This judgment from Allahabad High Court held that gifts given to the husband by the wife or some family member of wife is not Dowry.
The Andhra Pradesh Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990
Here is the 1990 edition of the The Andhra Pradesh Civil Rules of Practice and Circular Orders, 1990
Find the Criminal Rules of Practice of AP High Court here.
Ambika Ramakant Uniyal Vs Ramakant Shriram Uniyal on 18 November, 2013
The Bombay High Court has observed that leaving the matrimonial home with personal belongings signifies that there is intention of knife leaving husband/matrimonial home permanently and this can be construed as deserting the husband with out any reasonable cause and that leading to a solid ground for Divorce decree.
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Rajbir @ Raju and Anr Vs State of Haryana on 22 November, 2010
Here the Supreme Court judges are advising the lower courts as such,
“We further direct all trial Courts in India to ordinarily add Section 302 to the charge of section 304B, so that death sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women.”
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Shanti And Anr Vs State of Haryana on 13 November, 1990
This is a landmark judgment from Supreme Court of India which clarified the legal position around sections 304B and 498A IPC.
From Para 6,
Now we shall consider the question as to whether the acquittal of the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 498-A makes any difference. The submission of the learned counsel is that the acquittal under Section 498-A IPC would lead to the effect that the cruelty on the part of the accused is not established. We see no force in this submission. The High Court only held that Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC are mutually exclusive and that when once the cruelty envisaged in Section 498-A IPC culminates in dowry death of the victim, Section 304-B alone is attracted and in that view of the matter the appellants were acquitted under Section 498-A IPC. It can therefore be seen that the High Court did not hold that the prosecution has not established cruelty on the part of the appellants but on the other hand the High Court considered the entire evidence and held that the element of cruelty which is also an essential of Section 304-B IPC has been established. Therefore the mere acquittal of the appellants under Section 498-A IPC in these circumstances makes no difference for the purpose of this case. However, we want to point out that this view of the High Court is not correct and Sections 304-B and 498-A cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that “cruelty” is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of “cruelty” but having regard to the common background to these offences we have to take that the meaning of “cruelty or harassment” will be the same as we find in the explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by itself amounts to an offence and is punishable. Under Section 304-B as already noted, it is the “dowry death” that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to “cruelty” any time after the marriage. Further it must also be borne in mind that a person charged and acquitted under Section 304-B can be convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a case is made out. But from the point of view of practice and procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases to frame charges under both the sections and if the case is established they can be convicted under both the sections but no separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under Section 304-B.
And the benevolence of the judges overflows for women like juices… yakkk thuuu
From Para 8,
Further both the appellants are women. Under these circumstances, a minimum sentence of seven years’ rigorous imprisonment would serve the ends of justice. Accordingly the convictions are confirmed but the sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC of each of the accused appellant is set aside and instead each of them is sentenced to undergo seven years’ rigorous imprisonment.
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Rajani Kanta Padhi Vs State of Orissa and Others on 02 July 2010
Based on Arun Vyas judgment from Apex Court, High Court of Orissa held as,
From Para 8,
There is no dispute over the proposition that offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. is a continuing offence. The victim would have a new starting point of limitation on each occasion on which she was subjected to cruelty. Period of limitation has, therefore, to be computed from the last act of cruelty committed against the victim. In this context, decision in Arun Vyas and another v. Anita Vyas (supra) may be referred to. Section 498-A of the I.P.C. provides that a person for commission of offence thereunder shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 406 of the I.P.C. provides that whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Therefore, period of limitation for taking cognizance of commission of offences under Sections 498-A as well as 406 of the I.P.C. is three years as provided under Section 468 (2)(c) of the Cr.P.C.
From Para 11,
In Arun Vyas and another v. Anita Vyas (supra) also it was held that offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. is a continuing offence and that there would be a new starting point of limitation on each occasion on which the victim was subjected to cruelty. It was specifically held that the last act of cruelty was committed when the victim was forced to leave matrimonial home.
From Para 12,
12.
Thus, in view of nature of offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C., it has been consistently highlighted that court should adopt liberal approach in favour of extending of period of limitation under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. However, it is now well-settled that while taking cognizance after expiry of period of limitation, the Magistrate has to pass a speaking order assigning reasons for exercise of the discretion under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.
