(1) Whoever—
(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racials, language or regional groups or castes or communities, or
(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, or
(c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to
be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Offence committed in place of worship, etc.—Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious
worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
Author: ShadesOfKnife
Kanumuri Raghurama Krishnam Raju Vs State of AP and Ors
On his birthday 14 May 2021, Member of Parliament Sri Kanumuri Raghurama Krishnam Raju was arrested from his home at Hyderabad by the AP CID Police and brought to CID office at Guntur. On the intervening night between 14th and 15th May 2021, he was subjected to the 3rd degree police torcher by the AP CID Police on the instruction of their Higher up who may be boot-licking their political masters. Then a slew of legal actions were put to motion…
On 19 May 2021,
The Police officials who tried to act smart and favor their pay-master Chief Minister of AP by not implementing the Order of High Court, got served with Contempt of Court notices. The High Court also showcased the shenanigans of the Superintendent of the Government General Hospital, Guntur who is also the wife of the head of the ruling party’s IT Cell also, who did not finish the examination of accused in time and made the High Court wait until 6PM, finally issuing a notice why action should not be taken under the provisions of Contempt of Court Act.
The AAG got rap on his butt from Justice Lalitha Kanneganti by saying that he could be referred to Bar Council for taking appropriate action, which may involve immediate suspension from Bar Association which will render him a non-advocate during suspension period and eventually getting kicked out of the Legal profession itself, all for the chamchagiri he intended to do to the Chief Minister of AP.
Hilarious stuff!!
On 21 May 2021,
Supreme Court granted bail with usual conditions.
In our view, considering the injuries as reported by the Medical Board of the Army Hospital, we can prima facie form an opinion that the appellant may have been ill-treated while in police custody. Further, we are of the opinion that the charges against the appellant are not such in which custodial interrogation would be required as all the statements made by the appellant are on record and the FIR has been lodged only after a detailed enquiry by the State CID. Considering the totality of the circumstances and also the health position of the appellant, specially that the appellant has undergone heart bypass surgery in December 2020, which is not denied by the respondent and has also been noted in the report of the Medical Board of the Army Hospital, we deem it just and proper that the appellant be enlarged on bail
On 17 Jun 2021,
On the request of the petitioner’s advocate, AP High Court disposed of this petition as no further action is required.
Navendra Kumar Vs Union of India on 06 Nov 2013
A division bench of Gauhati High Court held in this Writ Appeal that, CBI to be an unconstitutional body.
Citations : [2013 SCC ONLINE GAU 305], [2014 GAU LR 1 529], [2014 AIC 133 743], [2013 CRI LJ 5009]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/133280611/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56eaac16607dba3c8ce40e16
The above Judgment and Order was stayed in 3 days time by a Division bench of Supreme Court.
Last update from Supreme Court website is this…
Pritilata Majumder Vs Krishnapada Majumder on 23 Apr 2021
Based on Apex Court decision here, Single Judge of High Court of Tripura held that the evidence of a dumb witness is a competent witness as per section 119 of Evidence Act.
[14] Evidently the petitioner was produced in court and an expert trained in sign language was also engaged by the court to interpret her evidence. As observed by the court, since the petitioner did not understand sign language she could not communicate her evidence to the interpreter and as a result the interpreter could not interpret her evidence to court. However, the petitioner was able to communicate to the court by her signs and gestures that everything of her life was known to her mother.
[15] In this emerged situation, mother [PW-2] of the petitioner is the best witness on her side. She had intimate knowledge of the signs and gestures and meaning of all expressions of her daughter who was brought up by her since her birth. None on earth other than her could better understand her daughter. The mother categorically stated at the trial that marriage of her daughter with the respondent was solemnized in a temple at Kumarghat and after marriage a daughter was born to her and thereafter the respondent left the area. Her evidence was supported by PW-3, a 70 years old man, unrelated to the petitioner who had no reason to tell lie. Moreover, the husband managed to escape. He never appeared either at the trial court or before this Court to discharge his burden. It was not unknown to him that legal proceedings were initiated by his wife against him because he was arrested in one of the cases instituted by his petitioner wife.
