Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. By order dated 02.09.2023, the Trial Court held that since the complainant was yet to be cross-examined, no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. It was also held that the amendment was in the nature of a typographical error, moved at an initial stage of the case. So holding the amendment was allowed.

From Para 9,

9. The learned counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish the judgement in S.R. Sukumar’s case (supra) by contending that in the said case amendment was sought and allowed at the pre-cognizance stage and as such the said case can have no application here. We are unable to countenance the said submission.

From Paras 15-19,

15. It will be appropriate to observe that amendments/alterations are not alien to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the power of Court to alter any charge and the concept of prejudice to the accused. No doubt when a charge is altered, what is altered is the legal provision and its application to a certain set of facts. The facts per se may not be altered. However, the section does throw some light in considering the issue of amendments.
16. It will be noticed that when a charge is altered, if there is no prejudice to the accused, the trial can be proceeded with. Further, if it is likely to prejudice, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial to such period. Section 217 of the Cr.P.C. grants liberty to the prosecutor and the accused to recall witnesses when charges are altered under the conditions prescribed therein. The test of ‘prejudice to the accused’ is the cardinal factor that needs to be borne in mind.
17. We have carefully perused the complaint and the application for amendment. The amendment was moved at a stage when after summons being issued to the respondents, the chief examination of the complainant had concluded and when cross-examination was awaited. The amendment made is also only with regard to the products supplied. According to the complainant, while what was supplied was “milk”, by an inadvertent error “Desi Ghee (milk products)” was mentioned. The error which occurred in the legal notice was carried in the complaint also.
18. On the facts of the present case and considering the stage of the trial, we find that absolutely no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. The actual facts will have to be thrashed out at the trial. As to what impact the amendment will have on the existence of debt or other liability is for the Trial Court to decide based on the evidence. It was a curable irregularity which the Trial Court rightly addressed by allowing the amendment. It could not be said that by allowing the amendment at a stage when the evidence of the complainant was incomplete, failure of justice would occasion.
19. The High Court completely mis-directed itself in delving into the aspects of leviability of GST which would be the concern of the appropriate authorities under the relevant statute. It could also not be said that the amendment altered the nature and character of the complaint.

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Post Views: 855

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Posted on July 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 18,

18. In the present case, First Information Report No. 501 of 2019, under Sections 323, 354, 498A, 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Police Station Mandion, District Lucknow was lodged on 14.06.2019 by the opposite party No.4 and during the course of investigation, FIR and its consequential proceedings were challenged before this Court, and thereafter, matter was referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court with the consent of counsel for the opposite party No.4 on the first date and it was successfully concluded and presently opposite party No.4 is enjoying her matrimonial life and residing with her husband and children. As in the case of Ram Lal Yadav (supra), this Court held that Investigating
Officer can not be restrained from arresting the accused of a cognizable offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and Ramawatar (supra) already held that FIR and its consequential proceedings can be quashed (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.), therefore, this Court is of the view that impugned FIR and its consequential proceedings is liable to be quashed in terms of settlement agreement of parties before Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Post Views: 827

Ekta Kapur Vs Kunal Kapur on 21 May 2025

Posted on July 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

In a sweet twist of events, a well-reasoned contested Divorce Judgment (on the ground of cruelty) is converted into a nice MCD settlement by a division bench of the Apex Court…

From Para 3,

3. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant-wife against the impugned judgment dated 02.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 321/2018, by which divorce has been granted under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to the respondent-husband.

but from Para 8,

8. Accordingly, we dispose of the present appeal in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties as noted above. The terms and conditions be strictly complied with by the respective parties within the time frame indicated in the settlement. Further, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court stands set aside and the parties are granted a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Registry to draw up a decree accordingly.

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. As the details of such cases/complaints are not specifically written in the settlement, we deemed it appropriate to ask the learned senior counsel, who have furnished the details of such cases/complaints. Accordingly, as per the list furnished by them, the following cases stand not only quashed but all observations made against any of the parties stand expunged:-
1. Petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C. filed by petitioner/wife against respondent-husband, bearing no.MT No.447/23 before Mr. Anil Kumar, PJFC, Dwarka, Delhi.
2. Petition u/s 12 of DV Act filed by petitioner/wife against respondent/husband and his family members, bearing no.MC No.712/23 before Ms. Surbhi, JMFC, Dwarka, Delhi.
3. Police complaint by petitioner/wife against respondent/husband and his parents at P.S. Dwarka (Dabri Moor), Delhi.
4. Police complaint by petitioner/wife against respondent/husband and his parents at P.S. Sector 56, Gurugram, Haryana.
12. Since we have expunged those remarks, in law, the said observations/remarks do not exist anymore and thus, any media link showing such expunged remarks will have to be mandatorily put down and if the same is not done, it is open for the parties to approach the concerned competent authority which shall ensure that the same are taken off the link.

