(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law—
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
Explanation I.—The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion.
Explanation II.—In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.
Author: ShadesOfKnife
Y. Sulochana Rani Vs Union of India (Seeking Shared Parenting)
News:
https://www.barandbench.com/news/absence-of-joint-parentage-violates-fundamental-rights-plea-in-sc-challenges-laws-on-custody-guardianship-of-children
https://www.barandbench.com/news/does-absence-of-joint-parentage-violate-fundamental-rights-supreme-court-notice-in-challenge-to-laws-on-custody-childre
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/sc-issues-notice-on-plea-challenging-provisions-allowing-exclusive-custody-of-child-to-one-of-the-parents-149243
Rosy Jacob Vs Jacob A. Chakramakkal on 05 Apr 1973
The Full Bench of Apex Court held as follows, with regards to Custody of minor children under GW Act 1890,
15. In our opinion. Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act contemplates not only actual physical custody but also constructive custody of the guardian which term includes all categories of guardians. The object and purpose of this provision being ex facie to ensure the welfare of the minor ward, which necessarily involves due protection of the right of his guardian to properly look after the ward’s health, maintenance and education, this section demands reasonably liberal interpretation so as to effectuate that object. Hyper-technicalities should not be allowed to deprive the guardian the necessary assistance from the Court in effectively discharging his duties and obligations towards his ward so as to promote the latter’s welfare. If the Court under the Divorce Act cannot make any order with respect to the custody of Ajit alias Andrew and Maya alias Mary and it is not open to the Court under the Guardians and Wards Act to appoint or declare guardian of the person of his children under Section 19 during his lifetime, if the Court does not consider him unfit, then, the only provision to which the father can have resort for his children’s custody is Section 25. Without, therefore, laying down exhaustively the circumstances in which Section 25 can be invoked, in our opinion, on the facts and circumstances of this case the husband’s application under Section 25 was competent with respect to the two elder children. The Court was entitled to consider all the disputed questions of fact or law properly raised before it relating to these two children. With respect to Mahesh alias Thomas, however, the Court under the Divorce Act is at present empowered to make suitable orders relating to his custody, maintenance and education. It is, therefore, somewhat difficult to impute to the legislature an intention to set up another parallel Court to deal with the question of the custody of a minor which is within the power of a competent Court under the Divorce Act. We are unable to accede to the respondent’s suggestion that his application should be considered to have been preferred for appointing or declaring him as a guardian. But whether the respondent’s prayer for custody of the minor children be considered under the Guardians and Wards Act or under the indian divorce act, as observed by Maharajan, J., with which observation we entirely agree, “the controlling consideration governing the custody of the children is the welfare of the children concerned and not the right of their parents”. It was not disputed that under the indian divorce act this is the controlling consideration. The Court’s power under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act is also, in our opinion, to be governed primarily by the consideration of the welfare of the minors concerned. The discretion vested in the Court is, as is the case with all judicial discretions to be exercised judiciously in the background of all the relevant facts and circumstances. Each case has to be decided on its own facts and other cases can hardly serve as binding precedents, the facts of two cases in this respect being seldom — if ever — identical. The contention that if the husband is not unfit to be the guardian of his minor children, then, the question of their welfare does not at all arise is to state the proposition a bit too broadly and may at times be somewhat misleading. It does not take full notice of the real core of the statutory purpose. In our opinion, the dominant consideration in making orders under Section 25 is the welfare of the minor children and in considering this question due regard has of course to be paid to the right of the father to be the guardian and also to all other relevant factors having a bearing on the minor’s welfare. There is a presumption that a minor’s parents would do their very best to promote their children’s welfare and, if necessary, would not grudge any sacrifice of their own personal interest and pleasure. This presumption arises because of the natural, selfless affection normally expected from the parents for their children. From this point of view, in case of conflict or dispute between the mother and the father about the custody of their children, the approach has to be somewhat different from that adopted by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court in this case. There is no dichotomy between the fitness of the father to be entrusted