Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court did settlement between parties at around 6 Crore rupees, but at least acknowledged and reproduced Delhi High Court observations. Thanks

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. In this case, the High Court observed that the appellant’s income, primarily from employment and investments, demonstrated his ability to provide for the wife and child’s maintenance adequately. The evidence revealed that the appellant earned over ₹4,00,000 (Rupees four lakhs only) per month
between 2007 and 2016. Although he claimed higher living expenses due to his residence in Mauritius, the High Court found his arguments to be unsubstantiated, as his financial resources allowed him to meet maintenance obligations without undue hardship. The High Court further noted several instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process. He withheld critical financial documents and selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth. The inquiry into the statutory forms of the appellant revealed that he had investments in mutual funds valued at ₹5.10 crores as early as 2009-2010, significant sums deposited in bank accounts, and other financial transactions that were not initially disclosed.
15. The High Court also identified false representations by the appellant regarding his property and income. He denied ownership of a property located at F-146, Richmond Park, Gurgaon, despite evidence of its ownership and rental income accruing to him. Additionally, the appellant misrepresented his association with Prasham Consultants LLP, wherein he continued to receive financial benefits until his father replaced him in 2016. These findings demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets by the appellant, aimed at minimizing his maintenance liability. Such conduct warranted judicial intervention to ensure justice and provide adequate financial support to the wife and child, reflecting principles of fairness, transparency, and equity. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interim maintenance that adequately addressed the needs of the wife and child, proportionate to his financial capacity and consistent with the obligations of a responsible spouse and parent.

From Paras 29

29. The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The issue of maintenance pendente lite is now infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony. The learned senior counsels for the parties have made submissions at length regarding the financial condition of both the parties. In order to establish the correct financial position of both the parties, they have filed their respective affidavits of income and assets as ordered by this Court.

From Para 34,

34. In the present case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years. We have perused the records of finances produced before us. Even though the records of the DEMAT accounts and the employment letters produced by the appellant are almost ten years ago or earlier, his financial position can be suitably ascertained from them.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 961], [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 969]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102090299/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759168762941119016e16ef

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-shouldnt-penalize-husband-but-should-ensure-decent-living-for-wife-supreme-court-lists-out-factors-277959

Parvin Kumar Jain vs Anju Jain Divorce Case

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/parvin-kumar-jain-vs-anju-jain

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/marriage-be-dissolved-if-succumbed-due-long-standing-differences-supreme-court

PARVIN KUMAR JAIN vs. ANJU JAIN

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1281

Supreme Court Upholds Financial Security in Marriage Breakdown: A Case Study

Alimony Decoded: 8 Critical Guidelines to Ensure Fair Settlements in Divorce Cases

The impugned Order from the Delhi High Court is below. Few relevant Paras from the said Order follow.

41. The Husband disputes the aforesaid finding on concealment. On behalf of the Husband, it has been strenuously urged that the Family Court though takes note of the affidavit dated 11thMay, 2018 filed by the Husband however, it does not deal with the same. We have carefully gone through the said affidavit. In our view, the said affidavit was yet another attempt on the part of the Husband to mislead the Family Court and conceal particulars of his income as well as assets.
47. On behalf of the Husband, it has been vehemently argued that it is the Wife who has filed false affidavits before this Court to the effect that she lives in a rented house and is paying rent on a regular basis. It is further alleged that the Wife has filed a forged Rent Agreement to claim that she is paying monthly rent to one Ms Sudesh Bansal. It is submitted that the Wife has failed to disclose that the house in which she lives has been transferred by Ms Sudesh Bansal in favour of the Wife’s mother vide registered General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell dated 25th June, 2009. On the basis of the aforesaid averments, an application has been filed by the Husband under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C before the Family Court, which is yet to be decided.
49. In our view, the explanation offered by the Wife is plausible. A perusal of the Rent Agreement dated 13th December, 2011 shows that the Wife was paying rent of Rs.11,000/- per month. It is not the case of the Husband that the Wife owns the said property or that she has paid any amount towards the purchase of the said property. There is nothing placed on record which would have us believe that what was apparent was not real. The Husband, in our opinion, is seeking to muddy the waters. The Husband’s concealments have been alluded to above. The Husband’s contentions on this count are, therefore, rejected. In our opinion, this cannot be a ground to deny the lawful maintenance to the Wife.
50. It must be emphasized that the discussion above leaves no doubt in our minds that the Husband has grossly concealed the real income as well as his movable and immovable assets in order to avoid paying the rightful amount of maintenance to the wife. The Family Court has correctly returned findings with regard to the earnings of the husband as well as attempts on the part of the Husband to conceal his real income.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 01 Aug 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony cases under HMA is here.

