Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Posted on June 25, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

We are of the considered view that in a matter involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to pass orders in one way or other taking into account the merits of the matter at the earliest. At any rate, posting an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated.
We request the High Court to dispose of the application for anticipatory bail on its own merits and in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of three weeks after reopening of the Court. If the main application could not be disposed of, for any reason, within the stipulated time, relief sought for in the interlocutory application shall be considered on its own merits. Till such time, we grant interim protection from arrest to the petitioner herein.

Rajamma H Vs Thimmaiah V on 09 Jun 2022

Posted on June 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court upheld the law the way it is.

From Para 5,

5. The application is filed admittedly invoking Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act reads as follows:
“12. Application to Magistrate.-
(5) The Magistrate shall Endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”
Sub-section (5) mandates that every application filed under the Act shall be disposed of by the Court within six months from the date of its presentation. The order sheet reveals that the application was filed on 12-11-2021 seeking maintenance. Six months have passed by. The order sheet does not demonstrate any consideration of the application. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a mandamus at the hands of this Court or a direction to the learned Magistrate to dispose of the application for maintenance expeditiously.

Rajamma H Vs Thimmaiah V on 09 Jun 2022

Connects to a PIL here.

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Posted on June 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division Bench of the Apex Court held as follows (in regards to Custody of Children):

8. Whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of a minor child, the matter is to be decided not on considerations of the legal rights of parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the minor. We have twice interviewed Dustan in our chambers and talked with him. We found him to be too tender in age and totally immature to be able to form any independent opinion of his own as to which parent he should stay with. The child is an American citizen. Excepting for the last few months that have elapsed since his being brought to India by the process of illegal abduction by the father, he has spent the rest of his life in the United States of America and he was doing well in school there. In our considered opinion it will be in the best interests and welfare of Dustan that he should go back to the United States of America and continue his education there under the custody and guardianship of the mother to whom such custody and guardianship have been entrusted by a competent court in that country. We are also satisfied that the petitioner who is the mother, is full of genuine love and affection for the child and she can be safely trusted to look after him, educate him and attend in every possible way to his proper upbringing. The child has not taken root in this country and he is still accustomed and acclimatized to the conditions and environments obtaining in the place of his origin in the United States of America. The child’s presence in India is the result of an illegal act of abduction and the father who is guilty of the said act cannot claim any advantage by stating that he has already put the child in some school in Pune. The conduct of the father has not been such as to inspire confidence in us that he is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the custody and guardianship of the child for the present.

Comity of Courts:

9. In Re H. (infants)1 the Court of Appeal in England had occasion to consider a somewhat similar question. That case concerned the abduction to England of two minor boys who were American citizens. The father was a natural-born American citizen and the mother, though of Scottish origin, had been resident for 20 years in the United States of America. They were divorced in 1953 by a decree in Mexico, which embodied provisions entrusting the custody of the two boys to the mother with liberal access to the father. By an amendment made in that order in December 1964, a provision was incorporated that the boys should reside at all times in the State of New York and should at all times be under the control and jurisdiction of the State of New York. In March 1965, the mother removed the boys to England, without having obtained the approval of the New York court, and without having consulted the father; she purchased a house in England with the intention of remaining there permanently and of cutting off all contacts with the father. She ignored an order made in June 1965, by the Supreme Court of New York State to return the boys there. On a motion on notice given by the father in the Chancery Division of the Court in England, the trial Judge Cross, J. directed that since the children were American children and the American court was the proper court to decide the issue of custody, and as it was the duty of courts in all countries to see that a parent doing wrong by removing children out of their country did not gain any advantage by his or her wrongdoing, the court without going into the merits of the question as to where and with whom the children should live, would order that the children should go back to America. In the appeal filed against the said judgment in the Court of Appeal, Willmer, L.J while dismissing the appeal extracted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Cross, J.‡:
“The sudden and unauthorised removal of children from one country to another is far too frequent nowadays, and as it seems to me, it is the duty of all courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that the wrongdoer does not gain an advantage by his wrongdoing.

The courts in all countries ought, as I see it, to be careful not to do anything to encourage this tendency. This substitution of self-help for due process of law in this field can only harm the interests of wards generally, and a Judge should, as I see it, pay regard to the orders of the proper foreign court unless he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that to do so would inflict serious harm on the child.”
10. With respect we are in complete agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of the principles of law to be applied by the courts in situations such as this.

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Citations : [1987 SCC 1 42], [1987 SCR 1 175], [1987 CRIMES SC 1 71], [1986 SCALE 2 745], [1987 AIR SC 3], [1986 JT 1 795], [1987 SCC CRI 13]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/271434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac23e4b014971140e22f

Nisar Ahmad Wani and Ors Vs Police Station Neemuch and Ors on 03 Jun 2022

Posted on June 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench held that, it has no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, since the FIR was registered outside the territory of the High Court.