with the custody of his minor children and considerations of their welfare. The father’s fitness has to be considered, determined and weighed predominantly in terms of the welfare of his minor children in the context of all the relevant circumstances. If the custody of the father cannot promote their welfare equally or better than the custody of the mother, then, he cannot claim indefeasible right to their custody under Section 25 merely because there is no defect in his personal character and he has attachment for his children—which every normal parent has. These are the only two aspects pressed before us, apart from the stress laid by the husband on the allegations of immorality against the wife which, in our firm opinion, he was not at all justified in contending. Such allegations, in view of earlier decisions, had to be completely ignored in considering the question of custody of the children in the present case. The father’s fitness from the point of view just mentioned cannot override considerations of the welfare of the minor children. No doubt, the father has been presumed by the statute generally to be better fitted to look after the children — being normally the earning member and head of the family — but the Court has in each case to see primarily to the welfare of the children in determining the question of their custody, in the background of all the relevant facts having a bearing on their health, maintenance and education. The family is normally the heart of our society and for a balanced and healthy growth of children it is highly desirable that they get their due share of affection and care from both the parents in their normal parental home. Where, however, family dissolution due to some unavoidable circumstances becomes necessary the Court has to come to a judicial decision on the question of the welfare of the children on a full consideration of all the relevant circumstances. Merely because the father loves his children and is not shown to be otherwise undesirable cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion that the welfare of the children would be better promoted by granting their custody to him as against the wife who may also be equally affectionate towards her children and otherwise equally free from blemish, and, who, in addition, because of her profession and financial resources, may be in a position to guarantee better health, education and maintenance for them. The children are not mere chattels : nor are they mere play-things for their parents. Absolute right of parents over the destinies and the lives of their children has, in the modern changed social conditions, yielded to the considerations of their welfare as human beings so that they may grow up in a normal balanced manner to be useful members of the society and the guardian court in case of a dispute between the mother and the father, is expected to strike a just and proper balance between the requirements of welfare of the minor children and the rights of their respective parents over them. The approach of the learned Single Judge, in our view, was correct and we agree with him. The Letters Patent Bench on appeal seems to us to have erred in reversing him on grounds which we are unable to appreciate.
Citations : [1973 AIR SC 2090], [1973 SCC 1 840], [1973 SCR 3 918], [1974 MLJ 2 34], [1973 AIR 2090]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/270778/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ab9ae4b014971140ce1a
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/rosy-jacob-vs-jacob-a-chakramakkal
Ayurveda and Yoga – Lifelines of your Life
The more you let Ayurveda and Yoga become the basis for your living, the easier living gets. Here are Some Ancient Indian Health Tips. – quotes in Sanskrit
1. Ajeerne Bhojanam Visham If previously taken Lunch is not digested, taking Dinner will be equivalent to taking Poison. Hunger is one signal that the previous food is digested
2. Ardharogahari Nidhraa Proper Sleep cures half of your Diseases
3. Mudhgadhaali Gadhavyaali Of all the Pulses, Green grams are the best. It boosts Immunity. Other Pulses all have one or the other side effects.
4. Bagnaasthi Sandhaanakaro Rasonaha Garlic even joins broken Bones.
5. Athi Sarvathra Varjayeth Anything consumed in Excess, just because it tastes good, is not good for Health. Be moderate.
6. Naasthimoolam Anoushadham There is No Vegetable that has no medicinal benefit to the body.
7. Na Vaidhyaha Prabhuraayushaha No Doctor is Lord of our Longevity. Doctors have limitations.
8. Chinthaa Vyaadhi Prakaashaya Worry aggravates ill health.
9. Vyayaamascha Sanaihi Sanaihi Do any Exercise slowly. Speedy exercise is not good.
10. Ajavath charvanam Kuryaath Chew your Food like a Goat. Never Swallow food in a hurry. Saliva aids first in digestion.
11. Snaanam Naama Manahprasaadhanakaram Dhuswapna Vidhwasanam Bath removes Depression. It drives away Bad Dreams.
12. Na Snaanam Aachareth Bhukthvaa Never take Bath immediately after taking Food Digestion is afected
13. Naasthi Meghasamam Thoyam No water matches Rainwater in purity.
14. Ajeerne Bheshajam Vaari Indigestion can be addressed by taking plain water.
15. Sarvathra Noothanam Sastham Sevakaanne Puraathanam Always prefer things that are Fresh. Old Rice and Old Servant need to be replaced with new. (Here what it actually means in respect of Servant is: Change his Duties and not terminate.)
