Another judgments from Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, where in DVC on brother-in-law and sister-in-law were quashed due to lack of specific allegations.
Guidelines on Grievances Received in The Department of Justice
Some emails may fail. Find the correct/latest contact details by going to that specific department site.
State of Maharashtra Vs Rajesh Laxman Kedar on 10 September, 2018
A judgment from a magistrate from Dhule, in Maharastra. See the bullshitting of this judge,
From Para 13,
It is the defence of accused persons that there are contradictions and omissions in the evidence of witnesses. Whatever these witnesses have stated is on the information gathered from the informant. It is very natural considering the nature of the charge. In the circumstances, the evidence of the informant is pivotal and the evidence of relative witnesses which has corroborative value always revolves around her evidence. Hence, evidence of such relative witnesses cannot be discarded by branding them as hearsay. Aftermath I have no hesitation to conclude that there is reliable corroboration from these so called interested witnesses.
From Para 14,
Learned advocate for accused persons urged that no independent witness is examined by prosecution and the investigation officer is also not examined. The offence of cruelty generally occurs within the four boundaries of the house. Under these circumstances, non examination of any independent witness can certainly be spared.
Para 17 will give you vomiting,
In the case in hand, informant was ousted from her matrimonial house on 11-02-2009 and she has lodged complaint on 14-02-2009. But she has mentioned in her evidence that, after accused persons had ousted her, she went to railway station and waited their for whole night, in the morning, she went at her elder son’s school to meet him but as her husband and her mother-in-law had prevented her from meeting her son she came back at her parent’s house. Her matrimonial house is at Mumbai and her maternal house is at Dhule, she has lodged report against accused persons at Dhule City Police Station. In view of all the above explanation, in my opinion delay is satisfactorily explained by informant.
Never mind the jurisdiction. Supreme Court’s Yours truly has already destroyed the jurisdiction with weird illogic here.
From Para 18, more vomiting,
With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, in the present case in hand, the alleged ill-treatment was occurred to informant till year 2009 and witnesses deposed during the trial in year 2013 to 2017, it would be too pedantic to state the exact dates. Hence, in my opinion, non disclosure of such dates would not be that material in the peculiar circumstances of the case as witnesses have correctly mentioned all the incidents of physical and mental cruelty. As well as in respect of the earlier discussion, offences under Section 498A occurs within four corners of the house, hence it is not expected from any neighbour to narrate the ill treatment suffered by informant by her husband and in laws. . And if for the sake of argument we accept that, her neighbours knew about the ill treatment to her by her husband and in laws, but a prudent man can conclude that a neighbor will not come and give evidence against his neighbors for the lady who is not living with his neighbour from years together.
Here goes 212 CrPC down the drain… Ahh this is womenland…
From Para 19,
With due respect to Hon’ble High Court, the above mentioned case laws are not applicable to the case in hand. In present case, informant and her witnesses have specifically deposed about the physical and mental torture as well as unlawful demand of money by accused persons and furthermore her torture on non fulfilling the unlawful demands by accused persons with corroboration. Not a single witness has deposed contrary to prosecution story regarding it. Hence, it constrains me to believe the version of informant and her witnesses
More diarrhea in Para 20,
It is also the defence of accused persons that, she herself has left company of accused no.1. She has filed divorce petition in the Court. The informant also accepted the contention of divorce in her cross examination. But while considering the situation in the Indian culture, when a marriage was performed with zeal and enthusiasm and a bride had left her parental house, it would be difficult to believe that she would leave company of her husband without any reason. Even in todays so called modern society, thereturn of daughter from matrimonial house is treated as a stigma. Considering these general factors, whenever the allegations of cruelty is made, the conduct of the parties, motive intention and other circumstances of the case etc. always needs to be kept in mind because, what amounts of cruelty is nowhere defined. It needs to be waited considering the facts of each and every case differently. However, once the unlawful demands are proved, it materially strengthens the prosecution story. Merely by saying that the informant left company of her husband on her own would not give probability to the defence of husband. He has to offer some plausible explanation on this point. Moreover, when it has emerged on record that even after partying ways with accused no.1, the informant from last 9 years or so is still residing at her parental house. There appears no other reason for her to leave her matrimonial life only because she doesn’t want to cohabit with accused no.1. It is pertinent to note that her elder son was with accused persons and one daughter is with her at the time she left her matrimonial house. Having regard to the Indian culture again a mother cannot leave her son without any strong reason. Only filing petition for divorce in the court will not mean that she was not ill treated by accused persons. Therefore, in my view, additional onus lies on the shoulder of the husband who is accountable to certain extent when his wife leaves his company by contending alleged ill-treatment.
