Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of AP High Court has set aside the 498A IPC conviction… one of the reasons being a Counterblast case.

From Para 23,

23) It is to be seen that, none of the witnesses clearly indicate as to when and also the nature of cruelty meted out to PW1. It is not as if A1 and PW1 lived only for a short period. The record shows that both of them lived together for more than three years. That being the position, some specific time period should have been mentioned with regard to the acts of harassment. Except saying that all the accused harassed, the evidence of PW1 to PW4 is silent as to the nature of harassment meted out to PW1. Whether it was beating or by any other method. The usage of word ‘harassed’ in loose manner, in my view, cannot be taken as amounting to cruelty, unless, the evidence disclosing the nature of the harassment falling within the meaning of cruelty as deposed in 498A IPC. Further, as observed earlier, the nature of harassment spoken to by PW1 to PW4 are inconsistent with each other. Each witness is improving the case. What is spoken to by one witness is not spoken to by another witness.

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Index of Quash judgments here.

Post Views: 906

Evidence Act Sec 65 – Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.––Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:
(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power ––
of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or
of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or
of any person legally bound to produce it,
and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in 1[India] to be given in evidence;
(g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.

Post Views: 667

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from this Magistrate, with legally-valid reasons and conclusions… and also directing perjury proceedings to be initiated…

From Para 26,

26. The first and foremost contention of the accused and their counsel is that FIR No: 488/2017 is barred by limitation, as such the court shall dismiss the proceedings and as per exhibit P1, the alleged last act of cruelty has taken place on 18.09.2012, so the limitation period was expired on 17.09.2015, but the report was given on 03.08.2017, therefore the proceedings are time barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C. while section 473 Cr.P.C provides an exception to bar of limitation, but its application is not automatic and there must be an explanation by the prosecution for such inordinate delay. Since the case is barred by limitation, the court is required to dismiss the proceedings. In support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments:
A. Kamlesh Kalra v. Shilpa Kalra & Ors. Reported in 2020 0 Supreme (SC) 605 wherein it was held that “ As regards, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of complaint/FIR filed under Section 498A IPC, we are of the firm opinion that the same does not call for interference. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time barred, having been filed much more than three years after the separation of Manish Kalra(husband) and Shilpika Kalra (wife) and the filing of the divorce petition by the husband, both in 2009. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court”.
B. Gudipati Mallikarjun Rao v. Gudiapati Saranya 2023 0 Supreme (A.P) 582 wherein it was held that “ In the circumstances, it would have to be held that the complainant, filed by the defacto complainant, is beyond the period prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C”.
C. Arun Vyas & Anr. V. Anitha Vyas 1999 0 Crl LJ 3479 wherein it was held that “ the court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 498-A of IPC, if the FIR is time barred, unless the delay is properly explained and condoned under Section 473 of the CrPC”.
D. Korimerla Videesha Vs. State of A.P. wherein it was held that “ According to Rule 10 of the A.P. Dowry Prohibition Rules, any offence under Section 3 and 4 or any dispute under Section 6 of the Act shall be filed before expiry of one year and finalized within two years from the date of filing”.

From Para 28,

28. In the case on hand the alleged demand for additional dowry was finally made on 18.9.2012 and that is the last date of alleged harassment. Even if the evidence of P.W.1 that the matter is place before the elders in 2013 has taken into consideration, the report is given after 4 years of said incident. But the report was given on 03.08.2017 i.e after 4 years of alleged harassment. So it can be safely conclude that the report is barred by limitation and the court has no power to take cognizance.