[16] A bare perusal of section 119 of the Evidence Act would show that a deaf and dumb witness who is unable to speak may give his evidence in any other manner intelligible to the court. It may be by writing or by signs in open court. It is evident that the mother [PW-2] and her petitioner daughter [PW-1] came to the court on the same day for giving deposition in the case. It also appears from the record that the petitioner was a literate person. She was able to read and write. Therefore, in case of any doubt, the court could have asked her to communicate her words in writing. The court could have also cleared its doubts from the mother of the petitioner by putting the questions to her in exercise of its power under section 165 of the Evidence Act. Without taking recourse to such means, the Family Court rejected the petition declining to grant maintenance allowance to the petitioner and her daughter which is unacceptable.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/50658253/
Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Anr on 14 Oct 1999
A Division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,
“6………………In our view, validity of the marriage for the purpose of summary proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to be determined on the basis of the evidence brought on record by the parties. The standard of proof of marriage in such proceeding is not as strict as is required in a trial of offence under section 494 of the I.P.C. If the claimant in proceedings under Section 125 of the Code succeeds in showing that she and the respondent have lived together as husband and wife, the Court can presume that they are legally wedded spouses, and in such a situation, the party who denies the marital status can rebut the presumption………………”
Citations : [1999 ACR SC 3 2547], [1999 AIR SC 3348], [1999 ALD CRI 2 955], [1999 ALR 37 733], [2000 ALT CRI 1 29], [1999 CALLT SC 3 61], [2000 CLT SC 89 167], [1999 GLH 2 1037], [1999 JT SC 8 329], [2000 LW CRL 1 218], [2000 PLJR 1 61], [2000 RLW SC 1 23], [1999 SCALE 6 579], [1999 SCC 7 675], [1999 SUPP SCR 3 684], [1999 SCC CRI 1345], [1999 SUPREME 8 602], [2000 CRLJ 0 1], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 4 577], [2000 CRI LJ 0 1], [2000 OCR SC 18 348], [1999 AIR SC 3844], [2000 BOMCR CRI SC 731], [1999 CRIMES SC 3 206], [2000 LW CRL 1 217], [2000 CRLJ SC 1], [1999 AIR SCW 3844]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/305700/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad5ee4b0149711411339
Dilranjan Bhatt Vs State of Maharashtra on 20 Sep 2019
Based on this landmark decision of Apex Court, Bombay High Court held that whatever be the final report of the police after their investigation finishes, has to be passed onto the informant.
Citation :
Other Source :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106594898/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d953443714d586ef563ac9b/
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Dilranjan-Bhatt-Versus-The-State-of-Maharashtra-2019-09-20
https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/Case?CaseId=319102340200&Title=DILRANJAN-BHATT-Vs.-STATE-OF-MAHARASHTRA
Bhagwat Singh Vs Commissioner of Police and Anr on 25 Apr 1985
Wonderful judgment clearly states how law takes care of scenarios where the Police do not investigate a complaint/FIR.
Rule-1
If, notwithstanding the First Information Report, the officer-in-charge of a police station decides not to investigate the case on the view that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he is required under sub-section (2) of Section 157 to notify to the informant the fact that he is not going to investigate the case because it to be investigated.
Rule-2
Then again, the officer in charge of a police station is obligated under sub-section(2)(ii) of Section 173 to communicate the action taken by him to the informant and the report forwarded by him to the magistrate under subsection (2)(i) has therefore to be supplied by him to the informant.
Rule-3
Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do one of three things:
(1) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process or
(2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or
(3) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report.
Rule-4
The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence apppears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of three courses:
(1) he may accept the report and drop the proceeding or
(2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process or
(3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156.
Opportunity of filing Protest Petition
We are accordingly of the view that in a case where the magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report.
And finally,
It was urged before us on behalf of the respondents that if in such a case notice is required to be given to the informant, it might result in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of the notice on the informant. But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the First Information Report has to be communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2) (i) of Section 173 if that be so, we do not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate.
Citation : [1985 AIR SC 1285], [1985 SCALE 1 1194], [1985 SCC CRI 267], [1985 SCC 2 537], [1985 CRLJ SC 1179], [1985 CRIMES SC 1 994], [1985 SCR 3 942], [1986 ACR SC 10 26], [1986 AWC SC 26], [1985 BOMLR 87 421], [1985 PLJR 53], [1985 SHIMLC 260], [1985 UJ 17 820], [1985 CRI LJ 1521], [1985 UJ SC 820]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118375/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac18e4b014971140e050
Madhuranatha and Anr Vs State of Karnataka on 28 Nov 2013
The Division bench of Apex Court reduced Death penalty to Life imprisonment for 30 years without remission.
From Para 11,
11. Thus, a witness is normally considered to be independent unless he springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and this usually means that the said witness has cause to bear such enmity against the accused so as to implicate him falsely. In view of the above, there can be no prohibition to the effect that a policeman cannot be a witness or that his deposition cannot be relied upon if it inspires confidence.
