Chatter Pal and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 May 2023

Posted on February 19, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Delhi High Court passed these guidelines to the Mediators…

From Para 42,

(b) Guidelines Apropos Drafting A Settlement Agreement in Matrimonial Disputes with Special Reference to Clauses dealing with Criminal Cases
42. Having discussed the significance of process of mediation in resolution of a dispute, especially those arising out of family and matrimonial cases, and having taken note of complexities that can arise due to inadequate drafting, inconsistencies, omissions or oversights within a settlement agreement achieved between parties subsequent to a successful mediation, this Court deems it appropriate to lay down following guidelines in relation to drafting of a Mediated Settlement Agreement, in addition to the guidelines laid down:
(i) Specify Names of Parties: The agreement must specifically contain names of all the parties to the agreement.
(ii) Avoid Ambiguous Terms: The terms such as ‘respondent’, ‘respondents’, ‘petitioner’ or ‘petitioners’, in absence of their names in the agreement must be avoided in an agreement as it leads to ambiguities and further litigation.
(iii) Include All Details: The terms and conditions of the agreement reached between the parties, howsoever small and minute they may be, must be incorporated in the agreement.
(iv) Timeline For Compliance: The timeline of the fulfilment of terms and conditions as well as their execution must be clearly mentioned. There should be no tentative dates as far as possible.
(v) Default Clause: A default clause should be incorporated in the agreement and the consequences thereof should be explained and enlisted in the agreement itself.
(vi) Mode of Payment: In case any payment is to be made as per settlement, the agreement should specify the method of payment agreed upon between the parties which should also be as per their convenience i.e. electronic mode, by way of a Demand Draft or FDR and the necessary details for fulfilment of this condition.
(vii) Follow-Up Documents: The agreement should also stipulate as to which Follow-up documents are to be prepared and signed by which party. It may also be mentioned as to when, where, how and at whose cost such documents are to be prepared in furtherance of the terms of the agreement, as far as possible.
(viii) Cases involving 498A IPC: Further, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes, where one of the conditions in the Agreement is to cooperate in quashing of FIR, such as those under Section 498A IPC, and filing of affidavit and appearing in the Court for the purpose of the same, it is advisable that the agreement must stipulate the names of all the parties concerned who have been named in the FIR specifically and the fact that the claims have been settled in totality for quashing of entire FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom qua all persons named in the FIR. It be also clarified specifically that the FIR will be quashed in totality against all the persons arrested, not arrested, chargesheeted, not chargesheeted, with their names and whether the entire FIR will be quashed against all of them upon payment by husband or any other person on behalf of the husband.
(ix) Criminal Complaints/Cross-cases: Criminal Complaints filed by parties against each other, pending trial or investigation should also find specific mention with names of all the parties, the Court concerned, and as to how the parties intend to deal with them. The number/details of the complaint, FIR, Sections under which they have been filed, should also be mentioned specifically.
(x) Read and Understood: The agreement should necessarily mention that all the parties have read and understood the contents of the settlement agreement in their vernacular language.
(xi) Signing of Agreement: In case only one or some parties are present during mediation proceedings and only their signatures are obtained on the agreement, it be clearly mentioned and clarified that the agreement is being signed on behalf of those relatives or parties also even in case they are not present, in case the agreement is qua them too and they are not present in person due to age, ailment, distance or any other reason. It is important to do so since in matrimonial offences, the near and distant relatives may, due to above reasons, not be present in person but agreements are reached in totality, especially regarding quashing of FIRs and criminal proceedings and withdrawal of complaints.
(xii) Clarity of Language: At last, the language used in a settlement agreement must be definite enough to understand the real intention of the parties and the goals they wish to achieve by entering into the agreement.

Chatter Pal and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 May 2023

Post Views: 679

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Feb 2024

Posted on February 18, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court trashed the mindless orders passed by AP High Court and quashed the settled criminal proceedings.

From Paras 11-15,

11. Learned Counsel for the Appellants vehemently submits that a bare perusal of the complaint filed by Respondent No.2 and the charge-sheet plainly discloses the absence of any necessary ingredients of the charged offences. It is submitted that the allegations are wholly general and omnibus in nature, made only with the intention to harass the Appellants, amounting to an abuseof the process of the law.
12. To buttress his contention, Learned Counsel for the Appellants has drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that Respondent No. 2 filed a petition seeking divorce and onlythereafter, the memo seeking reopening of the criminal proceedings against the Appellants was filed before the Trial Court.
13. This Court has heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement ofwitnesses’ and the charge-sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even ifthey are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses thespecific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of generalomnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v.State of Bihar2, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein theallegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s.498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if leftunchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.

