In this set of cases, petitioners raised voice against destruction of Mangrove forests in Kakinada which have been protecting the city from the onslaught of sea currents/waves. The following are various orders issued by AP High Court.
On 23 April 2020,
On 04 May 2020,
On 11 May 2020,
A complete indexed and mess-wise segregated collection of reprimands received by this incumbent State Government of YSRC Party are here.
AP High Court had issued the following directions in regards to functioning of judiciary in Andhra Pradesh during COVID-19.
(i). All the cases in which interim orders were passed by the High Court, District Courts, Civil Courts, Family Courts, Labour Courts, Industrial and other Tribunals, functioning in the State of Andhra Pradesh, over which the High Court has the power of superintendence and the stay has expired two weeks prior or are due to expire within a period of one month, shall continue to operate for a further period of one month from today. It is made clear here that interim orders which are having a limited duration shall continue to operate until further orders;
(ii). In criminal matters where bail/suspension has been granted by the Court either anticipatory or regular for a limited period, which are likely to expire within one month from today, shall be automatically extended for a further period of one month from today;
(iii). In the matters in which demolition, dispossession, eviction, auction is in question, in those cases, if limited stay is granted, it be treated to be extended for one month or otherwise, the instrumentalities shall not proceed for the above until one month from today;
(iv). In the matters of tenders, if they have not been finalized, they shall not be given effect to for a period of one month and the process may be made after expiry of the lock-down period.
(v). As this Court feels that the citizens are not in a position to reach the Court on account of lock-down of the boundaries and surveillance by the Police, however, for redressal of their grievance, we have been developing a URL, which shall be notified by Registrar General. Publishing URL in the official website of the High Court for e-filing to Advocates is only with regard to genuine grievances.They may submit their petitions by way of e-mail, viz., [email protected] on the same lines till then.On submission of the petitions, the Government may submit their objections and they shall be considered for the purpose of interim relief by the High Court through the Benches constituted by the Chief Justice, by way of Video Conference and if necessary opportunity of personal hearing may be offered on demand. Otherwise, interim relief may be considered on the facts and circumstances of the case;
(vi). The State Government is directed to ensure and provide all necessary equipment like N-95 masks, sterile medical gloves, starch apparels, personal protection equipment and all other necessary things to the Doctors in the dispensaries and other Paramedical staff, thereby they may be in a position to provide medical aid to the citizens;
(vii). The issue regarding entry on boundaries of the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, it is directed that no mass gathering shall be allowed by the authorities of both the States. The officers of both the States shall follow National Protocol or otherwise looking to the peculiar situation in which the citizens of the State of Andhra Pradesh have been left over by the Telangana State, to go to their homes, taking due steps for quarantine process, by staying at their homes through such undertaking, on necessary tests, the National Protocol shall be observed by them. In any case, care of females with children and pregnant women must be undertaken by the authorities with humanity; however, officers of both the States shall observe National Protocol applying exceptional circumstances with due care.
(viii). As per the resolution of the committee formulated by the Supreme Court, dated 26.03.2020, it is directed that the convicts or under-trial offenders for the offences to which maximum sentence prescribed is not more than (7) years, may be released on interim bail on furnishing adequate bail bonds if they are not second offenders and also not offenders under Section 376 of IPC and POCSO Act, for a period of one month. For the purpose of bail bond, it is however directed that the Principal District and Sessions Judge shall assign the Judicial Magistrate to reach the District Jails on being asked by the Superintendent of the Central Jail of his area, for furnishing/accepting adequate bail bonds to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, for their release to a limited period. The undertaking shall be taken from them for having quarantine for 14 days at their home under the surveillance of the Doctor with the help of the Police.
(ix). Violation of conditions would entail cancellation of the interim bail/suspension and such persons who violate the conditions may be taken to custody immediately;
(x). As stated by the Director of Social Welfare, Ms.Kritika Shukla, that limited number of inmates are in the remand homes, however, due care and caution be taken for social distancing to those children in the remand homes. The said social distancing must be maintained in the CCIs., and SAAs., in the State.
