Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Posted on June 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court passed scathing remarks regards litigants who lie with impunity in their affidavits filed into the Court.

This case is also called as Re: Suo Moto Proceedings Against MR. R, KARUPPAN, ADVOCATE Vs Unknown.

From Para 15,

15. Court are entrusted with the powers of dispensation and adjudication of justice of the rival claims of the parties besides determining the criminal liability of the offenders for offences committed against the society. The courts are further expected to do justice quickly and impartially not being biased by any extraneous considerations. Justice dispensation system would be wrecked if statutory restrictions are not imposed upon the litigants, who attempt to mislead the court by filing and relying upon the false evidence particularly in cases, the adjudication of which is depended upon the statement of facts. if the result of the proceedings are to be respected, these issues before the courts must be resolved to the extent possible in accordance with the truth. The purity of proceedings of the court cannot be permitted to be sullied by a party on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds or relying upon false evidence inspired by extraneous considerations or revengeful desire to harass or spite his opponent. Sanctity of the affidavits has to be preserved and protected discouraging the filing of irresponsible statements, without any regard to accuracy.
17. In India, law relating to the offence of perjury is given a statutory definition under Section 191 and Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, incorporated to deal with the offences relating to giving false evidence against public justice. The offences incorporated under this Chapter are based upon recognition of the decline of moral values and erosion of sanctity of oath. Unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant falsehood in the courts which has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact, though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the courts despite taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let lose by vested interest and professional litigants. The mere existence of the penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society unless the courts stop to take an evasive recourse despite proof of the commission of the offence under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to service, effective action is the need of the time. The present case is no exception to the general practice being followed by many of the litigants in the country.
18. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, the record of proceedings in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Criminal) No.5 of 2000 and Writ Petition No.77 of 2001, we are prima facie satisfied that the respondent herein, in his affidavit filed in support of the writ petition (for the purposes of being used in the judicial proceedings, i.e. writ petition), has wrongly made a statement that the age of Dr. Justice A.S. Anand has not been determined by the President of India in terms of-Article 217 of the constitution. We are satisfied that such a statement supported by an affricative of the respondent was known to him to be false which he believed to be false and/or atleast did not believe to be true. It is not disputed that an affidavit is evidence within the meaning of Section 191 of the Indian Penal Code and a person swearing to a false affidavit is guilty of perjury punishable under Section 193 IPC. The respondent herein, being legally bound by an oath to state the truth in his affidavit accompanying the petition is prima facie held to have made a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false evidence as defined under Section 191 IPC, punishable under Section 193 IPC.
19. With the object of eradicating the evil of perjury, we empower the Registrar General of this Court to depute an officer of the rank of Deputy Registrar or above of the Court to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent herein, before a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction at Delhi. Such officer is directed to file such complaint and take all steps necessary for prosecuting the complaint.

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Citations : [2001 OLR 2 188], [2001 SCC 5 289], [2001 SCALE 4 199], [2001 SUPREME 4 108], [2001 JT SUPP 1 332], [2001 CGLJ 2 499], [2001 CRLJ SC 2611], [2001 SCR 3 750], [2001 AIR SC 2204], [2001 LW 3 61], [2001 SCC CRI 876], [2001 AIR SCW 2104]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1356442/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9be4b0149711411d8a

Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 31 Aug 2021

Posted on June 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Single bench of Karnataka High Court nailed the perjuror, A medical doctor.

From point c of Para 4,

c) The vehement contention of Mr. Jhadhav, learned Sr. Adv. that a Police investigation is launched against the petitioner-husband for producing copies of IT Returns and other documents of the respondent and therefore, till after its completion, no action for the commission of alleged perjury can be initiated, is bit difficult to countenance, more particularly, when the authenticity of these documents is not disputed even before this Court; in fact the Court below too has recorded a specific finding to this effect; the said Police investigation has nothing to do with perjury allegedly committed by the respondent; act of perjury is treated as a heinous offence in all civilized societies; consideration of complaints with regard to the same cannot be deferred or delayed; otherwise there is all possibility of the fountain of justice being polluted.
e) Lastly, heavy reliance placed by Mr. Jhadhav on the decision of Apex Court in V.K.Gupta’s case supra, does not much come to his rescue; there are some observations in the said ruling that recognize greater degree of discretion with the Courts in deciding application of the kind, is true; however, that cannot be construed as a discretion of the Moguls; the sages of law like Lord Halsbury have said that discretion means according to rules of reason & justice; the reason assigned by the Court below for holding petitioner’s subject application to be premature, is unsustainable to say the least; the view of the learned trial Judge that petitioner can move similar application subsequently offends sense of justice; applications of the kind need to be considered on merits at the earliest point of time so that a loud message goes to the unscrupulous section of the litigant public as to what would befall the perjuring parties.

Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 31 Aug 2021 (Perjury)

Citations :

Other Sources :

Kar HC | “Act of perjury is treated as a heinous offence in all civilized societies”; Delay in consideration of such complaints can pollute the fountain of justice

https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/karnataka-hc-perjury-complaints-not-to-be-deferred-wifes-false-maintenance-claim-181709

Index here.

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Posted on June 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

From the decision of the division bench of Supreme Court, this is the concurring opinion of Justice D.P. Wadhwa. Wonderful, indeed!

D.P Wadhwa, J. (concurring)— I agree with the judgment pronounced by my noble and learned sister Ruma Pal, J. I, however, wish to add a few lines.
35. The first information report was lodged within 2-1/2 hours of the occurrence and the case registered against four persons, namely, Shamsher Singh, Jagjit Singh, Amrik Singh and Mittar Pal Singh alias Lovely. These four accused were named in the FIR. While Shamsher Singh surrendered a day following the lodging of the FIR, no steps were taken to apprehend the other named accused. The case was not only investigated by Sub-Inspector Karnail Singh, SHO of the police station concerned but also by Mohinder Singh, DSP, Baldev Sharma, DSP, Sanjeev Gupta, SP (Detective) and B.P Tiwari, DIG (Crime). When challan was put up, it was only against Shamsher Singh. A criminal complaint was filed by the complainant and all the accused were committed to stand their trial in the Court of Session for various offences. In the course of the trial, more than 50 prosecution witnesses were given up having been won over and the case hinged on the statements of seven witnesses which led to the conviction of Shamsher Singh and Jagjit Singh by the trial court, upheld by the High Court and now affirmed by this Court. The questions that arise for consideration are as to why the police did not challan the accused Jagjit Singh and why over 50 witnesses should have been given up. It only shows that the criminal justice system is in doldrums. There has to be honest investigation uninfluenced by any political or other pressure.
36. A criminal case is built on the edifice of evidence, evidence that is admissible in law. For that, witnesses are required whether it is direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Here are the witnesses who are a harassed lot. A witness in a criminal trial may come from a far-off place to find the case adjourned. He has to come to the court many times and at what cost to his own self and his family is not difficult to fathom. It has become more or less a fashion to have a criminal case adjourned again and again till the witness tires and gives up. It is the game of unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for one excuse or the other till a witness is won over or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or even bribed. There is no protection for him. In adjourning the matter without any valid cause a court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of justice. A witness is then not treated with respect in the court. He is pushed out from the crowded courtroom by the peon. He waits for the whole day and then he finds that the matter is adjourned. He has no place to sit and no place even to have a glass of water. And when he does appear in court, he is subjected to unchecked and prolonged examination and cross-examination and finds himself in a hapless situation. For all these reasons and others a person abhors becoming a witness. It is the administration of justice that suffers. Then appropriate diet money for a witness is a far cry. Here again the process of harassment starts and he decides not to get the diet money at all. High Courts have to be vigilant in these matters. Proper diet money must be paid immediately to the witness (not only when he is examined but for every adjourned hearing) and even sent to him and he should not be left to be harassed by the subordinate staff. If the criminal justice system is to be put on a proper pedestal, the system cannot be left in the hands of unscrupulous lawyers and the sluggish State machinery. Each trial should be properly monitored. Time has come that all the courts, district courts, subordinate courts are linked to the High Court with a computer and a proper check is made on the adjournments and recording of evidence. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils must play their part and lend their support to put the criminal system back on its trail. Perjury has also become a way of life in the law courts. A trial Judge knows that the witness is telling a lie and is going back on his previous statement, yet he does not wish to punish him or even file a complaint against him. He is required to sign the complaint himself which deters him from filing the complaint. Perhaps law needs amendment to clause (b) of Section 340(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this respect as the High Court can direct any officer to file a complaint. To get rid of the evil of perjury, the court should resort to the use of the provisions of law as contained in Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Citations : [2000 ACR SC 2 1648], [2000 AIR SC 2017], [2000 CRI LJ 2780], [2000 JT SC 6 623], [2000 RCR CRIMINAL 2 762], [2000 SCALE 4 153], [2000 SCC 5 668], [2001 SCC CRI 190], [2000 CRLJ 0 2780], [2001 SCC CR 0 190], [2000 AIR SC 1895], [2000 CRIMES SC 3 12], [2000 SUPREME 4 364], [2000 CRLJ 106 2780], [2000 CCR 2 149], [2000 SLT 4 138], [2000 SRJ 5 487], [2000 JCC SC 2 694], [2000 JT 6 623], [2000 CRIMES 3 12], [2000 RECENTCR 2 762], [2000 AIR SCW 1895], [2000 CRILJ 2780]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/489802/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad6ae4b0149711411587

Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX Cases

Posted on June 26, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Here are the list of cases filed by these people…

Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 24 Mar 2016 – In a ‘Annulment of marriage due to consummation of marriage by wife’ case, High Court granted opportunity to file the Written Statement/Counter.
Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 16 Jun 2020 – DVC was part allowed due to bad cross-examination.
Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 31 Aug 2021 – Perjury allowed.
- (Master Page for Perjury Judgments here)
Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 03 Mar 2022 – Compromised and settled. All cases withdrawn.

