Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from a single judge of High Court of Chhattisgarh Judgment explaining how important it is to follow the mandate u/s 421 Cr.P.C. while executing maintenance orders u/s 125(1) Cr.P.C.

From Paras 10, 11 and 12,

10.A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that for recovery of the amount of maintenance, procedure under Section 421(1) has to be followed by either issuing warrant for levying the amount due by attachment and sale of movable property belonging to the offender or by issuing a warrant to the Collector of the district, for authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter. Section 421(3) provides that where the Court issues a warrant to the Collector under clause (b) of Subsection (1), the Collector shall realise the amount in accordance with the law relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue, as if such warrant were a certificate issued under such law.
11.A conjoint reading of the provisions contained under Section 125(3) read with Section 421 of CrPC would show that by virtue of Section 125(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate has been empowered to recover the amount of arrears of maintenance by following the procedure prescribed for levy of fine under Section 421 of CrPC. Two modes are prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC for recovery of the arrears of maintenance due as if it were a fine levied. The Court can either issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the defaulter or issue a warrant to the Collector of the District, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC. It is only after the Magistrate has exhausted the two modes prescribed under Section 421 of CrPC and still fails to recover the arrears of maintenance due that he can sentence the person who committed the default to imprisonment as enjoined under Section 125(3) of CrPC for the period prescribed in the above-stated provision and if in the execution of sentence of imprisonment so awarded, the defaulter does not appear to suffer, the sentence so awarded, the Court should at the first instance issue summons/notice for his appearance and if the defaulter seems to be avoiding the summons, the Court in the second instance should issue bailable warrant for his appearance to undergo sentence. The Courts, at first and second instance, shall refrain from issuing non-bailable warrant.
12.It is quite vivid that the provisions contained under Section 125(3) of CrPC itself provide that the Court may sentence such a person for whole or
any part of each month’s allowance after the execution of the warrant, as such, Section 125(3) CrPC speaks only of issue of a warrant for levying the amount in the manner provided for levying fines and does not speak of a warrant of arrest. The issue of a warrant for levy of the amount due by way of attachment and sale is a condition precedent to the sentencing of the defaulter to imprisonment. As such, without following the procedure prescribed under Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC and without issuance of warrant of attachment and sale, no warrant can be issued and no order for imprisonment can be passed under Section 125(3) of CrPC.

From Para 17,

17. Reverting to the facts of the instant case in light of the aforesaid legal analysis, it is quite vivid that learned Family Court, finding that the arrears of maintenance is due from the petitioner, straightway issued warrant of arrest without following the procedure laid down in Section 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of CrPC, whereas learned Magistrate ought to have followed the procedure laid down in Section 421 of CrPC for recovering the arrears of the amount of maintenance, and if after following the procedure as envisaged in Section 421 of CrPC by issuance of warrant of attachment of movable and immovable property of the defaulter and sale thereof; still arrears of amount of maintenance remains due, then order of imprisonment can be passed, as such, the order directing issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner is contrary to Section 125(3) read with Sections 421(1)(a) and 421(1)(b) of the CrPC. Accordingly, the order dated 09/05/2019 (Annexure A/1) passed in MJC No. 43/2019 is hereby set aside and learned Family Court is directed to follow the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Rajnesh (supra) strictly for recovery of the amount of maintenance.

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

Citations: [LAWS(CHH)-2021-1-96]

Other Sources:

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/judgements/1070468/jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6050d0e69fca195f67640edb

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/jagdamba-trivedi-versus-neha-trivedi

https://www.the-laws.com/encyclopedia/browse/case?caseId=021202701000&title=jagdamba-trivedi-vs-neha-trivedi#:~:text=He%20would%20also%20submit%20that%20if%20the,(Annexure%20A/2)%20deserve%20to%20be%20set%20aside.

Index of Maintenance Orders u/s 144 BNSS is here.