(xi). In the case of health checkup, the State shall protect the confidentiality regarding patients and the poor patients shall not be discriminated with others. It is further to direct that marginalised and poor must have access to healthcare and they should be provided adequate food facilities; thereby they should not sleep with empty stomach in the night;
(xii). Essential items may be made available to the citizens as specified in the circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 24.03.2020 specifying the protocol to those vendors;
(xiii). The Police, Doctors, paramedical staff and other persons engaged in these days may be provided adequate facilities on account of rendering emergent services by them.
(xiv). Because of the fact that flights, trains have been stopped and the road transportation has also been checked due to lock-down, but in the State of Andhra Pradesh, there is a coastal area, where ships are coming to the ports, however, due care and caution as directed by the Central Government must be taken by the authorities in the ports at Visakhapatnam, Kakinada, Machilipatnam, Kalingapatnam and other sea ports and the port authorities are directed to take special measures in this regard in coordination with the State authorities.
On 20 April 2020,
Directions given above were extended until 31 May 2020.
On 24 April 2020,
Permission was given for a certain tenders to be finalized.
On 29 May 2020,
Further extension of Interim Order Passed in March 2020.
Citations: [
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Since there was prima facie opinion formed by the Trial court in framing the charges on the accused persons, Apex Court held that High Court was not correct in interfering into the Trial Court Order.
Citations: [2001 ACR SC 2 1038], [2001 AIR SC 1507], [2001 ALD CRI 1 663], [2001 CRI LJ 1723], [2001 CRIMES SC 2 59], [2001 JT SC 3 585], [2001 LW CRL 2 687], [2001 PLJR 3 4], [2001 SCALE 2 505], [2001 SCC 4 333], [2001 SCR 2 482], [2001 UC 1 551], [2001 CRLJ 1723], [2001 SCC CR 685], [2001 SUPREME 2 423], [2001 SLT 2 796], [2001 SCJ 2 528], [2001 SRJ 4 308], [2001 CCR 2 43], [2001 RENTCR 2 255], [2001 KLT SN 2 89], [2001 AIR SC 1230], [2001 BOMCR CRI SC 730], [2001 SCC CRI 685]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1931219/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ae4b0149711411d3b
Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 are here.
Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, gave this Judgment.
From Para 26,
26. At this stage, it is necessary to note that the attention of Mr Kapil Sibal and Dr Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel was specifically drawn to the fact that the FIRs which were filed in various states by persons professing allegiance to the INC appear, prima facie, to be reproductions of the same language and content. Responding to this, Mr Sibal fairly stated that in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court may well quash all the other FIRs and allow the investigation into the FIR which has been transferred to the NM Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai to proceed in accordance with law. Mr Sibal has also urged that there cannot be any dispute in regard to the legal position that a complaint in regard to the offence of defamation can only be at the behest of the person who is aggrieved. Consequently, the FIR which has been presently under investigation at the NM Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai would not cover any offence under Section 499 of the IPC.
Citations: [
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In this landmark judgment, Justice Hans Raj Khanna, held the following valuable principles.
From Para 23,
23. Observations in a recent decision of this Court, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973 2 SCC 793 to which reference has been made during arguments were not intended to make a departure from the rule of the presumption of innocence of the accused and his entitlement to the benefit of reasonable doubt in criminal cases. One of the cardinal principles which has always to be kept in view in our system of administration of justice for criminal cases is that a person arraigned as an accused is presumed to be innocent unless that presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by production of evidence as may show him to be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. The burden of proving the guilt of the accused is upon the prosecution and unless it relieves itself of that burden, the courts cannot record a finding of the guilt of the accused. There are certain cases in which statutory presumptions arise regarding the guilt of the accused, but the burden even in those cases is upon the prosecution to prove the existence of facts which have to be present before the presumption can be drawn. Once those facts are shown by the prosecution to exist, the Court can raise the statutory presumption and it would, in such an event, be for the accused to rebut the presumption. The onus even in such cases upon the accused is not as heavy as is normally upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. If some material is brought on the record consistent with the innocence of the accused which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal.