16. Nithyam Sarvaa Rasaabhyaasaha Take complete Food that has all tastes viz: Salt, Sweet, Bitter, Sour, Astringent and Pungent).
17. Jataram Poorayedhardham Annahi Fill your Stomach half with Solids, a quarter with Water and rest leave it empty.
18. Bhukthvopa Visathasthandraa Never sit idle after taking Food. Walk for at least half an hour.
19. Kshuth Saadhuthaam Janayathi Hunger increases the taste of food. In other words, eat only when hungry.
20. Chinthaa Jaraanaam Manushyaanaam Worrying speeds up ageing.
21. Satham Vihaaya Bhokthavyam When it is time for food, keep even 100 jobs aside.
22. Sarvaa Dharmeshu Madhyamaam Choose always the middle path. Avoid going for extremes in anything. This is Ayurveda a simple way of living a healthy life
ॐ Breathe in calmness, Breathe out stress and anxiety.
Puttaraju Vs Shivakumari on 01 Apr 2021
A single judge of Karnataka High Court held that, an offence under the PWDV Act alone is subject to limitation under CrPC but not the application filed belatedly u/s 12 of the Act.
From Paras 16-17,
16. To attract Section 468 of Cr.P.C, essentially the Act alleged must be an offence. Under the DV Act, the offence is not defined, as defined in Section 40 of IPC. Therefore, we have to revert to the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act defines the offences as follows:
“3(38). “Offence” shall mean any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force.
17. Perusal of the above provision makes it clear that to call an act as offence, act or omission must be made punishable under law. As already pointed out, under Sections 12, 20 and 21 of the DV Act have not made the domestic violence alleged thereunder punishable or defined them as offence. Section 12 of the DV Act is only an enabling provision to initiate enquiry to find out whether such act or omission is committed.
From Para 19-20, Conclusions
19. Perusal of Section 31 of the DV Act makes it clear that only breach of the protection order or interim protection order etc. passed under Section 12 of the DV Act constitutes an offence and made punishable. As held by Punjab High Court in Vikas’s case referred to supra, Section 12 of the DV Act is only enabling provision. Therefore it is clear that the act or omission contemplated under Section 31 of the DV Act is an offence and the application under Section 12 of the DV Act itself is not an offence.
20. When the application under Section 12 of the DV Act is not covered under the term ‘offence’, Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is inapplicable. Therefore the application of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. to an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is clearly a misconception.
From Paras 24-26,
24. Distinguishing judgment in Inderjit Singh Grewal’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in subsequent judgment in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra held that the observation regarding domestic relationship in Inderjit Singh Grewal’s case were based on the facts and circumstances of the said case and they are not of general application.
25. Further in para 32 of the judgment in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the definition of the aggrieved person and domestic relationship remains and the act of domestic violence attracts the term ‘continuing offence’, therefore does not get time barred.
26. In the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above, the interplay of Section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, Section 31 of the DV Act and Section 468 of Cr.P.C. had not fallen for consideration. In view of the later judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Bhattacharjee’s case referred to supra the judgments of this Court in Srinivas’s case and Gurudev’s case cannot be followed. Therefore this Court does not find any merit in the contention that the petition was time barred. Under the circumstances the respondent is entitled for withdrawal of the amount. The application is allowed.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://primelegal.in/2021/05/20/an-application-under-section-12-of-the-domestic-violence-act-is-not-barred-by-the-limitations-set-out-in-section-468-of-the-criminal-procedure-code-karnataka-high-court/
https://www.indiclegal.com/post/application-of-section-468-to-section-12-of-the-domestic-violence-act-is-clearly-a-misconception-hc
https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/sri-puttaraju-vs-smt-shivakumari-5216.asp
Vimlesh Agnihotri and Ors Vs State and Anr on 16 Aug 2021
A single judge of Delhi High Court talks about the alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
From Para 6,
6. A perusal of the abovementioned facts would show that the parties have registered cross-cases against each other for offences under Section 376 IPC. It is tragic to note that practising advocates belonging to the legal fraternity are trivialising the offence of rape. Rape is not merely a physical assault; it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. The act of rape has the ability to scar the mental psyche of the victim and this trauma can persist for years.