Ekta Kapur Vs Kunal Kapur on 21 May 2025

Post Views: 990

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of AP High Court has set aside the 498A IPC conviction… one of the reasons being a Counterblast case.

From Para 23,

23) It is to be seen that, none of the witnesses clearly indicate as to when and also the nature of cruelty meted out to PW1. It is not as if A1 and PW1 lived only for a short period. The record shows that both of them lived together for more than three years. That being the position, some specific time period should have been mentioned with regard to the acts of harassment. Except saying that all the accused harassed, the evidence of PW1 to PW4 is silent as to the nature of harassment meted out to PW1. Whether it was beating or by any other method. The usage of word ‘harassed’ in loose manner, in my view, cannot be taken as amounting to cruelty, unless, the evidence disclosing the nature of the harassment falling within the meaning of cruelty as deposed in 498A IPC. Further, as observed earlier, the nature of harassment spoken to by PW1 to PW4 are inconsistent with each other. Each witness is improving the case. What is spoken to by one witness is not spoken to by another witness.

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Index of Quash judgments here.

Post Views: 878

Evidence Act Sec 65 – Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.––Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:
(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power ––
of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or
of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or
of any person legally bound to produce it,
and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in 1[India] to be given in evidence;
(g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.

Post Views: 629

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from this Magistrate, with legally-valid reasons and conclusions… and also directing perjury proceedings to be initiated…

From Para 26,

26. The first and foremost contention of the accused and their counsel is that FIR No: 488/2017 is barred by limitation, as such the court shall dismiss the proceedings and as per exhibit P1, the alleged last act of cruelty has taken place on 18.09.2012, so the limitation period was expired on 17.09.2015, but the report was given on 03.08.2017, therefore the proceedings are time barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C. while section 473 Cr.P.C provides an exception to bar of limitation, but its application is not automatic and there must be an explanation by the prosecution for such inordinate delay. Since the case is barred by limitation, the court is required to dismiss the proceedings. In support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments:
A. Kamlesh Kalra v. Shilpa Kalra & Ors. Reported in 2020 0 Supreme (SC) 605 wherein it was held that “ As regards, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of complaint/FIR filed under Section 498A IPC, we are of the firm opinion that the same does not call for interference. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time barred, having been filed much more than three years after the separation of Manish Kalra(husband) and Shilpika Kalra (wife) and the filing of the divorce petition by the husband, both in 2009. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court”.
B. Gudipati Mallikarjun Rao v. Gudiapati Saranya 2023 0 Supreme (A.P) 582 wherein it was held that “ In the circumstances, it would have to be held that the complainant, filed by the defacto complainant, is beyond the period prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C”.
C. Arun Vyas & Anr. V. Anitha Vyas 1999 0 Crl LJ 3479 wherein it was held that “ the court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 498-A of IPC, if the FIR is time barred, unless the delay is properly explained and condoned under Section 473 of the CrPC”.
D. Korimerla Videesha Vs. State of A.P. wherein it was held that “ According to Rule 10 of the A.P. Dowry Prohibition Rules, any offence under Section 3 and 4 or any dispute under Section 6 of the Act shall be filed before expiry of one year and finalized within two years from the date of filing”.

From Para 28,

28. In the case on hand the alleged demand for additional dowry was finally made on 18.9.2012 and that is the last date of alleged harassment. Even if the evidence of P.W.1 that the matter is place before the elders in 2013 has taken into consideration, the report is given after 4 years of said incident. But the report was given on 03.08.2017 i.e after 4 years of alleged harassment. So it can be safely conclude that the report is barred by limitation and the court has no power to take cognizance.

From Paras 36-37,

36. He further submitted that the conduct of P.W.1 amounts to perjury and warrants initiation of appropriate proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C in order to uphold the rule of law and protect sanctity of justice delivery system. On perusal of the record it appears that after filing the petition under section 340 Cr.P.C., my learned predecessor in the office returned the petition with some objections and the said petition is represented. But the said petition is again returned with endorsement previous objections not complied with and at present the said petition is not pending before the court. Here it is pertinent to mention that after assuming charge of this court, the said petition did not come before me and I have not given any assurance to the
counsel for the accused as mentioned in his written arguments.
37. During the cross examination P.W.1 denied that she completed her B.Tech in the year 2012. As per the evidence of D.W.1, Professor and controller of examination, JNTU Kakinada, P.W.1 completed her engineering graduation in April 2012 and on 16.10.2012 the student collected her provisional certificate from the college and as per the college rules, they cannot produce the provisional certificate of the student unless it is applied by the student. The evidence of D.W.1 clinchingly proves that P.W.1 completed her B.tech in April 2012 from JNTU. The evidence on record shows she intentionally denied that she completed her B.tech in 2012 and she has given false evidence on oath. Hence, she is certainly liable for punishment for giving false evidence. Hence, the Superintendent of this court is directed to give report before 3rd Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate Court against P.W.1 for giving false evidence.