From Para 2,

2. It is averred in the application that the petitioners happen to be the in-laws and husband of the complainant. It is stated that the marriage between petitioner No.l and the complainant has taken place in the year 2013 and out of this marriage, one son has been born. It is submitted that the respondent No.2 has lodged an FIR in Madhya Pradesh against the petitioners alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Cr. P. C. It is also contended that under Section 79 of the Cr. P. C, warrants have to be executed by a police station located outside the jurisdiction of a State through the local police station and, as such, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present application.

Issue from Para 5,

5. In the instant case, the petitioners are seeking bail in an FIR which has been registered beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, inasmuch as the FIR has been registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The question that arises for consideration is whether this Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 438 of the Cr. P. C, is vested with jurisdiction to grant bail in a case that has been registered beyond its local limits of jurisdiction.

Decision from Paras 7-9,

7. On the basis of the aforequoted reasoning, the Court came to the conclusion that the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to a person against whom a case has been registered with a police station which is situated outside the local limits of its jurisdiction under the Code.
8. From the aforequoted enunciation of law on the subject, it is clear that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the bail application which relates to an FIR that has been registered beyond the local limits of this Court even though the accused/petitioner may be residing within the jurisdiction of this Court.
9. The petitioners in the instant case are not seeking transit bail but are seeking bail in anticipation of their arrest on a permanent basis, regarding which this Court lacks jurisdiction in view of the ratio laid down in the aforequoted judgment.

Nisar Ahmad Wani and Ors Vs Police Station Neemuch and Ors on 03 Jun 2022

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 28 Mar 2018

Posted on June 17, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court allowed the transfer petitions of UOI praying to transfer two case pending before High Courts of Delhi and Chhattisgarh.

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 28 Mar 2018

Here is the earlier order, staying operation of the further proceedings in above pending Writs before High Courts of Delhi and Chhattisgarh.

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 22 Jan 2018

Mukesh Bansal Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jun 2022

Posted on June 16, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A judge from Allahabad High Court used choicest words in this judgment.

From Para 8,

[8] The story narrated in the FIR is not only abhorring, full of dirt, filth and venomous accusations where the informant fiercely abused her own husband and in-laws by using all the ways and means in the tone, tenor and texture in the extreme manner. The graphic and vivid descriptions of the incident without any shame or hitch of any sort which, speaks out volume of mental condition and amount of venom and poison in the mind of the informant. She without mincing any word, rather exaggerating the incident to manifolds, had vomitted the snide before the Court. Interestingly, general and sweeping allegations have been fastened against all the family members for committing sodomy, attempt to rape and illegal abortion etc. upon all the family members with special focus upon her husband, Sahib Bansal.

From Para 12,

[12] The police, after probing the matter in depth, has submitted the charge sheet dropping all the offences, wherein the informant had made wild
accusations in the FIR against her husband and his family members. The aforesaid charge sheet has been filed only under sections 498A, 323, 504, 506, 307 IPC and 3 and 4 of D.P. Act. Thus, it is explicitly clear that the FIR is nothing but a virtual canard and full of venom where the informant unmindful of the fact to its far-reaching repercussions, pasted all the filth upon revisionist in wild manner but was unable to produce any documentary evidence/proof to substantiate the levelled allegations and thus, all the sections of unnatural/oral sex, forcible abortion have gone to haywire resultantly dropped from charge sheet. Not only this, names of Chirag Bansal and Ms. Shipra Jain finds no place in the charge sheet, so filed by the police.

From Para 30,

[30] Yet coming to another aspect of the issue which is disturbing and mind-boggling to the Court. After reading the FIR allegedly lodged by Ms.
Shivangi Bansal after 18 days of the incident, which is ever-abhorring, full of dirt and filth. The graphical description portrayed by her in her FIR is deplorable to be condemned in its strongest terms. The FIR is the place where the informant gives the story mobilizing the State Machinery engaging in the commission of cognizable offence. It is not soft porn literature where the graphical description should be made. Hon’ble the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Priti Gupta Vs State of Jharkhand, 2010(71) SCC 667 has fastened the liability upon the counsels;

From Para 31,

[31] Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that while deciding the present issue, the Court should not take into these graphical description of the accusation made by the complainant and simply over-look these graphic and distressful allegations made by a lady who after receiving legal advice, pasted those dirt and filth upon her husband and other family members. The interesting feature is that she has been unable to substantiate those allegations even at the time of investigation and these allegations were found false and the sections related to it were dropped.
The Court records its strongest exception to such type of language used by the informant. The language of the FIR should be decent one and no amount of atrocitiesfaced by the informant, would justify her to use such type of castic expressions. FIR/complaint is the gateway of any criminal case even soft and decent expressionwould well communicate the alleged atrocities faced by her.