From Para 25,
25. Another golden thread which runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that is is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh 1974 3 SCC 227 a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures.
Citations: [1975 MLJ CRI 1 313], [1973 CRLR 705], [1974 CRLJ 0 1], [1973 SCC CRI 0 1048], [1974 ILR HP 3 575], [1974 CAR 1], [1973 SCC 2 808], [1973 AIR SC 0 2773], [1973 SCC CR 0 1048], [1974 CRI LJ 1], [1973 AIR SC 773], [1974 SCR 1 722]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1072474/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab92e4b014971140cc9d
The 3-judge bench of Karnataka High Court held that Section 8A of Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 is constitutionally valid and the burden of proof laid on the accused in offences under this Act carry onus on the Prosecution to discharge their duty to establish their case based on foundational facts relevant and only then the proof of burden shifts to accused.
From Paras 4-8,
4. It is true that if Section 8-A of the Act, is read literally, an impression is gathered therefrom that once an accused is prosecuted and charged for the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, then the entire burden is on him to show that he had not committed any offence and the prosecution may not be required to prove anything else except placing implicit reliance on the contents of the charge framed against the accused. But, on a closer scrutiny, such first-hand impression about the Section gets dispelled. It has to be kept in view that Section deals with burden of proving innocence in given cases. Therefore the Section,in substance, creates a Rule of Evidence and deals with casting of burden of proof in certain cases on the accused. A close reading of the Section shows that merely because the accused is charged with offences under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act, the initial burden which is always on the prosecution to prove basic ingredients of the Sections for bringing home the charges to the accused will not get displaced or dispensed with. Section 8-A will have to be read with Section 2, which defines the term dowry. When so read, it becomes clear that when an accused is charged of an offence of giving or taking or abetting in giving or taking any dowry, under Section 3, the following ingredients of the offence will have to be established before a competent Criminal Court before which the accused is prosecuted.
i) any property or valuable security must be proved to have been given or taken by the accused pursuant to an agreement or otherwise; or
ii) the accused must be shown to have abetted such giving or taking of any property or valuable security;
iii) such giving or taking of any property or valuable security either directly or indirectly or its abetment must be done by any party to the marriage vis-a-vis the other party to the marriage; or;
iv) such giving or taking of any property or valuable security either directly or indirectly or its abetment is done by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, for the benefit of either party to the marriage or any other person;
v) such property or valuable security is given or taken at or before or at any time after the marriage;
vi) such property or valuable security must be given in connection with the marriage of said parties.
5. Now it is obvious that before any offence can be brought home to the accused under Section 3 read with Section 2 of the Act, the aforesaid ingredients have to be established. So far as Section 8A is concerned, all that it mandates is that the burden of proof that he has not committed such an offence is on the accused. Meaning thereby, that it will be for the accused to show that he had not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security in connection with the marriage of the said parties. He will have to show that last ingredient of the offence being ingredient No. (vi), is not established.The only burden cast on the accused is to prove that he had not committed offence of giving or taking or abetting the giving or taking of dowry as contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. It is not as if he has also to prove that he has not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security or that he has not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security or that he has to disprove all the ingredients (i) to (vi). As per Section 8A, once prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the basic ingredients (i) to (v), burden shifts on the accused to prove that the last one is not established viz., that he had not taken or given or abetted in giving or taking any property or valuable security in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The Section, of necessity, will have to be read down as aforesaid.
6. Similarly, for the purpose of proving an offence under Section 4, Section 8A will have to be read with Sections 4 and 2 of the Act. On a conjoint reading of these provisions, it becomes clear that before any offence under Section 4 is brought home to an accused, the following facts will have to be established:
(1) The accused must be shown to have demanded directly or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be;
(2) Any property or valuable security to be given by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(3) Any property or valuable security to be given by parents of either party to the marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
(4) Such demand should be made at or before or any time after the marriage;
(5) Such demand for any property or valuable security must be in connection with the marriage of the said parties.
