The single judge of Delhi High Court pass injunction orders against the serial online abuser/leech and also directed Twitter to delete tweets if the leech fails to delete them within 24 hours.
Citations :
Other Sources :
Author: ShadesOfKnife
CrPC 315 – Accused person to be competent witness
(1) Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him or any person charged together with him at the same trial:
Provided that—
(a) he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing;
(b) his failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him that the same trial.
(2) Any person against whom proceedings are instituted in any Criminal Court under section 98, or section 107 or section 108, or section 109, or section 110, or under Chapter IX or under Part B, Part C or Part D of Chapter X, may offer himself as a witness in such proceedings:
Provided that in proceedings under section 108, section 109, or section 110, the failure of such person to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Court or give rise to any presumption against him or any other person proceeded against together with him at the same inquiry.
CrPC 243 – Evidence for defence
(1) The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence; and if the accused puts in any written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record.
(2) If the accused, after he has entered upon his defence, applies to the Magistrate to issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination or cross-examination, or the production of any document or other thing, the Magistrate shall issue such process unless he considers that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice and such ground shall be recorded by him in writing:
Provided that, when the accused has cross-examined or had the opportunity of cross-examining any witness before entering on his defence, the attendance of such witness shall not be compelled under this section, unless the Magistrate is satisfied that it is necessary for the ends of justice.
(3) The Magistrate may, before summoning any witness on an application under sub-section (2), require that the reasonable expenses incurred by the witness in attending for the purposes of the trial be deposited in Court.
Shyam Manohar Saxena Vs CBI and Ors on 1 Jul 2019
A single judge bench of Delhi High Court found the Trial Court to be erring in not allowing a 91 CrPC petition sought by the accused citing wrong reasons. Each of such error is clearly called out and hung to dry.
From Para 30,
25. The reasoning given by the Trial Court that specific particulars or dates of meetings have not been given is ex-facie unsubstantiated. The list of documents, as extracted hereinabove, clearly shows that the petitioner has given requisite particulars so as to identify the relevant documents. It may further be noticed that subject application was filed along with an application under Section 315 Cr.P.C filed by the petitioner as well as the other co-accused. Applications under Section 315 Cr.P.C. of the accused were allowed and accused were permitted to examine themselves as witnesses.
26. Under Section 243 Cr.P.C. it is obligatory on the part of the Trial Court to issue process when the accused seeks summoning of any witness or production of any document in his defence. The only ground on which such an application can be refused is if the same was vexatious, delayed or would defeat the ends of justice.
27. In the instant case, no such findings have been returned by the Trial Court. On the contrary, the Trial Court has erred in not noticing that the petitioner had moved an application even at the stage when prosecution evidence was being led and was permitted to withdraw that application with liberty to move an appropriate application at the stage of defence evidence and that is exactly what the petitioner has done.
28. Further, the Trial Court has clearly erred in holding that it is within the discretion of the court, under Section 243 Cr.P.C. to decline such an application. On the contrary, as per section 243 Cr.P.C., it is obligatory on the part of the Trial Court to issue process, unless, it for the reasons to be recorded, holds that the application is vexatious, delayed or defeats the ends of justice.
29. Further reasoning given by the Trial Court, that the petitioner is seeking re-summoning of the witnesses, who have already been examined, is also not correct. Petitioner has not sought summoning of the witnesses, who have already been examined as prosecution witnesses for re-examination/cross-examination. Petitioner has merely sought production of the relevant record of the association from the custodian thereof. Admittedly, the record would come from an undisputed source. Petitioner has not sought re-summoning of any witness already examined, by name but has only sought production of the documents from the custodian thereof. Once the documents are produced, it would be open to the petitioner to prove the same in accordance with the Evidence Act.
30. Further reasoning given by the Trial Court, that the petitioner could have obtained copies of the documents under the Right to Information Act and then cross-examined the witnesses on the said documents, is also erroneous. Even if a person were to obtain copies of the documents under the Right to Information Act, said copies would not become primary evidence in terms of the Evidence Act and a party would still need to summon the original record from the custodian thereof.