From Para 25, vomiting about 406 IPC (No entrustment, No list of jewelry, To whom, When)
It is pertinent to note that there is no bar of filing criminal case for embezzlement of her jewelery. It is the admitted position of law that the jewelery and ornaments wore by bride at the time if her marriage are her Stridhana. It is nowhere come on record that accused no.1 had returned the jewelery to informant during the pendency of this case. Hence, I came to the conclusion that prosecution has proved section 406 of Indian Penal Code, which accused no.1 cannot rebute.
And some liberal diarrhea gyan delivery from Para 30,
The incidents of cruelty to wives is increasing day by day all over the country. The greed of her husband and relatives is unending and due to this many women has to suffer a lot, many times the greed of her husband and in laws is satisfied at the cost of her life. It is necessary to eradicate such tendency of unlawful demand of money and cruelty to a married woman. Hence, deterrence is must to curb such tendency of society. Therefore, I am not inclined to extend the provision of Probation of Offenders Act, 1884 to him.
You can read the rest of junk below.
Rupali Devi Vs State of UP and Ors on 09 April, 2019
A clear attempt to link circumstances to a pre-judged conclusion by Hon’ble CJ of India himself. At best, this is just an attempt to let go off one of the many grounds husband’s can take in their Discharge and Quash petitions, going against such landmark precedents.
If this assumption is allowed to continue, ablanaris will claim, her hubby dear comes in her dreams and molests, threatens, harasses, violates her & thereby it is a continuing offence as per Black&White Dictionary and attracts 179 CrPC squarely, and consequently your’s truly will wag their tails (heads may be) to it too.
One Gem from this Judgment:
Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony.
Alright. Little bit of difficulty in travel involved. We will use 20 other grounds, Mr. CJI. We also have clubbing of cases judgment and many more judgments on our side.
Frankly speaking, one has to see the caveat laid by Supreme Court in this judgment. Only when the Prosecution can establish that there was threat to the life and/or limb of the knife due to which the false case if institute out side the Jurisdiction, where the alleged offence has happened as mentioned in the Complaint, this judgment can be gainfully invoked.
The Key element is this “compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents“. As long as the Prosecution documents do not prima facie exhibit the above criteria, the ground of Territorial Jurisdiction is still a valid ground to see Discharge or Quash from a false case.
Go here.
My Note:
This is a bad judgment because, we all know the complainant may invoke Zero FIR at her place of residence/parental/shelter home which may be transferred to the location where there is actual territorial jurisdiction to the alleged offence. Or the parents or relative or any good Samaritan can file a report under sec 154(1) to a nearby police station, and again that PS has to register a Zero FIR. Moreover, the complaint’s case is fought by the State via Public Prosecutor and the Chief examination is done via affidavit these days and even that may be one of the instances when the complaint has to appear before Court. Due to technological advances which are expedited by COVID-19 pandemic, even the oath taken at such instance can be made via Video conference. Even the Cross can be conducted via Video conference.
Then what was the need to muddle the sacred principle of territorial jurisdiction enshrined under CHAPTER XIII provisions of Cr.P.C.?
Citations: [2019 SCC 5 384], [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 493], [2019 AIR SC 1790], [2019 KLJ 2 601]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/78252061/
https://www.legitquest.com/case/rupali-devi-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh/11C400
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5cb00bc54a9326247ab05a22
Vijayanand Dattaram Naik And 5 Ors. Vs Vishranti Vijayanand Naik on 13 February, 2019
Relying on landmark judgment here, the magistrate in this case has confirmed the proposal of husband to pay maintenance only for six months, on his own will, even though there is no DV established.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c75ea7eb338d11c8d0c1bb8
https://www.legitquest.com/case/vjayanand-dattaram-naik-v-vishranti-vijayanand-naik/1E16DE
Manmohan Attavar Vs Neelam Manmohan Attavar on 14 July, 2017
Without residing in a shared household, the cunning ‘knife’ tried to grab Residence order. But Hon’ble Supreme Court caught hold of the fraud attempts and nullified them.