Post Views: 283

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Posted on September 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court ruled that none of the offences in the FIR were made out against the Petitioners.

From Paras 8-12,

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the FIR dated 06.02.2022 as well as the final report, we are of the considered opinion that the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants pursuant to the registration of offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code deserve to be quashed.
9. Before examining the FIR along with the complaint of the complainant, we may refer to the parameters that are to be borne in mind while entertaining the prayer for quashing of the FIR. If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified. Vague and general allegations cannot lead to forming of a prima facie case. As regards the ingredients for making out an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code is concerned, the requirement is that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. The latter part of the provision refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives. These aspects have been considered in detail in a recent decision in Digambar and Another (supra) (to which one of us, B.R. Gavai, J, as he then was, was a party).
10. A perusal of the FIR and its consideration in entirety indicates that statements of a general nature have been made therein as against the present appellants. The complainant states that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery. When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members. Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars. There are other omnibus statements made in the complaint without any particulars whatsoever. It is also to be noted that for the purpose of constituting an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, cruelty as indicated in the Explanation to the said provision must be stated to be inflicted. The cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. Such allegations are absent in the present case. We do not find that on a complete reading of the complaint, a prima facie case for proceeding under Section 498-A of the Penal Code has been made out against the appellants.
11. As regards the offence punishable under Sections 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code is concerned, it is seen that the allegations in this regard have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants. The entire tenor of the complaint in that regard seeks to implicate the complainant’s husband and all incidents stated therein relate to him. There is no allegation whatsoever in that context against the appellants that would require them to face trial on that count. The proceedings insofar as the present appellants are concerned, thus, deserve to be quashed in their entirety. In our view, the High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that on the touchstone of the law laid down in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others2, a case has been made out by the appellants for quashing of the criminal proceedings lodged against them under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Continuation of these proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and, hence, the appellants are entitled to relief.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 812

Resham Lal Dewangan Vs Suman Dewangan on 09 May 2025

Posted on September 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of High Court of Chhattisgarh held that once a divorce decree is granted on the ground that wife is living in adultery then, wife suffers from the disqualification to claim maintenance from her ex-husband.

From Paras 19-21,

19.Sub- Section 4 of Section 125 of the CrPC provides that if a woman lives in adultery, whose marriage is still subsisting, she is not entitled for
maintenance from her husband. Suppose, a decree for divorce is granted on the ground of her living in adultery, can it be said that the said disqualification of which she was suffering from all along, during the subsistence of the marriage, will cease to exist, because of the decree for divorce?. The prudent answer to this question shall be an emphatic – “No”. The decree obtained by the husband for divorce on proving the adulterous life of the wife cannot give a license to her to continue to live in illicit relationship and to get her right to claim maintenance revived. Therefore, I conclude that a divorced wife, who lives in adultery, viz., living in illicit relationship with man other than her former husband is disqualified from claiming maintenance, under Section 125 of the Code.
20.If once the decree for divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, such finding is relevant for deciding the issue of adultery in the present case. The decree is a decree passed on proof of the claim made by means of sufficient evidence which has not been challenged by the aggrieved party.
21.Considering the aforesaid legal proposition of law and considering the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the decree for divorce
granted by the family Court in favour of the applicant-husband is sufficient proof that the applicant-wife was living in adultery. When once such a decree is in force, it is not possible for this Court to take a different view contrary to the decree granted by the Civil court. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the decree granted by the Family Court clearly goes to prove that the applicant-wife is living in adultery and thus, applicant-wife suffers from the disqualification to claim maintenance from the petitioner.

Resham Lal Dewangan Vs Suman Dewangan on 09 May 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here. Index of Maintenance judgments is here.