Before any offence under Section 4 is brought home to the accused, all the aforesaid ingredients must be established. So far as the first four ingredients are concerned, they will have to be established as basic facts by the prosecution and only when the burden would shift to the accused to show that he had not demanded directly or indirectly any property or valuable security in connection with the marriage of the said parties. The burden of proving non-existence of last ingredient rests on the accused as per Section8A of the Act. But the initial burden to establish beyond reasonable doubt the aforesaid ingredients (1) to (4) will rest on the prosecution. Once these basic ingredients are established by the prosecution, the burden would shift on the accused to show that such demand if any by him was not in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Meaning thereby, that he had not demanded any dowry from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be. Thus burden will shift on him only to establish that the last ingredient is not proved. Section 8-A, in its operation, will have to be read down in the light of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Act. Once it is so read down, the challenge to the said Section on the anvil of Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India, would not survive. However, as the learned Advocate for the appellant has sought to challenge the Constitutional validity of Section 8-A on the anvil of Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution, we may now deal with these challenges.
From Para 9,
9. As we have discussed earlier, if Section 8-A is read down as aforesaid, then there would remain no substance in what the learned Advocate submits. Once it is read down as indicated hereinabove, then the challenge to this Section on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, would not survive. The prosecution will have to lead in the first instance evidence to prove the basic ingredients of the offences under Sections 3 and 4. Once the prosecution proves them beyond reasonable doubt, then only the burden is shifted on the accused under Section 8A of the Act. Thus, the initial burden will rest on the prosecution to bring home the basic ingredients of the Sections and that will never shift on the accused under Section 8A of the Act. The Section so read down, would represent only a rule of evidence and nothing more. Even the objects and reasons for introducing Section 8-A to which we have made reference earlier, clearly indicate the legislative intent that the Section is to serve only as a rule of evidence by casting on the accused the burden of proving that he had not taken or given or abetted in taking or giving of dowry or that he had not demanded either directly or indirectly any dowry.
Citations: [1995 ALT CRI 1 25], [1993 ILR KAR 3035], [1994 DMC 1 356], [1995 CRIMES 1 573], [1994 KARLJ 3 335], [1994 KANTLJ 3 335], [1993 SCC ONLINE KAR 240], [1994 KANT LJ 3 335], [1993 HLR 2 672]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1973279/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56093aeee4b0149711228334
Index of Dowry related Judgments is here.
Taking cue from Geeta Mehrotra judgment here, Punjab High Court has quashed proceedings on relatives living far away in Canada taking a ground that no specific allegation are in the complaint.
Citations: [2]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12422589/
The 3-judge bench of Allahabad High Court held right the decision made in Nawal Kishore Sharma here.
Citations: [2]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172265121/
This judgment from Supreme Court hits the final nail of those persons who say a High Court does not have territorial jurisdiction beyond it’s borders. It also cites Kusum Ingots where by Supreme Court has expressed an Obiter Dicta (Judicial opinion, different from ratio decidendi, which is word of Judge based on case facts) to the same effect.
From Para 11
11. On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is clear that now the High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. The term “cause of action” as appearing in clause (2) came up for consideration time and again before this Court.
Citations: [2014 AIR SC 3607], [2014 AJR 4 410], [2014 ALR 106 710], [2014 AWC SC 5 4947], [2014 SCSUPPL CHN 5 192], [2014 FLR 143 1015], [2014 JLJR 4 69], [2014 PLJR 4 227], [2014 SCALE 9 244], [2014 SCC 9 329], [2014 SCJ 7 307], [2014 SCT SC 4 129], [2014 SLJ SC 3 175], [2014 SCC ONLINE SC 610], [2014 AIC 142 193], [2014 ALLLR 106 710], [2014 KHC 0 4507], [2014 AIOL 481], [2014 JT 9 46], [2014 SLT 6 703], [2014 SUPREME 5 689], [2015 LW 1 810], [2014 CALHN 5 192]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70426214/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af57e4b01497114161bb
This was followed in this 2-judge bench judgment of Allahabad High Court here.
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