Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

A Division bench of Delhi High Court held that, the law does not prescribe any precondition such that the arrears amount of maintenance has to be deposited before appeal or revision can be allowed.

From Para 22,

22. Neither the language used by the Legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., nor the language used in Section 29 of the DV Act even remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to impose pre-conditions to the availment of the said remedies, of the kind evolved in Rajeev Preenja (supra).

And then from Para 25,

25. Laudable as the object of the learned Single Judge may have been, the question is, whether in the light of the settled law taken note of hereinabove, the learned Single Judge while deciding Rajeev Preenja (supra) could have issued a general direction barring entertainment of criminal revisions under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. against orders granting interim maintenance to the wife/ child under Section 125 Cr.P.C., unless the entire arrears of maintenance up to date were first deposited? In our view, with due respect to the learned Single Judge, the answer is clearly in the negative. As to what should be the policy of the law is a matter which squarely falls within the preserve of the Legislature, and it is not a matter which the Courts can dictate, or evolve. It is one thing to interpret an existing law and, while doing so, to adopt an interpretation which is purposive, i.e. one which advances the objective of the enactment. However, it is quite a different thing to evolve a statutory scheme which, even the Legislature did not provide for.

Finally, in Paras 29 and 30,

29. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bahl, imposition of a limitation on the statutory remedy of revision/ appeal under Section 399 of the Cr.P.C. or Section 29 of the DV Act- as the case may be, also falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons noticed by the Division Bench in Gagan Makkar (supra).Even if the condition in question – of the nature directed by the learned Single Judge in Rajeev Preenja (supra), were to exist in the statutory framework, the same may fail the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This is for the reason that, in a given case, the order granting interim maintenance passed by the Ld. Magistrate either under Section 125 Cr.P.C or under Section 29 of the DV Act, may be so harsh and so unreasonable, as to make it impossible for the opposite party/ husband to comply with the same. Experience shows that in a large number of cases, the arrears of interim maintenance- which may be granted from the date of moving of the application before the Ld. Magistrate, may accumulate to a very large amount running into lakhs of rupees. The arrears of interim maintenance may not necessarily be a meager amount in all cases. It would be most unjust and unreasonable to bar his statutory remedy of revision/ appeal as the case may be, merely because he may not be in a position to deposit the entire arrears of interim maintenance.

From Para 30 (Corum cleverly clubbed 125 Cr.P.C. cases also along with DV cases!)

30. Thus, we answer the reference by holding that the general direction issued in Rajeev Preenja (supra) in paragraphs 15, 16 and 20 are not sustainable. The said directions could not have been issued by the learned Single Judge as they seek to curtail the statutory remedy of revision available under Section 399 read with Section 401 of the Cr.P.C, and of appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against orders granting interim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 23 of the DV Act respectively. The direction in question over steps into the legislative field, which was impermissible for the Court to do. We agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Brijesh Kumar Gupta (supra), that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the Trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/ appeal illusory. Accordingly, we hold that a revision under Section 399 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C. and an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, against the order granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and under Section 23 of the DV Act respectively, would be maintainable, and would be entertained and heard without any pre-condition of deposit of the arrears of maintenance as ordered by the Ld. MM. We further hold that the pendency of such a Revision or Appeal- as the case may be, shall not operate as a stay of the operation of the order granting interim maintenance. The reference is answered accordingly.

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Citations : [2018 DLT 251 245], [2018 HLR 3 413], [2019 CRI LJ 218],[2018 (4) RCR (Criminal) 30], [2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747],

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/80568294/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b44dfac9eff431bb54655a9

Index of PWDV Act cases here. Index of Maintenance cases u/s 144 BNSS (125 Cr.P.C.) here.

Post Views: 407

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Posted on November 14, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge Bench said one thing in this Order which is as follows:

7. Qualification of the wife and the capacity to earn cannot be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife who is dependant and does not have any source of income.

The converse is read like this:

Wife who is independant and have source of income, can be a ground to deny interim maintenance to a wife.

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Citations :

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/92763076/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d8b2ff8714d58374079df99

Index of Maintenance cases under Section 125 CrPC here.

Post Views: 192

Indian Olympic Association Vs Kerala Olympic Association and Ors on 06 Nov 2020

Posted on November 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Single-judge bench held that, if a if a court has no jurisdiction to try a lis, it is good for the party raising the issue of jurisdiction to seek the dismissal/return of the proceedings, rather than seeking a transfer.