From Paras 36-37,

36. He further submitted that the conduct of P.W.1 amounts to perjury and warrants initiation of appropriate proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C in order to uphold the rule of law and protect sanctity of justice delivery system. On perusal of the record it appears that after filing the petition under section 340 Cr.P.C., my learned predecessor in the office returned the petition with some objections and the said petition is represented. But the said petition is again returned with endorsement previous objections not complied with and at present the said petition is not pending before the court. Here it is pertinent to mention that after assuming charge of this court, the said petition did not come before me and I have not given any assurance to the
counsel for the accused as mentioned in his written arguments.
37. During the cross examination P.W.1 denied that she completed her B.Tech in the year 2012. As per the evidence of D.W.1, Professor and controller of examination, JNTU Kakinada, P.W.1 completed her engineering graduation in April 2012 and on 16.10.2012 the student collected her provisional certificate from the college and as per the college rules, they cannot produce the provisional certificate of the student unless it is applied by the student. The evidence of D.W.1 clinchingly proves that P.W.1 completed her B.tech in April 2012 from JNTU. The evidence on record shows she intentionally denied that she completed her B.tech in 2012 and she has given false evidence on oath. Hence, she is certainly liable for punishment for giving false evidence. Hence, the Superintendent of this court is directed to give report before 3rd Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate Court against P.W.1 for giving false evidence.

From Paras 39, 41 and 42,

39. Learned counsel for the accused further contended that despite clear admissions of P.W.1 about unregistered land sale deeds dated 31.05.2010, 27.06.2011, this court refused to mark the said photocopies solely on the ground that they were not originals and this refusal is patently erroneous and it is settled law u/s 65 (c) of Indian Evidence Act, the secondary evidence is admissible where the original is lost or not in the possession of the party and a proper foundation is laid.
41. To mark the photocopies of documents, the party who intends to mark shall explain where is the original and as to why he is marking the photocopies of the documents. If the document is with the other party, first he has to give notice to the other party and even after receiving notice the other party fails to produce the document, then he can mark the photocopy. If he lost the original then also he is entitled to mark the photocopy, but in the case on hand there is no material on record to show that the accused or prosecution has given notice to other party to produce the documents and that the originals were lost. Without complying the conditions of section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, blaming this Court that the decision of the court is erroneous is not acceptable.
42. Learned counsel for the accused mentioned in his written arguments that the non production of the original unregistered sale deeds was reasonably explained during cross examination and it was put to P.W.1 that since accused no longer had access to the original land sale deeds dated. 31.05.2010 and 27.06.2011 since the property was transferred to Ch. Appala Raju and the denial of suggestion does not itself negate the reasonable explanation offered by the accused. On perusal of entire cross examination of P.W.1 it appears no such suggestion was given to P.W.1. As such the
contention of counsel for accused that they have given reasonable explanation for not filing the originals is not at all acceptable.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Post Views: 996

Dowry Prohibition Officers of Andhra Pradesh working?

Posted on July 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

After failing to make sense of the hypocrisy of Police and Judiciary on the fact that Dowry giving is equally punishable as much as Dowry taking under same section i.e., Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, so I decided to go in a different route.

The usual combo of offences that Police add to a FIR in a matrimonial crime is Section 498A IPC (Max Imprisonment is 3 years with fine) + Section 3 of DP Act (Imprisonment not less than five years with fine) + Section 4 of DP Act (Imprisonment not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine).

So, this time my attack is to target the larger offence in this combo i.e., Section 3 of DP Act (Imprisonment not less than five years with fine) and cripple the false Criminal matrimonial cases to half.

How to do that? I found one aspect from the DP Act itself that I can use to poke the eyes of devil of the false Criminal matrimonial cases. Section 8B of DP Act. As is evident, this is just the first piece of the larger puzzle. Few more PILs are necessary to break the back of this nonsense but one may not survive until that glorious moment. I will document next steps/PILs shortly.

After some research and RTI applications, found that Government of Andhra Pradesh under G.O.Ms.No. 69 dt: 24-Jun-1989 and some other G.O.s, designated the Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collectors take up cases under Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, instead of Police Department. Now, every tom, dick and harry in our Sunshine State knows that the Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collectors in our State are NOT taking up cases under Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 due to ignorance or reluctance. Quite a nice bit of realization that this deserves a PIL to fix it! Hence this PIL.

Here is the G.O. copy received from Women Development and Child Welfare Department, Government of AP. It is not legible so better you file RTI and get a neat copy for yourself.

1989-Jun-24 G.O.Ms.No. 69

Here is the Petition copy:

2025-07-08 Dowry Prohibition Officers under sec 8B of DPA v0.1

On 16-Jul-2025, Court-1 heard me and directed Respondents to file Counter.