From Paras 39, 41 and 42,

39. Learned counsel for the accused further contended that despite clear admissions of P.W.1 about unregistered land sale deeds dated 31.05.2010, 27.06.2011, this court refused to mark the said photocopies solely on the ground that they were not originals and this refusal is patently erroneous and it is settled law u/s 65 (c) of Indian Evidence Act, the secondary evidence is admissible where the original is lost or not in the possession of the party and a proper foundation is laid.
41. To mark the photocopies of documents, the party who intends to mark shall explain where is the original and as to why he is marking the photocopies of the documents. If the document is with the other party, first he has to give notice to the other party and even after receiving notice the other party fails to produce the document, then he can mark the photocopy. If he lost the original then also he is entitled to mark the photocopy, but in the case on hand there is no material on record to show that the accused or prosecution has given notice to other party to produce the documents and that the originals were lost. Without complying the conditions of section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, blaming this Court that the decision of the court is erroneous is not acceptable.
42. Learned counsel for the accused mentioned in his written arguments that the non production of the original unregistered sale deeds was reasonably explained during cross examination and it was put to P.W.1 that since accused no longer had access to the original land sale deeds dated. 31.05.2010 and 27.06.2011 since the property was transferred to Ch. Appala Raju and the denial of suggestion does not itself negate the reasonable explanation offered by the accused. On perusal of entire cross examination of P.W.1 it appears no such suggestion was given to P.W.1. As such the
contention of counsel for accused that they have given reasonable explanation for not filing the originals is not at all acceptable.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Post Views: 960

Dowry Prohibition Officers of Andhra Pradesh working?

Posted on July 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

After failing to make sense of the hypocrisy of Police and Judiciary on the fact that Dowry giving is equally punishable as much as Dowry taking under same section i.e., Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, so I decided to go in a different route.

The usual combo of offences that Police add to a FIR in a matrimonial crime is Section 498A IPC (Max Imprisonment is 3 years with fine) + Section 3 of DP Act (Imprisonment not less than five years with fine) + Section 4 of DP Act (Imprisonment not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine).

So, this time my attack is to target the larger offence in this combo i.e., Section 3 of DP Act (Imprisonment not less than five years with fine) and cripple the false Criminal matrimonial cases to half.

How to do that? I found one aspect from the DP Act itself that I can use to poke the eyes of devil of the false Criminal matrimonial cases. Section 8B of DP Act. As is evident, this is just the first piece of the larger puzzle. Few more PILs are necessary to break the back of this nonsense but one may not survive until that glorious moment. I will document next steps/PILs shortly.

After some research and RTI applications, found that Government of Andhra Pradesh under G.O.Ms.No. 69 dt: 24-Jun-1989 and some other G.O.s, designated the Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collectors take up cases under Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, instead of Police Department. Now, every tom, dick and harry in our Sunshine State knows that the Revenue Divisional Officers/Sub-Collectors in our State are NOT taking up cases under Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 due to ignorance or reluctance. Quite a nice bit of realization that this deserves a PIL to fix it! Hence this PIL.

Here is the G.O. copy received from Women Development and Child Welfare Department, Government of AP. It is not legible so better you file RTI and get a neat copy for yourself.

1989-Jun-24 G.O.Ms.No. 69

Here is the Petition copy:

2025-07-08 Dowry Prohibition Officers under sec 8B of DPA v0.1

On 16-Jul-2025, Court-1 heard me and directed Respondents to file Counter.

Sandeep Bhavan Pamarati Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 16-Jul-2025

On 31-Jul-2025: Contacted the Special GP today seeking to know if any instructions were received but she clarified no instructions were yet issued. She did say it is a for a ‘good cause‘. Even though I know that already, happy that, a woman backed my PIL

On 08-Oct-2025, as expected, no Counter was filed by the Respondents and shamelessly, sought time and the ever-benevolent High Court granted them 3 months time.