S.Mumthas and Anr Vs M.Nizar @ Nizarudeen and Anr

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Case No: OP (Crl.) 802/ 2024

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Posted on October 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court observed as follows, while upholding the Family Court’s decision not to grant alimony.

From Paras 53 to 57,

53. In the present Appeal, the Appellant‟s primary challenge is directed against the learned Family Court‟s finding on cruelty. The evidence on record unequivocally establishes a sustained pattern of mental cruelty inflicted by the Appellant upon the Respondent.
54. The most compelling evidence comprises the series of text messages sent from the Appellant‟s mobile number between March and June 2011. These messages, which contained vile, derogatory, and scandalous language, including questioning the Respondent‟s legitimacy and making reprehensible allegations against his mother, were proved beyond doubt.
55. Specific messages dated 09.05.2011, 15.05.2011, and 27.06.2011, which included terms such as “bastard”, “son of a bitch,” and suggestions that his mother should “earn through prostitution”, are by themselves sufficient to constitute mental cruelty of the gravest kind.
56. The Appellant‟s explanation that the Respondent must have sent these messages to himself from her phone is inherently improbable and was rightly rejected by the learned Family Court as an afterthought, particularly since this defense was never pleaded in the written statement and no corroborative evidence was adduced to support it.
57. Words and communications of the sort proved in this case are not innocuous. The law recognizes that mental cruelty may be visited by persistent and deliberate verbal abuse and conduct that degrades a spouse and injures reputation and self-respect. The text messages in question contained imputations of illegitimacy, filthy epithets directed at the Respondent‟s mother and other degrading expressions a pattern of conduct which, cumulatively, the learned Family Court was entitled to regard as causing grave mental agony to the Respondent.

From Para 82,

82. The provision under Section 25 is fundamentally equitable in nature and aims to secure financial justice between spouses, ensuring that a party lacking independent means of subsistence is not left destitute following the dissolution of marriage. However, the grant of such relief is not automatic; it is contingent upon proof of genuine financial necessity and equitable considerations.
83. In the present case, the Appellant is an officer of the IRTS, a highly esteemed branch of the Indian Civil Services, whereas the Respondent is a practicing lawyer.
84. It is an undisputed fact that the Appellant, being a Group ‘A’ officer, holds a senior and responsible position in the Government of India and receives a regular and substantial salary along with numerous allowances and service benefits commensurate with her post. The material on record does not disclose any evidence of financial hardship, dependency, or extraordinary circumstances that would render her incapable of maintaining herself with dignity. There is also no pleading or proof of any financial liability, medical condition, or familial obligation that could necessitate monetary support from the Respondent. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest a substantial difference between the incomes of the parties.
85. Judicial discretion under Section 25 cannot be exercised to award alimony where the applicant is financially self-sufficient and independent, and such discretion must be exercised properly and judiciously, based on the record, the relative financial capacities of the parties, and the absence of any material demonstrating economic vulnerability on the part of the Appellant.
86. A careful examination of the record further reveals that the parties cohabited as husband and wife only for a brief and transitory period, and the marriage did not evolve into a stable or enduring union characterized by emotional, social, or financial interdependence. The absence of any child from the wedlock further eliminates a continuing financial responsibility that might otherwise justify an award of alimony or maintenance.
87. It is a settled principle that permanent alimony is intended as a measure of social justice and not as a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals. The law requires that the applicant demonstrate a genuine need for financial assistance. In the present case, the Appellant‟s position as a senior government officer, her steady and substantial income, and the absence of dependents collectively establish that she is fully capable of maintaining herself. No evidence of financial incapacity, duress, or other compelling circumstances has been presented to justify judicial intervention.

