Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 22,

22. The fact that the present complaint which ultimately culminated in the impugned order was filed by the complainant subsequent to the grant of divorce between the first accused and the complainant’s daughter, is a fact discernible and indisputable. This had occurred in Canada. A perusal of the final report would reveal that even after the investigation no material whatsoever worthy to connect the appellant with the offences was seen collected. Therefore, the question is whether the vague, and at the same time, highly exaggerated versions of FIR and the proceedings subsequent thereto can be permitted to be proceeded against accused Nos.5 and 6. In short, on a careful consideration of FIR and the final report and materials we have no hesitation to hold that there is nothing on record to suggest, even prima facie that they would constitute the alleged offences against the accused No.6.

From Para 23,

23. A scanning of the FIR and the subsequently filed final report would reveal that the allegation against accused No.5, who is the wife of accused No.6, are also of the same nature. It is relevant to note that she is related to the husband of complainant’s daughter only through her marriage with cousin brother of the first accused viz., accused No.6. When the subject FIR and all further proceedings pursuant therefrom were quashed against the said cousin brother viz., accused No.6, the same reasons must apply to the case of accused No.5 as well. We are of the considered view that the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the subject FIR and all other proceedings therefrom in relation to accused No.5 viz., the wife of accused No.6 as well. To secure interest of justice in the circumstances obtained, we are of the considered view that filing of the chargesheet cannot be a reason for interfering with impugned order in respect of accused No.6 or rejecting the prayer of accused No.5 to quash the proceedings and to make them to argue or to raise the legal and factual issues at the stage of framing of the charges. It is evident that making them to face the trial based on the allegations or accusation as referred above would be nothing but an abuse of process of court.

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 896]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101620228/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67458986e8c0441261878a34

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/payal-sharma-v-state-of-punjab-2024-insc-896-over-implication-of-close-relatives-of-husband-in-alleged-dowry-cases-1559200

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/dowry-harassment-cases-supreme-court-stresses-courts-duty-check-exaggerated-versions

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/payal-sharma-vs-state-of-punjab

PAYAL SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB & Anr, (26 November 2024)

Karnataka High Court relied on this Judgment in Crl.Pet.No.13296/2024 to grant interim stay.

Index of Quash Judgements is here.

Antics of Bar Council of India or State Bar Councils

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

Despite being a statutory bodies, there are many instances where the Bar Council of India or various State Bar Councils have crossed their statutory limits and embarked on a journey which is legally called as Colourable exercise of power granted by Parliament to them. The following is just a small list of cases that came to my notice.

From 1996 – 2000:

Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa on 8 Apr 1996 [SC: Cannot practice as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 as well as a medical practitioner who does not want to give up his medical practice but wants simultaneously to practice law]

From 2016 – 2020:

Rishabh Duggal vs Bar Council of India on 12 Mar 2019 [SC: BCI imposed age limit]
Bar Council of Kerala Vs T.Koshy on 12 Apr 2018 [KerHC: Bar Council of Kerala does not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee]
Braj Mohan Mahajan Vs Bar Council of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 11 Sep 2018 [MPHC: A person who is not convicted but merely accused cannot be denied entry into the State Bar Council rolls]
Bar Council of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019 [SC: Bar Council (of any State or India) do not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee.]

From 2021 – 2025:

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 10 Feb 2023 [SC: BCI is empowered to conduct AIBE and it is a valid exam]
Are State Bar Councils Statutorily empowered to Levy Fees for Gaps in academics during Enrollment? [SC: Bar Council of AP charged me an additional Rs.7000/- as fees towards the gap in my academic, before enrollment and my case was transferred to Supreme Court and clubbed with many other such cases and eventually SCI held that Bar Councils cannot charge fees under any name beyond what is permitted in Advocates Act, 1961]

From 2026 – 2030:

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025 [KarHC: Persons can be admitted as advocates on a State roll even if they completed LL.B. outside the State]
Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026 [TelHC: Membership with a Bar Association is not mandatory to practice Law in the State]
Are BCI and State Bar Councils Statutorily empowered to Levy Fees for Transfer of Enrollment?
1. KarHC:
2. APHC:

MASTER INDEX is here.

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows,

From Para 3,

3. On an enquiry with the learned counsel appearing for Bar Council of India, as to whether there is any restriction for such enrolment, she submits that there is no such restriction and any person who has passed out of any Law colleges across the country could be registered with the State Bar council where such person intends to practice in terms of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. She further submits that it is only if transfer of registration is required to be done, certain procedures would be required to be followed.