NDOH: 28-Jan-2026

1 Sandeep Bhavan Pamarati Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 08-Oct-2025

On 15-Nov-2025, unexpectedly, I got to know that the Director, Women and Development and Child Welfare Department, Guntur has issued a letter to all Collectors and District Magistrates vide Lr.No. WDC02-25022/2019-PROGRAMS SEC. dt:04-08-2025. Content? On 16-Jul-2025, the AG’s office shot a letter to Director, WDCW Department, Guntur regarding my PIL, since on the same day the first hearing happened! Here is the copy of that letter. Thanks to Vinay Kumar K _/\_

2025-08-04 Women And child welfare department issue letter for distirct Collectors

On 28-Jan-2026, Court-1 did not convene. Still the Office of AG sent me a copy of the Counter filed on behalf of Respondent No.3 (Women Development and Child welfare Department). Read it. Share it. Enjoy it.

2026-01-28 Reply by R3 LAW040301283

Prepared a ‘nice’ Rejoinder and filed into Court on 05-Feb-2026. Let’s see what happens next. Thanks a lot to ChatGPT and Google Gemini for proof-reading and improving my Rejoinder!

2026-02-05 Rejoinder to the Counter of R3 v0.1

No new date yet. Court-1 was not convened. Need to mention on Monday.

On 11-Feb-2026, the PIL was listed but did not reach. It was listed for 18-Mar-2026.

On 18-Mar-2026, what will happen?

Never expected that someone at the stature of the Chief Justice of a High Court can be such a dumb-ass idiotic muff. Read the Order below yourself and tally it against the Prayers of PIL.

2026-03-18 Sandeep Bhavan Pamarati Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 18-Mar-2026

Silver lining is even for name same (only for this PIL sake), Dowry Advisory Boards were activated hurriedly from August 2025. Let’s see if this continues. To check same, already filed RTI applications to all three Respondents. Still awaiting replies.

EN500288002IN delivered at AP POLICE HQ, Mangalagiri on 30 Mar 2026
Representation to SPIO, DGP Office, regarding DPO+Police Activities wrt DP Act/G.O.Ms.No. 69
Wait until 30-Apr-2026

EN500287885IN delivered at AP Secretariat on 30 Mar 2026
Representation to PIO, Revenue Department, regarding DPO Activities
Wait until 30-Apr-2026

EN500287885IN delivered at Guntur on 30 Mar 2026
Representation to PIO, Commissioner of WDCW Department, regarding DPO Activities
Wait until 30-Apr-2026

I did receive some replies based on which I am initiating Round-2 of the litigation on this subject here.

Same attack to be done in Telangana, Kerala and Karnataka too. RTIs filed. Telangana PIL is here.

Index to all Goals here.

Post Views: 1,084

Cases where Perjury Proceedings were initiated

Posted on July 3, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

This page lists some cases where Criminal Proceedings were initiated for committing the offence of Perjury under IPC 1872/BNS 2023.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025 [Senior Civil Judge Court, Gajuwaka, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh]

Index of Perjury Judgements is here.

Post Views: 911

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on June 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court hung the false 498A IPC case high and dry and reminded the High Courts of their solemn duty to stop the misuse of matrimonial laws as weapons.

From Para 8,

8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants never demanded any dowry from respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in fact used to leave the matrimonial house uninformed. In fact, on one such occasion when she left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021, appellant No.1 made a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police found her whereabouts, she was allegedly living with someone. Respondent No.2 after being counselled, returned to her matrimonial house. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1 wherein she admitted that she had left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 because of one Govindan, with whom she was talking over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She also stated that she would not repeat such acts in future. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondent No.2 again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and children behind….

From Para 18,

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

From Paras 19-21,

19. Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.
20. Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.
21. Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No. 1 and his family members.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24. Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and their children.Appellant Nos.2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos. 4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively.
25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

From Para 28,

28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

From Para 29, (Cover drive by Supreme Court!)

29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 10 Dec 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93461652/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759166862941119016e1691

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/2370197-dara-lakshmi-narayana-others?s=Dara%20Lakshmi%20Narayana&refine_search=&s_acts=

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/dara-lakshmi-narayana-others-v-state-of-telangana-another-2024-insc-953-498a-ipc-fir-quashed-1560806

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1285

https://advamritaverma.com/legal-updates/f/498-a-ipc-has-become-the-legal-weapon?blogcategory=CPC

The Order from Telangana High Court refusing to Quash the fake 498A IPC proceedings…

Dara Lakshmi Narayana and 6 Ors Vs State of Telangana and Anr on 16 Feb 2022

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 1,349

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Posted on June 26, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court cautioned High Courts about malicious matrimonial cases.

From Para 30,

30. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

Mohammad Wajid and Anr Vs State of U.P. and Ors on 08 Aug 2023

Index of Quash judgments is here.

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