From Para 14,

14. Suffice it to say that if a court has no jurisdiction to try a lis, it is good for the party raising the issue of jurisdiction to seek the dismissal/return of the proceedings, rather than seeking a transfer. I fail to understand the anxiety of the petitioner, to make an irregular proceeding initiated by the first respondent, regular. The decision in Arvee Industries (supra) is no answer to this contention, since this Court did not say in that case that an invalid proceeding, may be validated, at the instance of the opposite party by transferring the same to a court having jurisdiction.

Indian Olympic Association Vs Kerala Olympic Association and Ors on 06 Nov 2020

Citations :

Other Sources :

Post Views: 96

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Posted on November 13, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

2-Judge bench held that without prima facie opinion in a complaint made otherwise than a police complaint, invoking of perjury u/s 340 CrPC or 341 CrPC is indefensible.

From Para 58,

58. We are thus of the firm opinion that a Trial Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code, if there is a preliminary inquiry and adequate materials in support of the considerations impelling action under the above provisions are available, would be required to treat such complaint to constitute a case, as if instituted on police report and proceed in accordance with law. However, in absence of any preliminary inquiry or adequate materials, it would be open for the Trial Magistrate, if he genuinely feels it necessary, in the interest of justice and to avoid unmerited prosecution to embark on a summary inquiry to collect further materials and then decide the future course of action as per law. In both the eventualities, the Trial Magistrate has to be cautious, circumspect, rational, objective and further informed with the overwhelming caveat that the offence alleged is one affecting the administration of justice, requiring a responsible, uncompromising and committed approach to the issue referred to him for inquiry and trial, as the case may be. In no case, however, in the teeth of Section 343(1), the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report would either be relevant or applicable qua the complaints under Section 340 and/or 341 of the Cr.P.C.

And from Final Para,

60. In view of the determination as above, the approach of the High Court is wholly indefensible, as in the face of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C., the procedure prescribed for cases instituted otherwise than on police report is not attracted qua a complaint under Section 340 and/or Section 341 of the Code. Even assuming that the Trial Magistrate had examined few witnesses in support of the complaint, it was in the form of a summary inquiry, to be satisfied as to whether the materials on record would justify the framing of charge against the respondent or not and nothing further. Any other view would fly in the face of the ordainment of Section 343(1) of the Cr.P.C. and thus cannot receive judicial imprimatur. The impugned judgment of the High Court in quashing the charge framed by the Trial Magistrate and remanding the case to him to follow the procedure outlined for cases, instituted otherwise than on police report, under Chapter XIX-B is on the face of it unsustainable in law and on facts. It is thus set aside. The appeals are allowed. The Trial Magistrate would proceed from the stage of framing of charge, strictly in compliance of the letter and spirit of the precept contained in Section 343(1) of the Code. We make it clear that we have not offered any observation on the merits of the charge and the Trial Court would further the proceedings in accordance with law.

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021], [2017 ALLCC 101 330], [2017 CCR SC 4 28], [2017 JCC 4 2245], [2017 RCR CRIMINAL 3 981], [2017 SCALE 9 527], [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 1021]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194410529/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbaf4a93263320778706

Index of Perjury Case laws is here.

Post Views: 625

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Nov 2020

Posted on November 11, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court granted interim bail to Arnab Goswami, after he suffered judicial custody for 7 days.

Here is the Order.

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Nov 2020

Here is the Judgment with reasons.

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 27 Nov 2020

Index of Quash judgments here.

Post Views: 185

Bikramjit Singh Vs State of Punjab on 12 Oct 2020

Posted on November 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court held that, the default bail that is available to an accused person u/s 167(2)(a) of CrPC, is part of the fundamental rights available to him/her under Article 21 of Constitution of India.

From Para 28,

A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted.

But then from Para 29,

…
We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled.
…

Bikramjit Singh Vs State of Punjab on 12 Oct 2020

Citations : [(2020) SCC Online SC 824]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10807134/

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/bikramjit-singh-versus-the-state-of-punjab

Post Views: 160

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

Posted on November 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Delhi High Court held that there is no need for filing an formal application seeking default bail, once the conditions set out in section 167(2)(a) are made out, as continued confinement violates fundamental right under Article 21.