From Para 5,

5. In view of the said submission, it being clear that the petitioner has passed out of a college which is affiliated to respondent No.1 and there being no restriction or requirement for the State Bar Council to register only persons who have passed out within that particular State and in view of Section 24 of the Advocates Act, I pass the following:
ORDER
i. Writ petition is allowed.
ii. A mandamus is issued to respondent No.2 to enroll the petitioner as an advocate on its roll as per the Advocates Act, 1961, on the next enrolment date.
iii. Respondent No.2 is directed to, in future, take into consideration any application filed by any student who has passed out in Law in any other State so long as the verification process of the certificate issued is done in a proper manner.

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38447320/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/karnataka-high-court-ruling-enrolment-of-law-graduates-from-other-states-309383

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/karnataka-high-court/sri-rajashekar-v-bar-council-of-india-2025khc42704-advocate-with-law-degree-from-outside-state-can-enroll-1597580

Law Graduates From Any State Can Enroll With Any Bar Council in India: Karnataka High Court

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

From Para 4.1,

4.1 The petitioner, appearing in person, contends that Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, and ultra vires the provisions of the Act, 1961, particularly Sections 22, 30, and 33. It is argued that the statutory scheme unequivocally confers upon an enrolled Advocate the right to practice law, and such right is neither conditional nor subject to compulsory membership in any Bar Association.

From Para 4.4,

4.4. The petitioner further contends that the impugned rule violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(c) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the freedom to form associations inherently includes the right not to associate, as recognized in Damayanti Naranga v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 678. Therefore, any compulsion to join a Bar Association infringes this constitutional guarantee.

From Para 5.2,

5.2. The respondents argue that the impugned rules, including Rule 6.1, are within the statutory framework and are intended to regulate and identify practicing Advocates, as well as to ensure effective implementation of welfare schemes. It is specifically contended that Rule 6 does not mandate compulsory membership in any Bar Association; rather, it provides an option. An Advocate may either become a member of a recognized Bar Association or, alternatively, intimate the State Bar Council regarding non-membership and indicate how he or she proposes to avail welfare benefits.

From Para 5.4,

5.4. The respondents also contend that the requirement of certification and verification is intended solely to identify genuine practitioners and facilitate welfare distribution. There is no violation of Article 19, as the rules neither compel association membership nor restrict the right to practice.

From Para 8,

8. At the outset, Sections 29, 30, and 33 of the Act, 1961 unequivocally recognize Advocates as the only class of persons entitled to practice law, subject to enrolment under the Act. The statutory scheme does not expressly mandate membership in any Bar Association as a condition precedent to the exercise of such right.

From Paras 12 and 13,

12. A plain reading of Rule 6 indicates that membership in a Bar Association is not mandatory. The provision merely affords an option to an Advocate either to join a Bar Association or, in the alternative, to intimate the State Bar Council regarding such non-membership for the purpose of availing welfare benefits. When construed in this manner, the rule can be sustained as a regulatory measure. Notably, the respondents have also urged that the rule be interpreted in this light.
13. In such circumstances, the requirement would fall within the ambit of Sections 6, 7, and 49(1)(ah) of the Act, 1961, as a condition governing the right to practice, aimed at identifying genuine practitioners and facilitating the implementation of welfare schemes.

Finally from Para 17,

17. In view of the foregoing analysis, Rule 6 of the Rules, 2015 is read down to the following extent:
a) Membership in a Bar Association shall be purely voluntary;
b) Non-membership shall not disentitle or restrict an Advocate from practicing law;
c) Bar Associations shall not exercise any determinative or regulatory control over the right to practice.

Call to Action:

18. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1, namely the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, is directed to issue appropriate clarifications to all State Bar Councils. The requirement of certification and verification shall be implemented solely as a regulatory mechanism for availing welfare measures and not as a means of imposing coercive conditions.

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Citations: [2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 86]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/137307844/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/telangana-high-court/telangana-high-court-bar-associations-exercise-regulatory-control-advocate-right-to-practice-538287

https://www.verdictum.in/telangana-high-court/vijay-gopal-v-bar-council-of-india-anr-bar-council-of-india-membership-1613590

Index of Bar Council Antics is here.