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:9233-DB]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156230068/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/68f2a09ee5e6a9673013a510

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgment under Hindu Marriage Act is here.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Posted on October 18, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 79,

79. It is true that an affidavit is ‘evidence’ within the meaning of Section 191 of the IPC and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury. But the matter does not rest here. Before initiating the proceedings for perjury, the court concerned has to consider whether it would be expedient in the interest of justice to sanction such prosecution. What the courts have to see at this stage is whether there is evidence in support of the allegations made by the Union of India (respondent herein) to justify the initiation of proceedings against the writ petitioners, more particularly, the writ petitioner no. 1 herein who had filed the affidavit on behalf of himself and the other writ petitioners and not whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant his conviction. However, this does not mean that the court should not prima facie be of the opinion that there are sufficient and reasonable grounds for setting the machinery of criminal law in motion against the accused. As noted above, the Court has further to see that the false statement was deliberate and conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable or likely. In other words, before sanctioning the prosecution there must be a prima facie case of a falsehood on a matter of substance and the court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge. (see S.P. Kohli v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 212 : AIR 1978 SC 1753)

From Paras 86 and 87,

86. The conflict between the two decisions of this Court of equal strength, i.e. Pritish (supra) and Sharad Pawar (supra), was taken notice of by this Court in the case of the State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96. A Bench of two Judges of this Court ultimately thought fit to refer the question to a Larger Bench. The Court observed as under :
“14. In any event, given that the decision of the three-Judge Bench in Sharad Pawar (supra) did not assign any reason as to why it was departing from the opinion expressed by a Coordinate Bench in Pritish (supra) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC, as also the observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), we find it necessary that the present matter be placed before a larger Bench for its consideration, particularly to answer the following questions:
14.1 (i) Whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the Code by a Court ?
14.2 (ii) What is the scope and ambit of such preliminary inquiry ?”
87. It appears that the reference on the aforesaid two questions to a larger Bench is still pending.

From Paras 90 and 91,

90. The essential ingredients for invoking Section 211, I.P.C. are that the complaint must have falsely charged a person with having committed an offence. The complainant, at the time of giving the complaint must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for making a charge against the person. This complaint must have been given with an intention to cause injury to a person.
91. The CrPC does not define what constitutes the making of a “charge” of an offence or what amounts to the “institution of criminal proceedings”. But, in our opinion, a false “charge” in this Section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning, of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to the superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The nature of both expressions, and the difference between them has been explained in lucid terms in the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Emp, 17 C. 574. It points out that there may be a charge which does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings “and there may be criminal proceedings which do not necessarily involve a charge” of any offence. As an illustration of the former it points out that a charge made to the Judge of a Civil Court or to public officers of other kinds, in order to obtain sanction to prosecute may well be a charge “but is not the institution of criminal proceedings”. It further points out that an aggrieved person may seek to put the criminal law in motion either by making a charge or in the language of the Code giving information to the Police (Section 154 CrPC) “or he may” lay a charge, or as the Code calls it, a complaint (Section 190 CrPC) before a Magistrate”.

From Para 94,

94. Thus, as explained by this Court in Santokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain (supra), the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 211 IPC is to institute or cause, to be instituted any criminal proceeding against a person with intent to cause him injury or with similar intent to falsely charge any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge. Instituting or causing to institute false criminal proceedings assume false charge but false charge may be preferred even when no criminal proceedings result. Now, the expression “falsely charges” in this section, in our opinion, cannot mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal trial. “To falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be, read along with the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible of analogous meaning should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They get as it were their colour and content from each other. They seem to have been used in a technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings. In other words, it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or to an officer having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute the “charges” should be made with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion.

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/62d7ae969fca1923f0b04184

https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/himanshu-kumar-and-others-versus-state-of-chhattisgarh-and-others

Index of Perjury Judgment is here.

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Posted on October 8, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Re-affirming Dhariwal Tobaco Products Ltd judgment here, Full bench of Supreme Court held that, A Petition under section 482 CrPC is maintainable even when a Revision is available under 397/401 CrPC.