Citations : [2013 AD SC 12 587], [2014 AIR SC 394], [2014 AJR 3 489], [2014 AKR 1 305], [2014 ALD CRL SC 1 699], [2014 ALLCC 84 329], [2013 JT SC 15 58], [2014 KARLJ 2 158], [2014 KCCR 2 985], [2014 NCC 1 346], [2013 SCALE 14 502], [2014 SCC 12 419], [2014 SCC CRI 6 765], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 1048], [2014 AIC 133 87], [2014 ECRN 1 668], [2013 SUPREME 8 279], [2013 AIOL 784], [2013 CRIMES SC 4 571], [2013 AIR SC 6766], [2013 AIR SCW 6766], [2014 JCC SC 1 809], [2014 RCR CRIMINAL SC 1 203]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/176649597/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af33e4b0149711415ccf
Rajinder Pershad (Dead) By Lrs Vs Darshana Devi on 10 Aug 2001
A Division bench of Apex Court held as follows,
In the absence of cross-examination of the postman on this crucial aspect his statement in the chief-examination has been rightly relied upon. There is an age old rule that if you dispute the correctness of the statement of a witness you must give him opportunity to explain his statement by drawing his attention to that part of it which is objected to as untrue, otherwise you can not impeach his credit. In State of U.P. v. Nahar Sing (dead) and Ors., [1998] 3 SCC 561, a Bench of this Court (to which 1 was a party) stated the principle that Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right to cross-examination a witness tendered in evidence by opposite party. The scope of that provision is enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by permitting a witness to be questioned, inter alia, to test his veracity. It was observed.
“The oft-quoted observation of Lord Herschell, L.C. in Browne v. Dunn clearly elucidates the principle underlying those provisions. It reads thus:
“I cannot help saying, that it seems to me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct his attention to the fact by some questions put in cross-examination showing that that imputation is intended to be made and not to take his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and then, when it is impossible for him to explain, as perhaps he might have been able to do if such questions had been put to him, the circumstances which, it is suggested, indicate that the story he tells ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witness unworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always understood that if you intend to impeach a witness, you are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give an opportunity of making any explanation which is open to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case, but it is essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses.”
Citations : [2001 AIR SC 3042], [2001 SCALE 5 203], [2001 SUPREME 6 82], [2001 AIR SC 3207], [2001 SCC 7 69], [2002 UJ SC 1 89], [2001 DLT SC 93 1], [2001 UC 2 415], [2001 ALR 44 843], [2002 LW 1 69], [2001 AIR SCW 3042], [2001 JT SC 6 400]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1624346/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad98e4b0149711411cf1
Bharti Bhardwaj Vs Deepak Bhardwaj on 03 Feb 2021
Hon’ble Delhi High Court affirmed the divorce granted to husband because of the mental cruelty caused by the wife relying on landmark decision by Hon,ble Supreme Court.
From Paras 11, 12 and 13,
11. Now, given that matrimonial disputes rarely involve production of concrete evidence in documentary or audio-visual form, and mostly proceed on the relative strength of the opposing allegations made by the parties, the entire process of leading and recording evidence has a significant role to play in establishing one’s case. Thus, notwithstanding her denials in the written statement, the appellant was expected to properly and specifically cross-examine the respondent to prove her allegations of cruelty against him and disprove those he had levelled against her. The importance of properly discharging this function of cross-examination was discussed by the Supreme Court in the following paragraphs of its decision in Rajinder Pershad Vs. Darshana Devi (2001) 7 SCC 69
12. Although the appellant, in the grounds adopted in the appeal, has assailed the reliance of the learned Family Court on the decision in State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh (1998) 3 SCC 561 to contend that the same was a criminal case and the precedent arising therefrom could not apply to cross examinations in matrimonial proceedings, which are civil proceedings by nature, there is no merit to this opposition; especially in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in Darshana Devi’s case which was a civil proceeding. In fact, the standard of proof in a matrimonial proceeding- which is also in the nature of a civil proceeding is not as strict, as in criminal proceedings. Thus, the case is required to be proved on preponderance of probabilities and not the legal standard of being beyond a reasonable doubt. Keeping in view the aforesaid, it is evident that there was a crucial responsibility placed on the shoulders of the appellant which was to ensure that she challenged the specifics of the allegations raised by the respondent and establish their lack of veracity. Paragraphs 44 to 46 of the impugned judgment clearly show that the appellant had not cross-examined the respondent/husband on these important aspects, and, thus, completely failed to draw out the facts as claimed by her. In fact, even before us, the appellant, other than contending that the onus of proving cruelty rested upon the respondent, has failed to provide any cogent reasons for failing to cross-examine the respondent in support of her own case, or to challenge his allegations of cruelty. It is a settled proposition of law that the Court would normally accept unchallenged and uncontroverted assertions of fact. The failure of the appellant to effectively cross-examine the respondent shows that she neither seriously challenged his version of the factual position, nor established her own version. Therefore, in our view, the Family Court was justified in accepting the unrebutted testimony of the respondent.
13. When we view this in addition to the fact that in her written statement, the appellant had admitted to having levelled false allegations against the respondent and his family under the DV Act, we find there were plenty of holes in the appellant’s story. Her feeble explanation for this ill-thought out act of falsely implicating the respondent and his family was that the same was not done malevolently, but only with an intention to ensure that the parties were sent to counselling in order to settle their disputes. That
Citations : [2021 SCC ONLINE DEL 1060]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/141653082/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/602426e49fca1968807133e6
https://www.jainodin.com/2021/02/false-dvc-is-mental-cruelty.html
