After getting kicked in the nuts by AP High Court here, the Cabal went to Supreme Court and got the balls crushed.
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Author: ShadesOfKnife
Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd and Ors Vs State of Maharastra and Anr on 17 Dec 2008
A wonderful decision by Supreme Court of India around High Court’s inherent power under section 482 CrPC against the Revisional Powers u/s 401 CrPC.
From Para 8,
8. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R .P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka , [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 ] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] ).
Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Sessions is barred under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available.
Citations : [2009 SCC 2 370], [2009 CRLJ SC 974], [2008 SCALE 16 240], [2009 SCC CRI 1 806], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 1 802], [2008 AIOL 1468], [2008 SCR 17 844], [2009 AIR SC 1032], [2009 AIC SC 75 265], [2009 ECRN SC 2 284]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1891955/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae9ee4b0149711414586
CrPC 483 – Duty of High Court to exercise continuous superintendence over Courts of Judicial Magistrates
Every High Court shall so exercise its superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it as to ensure that there is an expeditious and proper disposal of cases by such Magistrates.
Ajita David Vs State on 29 Jun 2009
Inherent bias towards women can lead to incorrect judgments… This judgment totally fails to consider a question (may be not posed to the Court by the Counsels on both sides) isn’t this interpretation violative of Articles 14 and 21, Principles of Natural Justice and many more… More so, since the person aggrieved by the offence is not defined in the Act, every tom, dick and harry are given any interpretation to the provisions of this law.
From Paras 5-9,
5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would vehemently contend that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 which proposed to punish not only the receiver of dowry but also the giver of dowry. Referring to section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner would submit that though protection is provided from charging a person who is aggrieved by the offence under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the parents of the aggrieved wife do not fall under the category of person aggrieved by the offence. Therefore, the exemption contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not apply to the father of the de facto complainant, who purportedly gave dowry. It is his further submission that even before the case reaches the stage of trial, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the case as per section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is duty bound to array all the persons against whom offences have been made out. Therefore, it is his submission that when the giver of the dowry is also punishable under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, he cannot claim any exemption under section 7(3) of the said Act. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is bound to act under section 190 and take cognizance as against the father of the de facto complainant also, it is contended.
6. There was no representation for the intervenor. Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) appearing for the State would submit that the object of the amendment introduced by Act 43/1986 to exclude the person aggrieved from prosecution under Dowry Prohibition Act will have to be considered by this court before approaching the ambit of section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Referring to section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, he would further submit that a clear exemption is contemplated from prosecuting a person aggrieved by any offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act. Further, he would submit that the petition seeking to array the father of the de facto complainant is totally misconceived, inappropriate and premature.
7. The statement of objects and reasons for the enactment of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 would reflect that the Act is enacted to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking dowry. But, while dealing with the salient features of the Act 43/1986 which introduced the amendment, it has been stated that the statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act.
8. In terms of the statement of objects and reasons of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, provision under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted to punish not only the receiver but also the giver of the dowry. Section 7(1)(b)(ii) would read that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, no court shall take cognizance of the offence under this Act except upon a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person or by any recognised welfare institution or organisation. Section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act would provide that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject him to prosecution under the Act.
9. In order to provide more clarity to the provision under section 7(1)(b)(ii), the legislature has thought it fit to clarify that a parent or other relative of such a person also is entitled to lodge a complaint apart from the person aggrieved by the offence. Firstly, it is found that Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not define the person aggrieved by the offence. The aforesaid provision made to provide more clarity cannot be interpreted that the word ‘parent’ does not fall within the category of an aggrieved person by the offence provided under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The parent of the victim girl is definitely a person aggrieved by the offence. By no stretch of imagination, the legislature would have thought of excluding the parent from the purview of the person aggrieved by the offence while drafting section 7(3) of the Act to exempt from prosecution the person aggrieved by the offence for the statement made by him. At any rate, the phrase “person aggrieved by the offence” employed in sub-section 3 of section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 cannot be construed that it only refers to the victim girl who was deprived of the marital bliss on account of the harassment meted out to her demanding dowry. In the considered opinion of this court, parents and other relatives of the victim girl can safely be classified as person aggrieved by the offence as contemplated under section 7(3) of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
From Para 12,
12. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is subject to section 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on account of the non-obstante clause found under the above Act. When the provision under section 7(3) of the Special Act prohibits taking cognizance as against a person aggrieved by the offence for the incriminating statement made by him, the Judicial Magistrate cannot invoke the provision under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and include a person exempted under the Special Act as one of the accused. On account of the introduction of the provision to the Special Act to exclude certain persons from prosecution, the powers of the Judicial Magistrate under section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure referred to in the above ratio cannot be exercised.