From Para 4,

4. The facts of these appeals need not detain us because in our considered opinion the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the impugned order is contrary to law and therefore matters will have to be remanded back to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits within the scope of inherent powers available to the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It would suffice to note that in both these appeals, the miscellaneous petitions before the High Court arose out of an order dated 30.11.2006 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate No. 3, Jodhpur in the complaint no. 1669 of 2006, whereby it took cognizance against the appellants under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code and summoned them through bailable warrants to face further proceedings in the case.

From Paras 6-8,

6. In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that Section 482 begins with a non-obstante clause to state: “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J. “abuse of the process of the Court or other extraordinary situation excites the court’s jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more.” We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 Cr.P.C. is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.
7. As a sequel, we are constrained to hold that the Division Bench, particularly in paragraph 28, in the case of Mohit alias Sonu and another (supra) in respect of inherent power of the High Court in Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. does not state the law correctly. We record our respectful disagreement.
8. In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. (supra) and other earlier cases which were cited but wrongly ignored them in preference to a judgment of that Court in the case of Sanjay Bhandari (supra) passed by another learned Single Judge on 05.02.2009 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 289 of 2006 which is impugned in the connected Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 4744 of 2009. As a result, both the appeals, one preferred by Prabhu Chawla and the other by Jagdish Upasane & Ors. are allowed. The impugned common order dated 02.04.2009 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan is set aside and the matters are remitted back to the High Court for fresh hearing of the petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of law explained above and for disposal in accordance with law. Since the matters have remained pending for long, the High Court is requested to hear and decide the matters expeditiously, preferably within six months.

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Posted on October 7, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court directed to enhance Maintenance amount at 5% annually.

From Para 21,

(21) So far as the question for grant of interim maintenance to respondent-wife is concerned, an affidavit along with salary slip filed by appellant-husband clearly shows that he is a Software Engineer working in a private Firm, namely, Dassault System Software Solution Private Limited in Pune and getting gross salary of approximately Rs.1,18,875/-per month including other liability. It is averred that respondent- wife is a B. Com, MBA in Retail Business Management and Marketing from MIT College, Pune. From the record, it is found that the learned Family has already awarded maintenance amount to the extent of Rs.25,000/- per month by allowing the application under Section 125 of CrPC to maintain herself and her minor son Aryaman. The same amount of Rs.25,000/- per month awarded by the Family Court is found to be just and proper and, therefore, there is no need to pass separate order for the same.
However, we may add here that the amount of Rs.25,000/- per month shall fetch enhancement every calendar year @ 5% to meet the ends of justice, till it attains finality or altered subsequently in future, in some appropriate proceedings at the instance of parties.

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Arun R.Naik Vs Shwetha Arun Naik and Anr on 17 May 2021

Posted on October 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Kerala High Court directed to set aside the enhancement of Maintenance amount at 10% annually.

From Para 3,

3. In the M.C, the 1st petitioner had adduced oral evidence as PW1 and marked Exts.A1 to A10 as documentary evidence. On the respondent’s side, oral evidence was adduced by him as RW1 and Exts.B1 to B11 were marked as documentary evidence. The Family Court has appreciated the above evidence and allowed the M.C granting monthly maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs.10,000/- to the 1st petitioner and Rs.7,000/- to the 2nd petitioner, from the date of the petition. The Family Court has also directed the respondent to pay a lumpsum of Rs.30,000/- at the beginning of every academic year before June 30th subject to enhancement at the rate of 10% yearly to the 2nd petitioner for her education with effect from the date of the petition.