From Paras 17 and 18,
17. The facts of the present case are that the respondent has never stayed with the appellant in the premises in which she has been directed to be inducted. This is an admitted position even in answer to a court query by the respondent during the course of hearing. The “domestic relationship” as defined under Section 2(f) of the DV Act refers to two persons who have lived together in a “shared household”. A “shared household” has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act. In order for the respondent to succeed, it was necessary that the two parties had lived in a domestic relationship in the household. However, the parties have never lived together in the property in question. It is not as if the respondent has been subsequently excluded from the enjoyment of the property or thrown out by the appellant in an alleged relationship which goes back 20 years. They fell apart even as per the respondent more than 7 years ago. We may also note that till 22-2-2010 even the wife of the appellant was alive. We may note for the purpose of record that as per the appellant, he is a Christian and thus there could be no question of visiting any temple and marrying the respondent by applying “kum kum”, and that too when the wife of the appellant was alive.
18. We are thus unequivocally of the view that the nature of the ex parte order passed on 19-9-2016 permitting the respondent to occupy the premises of the appellant cannot be sustained and has to be set aside and consequently Civil Appeal No. 2500 of 2017 is liable to be allowed.
Citation: [(2017) 8 SCC 550]
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/30306259/
The index page is here.
S.R. Batra and Anr Vs Taruna Batra on 15 December, 2006
Landmark judgment from Apex Court setting record straight regarding the Shared Household. This is overruled in SC Ahuja case law here.
Indiankanoon.org Link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/594165/
Citations: (2007) 3 SCC 169, 2007(2)ALD66(SC); 2007(1)AWC664(SC); 2007(3)CTC219; 136(2007)DLT1(SC); I(2007)DMC1SC; (2007)146PLR425; RLW2007(2)SC1546; 2006(13)SCALE652; 2007(1)LC0007(SC); 2007AIRSCW1088; AIR2007SC1118; (2007)2SCC(Cri)56; 2007(2)CivilLJ215(SC); 2007LawHerald(SC)92
The index page is here.
Karthick Vs The Commissioner of Police on 8 July, 2013
The cunning knife produced a forged passport and husband exposed her with a RTI response from Passport Authority. And the clever police denied to file a FIR for the forgery complaint!!
Hon’ble Madras High Court ordered the police to file FIR and investigate the case in accordance with law. Awesome !!!
Citations:
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163886641/
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Anil Kumar and Ors. Vs Moti Ram and Ors. on 20 November, 1992
Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that Second revision is barred under 397(3) CrPC.
From Para 16,
The bare reading of Sub-Section 3 would how that it does not curtail the remedy but only bars or abrogate the remedy. It curtails the remedy second time. The power of the High Court and the Court of Sessions, so far as revision is concerned, are concurrent. The revisionist has choice to File revision directly in the High Court or in the Sessions Court. Having availed the remedy by filing revision before the Sessions Judge he cannot be permitted to avail second chance, the bar of Sub Section (3) will come in his way. V.R. Krishna lyer, J. in the case of Raj Kapoor Vs. State (Delhi Administration) observed that “In our constitutional order, fragrant with social,justice broader consideration of final relief must govern the juridical process save where legislature interdict plainly forbids that, course”. (underlining is mine). In Raj Kapoor’s case though Supreme Court was not cat tea upon to deal with Sub-Section (3), it was only dealing with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482, particularly where the petitioner instead of invoking the revisional power under Section 39 invoked the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482, particularly where the petitioner instead of invoking the revisional power under Section 39 invoked the inherent power of the High Court. It was in this background the above observations were made which will show that the Court was not unmindful of the fact that whenever legislature interdict plainly or statute bar the availing of remedy in that case, the High Court cannot resort to its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to circumvent the prohibition laid down in the Code.
Prakash and Ors Vs Phulvati and Ors on 16 October, 2015
This is reportable judgment from Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel, regarding applicability of Amendment Act of Hindu Succession Act to the woman claiming share in the family property.
