Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Posted on March 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.

Finally,

On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246

https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=

Chand Dhawan Vs. Jawaharlal Dhawan

SMT. CHAND DHAWAN Vs JAWAHARLAL DHAWAN

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal

https://www.simplekanoon.com/family-law/smt-chand-dhawan-v-jawaharlal-dhawan-1509/

https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5

Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.

Post Views: 2,123

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Posted on March 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an Order for Maintenance passed without adhering to the guidelines issued by Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha is liable to be set aside.

From Para 6,

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/husband would contend that no disclosure statement was filed by the respondent No.1 herein/wife and without the said statement, it is difficult to estimate the financial expenses of either of the parties to come to a conclusion as to how much amount is to be awarded to the respondent Nos.1 and 2 towards maintenance.

From Para 8,

8. A perusal of entire material on record coupled with the Order and Judgment passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, respectively, goes to show that either of the parties did not file disclosure statement. A disclosure statement in a Domestic Violence Case (DVC) refers to a document where a party involved in the case is required to provide detailed information about their financial assets and liabilities, including income, property ownership, bank accounts, and debt, as per the Court’s Order, usually to help in determining the appropriate maintenance or compensation amount in the case

From Para 10,

10. A plain reading of the above proposition of law, it is evident that while deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the Civil Court/Family Court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. The applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, to enable the Court to take into consideration the maintenance that was already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount and if the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding. In the case on hand, apparently, no disclosure statement was filed. It is mandatory that both husband and wife are supposed to file the disclosure statement before the trial Court. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the case in DVC No.27 of 2016 shall be remanded to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for trial of Prohibition and Excise Offences, Nellore, for fresh disposal.

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband.

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases under section 12 of DV Act is here.

Post Views: 835

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Posted on March 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabab held that

From Para 6,

6. Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.

From Paras 9 and 10,

9. As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learned A.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, it would not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially.The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter of Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in case of offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation is start on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the period of limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We may profitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads as under :-
“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P. C.’’
10. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further stated in paragraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally in favour of wife. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 of the Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the true object of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protecting the oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of Onkar Radha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993 AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay is properly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain a time barred matter in the interest of justice.

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. These observations have been made in the context of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with the aspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As against this in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) and Ramesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the question of limitation was directly involved and the same is answered referring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legal principle that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted in the backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has to be understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in the judgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which it is delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. It cannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems of geometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid three judgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun Vyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question of limitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court to deal with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.
14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shall commence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act of cruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitation for prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue for indefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intention of legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-A of the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C express provision could have been made for the said purpose.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025:BHC-AUG:2858-DB]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/bombay-high-court/bombay-high-court-cruelty-498a-ipc-limitation-283107

https://lawtrend.in/limitation-period-for-ipc-section-498-a-to-commence-from-last-act-of-cruelty-bombay-high-court/

Limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC commences from the last act of cruelty: Bombay HC

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/bombay-high-court/aurangabad-musin-babulal-thengade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-bhc-aug-2858-db-limitation-1567184

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 1,109

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Posted on February 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,

From Paras 10-12,

10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

From Para 31,

31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

From Paras 34-35,

34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Post Views: 1,142

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Posted on February 22, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this judgment whereby the marriage of parties is severed and Rs.25 Lakhs alimony was ordered to be paid to wife. Also since DV cases are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence/appearance of the appellant in these proceedings.

From Para 18,

18. In the afore-mentioned complaint case, an application10 was filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act against the appellant, her mother-in-law, and their five other relatives. A notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 21st July 2022. Subsequently, on 11th August 2022, the learned JMFC passed an interim order in favour of the respondent, prohibiting her eviction from the matrimonial home and directing the personal appearance of the appellant (respondent therein) and other respondents on the next hearing date. However, when the matter was listed again, the Court noticed that the appellant had not returned to India, and the concerned authorities were directed to initiate the extradition process against him.
We may observe that as the proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings. Thus, the learned Magistrate grossly erred while directing the appellant to remain personally present in the Court.

From Para 20,

20. It is apparent that the appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

From Para 26,

26. On the issue as to grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a very recent judgment of Rinku Baheti v Sandesh Sharda13, held that the factual analysis has to be undertaken in each case to determine as to what constitutes an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ while keeping in mind the non-exhaustive factors laid down in Shilpa Sailesh (supra).