Post Views: 500

K.Harish Kumar Vs Vanathy Rajkumar on 24 Apr 2024

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court held as follows,

From Para 8,

8. Having heard the learned counsels on either side, perused the entire material on record. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajnesh Vs. Neha1, if there is any dispute with respect to the declaration made in the affidavit of disclosure, the aggrieved party shall seek permission of the Court to serve interrogatories and seek production of relevant documents from the opposite party. The Court had elaborately discussed about the difficulties that the Court faces while granting interim maintenance and without material it is done on the guess work. As per the judgment of the Apex Court, they have to produce bank statements, income tax returns at least for two years prior to the application. Even if the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is taken into consideration that the bank account is a joint account, still the respondent have to disclose the statement which is two years prior to the closing date of the account and whatever is the income as per the bank statement or whatever are the details or the relevant factors, the duty is cast upon the wife to produce all these documents.
9. In that view of the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of this writ petition directing the wife to produce income tax returns, bank statements two years prior to 26.08.2019. The husband shall cooperate with the Court below in deciding the application for interim maintenance. No further adjournments shall be granted by the Court. The Court below shall stick to the same schedule as per the orders passed in WP.No.3267/2024 dated 11.03.2024.

K.Harish Kumar Vs Vanathy Rajkumar on 24 Apr 2024

Index of maintenance cases is here.

Post Views: 610

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that IPC 420 and IPC 406 offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

From Para 21,

21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No.2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Post Views: 1,272

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. A Division Bench of this Court in Saumya Ann Thomas v. The Union of India and others [MANU/KE/0255/2010] held that the stipulation of a period of two years as the minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and the period of two years has to be read as one year. This was taking note of the one year period stipulated in Section 28(1) of the Special Marriage Act, Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 32B(1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act.

From Paras 6-7,

6. Divorce by mutual consent reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The legislature has put safeguards against impulsive decisions that may permeate such a decision by stipulating a gestation period before presenting a petition for divorce on mutual consent. This period will insulate possible peril that may ensue for the parties as a follow-up of the decision for mutual separation. In the Indian social context, though marriages are solemnized by two individuals, it is seen more as a union for laying the foundation for a strong family and society. Many laws have been made and many rights have been created based on familial relationships. The legislature, therefore, decided that a minimum period of separation must precede before presentation of a petition for divorce on the ground of mutual consent.
7. The problem presented in this case is when the waiting period itself would cause hardship to the parties. Can the law command parties to sit at the
fence and suffer the agony? The legislature in its wisdom contemplated possible repercussions of such fixation of minimum period that would result in
hardships to spouses and accordingly allowed the Courts to entertain a petition within the minimum period in exceptional cases. This is how Section
29 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, enabled the Courts to entertain the petition to be presented before one year had lapsed from the date of marriage. There is no corresponding provision in the Divorce Act for the Court to permit the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent until the mandatory period of one year has lapsed from the date of separation. The constitutional validity of the mandatory period is, therefore, questioned in the writ petition filed by the parties. This Court in Saumya’s case (supra) had no occasion to advert to the validity of the minimum mandatory period by which spouses are denied the remedy of approaching the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or from the date of separation.
The above reasoning of the Court would clearly show that the decision rendered and the conclusion arrived at was on a premise that the mandatory
minimum residence period of two years for Christians is discriminatory as there is no such prescription of two years under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act etc. This Court, however, considers the question in these cases on a different ground; whether in the absence of any provisions allowing the parties to a marriage to move the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or the date of separation. Can the provisions stand the test of constitutional scrutiny? The plea of arbitrariness would arise in this context of denial of judicial remedy to approach the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or separation.

From Para 11,

11. We hold that the fixation of the minimum period of separation of one year as stipulated under Section 10A is violative of the fundamental right and accordingly, strike it down.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Post Views: 897

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that Family Courts do have power to waive the cooling of period in a divorce by mutual consent under Indian Divorce Act.