V.Sadagopan Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Jun 2022

Posted on June 25, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madras High Court held as follows:

4. In view of the above, it is clear that the writ petition is filed by the individual having no locus to challenge the validity of the Rule and he is not affected, rather if anyone is affected it is the educational institution. Hence, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of locus as it is not otherwise a Public Interest Litigation.

Taking delay as ground:

5. That apart, the writ petition has been filed after a lapse of around 12 years to challenge the Rule brought in the year 2010. If it was affecting the educational institution, it is from the date of bringing the Rules. No justification for the delay in challenging the Rule has been given in the writ petition. Thus, the writ petition suffers from laches as well.

V.Sadagopan Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Jun 2022

Shilpa SC Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 02 Jun 2022

Posted on June 25, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A Single Judge of Karnataka High Court held that a woman having illicit relationship with accused does not constitute the commission of the offence.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that only allegation against the petitioner – accused No.5 is that, she is having illicit relationship with accused No.1, who is her legally wedded husband. Hence, the allegation made against the petitioner – accused No.5 does not constitute the commission of the offences alleged against the petitioner. Hence, the registration of FIR for the aforesaid offences is impermissible.
6. The only allegation as against the petitioner – accused No.5 is that she is having illicit relationship with the accused No.1 who is the husband of respondent No.3 – informant. This allegation does not constitute the commission of the offences alleged against the petitioner – accused No.5 and itn the absence of any essential ingredients so as to constitute the commission of the said offences, registration of FIR against accused No.5 is without any substance.

Shilpa SC Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 02 Jun 2022

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Posted on June 25, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

We are of the considered view that in a matter involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to pass orders in one way or other taking into account the merits of the matter at the earliest. At any rate, posting an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated.
We request the High Court to dispose of the application for anticipatory bail on its own merits and in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within a period of three weeks after reopening of the Court. If the main application could not be disposed of, for any reason, within the stipulated time, relief sought for in the interlocutory application shall be considered on its own merits. Till such time, we grant interim protection from arrest to the petitioner herein.

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Rajamma H Vs Thimmaiah V on 09 Jun 2022

Posted on June 24, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court upheld the law the way it is.

From Para 5,

5. The application is filed admittedly invoking Section 12 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 of the Act reads as follows:
“12. Application to Magistrate.-
(5) The Magistrate shall Endeavour to dispose of every application made under sub-section (1) within a period of sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”
Sub-section (5) mandates that every application filed under the Act shall be disposed of by the Court within six months from the date of its presentation. The order sheet reveals that the application was filed on 12-11-2021 seeking maintenance. Six months have passed by. The order sheet does not demonstrate any consideration of the application. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a mandamus at the hands of this Court or a direction to the learned Magistrate to dispose of the application for maintenance expeditiously.

Rajamma H Vs Thimmaiah V on 09 Jun 2022

Connects to a PIL here.

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Posted on June 21, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

The Division Bench of the Apex Court held as follows (in regards to Custody of Children):

8. Whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of a minor child, the matter is to be decided not on considerations of the legal rights of parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the minor. We have twice interviewed Dustan in our chambers and talked with him. We found him to be too tender in age and totally immature to be able to form any independent opinion of his own as to which parent he should stay with. The child is an American citizen. Excepting for the last few months that have elapsed since his being brought to India by the process of illegal abduction by the father, he has spent the rest of his life in the United States of America and he was doing well in school there. In our considered opinion it will be in the best interests and welfare of Dustan that he should go back to the United States of America and continue his education there under the custody and guardianship of the mother to whom such custody and guardianship have been entrusted by a competent court in that country. We are also satisfied that the petitioner who is the mother, is full of genuine love and affection for the child and she can be safely trusted to look after him, educate him and attend in every possible way to his proper upbringing. The child has not taken root in this country and he is still accustomed and acclimatized to the conditions and environments obtaining in the place of his origin in the United States of America. The child’s presence in India is the result of an illegal act of abduction and the father who is guilty of the said act cannot claim any advantage by stating that he has already put the child in some school in Pune. The conduct of the father has not been such as to inspire confidence in us that he is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the custody and guardianship of the child for the present.