Sandeep Bhavan Pamarati Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 16-Jul-2025

On 31-Jul-2025: Contacted the Special GP today seeking to know if any instructions were received but she clarified no instructions were yet issued. She did say it is a for a ‘good cause‘. Even though I know that already, happy that, a woman backed my PIL

On 08-Oct-2025, as expected, no Counter was filed by the Respondents and shamelessly, sought time and the ever-benevolent High Court granted them 3 months time.

NDOH: 28-Jan-2026

1 Sandeep Bhavan Pamarati Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 08-Oct-2025

On 15-Nov-2025, unexpectedly, I got to know that the Director, Women and Development and Child Welfare Department, Guntur has issued a letter to all Collectors and District Magistrates vide Lr.No. WDC02-25022/2019-PROGRAMS SEC. dt:04-08-2025. Content? On 16-Jul-2025, the AG’s office shot a letter to Director, WDCW Department, Guntur regarding my PIL, since on the same day the first hearing happened! Here is the copy of that letter. Thanks to Vinay Kumar K _/\_

2025-08-04 Women And child welfare department issue letter for distirct Collectors

On 28-Jan-2026, Court-1 did not convene. Still the Office of AG sent me a copy of the Counter filed on behalf of Respondent No.3 (Women Development and Child welfare Department). Read it. Share it. Enjoy it.

2026-01-28 Reply by R3 LAW040301283

Prepared a ‘nice’ Rejoinder and filed into Court on 05-Feb-2026. Let’s see what happens next. Thanks a lot to ChatGPT and Google Gemini for proof-reading and improving my Rejoinder!

2026-02-05 Rejoinder to the Counter of R3 v0.1

No new date yet. Court-1 was not convened. Need to mention on Monday.

On 11-Feb-2026, the PIL was listed but did not reach. It was listed for 18-Mar-2026.

On 18-Mar-2026, what will happen?

Never expected that someone at the stature of the Chief Justice of a High Court can be such a dumb-ass idiotic muff. Read the Order below yourself and tally it against the Prayers of PIL.

2026-03-18 Sandeep Bhavan Pamarati Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 18-Mar-2026

Silver lining is even for name same (only for this PIL sake), Dowry Advisory Boards were activated hurriedly from August 2025. Let’s see if this continues. To check same, already filed RTI applications to all three Respondents. Still awaiting replies.

EN500288002IN delivered at AP POLICE HQ, Mangalagiri on 30 Mar 2026
Representation to SPIO, DGP Office, regarding DPO+Police Activities wrt DP Act/G.O.Ms.No. 69
Wait until 30-Apr-2026

EN500287885IN delivered at AP Secretariat on 30 Mar 2026
Representation to PIO, Revenue Department, regarding DPO Activities
Wait until 30-Apr-2026

EN500287885IN delivered at Guntur on 30 Mar 2026
Representation to PIO, Commissioner of WDCW Department, regarding DPO Activities
Wait until 30-Apr-2026

I did receive some replies based on which I am initiating Round-2 of the litigation on this subject here.

Same attack to be done in Telangana, Kerala and Karnataka too. RTIs filed. Telangana PIL is here.

Index to all Goals here.

Post Views: 1,150

Cases where Perjury Proceedings were initiated

Posted on July 3, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

This page lists some cases where Criminal Proceedings were initiated for committing the offence of Perjury under IPC 1872/BNS 2023.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025 [Senior Civil Judge Court, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh]

Index of Perjury Judgements is here.

Post Views: 962

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on June 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court hung the false 498A IPC case high and dry and reminded the High Courts of their solemn duty to stop the misuse of matrimonial laws as weapons.

From Para 8,

8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants never demanded any dowry from respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in fact used to leave the matrimonial house uninformed. In fact, on one such occasion when she left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021, appellant No.1 made a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police found her whereabouts, she was allegedly living with someone. Respondent No.2 after being counselled, returned to her matrimonial house. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1 wherein she admitted that she had left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 because of one Govindan, with whom she was talking over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She also stated that she would not repeat such acts in future. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondent No.2 again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and children behind….