Citations : [2009 MLJ CRL 3 728]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1269967/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609039fe4b014971115c0a5
Jamaluddin Ansari Azad Vs State and Anr on 29 Jul 2013
See the interpretation of a single judge from Delhi High Court.
From Paras 11 and 12,
11. In Pooja Saxena (supra) it was observed that the observations made in Neera Singh’s case were obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provision of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 were not the subject matter of the dispute before the Court in the petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C in that case. Moreover in that case, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided u/s 7(3) of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In Pooja Saxena (supra), the allegations in the complaint were regarding demand of dowry by the father of respondent no.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner, failing which he would call off the marriage. It was observed that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation either to concede to the demand or face loss of honour of their family in the society and if under that fear the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of circumstances. As such, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and she could not be subjected to prosecution for the offence u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
12. A perusal of the complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C filed by respondent no.2 goes to show that he was invoking Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act only on the basis of allegations made in the complaint by Noor Jahan whereas in para 7 of the complaint he did not admit to the contents of the FIR. Merely on the basis of allegations which were not admitted by respondent no.2, the petitioner could not have been booked for offence u/s 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Moreover as held in Pooja Saxena(supra) and Ram Gopal Shah v. State of Jharkhand, II 2009 DMC 848, the petitioner being father of the complainant is an aggrieved person from whom the dowry was being demanded. Such aggrieved person is protected u/s 7(3) from prosecution under the Act.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/71564569/
K Santhosha Vs The Karnataka Power Transmission on 24 Jun 2021
A division bench of Karnataka High Court held that a Son is a son, irrespective of if he is a legitimate son or illegitimate, with regards to compassionate appointments.
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Other Sources :
Earlier Writ Petition here; Review Petition here.
Narain Khamman Vs Parduman Kumar Jain on 19 Oct 1984
A division bench of Apex Court held the purpose for which the Statement of Objects and Reasons of a Bill may be replied upon.
From Para 12,
12. It is now well settled that though the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute, it is permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Bill for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy.
Citations : [1985 AIR SC 4], [1985 SCR 1 1025], [1984 SCALE 2 650], [1985 SCC 1 1], [1985 UJ 17 422], [1985 UJ SC 422]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1258047/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac15e4b014971140dfc3
P.K. Shaji Vs State of Kerala on 27 Oct 2005
A division bench of the Apex Court held that a superior court always has power to give directions to lower court to pass appropriate orders. In this case, to check if the bail conditions are violated and cancel the bail.
The order of the Sessions Court shows that the learned Magistrate has been empowered to consider the question of violation of any of the conditions imposed by the Sessions Court and was given powers to pass appropriate orders. The plea raised by the appellant’s learned Counsel is that when the learned Magistrate had no such power, the Sessions Court was not empowered to invest that power in the Magistrate. We do not find any force in this contention. The superior court can always give directions of this nature and authorise the subordinate court to pass appropriate orders and the trial Magistrate would be the competent authority to decide whether any condition had been violated by the person who had been released on bail. When there is a specific direction to pass appropriate orders as if the conditions for granting bail had been imposed by the learned Magistrate himself, the impugned Order is legal and valid.
Citations : [2005 JT 9 481], [2006 AIR SC 100], [2005 SCC 13 283], [2005 SCALE 8 724], [2005 CRLJ SC 5063], [2005 SCR SUPP 4 840], [2005 CRIMES SC 4 184], [2005 SUPREME 7 2652005 AIOL 534], [2005 AIR SC 5560], [2006 SCC CRI 2 174], [2005 KERLT 4 856], [2005 CRILJ 5063], [2005 ALD CRI 2 517], [2005 JT SC 7 282], [2005 SCC 12 461], [2005 UJ 2 1136], [2006 SCC CRI 174], [2005 CRI LJ 5063], [2005 KLT 4 856], [2005 AIR SCW 5560]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/440533/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae1ee4b0149711413041
M Karthiga Priyadarshini Vs State on 30 Mar 2021
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Ghulam Hassan Sofi and Anr Vs State of JK on 02 Apr 2021
Relying on the landmark judgment of SCI here, single judge of Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that the trial court can direct further investigation suo moto even after hearing the petitioner on the point of charging/discharge (under 239/240 CrPC)
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Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154829698/
https://primelegal.in/2021/04/05/court-can-order-further-investigation-while-exercising-its-discretion-u-s-156-cr-p-c-high-court-of-jammu-and-kashmir/