Guidelines issued from para 35,

[35] Thus, It is directed that :-
(i) No arrest or police action to nab the named accused persons shall be made after lodging of the FIR or complaints without concluding the “Cooling-Period” which is two months from the lodging of the FIR or the complaint. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter would be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committe (hereinafter referred to as FWC) in the each district.
(ii) Only those cases which would be transmitted to FWC in which Section 498-A IPC along with, no injury 307 and other sections of the IPC in which the imprisonment is less than 10 years.
(iii) After lodging of the complaint or the FIR, no action should take place without concluding the “Cooling-Period” of two months. During this “Cooling-Period”, the matter may be referred to Family Welfare Committee in each districts.
(iv) Every district shall have at least one or more FWC (depending upon the geographical size and population of that district constituted under the District Legal Aid Services Authority) comprising of at least THREE MEMBERS. Its constitution and function shall be reviewed periodically by the District & Sessions Judge/Principal Judge, Family Court of that District, who shall be the Chairperson or Co-chairperson of that district at Legal Service Authority.
(v) The said FWC shall comprise of the following members :-
(a) a young mediator from the Mediation Centre of the district or young advocate having the practices up to five years or senior most student of Vth year, Government Law College or the State University or N.L.Us. having good academic track record and who is public spirited young man, OR;
(b) well acclaimed and recognized social worker of that district having clean antecedant, OR;
(c) retired judicial officers residing in or nearby district, who can devote time for the object of the proceeding OR;
(d) educated wives of senior judicial or administrative officers of the district.
(vi) The member of the FWC shall never be called as a witness.
(vii) Every complaint or application under Section 498A IPC and other allied sections mentioned above, be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committee by the concerned Magistrate. After receiving the said complaint or FIR, the Committee shall summon the contesting parties along with their four senior elderly persons to have personal interaction and would try to settle down the issue/misgivings between them within a period of two months from its lodging.
The contesting parties are obliged to appear before the Committee with their four elderly persons (maximum) to have a serious deliberation between them with the aid of members of the Committee.
(viii) The Committee after having proper deliberations, would prepare a vivid report and would refer to the concerned Magistrate/police authorties to whom such complaints are being lodged after expiry of two months by inserting all factual aspects and their opinion in the matter.
(ix) Continue deliberation before the Committee, the police officers shall themselves to avoid any arrest or any coercive action pursuant to the applications or complaint against the named accused persons. However, the Investigating Officer shall continue to have a peripheral investigation into
the matter namely preparing a medical report, injury report, the statements of witnesses.
(x) The said report given by the Committee shall be under the consideration of I.O. or the Magistrate on its own merit and thereafter suitable action should be taken by them as per the provision of Code of Criminal Procedure after expiry of the “Cooling-Period” of two months.
(xi) Legal Services Aid Committee shall impart such basic training as may be considered necessary to the members of Family Welfare Committee from time to time(not more than one week).
(xii) Since, this is noble work to cure abrasions in the society where tempos of the contesting parties are very high that they would melow down the heat between them and try to resolve the misgivings and misunderstanding between them. Since, this is a job for public at large, social work, they are acting on a pro bono basis or basic minimum honrarium as fixed by the District & Sessions Judge of every district.
(xiii) The investigation of such FIRs or complaint containing Section 498A IPC and other allied sections as mentioned above, shall be investigated by dynamic Investigating Officers whose integrity is certified after specialized training not less than one week to handle and investigate such matrimonal cases with utmost sincerity and transparancy.
(xiv) When settlement is reached between the parties, it would be open for the District & Sessions Judge and other senior judicial officers nominated by him in the district to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case.
At the cost of repetition, it is made clear that after lodging of the F.I.R. or the complaint case without exhausting the “Cooling-Period” of two months, no arrest or any coercive action shall be taken against the husband or his family members in order to derail the proceedings before the Family Welfare Committee.

Mukesh Bansal Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jun 2022

A.Sankar Vs V.Kumar and Ors on 27 Apr 2022

Posted on June 16, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Single Judge bench of Justice Anand Venkatesan took strong objection to the Police issuing summons to the advocate who, on instructions of his client Mr. A.Sankar, issued Contempt notice the Police boss, V.Kumar. Police showed their power, Court showed its’.

A.Sankar Vs V.Kumar and Ors on 27 Apr 2022

Finally, the Contempt Petition is closed.

