Here is the latest bare act copy.
Author: ShadesOfKnife
Noor Paul Vs Union of India and Ors on 05 Apr 2022
A division bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,
(57) In our opinion, non-supply of a copy of the LOC to the subject of the LOC at the time the subject is stopped at the airport for travel abroad, non-supply of reasons for issuing LOC , and absence of a post decisional hearing to the subject of the LOC, is not just, fair and reasonable procedure. It is violative of Art.21 of the Constitution of India.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56219635/
https://legiteye.com/in-cwp-5492-2022-om-punj-hc-non-supply-of-copy-of-look-out-circular-to-person-travelling-abroad-is-not-fair-and-reasonable-procedure-holds-ph-hc-justices-ramachandra-rao-harminder-singh-madaa/
Index of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices is here.
Vikas Chaudhary Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Jan 2022
Single Judge Bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,
What clearly emerges is that in the aforesaid case, the Court was dealing with a situation, where a FIR had already been lodged and a criminal investigation was ongoing against the person against whom the LOC had been issued. The same was the situation in S. Martin v. Deputy Commissioner of Police SCC OnLine Mad 426. In the present case, as has already been noted, no proceedings under any penal law have, in fact, been initiated against the petitioner. These decisions are therefore, clearly distinguishable and do not, in any manner forward the case of the respondents.
Citations : [2022 SCC ONLINE DEL 97]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172206187/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/61e011eb9fca1952d4e03e62
Index of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices is here.
State of West Bengal and Ors Vs R.K.B.K. Ltd and Anr on 4 Sep 2015
Supreme Court held that, any adverse Order passed by an authority can not be taken cognizance of in the eye of law if it is not communicated to the person aggrieved.
From Para 24,
24. The aforesaid decision, as is evident, lays down that passing of the order and communication thereof must be within 30 days and on that basis has opined that the order passed on the file and not communicated to the person aggrieved is not an order that can be taken cognizance of. There can be no scintilla of doubt that unless an adverse order is communicated that does not come into effect. Passing of an order on the file does not become an order in the eye of law. But the core question would be, if an order is passed within 30 days and communicated thereafter, what would be the effect. In the instant case, as the factual matrix would unveil, the order was passed before expiration of 30 days, but the same was served on the first respondent beyond 30 days. The thrust of the matter is whether the order has to be passed and communicated within 30 days. Paragraph 9 of the Control Order requires the competent authority to pass an order within 30 days from the date of serving the show cause notice or the suspension of licence. The word used is “shall”. Paragraph 10 of the Control Order enables the aggrieved person to prefer an appeal against an order passed under Paragraph 8 or 9 within 30 days to the State Government in Food and Supplies Department. In this context, reference to the authority in MCD v. Qimat Rai Gupta and others4 is of significance. In the said case, the Court was interpreting the word “made” occurring in Section 126(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, which stipulated that no amendment under sub-section 1 shall be made in the assessment list in relation to certain aspects. It was contended before this Court on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi that the use of the expression “made” occurring in the said sub-section would necessitate communication of the order. It was contended before this Court by the Corporation that the distinction must be made between communication of order and making thereof inasmuch as whereas communication may be necessary so as to enable an assessee to prefer an appeal against the order of assessment but only signing of the order would subserve the purpose of saving the period of limitation. The submission was that the expression “no amendment under sub-section (1) shall be made” should be given a liberal interpretation. Reliance was placed on the pronouncement in CCE v. M.M. Rubber and Co.5 The said stand was controverted on the ground that the Act having been enacted for the purpose of controlling the abuse of power on the part of the Commissioner, the same should be given purposive meaning so as to fulfil the purport and object of the legislation.
Citations : [2015 AIR SC 3411], [2015 AD SC 10 112], [2015 CALLT SC 4 1], [2015 CHN SC 5 144], [2015 MLJ 7 105], [2015 SCALE 9 550], [2015 SCC 10 369], [2015 SCJ 9 421], [2015 SCC ONLINE SC 783], [2015 CAL LJ 3 57]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/170103027/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b345e561097e45a4e3df
R.Rambilas Vs Anita and Anr on 16 Mar 2009
Hon’ble Justice K.C. Bhanu had delivered this judgment.
From Paras 4-5,
(4) THE main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the first respondent/wife had given up her right to seek maintenance as per agreement dated 16. 11. 1998 and therefore, continuation of the proceedings in the maintenance case is nothing but abuse of process of Court.
(5) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that, even a divorced wife is entitled for maintenance; that, the agreement and the divorce were obtained by playing fraud; that, even if any such agreement is there, that will not preclude the first respondent herein from claiming the maintenance. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel relied upon various decisions, which will be referred to, at appropriate time.
From Para 12,
(12) THE learned Counsel for the first respondent also placed strong reliance on a decision in Bai Tahira v. AH Hussain Fissalli Chothia and another, AIR 1979 sc 362, wherein it is held thus : (Para 10)
“the last defence, based on Mehar payment, merits more serious attention. The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail. The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available. But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual rights. No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right to the divorcee under Section 125 can operate to negate that claim.”