From Para 8,
8. The issue as to whether the High Courts, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, should quash an offence under Section 376 IPC has come for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases. Rape is an offence against the society. The Supreme Court has, time and again, directed that the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash an offence of rape on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise.
From Paras 14-19,
14. Quashing FIR for offences like rape on the basis of compromise will encourage accused to put pressure on the victims to agree to a compromise and this will open doors for the accused to get away with a heinous crime which cannot be permitted.
15. In the present case it appears that both sides have resorted to file complaints of rape without having any sensitivity to the offence of rape. While the repercussions of the offence of rape on the victim have been mentioned above, on the other hand, false allegations of rape have the potential to destroy the life and career of the accused. The accused in a false case of rape loses his honour, cannot face his family and is stigmatized for life. Allegations regarding offences such as one under Section 376 IPC cannot be made at the drop of a hat – in order to settle personal scores.
16. Further, the time spent by the police in investigating false cases hinders them from spending time in investigation of serious offences. As a result, it leads to faulty investigations and the accused end up going scot-free. Valuable judicial time is also spent in hearing cases where false allegations are made and is consequently an abuse of the process of law. Therefore, people who make such false allegations of rape cannot be permitted to go scot-free. This Court is pained to note that there is an alarming increase of false cases of rape and offences under Section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C & 354D only to arm-twist the accused and make them succumb to the demands of the complainant.
17. This Court, at the moment, is not commenting as to whether the present case is a false case or not. However, if it is found that the cases which have been filed by the parties against each other are false and frivolous then action should be taken against the prosecutrix and others who were instrumental in levelling allegations of rape only to settle some personal scores. There is an urgent need to deter such frivolous litigations.
18. False claims and allegations pertaining to cases of molestation and rape need to be dealt with an iron hand due to the serious nature of the offences. Such litigations are instituted by the unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will capitulate to their demands out of fear or shame. Unless wrongdoers are not made to face the consequences of their actions, it would be difficult to prevent such frivolous litigations. The Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for frivolous litigations which unnecessarily consumes the Court’s otherwise scare time. This Court is of the opinion that this problem can be solved, or at least minimized, to a certain extent, if exemplary cost is imposed on the litigants for instituting frivolous litigations.
19. In view of the mandate of the Supreme Court that High Courts must not exercise its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing an offence of rape only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise, this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/53326449/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/vimlesh-agnihotri-ors-versus-state-anr
Abdul Gafaoor Vs Hameema Khatoon and Ors on 15 Sep 2003
Relying on Supreme Court decision here, a division bench of AP High Court held that, a husband cannot be sentenced indefinitely for breach of maintenance orders.
From Para 3,
3. From bare perusal of this provision, it becomes clear that a person against whom an order under Section 125(3) of the Code is made does not become liable to imprisonment on passing of an order of maintenance, his liability to suffer imprisonment only starts if he fails to respond to a warrant issued under Section 125 (3) of the Code for payment of maintenance. A warrant has to be issued under Section 125(3) of the Code for payment of maintenance, when an application is made by the person who has been held entitled to maintenance under section 125 of the code. When such a warrant is issued for making payment of maintenance, it has to be levied as the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines and if this warrant is not responded by making the payment, then the Magistrate can order imprisonment and the imprisonment in no case can exceed one month. Therefore, it is immaterial whether there were arrears of 12 months or of any other duration. The material question is whether a warrant under Section 125(3) been issued or not and in case of one warrant issued under Section 125(3) of the Code, there can only be one imprisonment and the maximum imprisonment would be one month. So in case a person chooses to file an application under Section 125(3) of the Code on every successive month on failure to get maintenance, she may get successive orders of imprisonment if the person against whom the warrant is issued fails to make the payment. But if a person chooses to make an application after several months, then again she will be able to get an order of imprisonment on failure to make the payment which will be only a maximum imprisonment of one month. We are fortified in our view by a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Shahada Khatoon v. Amjad Ali, 1999 SCC (Cri) 1029 : (1999 Cri LJ 5060).
Indiankanoon Version:
Casemine Version:
Citations : [2004 DMC 1 693], [2003 ALD CRI 2 902], [2003 SCC ONLINE AP 894], [2004 AP LJ 1 154], [2004 CRI LJ 1280], [2004 CCR 2 332], [2004 HLR 1 332]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1923858/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f838e4b0149711141ca7