From Para 18,

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

From Paras 19-21,

19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his family members.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24. Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and their children.Appellant Nos.2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos. 4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively.
25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

From Para 28,

28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

From Para 29, (Cover drive by Supreme Court!)

29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93461652/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759166862941119016e1691

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/2370197-dara-lakshmi-narayana-others?s=Dara%20Lakshmi%20Narayana&refine_search=&s_acts=

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/dara-lakshmi-narayana-others-v-state-of-telangana-another-2024-insc-953-498a-ipc-fir-quashed-1560806

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1285

https://advamritaverma.com/legal-updates/f/498-a-ipc-has-become-the-legal-weapon?blogcategory=CPC

The Order from Telangana High Court refusing to Quash the fake 498A IPC proceedings…

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 16 Feb 2022

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 1,426

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on June 26, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court cautioned High Courts about malicious matrimonial cases.

From Para 30,

30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 1,126

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Posted on June 26, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabad Bench identified a fake case and dust-binned it.

From Para 7,

7 At the outset, we would like to start with observations that in matrimonial disputes suppression of facts carry importance. In fact, the marriage stands on the footing of faith, feelings and respect for each other.
….
In the information that was collected by applicant No.1 from the Right to Information Officer, Kharghar Police Station would show that the informant has been addressed as Dr. Sou. Sandhya Ashok Kadam (not as ‘Sandhya Ajay Khare’). If she had gone to Police Station and according to her, First Information Report was not taken, then why she had not lodged the report after she went to Nanded i.e. to her parental home, has not been explained by her. It is easy to make allegations against others, but when it comes to false allegations, they are hard to prove. This is the classic example of misuse of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 2,957

BSA Sec 128 – Communications during marriage

Posted on June 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Communications during marriage.—No person who is or has been married, shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person who made it, or his representative in interest, consents, except in suits between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.

Equivalent to IEA Sec 122 – Communications during marriage

Post Views: 718

Anjali Sharma Vs Raman Upadhyay on 16 Jun 2025

Posted on June 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior Bench held that one fundamental right under Constitution must yield to another and, the right to fair trial must yield to right to privacy.

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. In order to achieve its object to simplify the rules of evidence and procedure, Section 14 of the Family Courts Act provides for an exception to the general rule of evidence regarding admissibility of any report, statements, documents, information or matter, which it considers necessary to assist it and to deal with it effectively. Apparently, such a provision is made keeping in view the nature of cases which are dealt with by the Family Courts. Needless to mention here that Section 14 of Family Courts Act is a special legislation and by virtue of this provision, the strict principles of admissibility of evidence as provided under the Evidence Act have been relaxed.
12. A cumulative reading of Section 14 & 20 of the Family Courts Act, takes within its ambit the restricted applications of the provisions of the Evidence Act qua the documentary evidence which includes electronic evidence, whether or not the same is otherwise admissible. The only guiding factor is that the Family Court should be of the opinion that such evidence would assist the Court to deal with the matrimonial dispute effectively. It is the absolute power and authority of the Family Court either to accept or discard particular evidence in finally adjudicating the matrimonial dispute. However, to say that a party would be precluded from placing such documents on record and/or such documents can be refused to be exhibited unless they are proved as per Evidence Act, runs contrary to the object of Section 14 of the Family Courts Act.

From Paras 18 and 19, (No fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute)

18. By reading the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Sharda & Puttaswami (supra), it is evident that right to privacy is recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of Constitution, but the same is not an absolute right. In case of necessity, a law can be framed permitting invasion to life and personal liberty. Section 14 of Family Courts Act and Section 122 of Indian Evidence Act are some such statutory provisions which permits invasion to right to privacy. It is worth mentioning here that vires of either of the aforesaid provisions are not under challenge and, therefore, the same have to be deemed as valid, fair and reasonable.
19. Since no fundamental right under our Constitution is absolute, in the event of conflict between two fundamental rights, as in this case, a contest between the right to privacy and the right to fair trial, both of which arise under Article 21 of our Constitution, the right to privacy may have to yield to the right to fair trial. Reference in this regard can be made to the observations of a 5-Judge Constitution Bench decision of Apex Court in Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in (2012)10 SCC 603