From Para 16,

16. The Family Court has ordered the monthly maintenance allowance in favour of the 2nd petitioner as Rs.7,000/- and directed the respondent to pay the same and also an additional sum of Rs.30,000/- within June 30th of every academic year subject to 10% increase annually. The said direction undoubtedly is an unjustifiable one and will not sustain for the reason that the monthly maintenance allowance contemplated under Section 125 Cr.P.C will take within it’s sweep all genuine expenses of the child viz. expenses for education, food, shelter, medicine etc. and therefore, a court while fixing it shall take into account all possible and reasonable expenditures of a child. Therefore, if a lumpsum amount is fixed by the Family Court as payable, undoubtedly it would take care of all reasonable expenditures of the child. Moreover, the direction to pay Rs.30,000/- annually to the 2nd petitioner, in every academic year in addition to a lumpsum amount ordered as payable towards monthly maintenance allowance, is devoid of any basis.

From Para 17,

17. The Family Court has fixed the monthly maintenance allowance payable to the 2nd petitioner as Rs.7,000/- after duly considering the educational expenses also. Therefore the direction to pay Rs.30,000/- as additional sum only to meet the educational expenses is devoid of merits and liable to be set aside.

Finally,

In the result, both revisions are allowed in part. The monthly maintenance allowance stands ordered in favour of the 1st petitioner by the impugned order is modified and reduced to Rs.7,000/- and that to the 2nd petitioner is modified and enhanced to Rs.10,000/-. The direction to pay Rs.30,000/- before 30th June of every academic year subject to 10% enhancement annually is set aside.

Arun R.Naik Vs Shwetha Arun Naik and Anr on 17 May 2021

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Rajesh Kumar Vs Nutan Devi on 18 Feb 2025

Posted on October 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Patna High Court directed to enhance Maintenance amount at 5% annually.

From Paras 16-20,

16. However, I find that undisputedly the petitioner-husband was getting monthly salary of Rs. 30,000/- at the time of filing the maintenance petition and out of Rs. 30,000/-, award of Rs. 15,000/- per month towards maintenance is excessive.
17. Hence, the impugned order is modified by reducing the amount of maintenance @ Rs. 9,500/- per month, payable by the husband to his wife since the date of filing the maintenance petition.
18. However, this rate of maintenance will be subject to increment @ 5% per annum from today. In other words, after one year from today, the amount of the maintenance will be increased by 5% of maintenance and this increment will keep going on in the month of February every year and this maintenance will be permissible to the wife till she remarries.
19. The husband is having higher salary at present. But the number of dependents has also increased, because he has one additional legally wedded wife and one daughter born out of the wedlock with the new wife and as per statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner-husband, even second child is expected in a few months. Hence, increment of maintenance @ 5% per annum would be sufficient in the interest of justice.
20. It further transpires that during the pendency of this petition, petitioner-husband has made some payment. Hence, the petitioner-husband is also directed to pay up the whole arrear amount after setting off the payment already made towards maintenance, within the next two months by way of bank draft. In case, the arrear is not paid, it will be treated as a contempt of Court and the petitioner-husband would be dealt with accordingly.

Rajesh Kumar Vs Nutan Devi on 18 Feb 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Prakash Dheple Vs Vithabai and Anr on 10 May 2024

Posted on October 6, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court directed to Impose interest of Maintenance arrears.

From Para 9,

9. No doubt there is an evidence of income of respondent no.1 that she is getting salary of Rs.3,500/- from that job, but when an amount of maintenance, which was granted earlier to the respondents is considered. It is meager amount of Rs. 1500/- and Rs. 2000/- p.m. It was not possible for them to maintain themselves out of it. Therefore, merely because she is doing a job in private Company the applicant who is able bodied husband and father cannot be exonerated from the liability to pay the maintenance. The proceeding under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. is a summary proceeding. On this ground suppressing material fact does not extinguish right of maintenance. It is not an equitable relief which disentitles the persons who are not coming before the Court with clean hands. The learned trial Court has considered the earlier maintenance amount. The learned trial Court has considered the facts situation of both the sides, their status and needs. The learned trial Court has also considered the prices of the essential commodities which have gone high. Even though respondent no.1 is earning some amount, it is not shown that it is more than sufficient amount to her. Further merely because the wife is earning the husband cannot be exonerated from the liability to pay the maintenance amount. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh Vs. Neha and another reported in (2021) 2 SCC 324, though the respondent no.1 has not disclosed the fact that she is earning some amount by doing such a job, she cannot be held liable for giving a false evidence under section 340 of the Cr.P.C. If such course is adopted then it has to be adopted against applicant/husband and wife in each and every case, who are concealing such fact and showing that they are not having source of income.