Citations : [2019 SCC ONLINE DEL 8961]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/197449956/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5d1a4325714d580311101c19
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/shyam-manohar-saxena-versus-central-bureau-of-investigation-ors
Registrar General Vs State of Meghalaya on 23 Jun 2021
A division bench of Meghalaya High Court issued the below directions, when the Administration there tried to impose mandatory vaccination upon the traders for them to run their businesses…
Guidelines passed:
In addition thereto, we issue the following directions so that the public at large are provided with an option of making an informed choice:-
(i) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “VACCINATED”, in the event all employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are vaccinated.
(ii) All shops/establishments/local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses should display prominently at a conspicuous place, a sign, “NOT VACCINATED”, in the event all the employees and staff of the concerned shop/establishment are not vaccinated. Similarly, in the case of local taxis/auto-rickshaws/maxi cabs and buses where the concerned driver or conductor or helper(s) are not vaccinated.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/70432062/
Gulfasha Vs State of Maharashtra on 28 Jun 2021
A single judge bench of Bombay High Court asked a trial court to explain it’s stand when the trail court refused to accept cash bail and release an accused who is in jail with her 10 months son.
From Paras 4-9,
4. Learned counsel for the Applicant states that in spite of this order and in spite of urgency mentioned in the order itself, the trial Court has not accepted cash bail and has not released the Applicant on bail as of today.
5. This is serious breach of order passed by this Court. The trial Court was expected to follow the clear directions issued in the operative part of the order mentioned in paragraph No.8 of that order. The trial Court was not concerned with the other narration as well as reasoning part in the order. There is absolutely no ambiguity in the operative part of the order and it was duty of the trial Court to follow the order. In spite of that, unnecessary hurdles are created in giving effect to that order. Learned counsel for the Applicant states that specious reason given for not releasing the Applicant, was that section 302 of IPC was not mentioned in first paragraph of the order.
6. This Court does not have to explain the narration mentioned in this order to the trial Court. However, to clarify this, it is necessary to mention that, initially the offence was registered u/s 307 of the IPC on the basis of statement given by the deceased herself. Subsequently, the deceased had succumbed to her burns and the informant was described as ‘the deceased’ in the order. There is also reference to the ‘dying declaration’, in paragraph No.7. In spite of this, the trial Court exceeding its jurisdiction, has refused to obey order of this Court, specifically mentioned in paragraph No.8 as the operative part. This has seriously affected the Applicant’s valuable right of getting released on bail at the earliest. Her liberty is affected in spite of clear directions of this Court.
7. If there was any ambiguity in the order, it was for the parties and in particular was for learned APP, who had appeared in the matter, to point it at. The order could have also been corrected by a higher forum. But the trial Court had no authority to question that order. In any case, the operative part of the order is very clear and there was absolutely no ambiguity. The trial Court was supposed to follow these directions mentioned in the operative part.
8. In spite of this order, the Applicant had to suffer in jail custody for more period than was necessary, particularly when she had 10 months old child with her. Considering the repeated concerns expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding unnecessary crowding of the jail, the attitude of the trial Court is not proper in this case.
9. In these circumstances to prevent any further hurdles and only for that purpose, I am clarifying and adding section 302 of IPC in the first paragraph of the order. However, the trial Court will have to explain its stand and report will have to be submitted to this Court.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101221193/
Adv Gorkanti Vinod Kumar
గోవధ నిషేధ చట్టం
Telangana & AP Cows Laws:
ఆంధ్రప్రదేశ్ మరియు తెలంగాణ గోవధ నిషేధ & పశు సంరక్షణ చట్టం 1977 ( The A.P. & T.S. Prohibition of Cow Slaughter and Animal Preservation Act ) ప్రకారం…
1) Section – 5 : ఆంధ్రప్రదేశ్ మరియు తెలంగాణ లో గోవులను , దూడలను (దూడలు మగవి అయినా , ఆడవి అయినా సరే) ఎట్టి పరిస్థితులలో ఉద్దెశపూర్వకంగా చంపకూడదు.
2) Section – 6 : మిగిలిన పశువులను అంటే ఎద్దు, దున్న, గేదె మొదలైనవాటిని చంపాలంటే , వాటి వయస్సు ఖచ్చితంగా 14 సంవత్సరాలు దాటి వుండాలి, అలాగే వ్యవసాయం కి మరియు బ్రీడ్ డెవలప్మెంటకి పూర్తిగా నిరుపయోగంగా వున్నాయని, ప్రభుత్వము నియమించిన పశు వైద్యుడు సర్టిఫికేట్ ఇవ్వాలి.