From Paras 8-10,

8.The only point that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory waiting period of one year from the date of separation has to be compulsorily
sat through by the parties, who have already decided to part ways, by filing a mutual consent divorce petition. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Anup Disalva’s case, took note of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Saumya Ann Thomas vs Union of India reported in 2010 SCC Online Kerala 5197 and held that the stipulation of a period of two years being a minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and that the said two year period has to be read as one year, taking into account the one year period stipulated in similar legislations namely the Special Marriage Act ( Section 28(1) ) Hindu Marriage Act ( Section 13B(1)) and Parsi Marriage Act (Section 32B(1)).
9.The Honourable Division Bench further took note of the fact that an application for divorce by mutual consent presented by both the husband and
wife reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The Honourable Division Bench taking note of the entitlement of a spouse to file a petition for divorce under Section 10 on other available grounds, without any waiting period and the entitlement and power of the Court to grant a divorce, even before the period of one year, subject to being satisfied with the ground seeking divorce being made out, held that, while that is the position even for a contested proceeding before the Court, there can be no spokes put, impeding the parties from seeking divorce by mutual consent. The Honourable Division Bench, in fact, declared the stipulation of one year period or more, for the purposes of filing a divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A, as violative of fundamental rights and declared it to be unconstitutional.
10.Though said judgment of the Kerala High Court may not have a binding precedentiary value before this Court, the judgment will definitely have persuasive value, for this Court to take note of the ratio laid down by the Honourable Division Bench.
11.Even otherwise, the Honourable Supreme Court, in Shilpa Sailesh’s case, has clarified the ratio laid down in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur,
reported in 2017 (8) SCC 746, and held that the Courts can always waive the cooling period of six months under the Hindu Marriage Act to enable the parties to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, earlier.
12.However, the Family Court has relied on Amardeep Singh’s case, to hold that the one year separation period is mandatory under section 13B(1) of
the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore similarly even under the Divorce Act the cooling period cannot be condoned or waived.

From Paras 16-18,

16.Even though there is no decision of this Court toeing the same lines of the Kerala High Court, striking down the provisions of Section 10A regarding the mandatory waiting period, considering the import of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh’s case as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Kerala High Court, the Family Court is certainly entitled to waive the mandatory waiting period and cannot compel the parties to sit through the same before presenting a petition for divorce in the form of mutual consent, under Section 10A of the Divorce Act.
17.Independently, I also find that both the petitioners have filed separate affidavits even in this revision, affirming their decision to go separate ways. The interest of any children is also not involved in the present case, since the parties were not blessed with any issues and both the petitioners have categorically asserted that the relationship has become irreconcilable and distressing. In such circumstances, compelling the petitioners to wait for the mandatory period to expire would only further increase their agony. The petitioners have also stated that their decision is voluntary and only based on their free will and there is no fraud, collusion or undue influence brought upon them to file the mutual consent divorce petition.
18.In the light of the above, I am inclined to set aside the docket order of the Family Court, Coimbatore, and I direct the Family Court, Coimbatore, to
number DOP CFR.No.3726 of 2025, if it is otherwise in order. The Family Court, Coimbatore, shall not return / reject the petition on the ground that the parties have to wait for the mandatory period of one year from separation to pass off, before they are entitled to file an application for divorce by mutual consent.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Post Views: 795

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Posted on September 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a non-cooperating wife with the Criminal trail who has been evading appearance before the Court,.

From Paras 3-6,

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 1st respondent is not cooperating with the trail and has been evading appearance before the Court, even though bailable warrants were issued against the 1st respondent. It is also submitted that the bailable warrants were cancelled soon after the 1st respondent filed a memo undertaking to appear.
4. Today, when the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submits that even the petitioner was also absent on the last date of hearing, when the matter was listed for trial.
5. It is further submitted that the matter is now fixed for trial on 22.04.2017, and the 1st respondent would appear in Court and adduce the evidence.
6. Considering the submission, the Criminal Petition is disposed off with an observation that the learned Magistrate should endeavor to complete the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferable within a period of six (06) months from the date of the receipt of this order.

2025-03-27 K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79857987/

Thanks to Adv Ram G for the below copy. He practiced law (all subjects) at Anantapur Courts and reachable on +91-90000-32896

2025-03-27 K.Sreekanth_Naik_vs_P_Nalini_-_2025_Supreme(Online)(AP)_3987_-_Supreme

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband. This is my second reportable judgment.