From Paras 17-18,

17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court in this case has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution.
18. As stated above, given the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the material on record is wholly insufficient to proceed against the Appellants. Accordingly, the Impugned Orders and the Docket Order dated 20.07.2021 are set aside and the criminal proceedings against the Appellants are consequently quashed.

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Feb 2024

The mechanical orders passed by the AP High Court which are dust-binned by Apex Court are below…

CrlP filed by In-Laws:

Mamidi Damodar Reddy and Ors Vs State of AP and Anr on 11 Nov 2022

CrlP filed by Husband:

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 23 Nov 2022

Post Views: 661

Kinjal Jayesh Mehta Vs Disha Jimit Sanghvi and Anr on 14 Feb 2024

Posted on February 15, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Bombay High Court held as follows,

From Para 12,

12. The issue presented for consideration is whether the Petitioner who is the married sister in law of the aggrieved person and admittedly residing in her own matrimonial house can be stated to be in a domestic relationship within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the D.V. Act particularly when the marriage of the Petitioner has taken place prior to the marriage of the Respondent No.1. While deciding the above issue the incidental issue to be decided is whether the allegation in the application that the Petitioner used to spend her whole day in the shared household is sufficient to constitute domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the Petitioner.
13. The relationship between the parties inter se is not disputed neither the factum of the Petitioner’s marriage being solemnised prior to the marriage of the Respondent No 1. The separate residence of the Petitioner at her matrimonial house is also borne out from the address of the Petitioner given in the domestic violence application which is different from the address of the shared household.

From Para 16,

16. The facts of the instant case makes it evident that the Petitioner and the Respondent No 1 never resided together in the shared household i.e. the matrimonial house of the Respondent No.1 at “Siddesh Jyoti Tower”. To salvage the situation, given the above noted admitted position, Mr. Desai would contend that the decision of Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi (supra) as well as the decision in Rashmi Mehrotra (supra) has held that it was not mandatory for the aggrieved person to have actually resided with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled. I am unable to subscribe to the reading of the decision of the Apex Court as desired by Mr.Desai. The decision in the case of Prabha Tyagi (supra) is being read by Mr. Desai dehors the facts of that case which are completely distinguishable.

From Para 20,

20. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Prabha Tyagi (supra) will not assist the case of Respondent No 1 as the Petitioner is the married sister-in-law residing in her own matrimonial house and it cannot be said that the right of the aggrieved person to reside in the shared household would constitute a subsisting domestic relationship with the Petitioner. It would have been a different matter if the Petitioner was unmarried and was residing in the shared household in which case considering the right to reside conferred by Section 17(1) of the D.V. Act, the aggrieved person could have been said to be in subsisting domestic relationship with the Petitioner even if the parties had never resided together in the shared household. It is the right of the aggrieved person to reside in the shared household which constitutes domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and persons residing in the shared household. However, such are not the facts in the instant case as Petitioner is residing separately in her matrimonial house.

From Para 23,

23. Now coming to the pleadings in the application, it is pleaded by the Respondent No 1 that the Petitioner was spending her whole day in the shared household. The said pleading finds place in the paragraph describing the inter se relationship between the aggrieved person and the Respondents. The other pleading is that the Petitioner everyday used to come to the shared household at 2:00 p.m. and leave at around 8:00 p.m. The marriage of the Respondent No.1 was solemnized on 20th November, 2021 and has claimed to be dispossessed on 30th January, 2022. The pleadings as regards the visits of the Petitioner do not indicate an element of permanency sufficient enough to constitute domestic relationship even if it is accepted that the Petitioner was spending her entire day in the shared household.

Finally, from Para 27,

27. In view of the discussion above, in my view, there was no subsisting domestic relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent No 1 and the Petitioner could not have been arrayed as Respondent in the D.V. application. The mere visits of the Petitioner to the shared household being devoid of any permanency is not sufficient and adequate to constitute residence in shared household. Even otherwise considering the pleadings in the applications read with the reliefs, there is no case of domestic violence made out qua the Petitioner.

Kinjal Jayesh Mehta Vs Disha Jimit Sanghvi and Anr on 14 Feb 2024

Index of DV cases is here.

Post Views: 623

M.R.Somasundaram and Ors Vs B Rahini and Anr on 12 Dec 2023

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court at Madurai bench held as follows, while relying on Kunapareddy case,

From Para 10,

10. Considering the above, the petitioners are entitled to approach the concerned Magistrate Court itself and raise the issue of maintainability and other preliminary issues and if such an application is filed, the learned Magistrate shall decide the same as per the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and another reported in (2016) 11 SCC 774.