౩) Section – 8 : ప్రభుత్వ వైద్యుడి సర్టిఫికేట్ ఉన్నప్పటికీ, వాటిని ప్రభుత్వ అనుమతి వున్న కబేళా (పశువధశాల)లలో మాత్రమే వధించాలి, రోడ్డులపై, ఇండ్లల్లో, ఎక్కడ పడితే అక్కడ పశువులను వధించడం, మాంసాన్ని విక్రయించడం నేరము.
4) Section – 11 : ఈ యొక్క యాక్ట్ కాగ్నిజబుల్ (Cognizable) నేరం కింద వస్తుంది
(CRPC 43 ) సిర్ పిసి 43 :- ప్రకారం ఎప్పుడైనా కాగ్నిజబుల్ (Cognizable) నేరం జరిగినప్పుడు, ఎవ్వరైనా ప్రైవేట్ పర్సన్ (Private Person) అనగా మనం, నేరం చేసిన వ్యక్తిని అరెస్ట్ చేసే హక్కు ఉంటుంది, కావున గో వద అనేది కూడా కాగ్నిజబుల్ (Cognizable) నేరం కింద వస్తుంది, కావున గో వద చేసే రవాణా ని అడ్డుకొని అరెస్ట్ చేసే హక్కు ప్రతి ఒక్క ప్రైవెట్ పర్సన్ అనగా పౌరుడికి వుంది అనగా ఏ వ్యక్తి అయినా ఆపొచ్చు తర్వాత పోలీస్ వాళ్లకు అప్పగించాలి
(Animal Cruelty Act 1960 ) అనిమల్ క్రూయల్టీ యాక్ట్ 1960 :
1) Section – 11 : హింసిస్తూ, దెబ్బలు తాకుతూ, గాలి ఆడకుండా, రక్తం వచ్చేటట్టు కట్టేయడం, ఓవర్ లోడ్ చేస్తూ, నొప్పులతో ఇబ్బంది పెడుతూ తీసుకెళ్లడం నేరం
(A.P. & T.S. Motor Vehicle Rules 1989, Rule 253 Sub Rule (1), Clause (iii) ) ఏ.పి & టి.ఎస్ మోటార్ వెహికల్ రూల్స్ 1989, రూల్ 253 సుబ్ రూల్(1) క్లాస్ (iii) పశువుల రవాణాకు ప్రకారం నియమాలు:-
1)
a) ఒక లారీలో 06 కంటే ఎక్కువ పశువులను రవాణా చేయకూడదు.
b) ఈ 06 కూడా రవాణా చేస్తున్న సమయములో, పశువైద్యుడి ధ్రువపత్రాన్ని కలిగి వుండాలి.
c) వాహనములో పశువులతోబాటు, వాటి బాగోగులు చూసుకునే వ్యక్తి (attedent) వుండాలి.
d) ప్రధమ చికిత్స పెట్టె (First Aid Box) వుండాలి.
e) మేత, నీరు వుండాలి.
f) మూసివేయబడి ఉన్న వాహనాలో (Closed Containers) పశువులను తరలించకూడదు.
(IPC 428 & IPC 429 ) ఐపిసి 428 & ఐపిసి 429 ప్రకారం
1)పశు రవాణా సమయం లో ఏదైనా పశువు అనగా ఆవు లేదా ఎద్దు చనిపోతే ఈ సెక్షన్స్ కింద కేసు నమోదు చేయించాలి, ఈ సెక్షన్స్ జోడించినచొ 2 లేదా 5 సంవత్సరాలు జైలు శిక్ష పడుతుంది, కావున తప్పకుండ ఈ సెక్షన్స్ వేసేటట్టు చూడాలి అక్రమ గోవుల రవాణా వాహనాలు మనకు కనబడగానే వాటిని ఆపి 100 కి కాల్ చేసి, పోలీస్ వారికి తప్పనిసరిగా సమాచారాన్ని ఇవ్వాలి. పోలీస్ వాళ్లు పట్టుకున్న గోవులను, సురక్షితంగా రిజిస్టర్ అయినా గోశాలకు తరలించాలి అక్రమ రవాణా చేస్తున్న వారి మీద, అమ్మినవారి మీద, కోన్నవారి మీద, శిక్ష పడేలా FIR కేసు వేయించాలి.