From Para 12,

12. The applicant has challenged two proceedings of maintenance in this Revision Application. Therefore, also revision is also not maintainable. Revision Application, therefore, sans merit and it deserves to be dismissed with costs of Rs.5,000/- (Rs. Five Thousand Only) with @ 9% p.m. interest. It is because respondents must have incurred some amount for contesting this revision. The trial Courts are not awarding interest on maintenance amount. There is no any legal ban to award interest on that amount of maintenance. The husbands or fathers are many a times are not depositing the arrears of maintenance for years together. They have no fear or burden to payment of interest on that amount of maintenance. It is a serious legal mischief in mischief. Section 125 of the CrPC does not prohibit towards maintenance. Therefore, Courts of District Judiciary are expected to award interest on the amount of maintenance, so that these weaker sections of the society will get their maintenance amount expeditiously. It will serve the purpose of speed justice. Thus, in order to secure their rights fully, effectively and speedily which is an object of justice interest must be awarded which is rationally expected. Their amount of maintenance shall not remain in the hands of the other side which deprives them for maximum period from it. Thus, it is now mandatory to award interest on the amount of maintenance for that this judgment shall be circulated to the District Judiciary of Maharashtra.

Prakash Dheple Vs Vithabai and Anr on 10 May 2024

Index of Maintenance Judgments under Sec 144 BNSS is here.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Posted on October 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.

Solution is to use same evidence in maintenance case also, that was used in RCR proceedings and win the maintenance case. Simple…
The judiciary (could!) just delayed the inevitable. That’s all.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Thus, the preponderance of judicial thought weighs in favour of upholding the wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and the mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard and it must invariably depend on the distinctive facts and circumstances obtaining in each particular case. In any event, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights secured by a husband coupled with non-compliance therewith by the wife would not be determinative straightaway either of her right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
30. Another contention that was urged before us is that the findings in the judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings. This specious argument needs mention only to be rejected outright. No doubt, in Shanti Kumar Panda vs. Shakuntala Devi20, this Court held that a decision by a Criminal Court would not bind the Civil Court while a decision by the Civil Court would bind the Criminal Court. However, maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in nature and the reason for inclusion of the provisions dealing therewith in the Code of Criminal Procedure was clarified by the Law Commission of India in September, 1969. Significantly, as long back as in the year 1963, in Mst. Jagir Kaur and another vs. Jaswant Singh21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the precursor to Section 125 Cr.P.C., are in the nature of civil proceedings; the remedy, being a summary one; and the person seeking that remedy, ordinarily being a helpless person. Therefore, even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings. Nomenclature of maintenance proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those provisions find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to the nature of such proceedings.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Index of HMA judgments is here. Index of Maintenance Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Jagdamba Trivedi Vs Neha Trivedi on 18 Jan 2021

S.Mumthas and Anr Vs M.Nizar @ Nizarudeen and Anr

Rita Raj Vs Pabitra Roy Chaudhuri on 17 Oct 2025

Himanshu Kumar and Ors Vs State of Chhattisgarh and Ors on 14 Jul 2022

Prabhu Chawla Vs State of Rajasthan and Anr on 05 Sep 2016

Sumit Raj Shivhare Vs Anushree Gupta Shivhare on 05 Nov 2024

Arun R.Naik Vs Shwetha Arun Naik and Anr on 17 May 2021

Rajesh Kumar Vs Nutan Devi on 18 Feb 2025

Prakash Dheple Vs Vithabai and Anr on 10 May 2024

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