M.R.Somasundaram and Ors Vs B Rahini and Anr on 12 Dec 2023

Index of DV cases is here.

Post Views: 628

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

Sitting on the full bench of Apex Court, Justice Arijit Pasayat, held as follows, while interpreting the statutes passed by the Legislature.

From Para 9,

No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1] “we cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there”. In case of an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to few decisions of this Court would suffice. [See: Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Anr. (AIR 1990 SC 1747), Union of India and Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96), Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse and Anr. (1997 (6) SCC 312) and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and Ors. (JT 2002 (3) SC 21)]

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Court Kutchehry Version:

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002 (CK)

Post Views: 679

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on February 12, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur, held as follows,

From Para 19, (Presumption of Legislature is correct)

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P., reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 16 has held that in the interpretation of the statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. Therefore, a provision of a statute cannot be used to defeat another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Hence, the interpretation which involves conflict, must be avoided.

From Para 20,

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 has explained the principles of interpretation of statutes. It has been held as follows:
“39. …….The best interpretation is made from the context, ‘Injustum est nisi tota lege inspecta, de una aliqua ejus particula proposita judicare vel respondere’. It is unjust to decide or respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. ‘Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus’. To interpret and in such a way as to harmonise laws with laws, is the best mode of interpretation…….”

From Para 21,

21. In the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 297, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“10. ………Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions……”

Note: My intention of adding this case on the website is to make use of the Supreme Court judgments cited in this case, specifically the Grasim Industries Ltd one.

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Index of DV cases is here.

Post Views: 650

Bharti Anand Vs Sushant Anand and Ors on 26 Apr 2022

Posted on February 11, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Paras 13-15,

13. Although the complaint contains several allegations against the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as noted above, as far as the living arrangements are concerned, it is the case of the complainant herself that the matrimonial home in Jalandhar was shared between her and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 (being the sister-in-law of the petitioner and her husband) visited often for various lengths of time, but there is no suggestion that they were, or intended to be, permanently resident in the said household. It is in this context that the MM and the Appellate Court have reached the conclusion that there is no domestic relationship between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 and 4.
14. The Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja vs. Sneha Ahuja7, with respect to the definition of shared household in the DV Act, has observed inter alia as follows:-
“68. The words “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living including the nature of household have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as shared household or not. As noted above, the 2005 Act was enacted to give a higher right in favour of women. The 2005 Act has been enacted to provide for more effective protection of the rights of the women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The Act has to be interpreted in a manner to effectuate the very purpose and object of the Act. Section 2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 of the 2005 Act grants an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under the shared household irrespective of her having any legal interest in the same or not.”
15. While the above observations of the Court are in the context of the place of residence of the “aggrieved person”, it would equally apply to the identification of those who may be properly impleaded as respondents on the basis of residence in the shared household. Just as the woman living fleetingly or casually at different places, would not convert those places into a “shared household”, the visits of sundry family members to the matrimonial home, without permanency or the intention to treat the premises as shared household, would not render them as members of the “shared household”.

Bharti Anand Vs Sushant Anand and Ors on 26 Apr 2022

Index of Domestic Violence cases is here.

Post Views: 576

Mohammed Yasin Naikwadi Vs Aneesa and Anr on 13 Dec 2023

Posted on February 10, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Dharwad bench of Karnataka HC held that, the protection order does not include the order of granting monetary relief of maintenance under Section 20 of the D.V. Act.

From Paras 14-17,

14. In the present case, provisions of Section 31 of the D.V. Act was pressed into service before the Trial Court essentially on ground that of arrears of the maintenance was not paid and therefore it paved for penal action under Section 31 of the D.V Act. The learned Magistrate has construed that even the non-payment of arrears of maintenance amounts to the violation of protection order and thereby Section 31 of the D.V. Act could be invoked.
15. Providing two separate reliefs, one under Section 18 of the D.V. Act for protection and another for monetary relief under Section 20 of the D.V. Act will have to be taken into consideration while analyzing the scope of Section 31 of the D.V. Act. If protection order was inclusive of monetary relief of granting maintenance, Section 20 of the D.V. Act would not have been separately provided.
16. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of the Mr. Francis Cyril C Cunha Vs. Smt Lydia Jane D’Cunha(supra) considering similar case has exhaustively dealt with the scope of Section 31 of the D.V. Act in the light of Sections 2(o), 18 and 20 of the D.V. Act and held that the protection order does not include the order of granting monetary relief of maintenance under Section 20 of the D.V. Act.
17. In view of the matter, the approach of learned Magistrate in taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 31 of the D.V. Act is a glaring legal error and hence, the same will have to be set aside. Consequently, the proceedings against this petition in C.C.No/1/2022 pending on the file of the IV JMFC, Belagavi are requires to be quashed.