Closure from Paras 14-15,
(14) THEREFORE, from the above decisions, it is clear that, even if there is an agreement which would defeat the provisions of any law, the same cannot be used as a defence in a proceedings under section 125 Cr. P. C.
(15) IN view of the above decisions, it is clear that even if there is such an agreement where under and whereby the parties relinquished her right to maintain, it would not be a bar to file a petition under section 125 Cr. P. C. and therefore, the maintenance case is maintainable and question of quashing the same does not arise.
Citations : [2009 ALD CRI 1 855]
Other Sources :
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56ea70a6607dba369a6ee51e
https://www.lawyerservices.in/R-Rambilas-Versus-Anita-2009-03-16
Ramchandra Laxman Kamble Vs Shobha Ramchandra Kamble and Anr on 21 Dec 2018
A single judge bench of Bombay High Court held that if/when the wife gives up or relinquishes her right to claim maintenance at any time in the future through an agreement, such agreement is not enforceable since such an agreement is opposed to public policy.
Submissions from Paras 7-8,
7. Mr. Chavan submits that irrespective of pending Miscellaneous Application No.229 of 2012, and the so called consent decree, any agreement for waiver to receive maintenance is void, since, it is opposed to public policy. He submits that there can be no agreement in derogation of the provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., since, such provisions have been designed as a matter of public policy to protect against destitution and vagrancy.
8. Mr. Chavan relies upon several decisions to point out that even assuming that right to claim maintenance was voluntarily given up by the wife, that by itself does not bar the wife from seeking maintenance, provided the circumstances prescribed in Section 125 of Cr.P.C. stands fulfilled. For these reasons, Mr. Chavan submits that there is absolutely no error in the impugned orders and this petition may, therefore, be dismissed.
From Paras 12-13,
12. The consent decrees made by the courts are in effect of nothing but contracts with the seal of the court super-added to them. Accordingly, if the term of the contract is itself opposed to public policy then, such term, is void and unenforceable. If the term is severable then, only the term can be declared as void. If the term is not severable, then, perhaps, the entire contract may fall.
13. There are several rulings, which take the view that an agreement, in which the wife gives up or relinquishes her right to claim maintenance at any time in the future, is opposed to public policy and, therefore, such an agreement, even if voluntarily entered, is not enforceable. The two courts in the present case have basically relied upon such rulings and held that even if it is assumed that the parties had voluntarily agreed to give up their time to claim maintenance from each other, such agreement is opposed to public policy and, therefore, the same is not enforceable, or the same does not bar the maintainability of an application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. There is no jurisdictional error in the view taken by these two courts so as to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Citations : [2018 SCC ONLINE BOM 7039], [2019 HLR 1 404]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54396962/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c23adc49eff4309994e4f52
https://www.myrights.in/2020/07/ramchandra-laxman-kamble-vs-shobha.html
Agreements against Public Policy are Void
A small collections of Judgments which state that, All/any agreements against Public Policy are Void.
Bai Tahira A Vs Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia and Anr on 06 Oct 1978
A full bench of Apex Court held that, a statutory right created as a projection of public policy can not be negated by a contract.
The last defence, based on mehar payment, merits more serious attention. The contractual limb of the contention must easily fail. The consent decree of 1962 resolved all disputes and settled all claims then available But here is a new statutory right created as a projection of public policy by the Code of 1973, which could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when in 1962, they entered into a contract to adjust their then mutual rights. No settlement of claims which does not have the special statutory right of the divorcee under s. 125 can operate to negate that claim.
Citations : [1979 SCC CRI 473], [1979 SCR 2 75], [1979 AIR SC 362], [1979 MPLJ SC 132], [1979 CRLJ SC 151], [1979 SCC 2 316]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/359354/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd27f607dba63d7e69d57
Index is here.
Bulbuli Saikia Vs Jadav Saikia on 17 May 2022
Single Judge bench of Gauhati High Court held, any agreement which is against public policy is void.
From Para 18,
18. In Ranjit Kaur (Supra), the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that maintenance is a statutory right, which the legislature has framed irrespective of nationality, cast or creed of the parties. The statutory liability under Section 125 is, therefore, distinct from the liability under any other law. Therefore, the statutory right of a wife of a maintenance cannot be bartered, done away with or negatived by the husband by setting up an agreement to the contrary. Such an agreement in addition to it being against public policy would also be against the clear intendment of this provision. Therefore, giving effect to an agreement, which overrides this provision of law, that is, Section 125 of Cr.P.C. would tantamount to not only giving recognition to something, which is opposed to public policy, but would also amount to negation of it. The law makes a clear distinction between a void and illegal agreement and void but legal agreement. It has also been held that an agreement by which the wife waived her right to claim maintenance would be a void agreement as against public policy.
Index is here.
Kamal Anant Khopkar Versus Union of India and Anr
A full bench of Apex Court began looking into the Constitutional validity of Section 15 – General rules of succession in the case of female Hindus from Hindu Succession Act 1956.
Learned Additional Solicitor General appears for the Union of India and asks and gets a period of six weeks to file counter affidavit by the Union of India
More time given… already 4 years passed but the Central government did not file the Counter.
Another petitioner also challenged the same provision of HSA and this one got tagged with above main case…