From Para 31,

31. The filing of the aforesaid cases by the respondent-wife reflects her vindictive attitude towards the appellant and his family members and unambiguously reflects the bitterness that has seeped into the marital relationship. The tumultuous state of the marital relationship between the parties is quite evident, irrespective of the fate of the criminal complaints and the imputations made by the parties against each other. The passport of the appellant was also impounded by the concerned authorities, pursuant to the pending cases filed by the respondent.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Whatever may be the justification for the spouses living separately, with so much time having passed by any marital love or affection that may have developedbetween the parties seems to have evanesced. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged and multiple litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile are evidence enough to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no scope whatsoever for marriage to survive. Thus, no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship. On the basis ofthe above factual matrix, the present appears to be a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
36. Apart from the irreconcilable status of the relationship between the parties, in the present case, another factor that has weighed with this Court in favour of the exercise of the power under Article 142(1)of the Constitution of India is that there is no child born from the wedlock and therefore, any direction to allowthe parties to part ways would only affect the parties themselves and not any innocent child.
37. Thus, this is a fit case warranting the exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 42-43,

42. Before we conclude our discussion, we must note that the act of impounding the passport of the appellant by the concerned authorities of the Government of India was ex-facie illegal in the eyes of the law. In the present case, the appellant’s passport was impounded on the mere premise that the respondent has filed numerous cases before the various courts in India.
43. The law regarding the impounding of a passport of an individual has been settled by this Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.16, wherein it was held that the rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

From Paras 45-46,

45. Further, this Court, in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.17, while dealing with the question of arrest and fair investigation in a case alleging the offence of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, was of the view that in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine.
46. Applying the afore-mentioned legal principles to the present case, we find that the act of impounding the appellant’s passport under Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, was carried out without granting the appellant an opportunity to be heard. This clear violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act of impounding the passport ex-facie illegal. Consequently, we hold that the concerned authorities should release the appellant’s passport within a period of one week from today.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 254], [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97306350/

https://www.caseciter.com/vishal-shah-vs-monalisha-gupta-2025-insc-254-domestic-violence-act-passport-impounding-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage-permanent-alimony/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here. Divorce Judgments are here. Passport judgements are here.

Post Views: 1,195

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Posted on February 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on one Apex Court decision here and two High Court decisions here and here, a single judge bench of Telangana High Court pass this short Order.

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is filed to direct the lower Court i.e., Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date in the light of judgment reported in 2002 (1) Supreme Court Cases 253 and unreported Judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Syed Nazim Husain v. Additional Principal Judge in (W.P No. 56 of 2002) and the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Civil Application No.2939 of 2017 in W.P.No.14039 of 2017, dated 26.04.2018.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
3. An innocuous prayer has been sought for by the learned counsel for the petitioner to issue a direction to the Court below to dispose of the aforesaid Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date.
4. Having regard to the same, the Criminal Petition is disposed of directing the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016, within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, without granting any adjournment.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Post Views: 687

Nabaghana Sahoo Vs Smruti Prava Sahoo and Anr on 11 Feb 2025

Posted on February 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge from Orissa HC remanded a Maintenance Order back to Trial Court, for not complying with SC judgments in Rajnesh and Aditi, since neither of the parties has filed the disclosure affidavit as mandated in Rajnesh.

From Para 2,

2. …
It is further submitted by Mr. Mishra that admittedly neither of the parties has filed the disclosure affidavit in terms of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs. Neha and another; (2021) 2 SCC 324 which is the mandatory requirement for deciding application for maintenance under different provisions of law and although the Petitioner-husband has not filed such disclosure affidavit, but it is the mandatory requirement of the law as held in Rajnesh(supra).

From Para 3,

3. After having considered the rival submissions upon going through the materials placed on record, it appears that neither of the parties has filed the disclosure affidavit as mandated in Rajnesh(supra), but facts remain that the Apex Court in Rajnesh(supra) has issued a slew of directions in the form of guidelines making it mandatory for the Petitioner-Applicant to file disclosure affidavit at the time of bringing a proceeding for maintenance which is forthcoming from the following observation made by the Apex Court in paragraphs-72.2 and 72.3. In the above premises, viewing what should be the consequence for non-filing of disclosure affidavits which is mandatory in nature after the decision in Rajnesh(supra), this Court considers it useful to refer to the decision in Aditi Vs. Jitesh Sharma; (2023) SCC Online SC 1451

From Para 4,

4. It is also not in dispute that the judgment in Rajnesh(supra) was delivered on 4.11.2020 and the guidelines therein have been circulated to all the Courts in India for compliance, but it has not been followed in this case while passing the impugned judgment. When the principle culled out in a decision is directed to be followed mandatorily, the Court concerned is under obligation to follow such guidelines, but in this case, the learned trial Court having not followed the provisions of the guidelines issued in Rajnesh(supra), the matter is required to be remitted back for fresh disposal in accordance with law by complying the guidelines of the Rajnesh(supra).