Post Views: 824

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Posted on September 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. First and foremost, it may be noted that the allegation of “arm twisting” the respondent by the petitioners is a fine piece of irony. In fact, if anyone is twisting arms here, it is the respondent herself. Of course, not in the literal sense she claims, but in the far more creative, metaphorical sense of using the criminal process as her personal pressure lever. The oblique motive is hardly a guess i.e. it is either to extract what she calls “maintenance,” which her husband has not paid, or to drag the petitioners all the way from Bijnor to Delhi, making them undergo the harassment and humiliation, until her husband succumbs to her demands on the dotted lines. The reasons are not far to seek as they are lying in plain sight. Let us examine how.

From Para 17,

17. The accused no.1 to 5 named in the above police complaint are Harish Yadav, Mangal Singh Yadav, Moorti Devi, Kusum Lata and Chander Pal. None of the petitioners is named therein. A bare perusal of the above makes it abundantly clear that there is not even a whisper of any role attributed to the petitioners, nor any suggestion that they were present at the scene, much less that they caused injury or instigated those who allegedly did during the incident of 18.12.2012. On this ground alone, the belated attempt to drag the petitioners into the proceedings through a subsequent complaint under Section 200 CrPC qua the same incident of 18.12.2012 reeks of pure afterthought on the part of the respondent.

From Para 20,

20. Significantly, it is not even the respondent’s case that her parents and sister were present during the alleged incident. Surprisingly, their depositions have not been placed on record. It is obvious that their evidence, therefore, is nothing but hearsay, dressed up as testimony. It may be reasonably presumed that far from being independent, they merely echoed the complainant’s version, word for word, as dictated and their testimony has minimal probative value.

From Para 28,

28. Before parting, I cannot but note the rather desperate attempt of the respondent’s leaned counsel to dissuade this Court from exercising jurisdiction, on the specious plea of statutory bar. The argument, though dressed in attractive garb, doe not withstand scrutiny. It reminds one of the age-old courtroom maxim: “if you have the facts, hammer the facts; if you have the law, hammer the law; if you have neither, hammer the desk”. Unfortunately for the respondent, in this case, facts do not support her, law does not sustain her case and desk-thumping cannot rescue her. On all three counts, the respondent fails.

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Post Views: 1,687

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Posted on September 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Delhi High Court that, concealing actual income and withholding the most relevant documents which alone could establish her present financial incapacity should lead to adverse inference against wife.

From Paras 9-11,

9. At the outset, it will be apposite to note that Section 125 of the Cr.P.C is a beneficial provision, premised on a moral obligation of husband and father, and intended to prevent, inter alia, the wife and children from being subjected to the adversities of vagrancy and destitution. It is also trite that proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. are summary in nature and the Court has to take a prima facie view of the dispute between the parties.
10. In the above context, this Court has carefully examined the evidence on record as well as the findings recorded by the learned Family Court. Insofar as the wife’s claim for maintenance is concerned, it emerges that she had admitted in her cross-examination that she is employed in the Education Department at Khekra, Baghpat, though on a temporary basis. She further admitted that her salary slip of December 2016 reflected her salary as Rs. 33,052/- and her income tax return for the year 2017-2018 also disclosed an annual income of Rs. 4,00,724/-, though it is her case that thereafter, her services were terminated by way of judgment dated 25.07.2017 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after which she was working on a temporary basis. While she claimed that her current salary is only Rs. 10,000/- per month, she failed to produce any recent salary slip or Form-16 to substantiate the same, and thus, no recent salary certificate was placed before the learned Family Court despite opportunities given by the learned Trial Court. She also did not offer any plausible explanation in the evidence for withholding recent salary details.
11. The learned Family Court, thus rightly reached to a conclusion that such omission, without any cogent explanation, casts a doubt on the genuineness of her claim and justifies an adverse inference against her. The learned Family Court, therefore, rightly held that the wife had concealed her actual income and withheld the most relevant documents which alone could establish her present financial incapacity. This Court concurs with that view, as the primary ingredient for grant of maintenance to a wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C. – i.e. her inability to maintain herself – has not been satisfactorily proved, in absence of clear and reliable evidence of financial hardship, the claim of the wife becomes speculative and cannot be sustained.

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Post Views: 1,578

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Resham Lal Dewangan Vs Suman Dewangan on 09 May 2025

K.Harish Kumar Vs Vanathy Rajkumar on 24 Apr 2024

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025