A.Sankar Vs V Kumar on 06 Jun 2022

The earlier Writ Petition upon which the Contempt is filed is here.

A.Sankar Vs ACP Salem and Ors on 18 Jan 2019

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Posted on June 14, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court held as follows and passed directions to take steps to implement specific sections of DP Act 1961:

From Para 2,

2. Possibly, a social revolution is needed to put an end to the menace. Refusal by the bride’s father to pay dowry, refusal of the girls to get married if dowry is insisted upon and the attaching of a social stigma to those who demand dowry, can alone ultimately put an end to this system or at least reduce its prevalence. Obviously, the enactment of a law prohibiting this evil should go a long way in tackling the menace.

From Para 4,

4. There was a further amendment to the Act by Act 43 of 1986 making the provisions more stringent and enhancing the punishment for taking or abetting the taking of dowry. In spite of all this, it was seen that the enforcement of the provisions of the Act was thoroughly unsatisfactory and this is reflected by the filing of this Writ Petition in this Court, in public interest.

From Para 8,

8. In the context of the developments that have taken place, it is submitted by the amicus curiae appointed by this Court that no serious effort has been made to implement the provisions of the Act and the Rules and unless directions are issued by this Court it is highly unlikely that the provisions of the Act and the Rules will be effectively implemented. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court may direct the Central Government and the State Governments to give wide publicity to the relevant provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985 by appropriate means including educating the student community about the relevant provisions and the mandatory requirements of the Act and the Rules. It is further submitted that the State Governments may be directed to appoint sufficient number of Dowry Prohibition Officers with independent charge in each district of the concerned State, commensurate with the population of the District and to ensure that only dedicated and sincere officers are so appointed. It is submitted that directions may be issued to the Dowry Prohibition Officers to take immediate steps for strict enforcement and implementation of the provisions of Section 3, 4, 4A and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Rules 2 and 3 of the Dowry Prohibition (Maintenance of Lists of presents to the Bride and Bridegroom) Rules, 1985.

From Para 10,

10. When there is failure on the part of the Executive to strictly implement a law like the one in question, enacted to tackle a social problem which has assumed menacing proportions, the Court has a duty to step in with a mandamus to direct its implementation rigorously and effectively. In that context, we find that it is necessary to step in and issue some more directions to the respondents in addition to incorporating the directions already issued by this Court by way of interim measure as part of this final judgment.

From Para 11,

11. Therefore, in addition to directing the respondents to implement all the interim directions which were issued in this case thus far, we further direct the Union of India and the States to take more effective steps to implement the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 with particular reference to Sections 3 and 4 thereof and the various rules framed thereunder. In that process, they are also directed to activate the Dowry Prohibition Officers.

Closing comments:

12. The conscience of the society needs to be fully awakened to the evils of the dowry system so that the demand for dowry itself should lead to loss of face in the society for those who demand it. We have no doubt that our young and enlightened women would rise to the occasion to fight the evil which tends to make them articles of commerce. We also hope that our educated young males would refuse to be sold in the marriage market and come forward to choose their partners in life in a fair manner.
13. The establishment of a committed and sincere machinery to implement the Act and the Rules can hasten the eradication of the evil. The Union of India and the State Governments are directed to devise means to create honest, efficient and committed machinery for the purpose of implementation of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and the various Rules framed thereunder.

In Re Enforcement And Implementation Of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Citations : [2005 BOMCR 5 198], [2005 SUPREME 3 739], [2005 DLT SC 119 452], [2005 DMC SC 1 805], [2005 CRILJ 2598], [2005 CRLJ SC 2598], [2005 AIR SC 2375], [2005 JCR SC 3 170], [2005 JT SC 5 71], [2005 UJ SC 2 880], [2005 AIOL 241], [2005 SCC 4 565], [2005 SCALE 4 535], [2005 ALLMR SC 5 570], [2005 SCR 3 1020], [2005 BLJR 2 1285], [2005 SCC CRI 1163], [2005 CRI LJ 2598]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/899749/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae12e4b0149711412dda

https://www.legitquest.com/case/in-re-enforcement-and-implementation-of-dowry-prohibition-act-1961/18C

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)
11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:
“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”
The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Rajamma H Vs Thimmaiah V on 09 Jun 2022

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Nisar Ahmad Wani and Ors Vs Police Station Neemuch and Ors on 03 Jun 2022

Union of India and Ors Vs MS J.K.Mittal and Co and Ors on 28 Mar 2018

Mukesh Bansal Vs State of UP and Anr on 13 Jun 2022

A.Sankar Vs V.Kumar and Ors on 27 Apr 2022

In Re Enforcement And Implementation of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 on 02 May 2005

Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004