15 Lakhs of Compensation was granted by a City Civil Court on a Compensation Suit, against a False rape case.
Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar Case
Set of cases filed by the ex-Couple, Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar
- Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 12 February, 2019 [Interim Maintenance u/s 24 of HMA was denied]
- Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 20 Nov 2020 [Appeal on Divorce was dismissed]
IPC 498A is a Compoundable Case in Andhra Pradesh
Andhra Pradesh Legislature has passed an amendment to Cr.P.C. (a Central Act, 2 of 1974) in 2003 under Code of Criminal Procedure (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act, 2003 to add 494 IPC and 498A IPC to the list of Compoundable offences u/s 320 Cr.P.C.
Just for reference.
Index of all amendments (incl AP State amendments) to Cr.P.C. here.
Parveen Vs State of Haryana on 16 Nov 2020
In this Order from the 3-Judge bench of Supreme Court, it was held that, if the advocate provided by District Court Legal Aid Authority is absent from the proceedings, High Court ought to have appointed an Amicus to take up the case forward.
From Para 7,
7 The High Court, in our view, was manifestly in error in rejecting the revision in default, on the ground that the appellant’s advocate had remained absent on the previous four occasions. Since the revision before the High Court arose out of an order of the conviction under the Arms Act, the High Court ought to have appointed an Amicus Curiae in the absence of counsel, who has been engaged by the Legal Services Authority, Rohtak. The liberty of a citizen cannot be taken away in this manner.
Here is the SLP:
Roshni Biswas Vs State of West Bengal and Anr on 28 Oct 2020
Supreme Court sensed that, there is a need to ensure that the power under section 41A is not used to intimidate, threaten and harass. Thereafter, granted an ad-interim stay on High Court order compelling the petitioner to appear before Police u/s 41A CrPC.
Jangala Sambasiva Rao Vs State of AP and Anr on 28 Oct 2020
Justise Lalitha Kanneganti held that there is violation of Guidelines issued in Arnesh Kumar in effecting an arrest without complying with 41A CrPC procedure and held demanded reports from both Police belonging to concerned PS and also the Magistrate who mechanically issue Judicial custody.
A complete indexed and mess-wise segregated collection of reprimands received by this incumbent State Government of YSRC Party are here.
Shailaja Patil Vs Khobbanna Patil on 18 Jan 2017
In this Order, Supreme Court held as follows,
That apart, we find that the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the appellant No.1 was capable of earning and that is one of the reasons for reducing the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court. Whether the appellant No.1 is capable of earning or whether she is actually earning are two different requirements. Merely because the appellant No.1 is capable of earning is not, in our opinion, sufficient reason to reduce the maintenance awarded by the Family Court.
This means, due to the mistake of High Court in assuming that being capable means earning, Supreme Court clarified that it is NOT so. This principle should apply to men as much as it was applied to women.
And, it is not clear why no Court is asking this question: Why are your needs/expenses out of sync with your income? Just because of the termination of financial assistance from husband?
Citations : [2017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 11742017 AKR 2 3142017 ALLMR CRI 31072017 CRILJ 23062017 KCCR 3 18092017 OLR 1 9212017 RLW SC 3 24902017 RCR CIVIL 2 7012017 RCR CRIMINAL 2 4972017 SCC ONLINE SC 2692017 AIR SC 1174]
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cbb44a93263320779de5
Here is the High Court Order.
Note: The mistake is this… All Assumptions are highlighted…
Petitioner is said to be working as a Lecturer and in a matrimonial dispute between him and the 1st respondent wife, the Family Court has ordered to pay maintenance of Rs.15,000/- to the wife and Rs.10,000/- per month to the son. According to the petitioner’s counsel, the 1st respondent is also working as a Teacher and is earning.
However, according to the counsel representing the 1st respondent, there is no proof of income being produced and she has no permanent source of income. Accordingly, he has sought for rejection of the application filed by the petitioner and to enhance the maintenance awarded.
Having regard to the fact that the wife is also capable of earning, she could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month and the son could be awarded Rs.6,000/- per month. Ordered accordingly. Amount in deposit be adjusted towards arrears and also for future payment. Amount in deposit be released in favour of the respondent wife and child, as per the modified award.
Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari Vs Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Naidu Case
Here is the list of the cases fought by this couple. It is just a hilarious case that there are 11 Respondents arraigned in this case. Go figure!
- Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari On 18 April, 2016 : (SC says, amendments in petitions can be allowed, before Court takes cognizance of the case)
- Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari Vs Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Naidu on 12 August, 2016 : (Trial Court doles of relief after relief supported by BS)
- Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shankar Vs Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari on 5 January, 2018 : (Husband files appeal at Sessions; return of dowry amount of Rs.3.00 Lakhs and compensation amount of Rs.15.00 Lakhs set aside; despite no evidence for DV, but Monthly maintenance of Rs.10,000/- is confirmed anyways)
- Kunapureddy Swarna Kumari Vs Kunapureddy @ Nookala Shankar on 5 January, 2018 : (Wife files appeal at Sessions seeking enhancement in monthly maintenance; Dismissed)
Vikas Sharma Vs Monica Parashar on 30 Sep 2016
Single Judge declared as follows with regards to the application of Sec 25(2) of PWDV Act 2005 and specifically, what does ‘change in circumstances’ mean.
32. I find no force in the contention of the appellant that merely filing of application under section 25 (2) of the D. V. Act would amount to a change in the circumstances. The phrase “change in circumstances” would require that the circumstances on the basis of which any previous order was passed under this Act have undergone alteration, modification or have ceased to exist and warrant interference of the court. Hence, the contention of the appellant that merely filing an application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act would amount to change in circumstances cannot be accepted. Moreover, if such arguments of the appellant is accepted then parties will take advantage of such interpretation and would intentionally stay away from court on a day when any order is to be passed so that after passing of the order, they would file the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act and would plead that mere filing of an application under section 25(2) of the D.V. Act is a change in the circumstances thereby warranting passing of orders under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act.
33. A perusal of the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act filed by the appellant before the trial court shows that in the said application, the appellant has nowhere mentioned that consequent to the passing of the order by which interim maintenance has been fixed, there has been any change in the circumstances which warranted filing the application under section 25(2) of the D. V. Act for modification of the previous order dated 10.04.2015.