From Paras 20 and 21,

20. Reading the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Sharda, Puttaswamy & Sahara India (supra), it comes out loud and clear that even though right to privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right, the same is not absolute and is subject to exceptions and limitations. While a litigating party certainly has a right to privacy, that right must yield to the right of an opposing party to bring evidence it considers relevant to court, to prove its case. It is a settled concept of fair trial that a litigating party gets a fair chance to bring relevant evidence before court. It is important to appreciate that while the right to privacy is essentially a personal right, the right to fair trial has wider ramifications and impacts public justice, which is a larger cause. The cause of public justice would suffer if the opportunity of fair trial is denied by shutting-out evidence that a litigating party may wish to lead, at the very threshold. Saying otherwise, would negate the specific statutory provision contained in Section 14 of Family Courts Act, which says that evidence would be admissible, whether or not the same is otherwise admissible under Evidence Act.
21. If it were to be held that evidence sought to be adduced before a Family Court should be excluded based on an objection of breach of privacy right then the provisions of Section 14 would be rendered nugatory and dead-letter. It is to be borne in mind that Family Courts have been established to deal with matters that are essentially sensitive, personal disputes relating to dissolution of marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, legitimacy of children, guardianship, custody, and access to minors; which matters, by the very nature of the relationship from which they arise, involve issues that are private, personal and involve intimacies. It is easily foreseeable therefore, that in most cases that come before the Family Court, the evidence sought to be marshaled would relate to the private affairs of the litigating parties. If Section 14 is held not to apply in its full expanse to evidence that impinges on a person’s right to privacy, then not only of Section 14 but the very object of constitution of Family Courts shall be frustrated. Therefore, the test of admissibility would only be the relevance. Accordingly, fundamental considerations of fair trial and public justice would warrant that evidence be received if it is relevant, regardless of how it is collected. The purpose of legislating Section 14 would be frustrated if it is to give way to right of privacy.

From Para 35,

35. In view of the discussion made above, this court is of the opinion that the Legislature, being fully aware of the principals of admissibility of evidence, has enacted Section 14 in order to expand that principle in so far as disputes relating to marriage and family affairs are concerned. The Family Court is thereby freed of restrictions of the strict law of evidence. The only test under Section 14 for a Family Court to receive the evidence, whether collected legitimately or otherwise, is based upon its subjective satisfaction that the evidence would assist it to deal effectually with the dispute.

From Para 38,

38. In view of the discussion made above, it is held that:
(a) the evidence is admissible so long as it is relevant, irrespective of the fact how it is collected. The possible misuse of this rule of evidence, particularly in the context of the right to privacy, can be addressed by prudent exercise of judicial discretion by the Family Court, not at the time of receiving evidence but at the time of using evidence at the stage of adjudication;
(b) merely admitting evidence on record is not proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact. Admitting evidence is not even reliance by the court on such evidence. Admitting evidence is mere inclusion of evidence in record, to be assessed on a comprehensive set of factors, parameters and aspects, in the
discretion of the court;
(c) the test of ‘relevance’ ensures that the right of a party to bring evidence to court, and thereby to a fair trial, is not defeated. What weight is to be given to evidence so brought-in, and whether or not the court ultimately relies upon such evidence for proof of a fact-in-issue or a relevant fact, is always in the discretion of the court.
(d) merely because a court allows evidence to be admitted, does not mean that the person who has illegally collected such evidence is absolved of liability that may arise, whether in civil or criminal law or both;
(e) such evidence must be received and treated with caution and circumspection and to rule-out the possibility of any kind of tampering, the standard of proof applied by a court for the authenticity and accuracy of a such evidence should be more stringent as compared to other evidence;

Anjali Sharma Vs Raman Upadhyay on 16 Jun 2025

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Post Views: 992

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Evidence Act Sec 65 – Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Dowry Prohibition Officers of Andhra Pradesh working?

Cases where Perjury Proceedings were initiated

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Ajay Rajendra Khare and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra on 10 Jun 2025

BSA Sec 128 – Communications during marriage

Anjali Sharma Vs Raman Upadhyay on 16 Jun 2025