అందరు చదవండి – అందరికి పంపించండి
గో మాతలను రక్షించండి జై గో మాత
సవరణ : మీ గోరకంటి వినోద్ కుమార్ (గో రక్షక్)
న్యాయవాది, 9966064644,
ఎల్ బి నగర్, హైదరాబాద్, తెలంగాణా …
Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal Vs Mohan Singh and Ors on 08 Oct 1974
A division bench consisting the legendary Justice P.N. Bhagvati, held that a subsequent petition under 482 CrPC is maintainable if the facts and circumstances are different from earlier application. Here Section 561-A is current Section 482 CrPC.
Section 561-A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must, therefore, exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. The High Court was in the circumstances entitled to entertain the subsequent application of Respondents 1 and 2 and consider whether on the facts and circumstances then obtaining the continuance of the proceeding against the respondents constituted an abuse of the process of the Court or its quashing was necessary to secure the ends of justice.
Indiankanoon version:
Casemine version:
Citations : [1975 AIR SC 1002], [1975 PLR 77 147], [1975 SCC 3 706], [1974 CRLR 0 691], [1975 AIR SC 100], [1975 SCJ 11 478], [1976 MLJ CRL 1 1], [1975 SCC CRI 156], [1975 CRLJ SC 812]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1993916/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aba3e4b014971140cf5f
Index of Quash judgments is here.
Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs Bandaru Pavani on 4 Dec 2008
Going through the Preamble of the HMA 1955, the division bench of the Supreme Court held that the marriage of a Hindu with a Christian is void ab initio.
From Para 18,
18. Although, an attempt has been made to establish that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, did not prohibit a valid Hindu marriage of a Hindu and another professing a different faith, we are unable to agree with such submission in view of the definite scheme of the 1955 Act.
From Para 20,
20.As submitted by Mr. Rao, the Preamble itself indicates that the Act was enacted to codify the law relating to marriage amongst Hindus. Section 2 of the Act which deals with application of the Act, and has been reproduced hereinabove, reinforces the said proposition.
From Para 21, Use of ‘may’ in section 5 of HMA
21.Section 5 of the Act thereafter also makes it clear that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions contained in the said Section were fulfilled. The usage of the expression ‘may’ in the opening line of the Section, in our view, does not make the provision of Section 5 optional. On the other hand, it in positive terms, indicates that a marriage can be solemnized between two Hindus if the conditions indicated were fulfilled. In other words, in the event the conditions remain unfulfilled, a marriage between two Hindus could not be solemnized. The expression ‘may’ used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnized according to the ceremonies indicated therein.
And finally in Para 22,
22.In the facts pleaded by the respondent in her application under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act and the admission of the appellant that he was and still is a Christian belonging to the Roman Catholic denomination, the marriage solemnized in accordance with Hindu customs was a nullity and its registration under Section 8 of the Act could not and/or did not validate the same. In our view, the High Court rightly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent herein and the judgment and order of the High Court does not warrant any interference.
Citations : [2009 MPLJ SC 2 48], [2008 SCALE 16 109], [2008 AIOL 1405], [2009 MHLJ SC 2 850], [2008 SCR 17 35], [2009 ALLMR SC 1 488], [2009 BOMCR SC 5 906], [2009 SCC 1 714], [2009 AIR SC 244], [2008 JT 13 450], [2009 SUPREME 1 145], [2009 SCC CIV 1 326], [2009 AIR SC 1085], [2009 AIC SC 74 33], [2009 CHN SC 1 158], [2009 AIR SCW 244]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/421764/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ae4b0149711413cbe
Rehena Khatoon Vs Jargis Hossain on 24 Jun 2021
A single judge bench of Calcutta High Court held that a divorced women is entitled to maintenance even if she unilaterally obtains divorce from her husband.
The Learned Trial Judge committed illegality when she held that a divorced wife is not entitled to get maintenance. The petitioner moved in revision for redrassal of the said wrong but she was again wronged by the Learned Revisional Court on the ground that the petitioner was allegedly found in compromise situation with a third person by the opposite party and accordingly she was not dutiful to her husband.
Law is absolutely settled that even a divorced wife is entitled to get maintenance till her remarriage if she is unable to maintain herself. The impugned order does not suggest any finding as to whether the petitioner was able or unable to maintain herself or not independently.
Citations :
Other Sources :