From Para 5,

5. In the result, the revision stands allowed and the impugned judgment dated 22.07.2023 passed by learned Judge Family Court, Khurda in Criminal Petition No.431 of 2017 is hereby set aside. Ergo, the matter is remitted back for fresh disposal in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that the learned trial Court while adjudicating the matter afresh may receive the disclosure affidavits from the parties and provide opportunity to lead evidence on the very aspect of the disclosure affidavits by taking into consideration the mandatory guidelines of the Apex Court in Rajnesh(supra). Since the maintenance proceeding is pending between the parties from the year 2017, the learned trial Court is hereby requested to dispose of the aforesaid proceeding after remand as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Nabaghana Sahoo Vs Smruti Prava Sahoo and Anr on 11 Feb 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments which fail to follow RvN and AvJ Judgement is here.

Post Views: 728

Krishnawati Devi and 6 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 22 Jan 2025

Posted on February 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Paras 13-14,

13. From the above analysis, it is clear for holding a person liable u/s 3 of Domestic Violence Act, the following condition must be satisfied:
“The respondent must be related to the aggrieved person in the manner as mentioned in Section 2(f) and he lived or has been living together with aggrieved person in a shared household and then commits domestic violence in the manner mentioned in Section 3 of Domestic Violence Act.”
14. This Court came across number of cases where just to harass the family of husband or the person in domestic relationship, aggrieved party used to implicate the relatives of other side who are not even living or lived with the aggrieved person in shared household and they have been residing at separate places. Therefore, courts below while issuing notice u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act must look into this fact from the perusal of the application filed u/s 12 of the Domestic Violence Act along with other available record including the report of the Protection Officer, if available on record. It is further observed that the concerned courts before issuing notices to the persons impleaded as respondents in the application under Domestic Violence Act should satisfy about the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in paragraph no. 13 of this judgment.

From Para 20,

20. The court below is free to proceed against applicant nos. 1 and 7 and decide Case No. 59 of 2016 (Smrita Srivastava Vs. Rajiv Kumar Srivastava and others) expeditiously within a period of 60 days from the date of receiving the copy of this order.

Krishnawati Devi and 6 Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 22 Jan 2025

Index of DV cases is here.

Post Views: 803

Madan Kumar Satpathy Vs Priyadarshini Pati on 07 Feb 2025

Posted on February 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Orissa HC reduced the maintenance amount granted by a Trial Court.

From Para 4,

4. Law never appreciates those wives, who remain idle only to saddle the liability of paying maintenance on the husband by not working or not trying to work despite having proper and high qualification. It is found in this case that the OP-wife had earlier worked in some media houses and she has got definite prospect to work and earn her livelihood. The intention and objective of legislature in enacting Section 125 of CrPC is to provide succor to those wives, who are unable to maintain themselves and have no sufficient income for their sustenance. The social objective behind the provision for grant of maintenance, if considered on the admitted facts as discussed in this case, it would go to disclose the wife’s need and requirement to be balanced not only with the income and liability of the husband, but also has to be considered on the backdrop of the education and prospect of the wife to earn.

Madan Kumar Satpathy Vs Priyadarshini Pati on 07 Feb 2025

Index of maintenance judgment u/s 144 BNSS here.

Post Views: 814

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Posted on February 12, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this order to a reference from a division bench.

From Para 6,

6. The following questions arise for our consideration:
(i)Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act?
(ii)Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section 11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

From Para 26,

26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of Section 25 uses the word “may”. A grant of a decree under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.

From Paras 27 and 28,

27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant interim maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree contemplated under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending the proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the 1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
(i) There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
(ii) the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned above are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary as the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct of the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to pay a reasonable amount.

Final conclusions:

29. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
a. A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section 25 is always discretionary; and
b. Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied. While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24, the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24 is always discretionary.

Sukhdev Singh Vs Sukhbir Kaur on 12 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 197]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-interim-maintenance-can-be-granted-even-when-marriage-is-void-under-hindu-marriage-act-supreme-court-283751

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/spouse-of-void-marriage-under-hindu-marriage-act-entitled-to-permanent-alimonymaintenance-supreme-court

https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=18508

https://lawtrend.in/hindu-marriage-act-alimony-and-maintenance-granted-even-if-marriage-is-void-supreme-court/

Index of Maintenance Judgements under HMA here.

Post Views: 912

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