Mohammed Yasin Naikwadi Vs Aneesa and Anr on 13 Dec 2023

Index of DV judgments here.

Post Views: 588

Venus Remedies Ltd and Ors Vs State of Karnataka on 30 Oct 2023

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Dharwad bench of Karnataka HC held as follows:

From Paras 10 and 11,

10. In the application filed by the petitioners seeking recall of NBW, they have undertaken to appear before the Court if sufficient time is granted to them in para 13 of their application. The application of the petitioners seeking recall of NBW came to be rejected on the ground that they are not physically kept present. The Hon’ble Apex Court in SATENDER KUMAR ANTIL case (supra) as held that the NBW may be cancelled or converted into a bailable warrant/summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.
11. The learned Magistrate erred in rejecting the application seeking recall of NBW only ground that they were not kept present either physically or in Video Conference and no affidavit is filed undertaking to appear on the next date on hearing. The application itself contains an undertaking of the accused persons that they will appear if sufficient time is given to them in para 13 of their application.

Venus Remedies Ltd and Ors Vs State of Karnataka on 30 Oct 2023

Index of NBW Judgments is here.

Post Views: 631

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)

Posted on February 7, 2024 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed these guidelines with respect to issue of Summons and Warrants and Recall of NBW,

After filing of chargesheet/complaint taking of cognizance
a) Ordinary summons at the 1st instance/including permitting appearance through Lawyer.
b) If such an accused does not appear despite service of summons, then Bailable Warrant for physical appearance may be issued.
c) NBW on failure to failure to appear despite issuance of Bailable Warrant.
d) NBW may be cancelled or converted into a Bailable Warrant/Summons without insisting physical appearance of accused, if such an application is moved on behalf of the accused before execution of the NBW on an undertaking of the accused to appear physically on the next date/s of hearing.
e) Bail applications of such accused on appearance may be decided w/o the accused being taken in physical custody or by granting interim bail till the bail application is decided.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021

Citations: [(2021) 10 SCC 773], [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 577]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/16350770/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62ba660db50db90d4b55ecaf

A corrected Reportable judgment is passed on 11 Jul 2022…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 11 Jul 2022

Further time is given to comply with the directions earlier given on 03 Feb 2023…

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 03 Feb 2023

Supreme Court also directed as follows.

The judgment in the present case i.e. “Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI” reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51 and the judgment in Siddharth’s case (supra) should be incorporated as part of the curriculum of the State Judicial Academies and the National Judicial Academy.

Interim directions given on 21 Mar 2023 considering the States and High Courts did not provide the required information to Amicus

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 21 Mar 2023

Some individual cases were filed alleging non-compliance of this Order by some Magistrates… SC passed this order on 02 May 2023

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 02 May 2023

Final Judgment on 13 Feb 2024

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 13 Feb 2024

Supreme gave another ‘last’ change on 07 May 2024 to file affidavits that have not complied with the directions issued in this case.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 May 2024

Notices must not be issued via WhatsApp, says Supreme Court.

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI on 21 Jan 2025

Negating the plea of State of Haryana, Supreme Court held that notices u/s 41A of Cr.P.C. or u/s 35 of BNSS cannot be sent via WhatsApp or any other electronic communication medium, unlike section 530 BNSS, which mandates that, Trials, Inquires and Proceedings that may be held in electronic mode, by use of electronic communication or use of audio-video electronic means.” So, Parliament says, Courts can use technologia but Police must use postman.

Satendar Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 16 Jul 2025

Index of NBW Judgments is here.

Post Views: 721

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Chatter Pal and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 May 2023

Mamida Anil Kumar Reddy Vs State of AP and Anr on 05 Feb 2024

Kinjal Jayesh Mehta Vs Disha Jimit Sanghvi and Anr on 14 Feb 2024

M.R.Somasundaram and Ors Vs B Rahini and Anr on 12 Dec 2023

Grasim Industries Ltd Vs Collector of Customs Bombay on 04 Apr 2002

Ashwini Pradhan Vs UOI and Anr on 08 Aug 2023

Bharti Anand Vs Sushant Anand and Ors on 26 Apr 2022

Mohammed Yasin Naikwadi Vs Aneesa and Anr on 13 Dec 2023

Venus Remedies Ltd and Ors Vs State of Karnataka on 30 Oct 2023

Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI and Anr on 07 Oct 2021 (and other Directions)