From Paras 32, 33 and 34,

32. A plain reading of the Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC indicates that an accused would necessarily have to be released on bail “if he is prepared to and does furnish bail”. Thus, in cases where the statutory period of sixty days or ninety days has expired, the accused would be entitled to be released on bail provided he meets the condition as set out therein – that is, he is prepared to furnish and does furnish bail. It is important to note that there is no provision requiring him to make any formal application.
33. It is also trite law that there is no inherent power in a court to remand an accused to custody. Such power must be traced to an express provision of law [See: Natbar Parida Bisnu Charan vs State of Orissa: (1975) Supp SCR 137 and Union of India vs Thamsharasi: (1995) 4 SCC 190]. As is apparent from the language of Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC, the power of a Court to remand an accused to custody pending investigation is circumscribed and stands denuded if the period of sixty days or ninety days, as the case may be, has expired and the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail.
34. It is also necessary to bear in mind that courts have consistently leaned to resolve the tension between form and substance, in favour of substance and have used the interpretative tools to address the substance of the matter. In Ajay Hasia Etc v Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors:1981SCR(2) 79 had, in an altogether different context, observed that “where the constitution fundamentals vital to maintenance of human rights are at stake, functional realism and not facial cosmetics must be the diagnostic tool, for constitutional law must seek the substance and not the form”. Thus, if in substance the essential conditions as set out under the Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC are met and complied with – that is (i) if the investigation has not been completed within the period of sixty or ninety days, as the case may be, from the date of arrest of the accused; and (ii) if the accused is prepared to offer bail – then there would be no justifiable reason to detain the accused.

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

More Gyan here.

Post Views: 136

Default or Statutory Bail under Code of Criminal Procedure

Posted on November 10, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Code of Criminal Procedure contains lot of provisions that give powers to Police/investigating agencies to take an accused person into their custody (police custody in the lockup cell of a Police station, where lockup deaths happen). At the same time, time limits were placed on such custody for inquiry/investigation so as to protect the fundamental rights of accused. When such time limits expire, Courts are empowered (actually duty-bound) to order for release of such accused at the expiration of such statutory time-limits.

Here are the provisions.

As per subsection (2) of section 167 CrPC, the following situation allows for default bail for an accused.

(2) XXXXX:
Provided that—
(a) XXXXX, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding—
(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and,

on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;

Also, obviously

Explanation I.—For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.

As per subsection (2A) of section 167 CrPC, the following situation allows for default or statutory bail for an accused.

(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and
thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where no order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2):

Some helpful cases laws are here.

Index of all Bail matters is here.

Post Views: 222

AP Suryakrasam Vs State of Tamil Nadu and Ors

Posted on November 9, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

High Court of Madras observed that, punishment for corrupt practices should be increased to include death sentence also. Wonderful step!

From Para 11,

11. Though the learned Advocate General has referred to about the prevailing Act, namely, the Prevention of Corruption Act and its procedures, the menace of corruption has not come down. Prevention of Corruption Act is a Central Act, enacted by the Central Government as early as in the year 1947, followed by several amendments, with the latest amendment in the year 2018, giving elaborate procedures to be followed along with punishment and penalties. People are compelled to accept corruption as normal one. Corruption has become deep rooted and has spread like Cancer. Every day, it is reported in the media that many officials are caught red handed, while taking bribes. Hence, the punishment needs to be enhanced. Therefore, this Court is of the view that there should be a re-visit and the Act should be strengthened and stringent penalties should be imposed to curb the menace of corruption. The Central Government may consider imposing punishment, such as, “hanging” or “death penalty”, for corrupt practices or for demanding and accepting bribes, like in China, North Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Morocco. Hence, this Court suo-motu impleads,
i) the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India, North Block, New Delhi;
ii) the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Law and Justice, Union of India, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi; and
iii) the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Union of India, Parliament House, New Delhi
as party respondents / respondents 5 to 7 to this proceedings.

AP Suryakrasam Vs State of Tamil Nadu and Ors on 02 Nov 2020

Post Views: 82

Hansa Research Group Pvt Ltd Vs Sachin Vaze and Ors

Posted on November 9, 2020 by ShadesOfKnife

Bombay High Court directed the Respondents not to harass the petitioners by calling them daily. Respondents agreed to call the petitioners for inquiry twice in a week.

Hansa Research Group Pvt Ltd Vs Sachin Vaze and Ors on 07 Nov 2020

Here is the Writ petition:

Hansa Research Group Pvt Ltd Vs Sachin Vaze and Ors

Post Views: 60

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Sabina Sahdev and Ors Vs Vidur Sahdev on 9 Jul 2018

Binita Dass Vs Uttam Kumar on 9 Aug 2019

Indian Olympic Association Vs Kerala Olympic Association and Ors on 06 Nov 2020

State Of Goa Vs Jose Maria Albert Vales @ Robert Vales on 18 Aug 2017

Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 11 Nov 2020

Bikramjit Singh Vs State of Punjab on 12 Oct 2020

Subhash Bahadur @Upender Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 6 Nov 2020

Default or Statutory Bail under Code of Criminal Procedure

AP Suryakrasam Vs State of Tamil Nadu and Ors

Hansa Research Group Pvt Ltd Vs Sachin Vaze and Ors