosecutors and ensure implementation of this order
- Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate copy of this order to all the Principal District Judges in the State, who, in turn, shall sensitize all the Presiding Officers and ensure implementation of this order.
- Registrar (Judicial) is further directed to circulate the copy of this order to all the Bar Associations in the State through the Principal District Judges, so that they can effectively address their client’s cause.
- Registrar (Judicial) shall also issue a separate notification in this regard and the same shall be displayed in the High Court’s Website.
- These directions will apply to all bail application including bails in Criminal Revision as well as Criminal Appeals.
This order shall come into force from 22.11.2021.
A police officer was punished with 1 day imprisonment (suspended the same so that an appeal may be filed) for breaching Arnesh Kumar Guidelines.
From Paras 1 and 2,
1. The court has already held R-3 guilty of committing contempt of court. He arrested the petitioner in breach of directions passed by the Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar Vs State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 1277/2014. The requisite notice was not served upon the petitioner. There were mere allegations of criminal breach of trust against the petitioner, which entailed a maximum sentence of three years. It did not warrant the arrest of a person in the manner in which it was done. The petitioner’s own complaints to the police were not responded to. The highhandedness of the police officer, in specific breach of the Supreme Court’s directions is evident. Arnesh Kumar (supra) holds that in the event of non-service of notice under section 41A of the Cr.P.C., contempt proceedings would be initiated.
2. The petitioner’s right to personal liberty is ensured by the Constitution of India. It can be curtained only by a procedure prescribed established by law. The Supreme Court has said in Arnesh Kumar that notice under s. 41A Cr.P.C. is requisite. The notice was not served. The law has been breached. It is not the petitioner only who has suffered the humiliation and the indignity of being arrested; the ordeal would have affected the reputation of his family i.e. his children, wife and parents. No amount of explanation to the neighbours or those who may have seen the arrest, would undo the
embarrassment and indignity suffered by the petitioner and his relatives. Arrest and incarceration destroys a person and collaterally affects many other innocent relatives. Subsequent release or acquittal of an innocent, is of no solace and offers no reparation to the loss of reputation or for the temporary loss of precious personal liberty. A stigma gets attached to the person who has been taken away, detained and/or put behind bars by the police. R-3 is deemed to have due knowledge of the rights of a citizen and the procedure prescribed in law.
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