Comity of Courts:

9. In Re H. (infants)1 the Court of Appeal in England had occasion to consider a somewhat similar question. That case concerned the abduction to England of two minor boys who were American citizens. The father was a natural-born American citizen and the mother, though of Scottish origin, had been resident for 20 years in the United States of America. They were divorced in 1953 by a decree in Mexico, which embodied provisions entrusting the custody of the two boys to the mother with liberal access to the father. By an amendment made in that order in December 1964, a provision was incorporated that the boys should reside at all times in the State of New York and should at all times be under the control and jurisdiction of the State of New York. In March 1965, the mother removed the boys to England, without having obtained the approval of the New York court, and without having consulted the father; she purchased a house in England with the intention of remaining there permanently and of cutting off all contacts with the father. She ignored an order made in June 1965, by the Supreme Court of New York State to return the boys there. On a motion on notice given by the father in the Chancery Division of the Court in England, the trial Judge Cross, J. directed that since the children were American children and the American court was the proper court to decide the issue of custody, and as it was the duty of courts in all countries to see that a parent doing wrong by removing children out of their country did not gain any advantage by his or her wrongdoing, the court without going into the merits of the question as to where and with whom the children should live, would order that the children should go back to America. In the appeal filed against the said judgment in the Court of Appeal, Willmer, L.J while dismissing the appeal extracted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Cross, J.‡:
“The sudden and unauthorised removal of children from one country to another is far too frequent nowadays, and as it seems to me, it is the duty of all courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that the wrongdoer does not gain an advantage by his wrongdoing.

The courts in all countries ought, as I see it, to be careful not to do anything to encourage this tendency. This substitution of self-help for due process of law in this field can only harm the interests of wards generally, and a Judge should, as I see it, pay regard to the orders of the proper foreign court unless he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that to do so would inflict serious harm on the child.”
10. With respect we are in complete agreement with the aforesaid enunciation of the principles of law to be applied by the courts in situations such as this.

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Citations : [1987 SCC 1 42], [1987 SCR 1 175], [1987 CRIMES SC 1 71], [1986 SCALE 2 745], [1987 AIR SC 3], [1986 JT 1 795], [1987 SCC CRI 13]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/271434/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac23e4b014971140e22f

Nisar Ahmad Wani and Ors Vs Police Station Neemuch and Ors on 03 Jun 2022

Posted on June 18, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench held that, it has no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner, since the FIR was registered outside the territory of the High Court.

From Para 2,

2. It is averred in the application that the petitioners happen to be the in-laws and husband of the complainant. It is stated that the marriage between petitioner No.l and the complainant has taken place in the year 2013 and out of this marriage, one son has been born. It is submitted that the respondent No.2 has lodged an FIR in Madhya Pradesh against the petitioners alleging commission of offences under Section 498-A of the Cr. P. C. It is also contended that under Section 79 of the Cr. P. C, warrants have to be executed by a police station located outside the jurisdiction of a State through the local police station and, as such, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present application.

Issue from Para 5,

5. In the instant case, the petitioners are seeking bail in an FIR which has been registered beyond the jurisdiction of this Court, inasmuch as the FIR has been registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The question that arises for consideration is whether this Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 438 of the Cr. P. C, is vested with jurisdiction to grant bail in a case that has been registered beyond its local limits of jurisdiction.

Decision from Paras 7-9,

7. On the basis of the aforequoted reasoning, the Court came to the conclusion that the High Court has no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail to a person against whom a case has been registered with a police station which is situated outside the local limits of its jurisdiction under the Code.
8. From the aforequoted enunciation of law on the subject, it is clear that this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the bail application which relates to an FIR that has been registered beyond the local limits of this Court even though the accused/petitioner may be residing within the jurisdiction of this Court.
9. The petitioners in the instant case are not seeking transit bail but are seeking bail in anticipation of their arrest on a permanent basis, regarding which this Court lacks jurisdiction in view of the ratio laid down in the aforequoted judgment.

Nisar Ahmad Wani and Ors Vs Police Station Neemuch and Ors on 03 Jun 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Madras High Court Advocates Association Vs Dr.A.S.Anand, Honble The C.J.I. on 12 May 2001

Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX on 31 Aug 2021

Swaran Singh Vs State of Punjab on 26 Apr 2000

Dr.XXXXX Vs Dr.XXXXX Cases

V.Sadagopan Vs Union of India and Ors on 21 Jun 2022

Shilpa SC Vs State of Karnataka and Anr on 02 Jun 2022

Sanjay Vs The State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 20 Jun 2022

Rajamma H Vs Thimmaiah V on 09 Jun 2022

Elizabeth Dinshaw Vs Arvand M.Dinshaw and Anr on 11 Nov 1986

Nisar Ahmad Wani and Ors Vs Police Station Neemuch and Ors on 03 Jun 2022