Citation: [
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/913921/
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Rajani-Kant-Padhi-Versus-State-of-Orissa-2010-07-02
Arun Vyas and Anr Vs Anita Vyas on 14 May 1999
In this landmark judgment, Apex Court held that offence under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. is a continuing offence and that there would be a new starting point of limitation on each occasion on which the victim was subjected to cruelty. It was specifically held that the last act of cruelty was committed when the victim was forced to leave matrimonial home.
Citation: [1999 ACR SC 2 1456], [1999 CRI LJ 3479], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 90], [1999 DMC SC 2 247], [1999 JT SC 4 421], [1999 OLR 2 364], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 2 828], [1999 SCALE 3 724], [1999 SCC 4 690], [1999 SCR 3 719], [1999 UJ 2 968], [1999 SCC CRI 629], [1999 AIR SC 0 2071], [1999 SCC CR 0 629], [1999 AIR SC 207], [1999 RCR CRI 2 828], [1999 CRLJ 0 3479], [1999 CALCRILR 0 297], [1999 AIR SC 0 1793], [1999 SCC 4 691], [2000 BOMCR SC 1 233], [1999 SUPREME 5 458]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1494464/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5de4b0149711411319 or https://mynation.net/judgments/arun-vyas-anr-vs-anita-vyas-on-14-may-1999/
Orissa High Court passed a similar judgment here.
Shalu Ojha Vs Prashant Ojha on 25 January, 2019
This is the contempt petition allowed by Supreme Court and levying cost of Rs.25,000/- on the husband.
Apex Court says,
Since the petitioner is unnecessarily dragged to this Court and had to file this Contempt Petition, we impose a cost of Rs. 25,000/- which shall be paid to the petitioner by 15.02.2019.
The Case Index is available here.
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Shalu Ojha Vs Prashant Ojha on 28 Ferbuary, 2019
Delhi High Court held that the divorce granted to husband by closing the right of the appellant to cross-examine the respondent and also further proceeded to close complainant’s evidence; as well as thereafter pronounce ex parte judgment on the same day,
The Case Index is available here.
Shalu Ojha Vs Prashant Ojha on 23 July, 2018
In this proceedings, Apex Court has observed some interesting information. Take a look.
From Para 6,
It is not understood as to how petitioner’s share of expenditure is Rs. 1 lakh per month out of Rs.1.5 lakhs monthly expenditure. Likewise, it is not explained in Col. 16 as to in what form, income of Rs. 1.5 lakhs per month is generated and who is earning that income. Of course, the petitioner has otherwise maintained that she is not having any other source of income except the amount of maintenance given to her by the respondent. The petitioner has also stated that she is compelled to live in her parents house as the maintenance amount is not sufficient even to pay monthly rent of an aparment.
From Para 8,
In the reply affidavit filed by the respondent, it is averred that the petitioner is maintaining four bank accounts and the total amount lying in these accounts is Rs.8,36,610/-. It is also stated that the petitioner is having fixed deposits in the banks for a total sum of Rs. 35,75,000/-. In this manner, the total bank balance of the petitioner is Rs.44,11,610/-. As against this, the respondent has paid to the petitioner a sum of Rs.49 lakhs from June 4, 2009 to July, 2017. Thus, in the last eight years, against a sum of Rs.49 lakhs paid by the respondent to the petitioner, the petitioner is still having bank balance of Rs.44 lakhs. According to the respondent, it would be inconceivable that petitioner has spent only Rs.5 lakhs of rupees (or little more if interest earned by the petitioner on the aforesaid Rs.49 lakhs is added) in eight years and that shows that she has other sources of income as well. Other averments in the petitioner’s affidavit was also denied including her share of expenditure in the neighbourhood of Rs.1 lakh per month or that respondent is earning Rs.20 lakhs per month. In respect of the particulars given by the petitioner about the businesses of the respondent, the respondent has denied the same and submits that, at present, there is no Restaurant or Bar anywhere in India in which respondent has any share or interest. He has his own explanation and has given alleged circumstances in which he had to give up his share in certain businesses. The petitioner has controverted his averments in her rejoinder affidavit. During arguments, the petitioner also tried to demonstrate, by referring to certain documents filed by her, that the respondent was indulging in falsehood.
Advice from Supreme Court, hmmm
In these circumstances, the appropriate course of action would be to allow the petitioner to file an application for maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 or under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 so that in these proceedings, both the parties lead their documentary and oral evidence and on the basis of such material, appropriate view is taken by the said Court.
The Case Index is available here.
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