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Posted on June 30 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent-husband in the cases of Sheetal Patil (supra), Alipka @ Lokesh (supra) and Kanchan (supra) are that of High Courts of Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Bombay, respectively. Since two Division Bench judgments of this Court have categorically held that once an appeal is filed within the period of limitation and after filing thereof contracting of a second marriage by the husband tantamounts to contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the argument of learned counsel for the respondent-husband deserves to be rejected. Further, as noticed above, their Lordships in the case of N. Rajendran (supra) have also held that the bar on re-marriage under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 after divorce will apply on mere filing of an appeal.

From Para 16 (the bullshit arises here; no one knows the legal mandate of Audi Alterum Partem)

16. Learned counsel for the respondent-husband has not been able to point out to any case law to the contrary that a marriage contracted in contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would not amount to civil contempt. The reliance made by learned counsel for respondent-husband to the judgment in the case of Suresh (supra) would also not come to his aid as the same does not deal with the contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

From Para 17,

17. As discussed above, not only the appeal was filed within the prescribed period of limitation but the respondent-husband also appears to have evaded the service of notice in the appeal as he remained unserved on the same very address i.e. ‘House No.41, Pooja Vihar, Industrial Area, Ambala Cantt. District Ambala’, wherein he had also been served in FAO-M-5170-2018, which was the same address given by him in the divorce petition filed by him. In his reply the respondent-husband has categorically admitted that after the marriage was dissolved vide a decree of divorce dated 02.03.2020, he contracted a second marriage on 03.01.2021. The only plea taken by the respondent-husband is that he was never served and that he gained knowledge about the pendency of FAO-1935-2020 on 23.02.2021. It has further been stated that there cannot be endless time limit for the spouse not to re-marry and that the respondent-husband re-married only after the grant of decree of divorce and that the appeal pending before this Court has still not been decided. In a nutshell, in his reply the respondent-husband, instead of tendering an unqualified apology, has tried to contest his act of solemnizing the second marriage during the pendency of the above appeal and stay having been granted therein. It is only when this fact was pointed out by this Court to learned counsel for the respondent-husband that an affidavit was filed along with CM-22461-CII-2025 tendering an unqualified apology. However, the apology in the present case cannot be accepted for the reason that there has been willful contravention of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Even if the argument of learned counsel for the respondent-husband as regards the fact that respondent-husband was not served in the appeal is to be taken on its face value, he admittedly never made inquiries within the prescribed period of limitation regarding filing of the appeal.

From Para 21, (Why the fish does husband want anything to do with reconciliation, after he won his divorce case on merits against the OP?)

21. The act and conduct of the respondent-husband is such that the clock cannot be put back and the damage which has ensued cannot be rectified. Virtually, the conduct of respondent-husband has rendered the appeal filed by the petitioner-wife infructuous and the petitioner-wife being remediless. The petitioner-wife and her daughter have even missed out the chance to partake in any reconciliation process.

Note: I just wish and pray that this BS gets thrown out of window at Supreme Court.

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Contempt of Court decisions is here.

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Posted on June 29 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru held as follows:

From Para 7,

7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that respondent No.1 is the only child to her parents. No doubt she is earning around ₹1,00,000/- per month, but she is under obligation to clear all the debts which she incurred for her marriage. Therefore, Trial Court rightly directed petitioner to pay respondent No.1 a sum of ₹20,000/- towards interim maintenance and thus this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

From Para 8,

8. …
No material whatsoever is produced by respondent No.1 which gives the details of the loans she obtained and the EMI’s. Even in the affidavit filed disclosing her assets and liabilities she has not mentioned the details of those loans, when she obtained and what amount is still due to be paid. Trial
Court made an observation at para 12 of the impugned order that as per the bank statement and pay slip produced by respondent No.1, it is evident that he is employed with Genpact India Private Limited and is drawing gross monthly salary of ₹60,646/-. The Trial Court did not consider the income of respondent No.1/wife at all. In her affidavit given disclosing assets and liabilities she herself mentioned that she gets ₹1,00,000/- per month as salary. The Trial Court which discussed about the earnings of petitioner/husband ought to have discussed about the earnings of respondent No.1/wife and thereafter should have come to a conclusion with regard to the entitlement for interim maintenance. But, totally ignoring the earnings of respondent No.1/wife, the impugned order came to be passed.

From Para 9, (Slipper shot!) Trial Court judge has no sense of difference between a case of DV and a case of neglect… Thuuu…

9. Only because a woman more particularly a wife files a petition invoking the provisions of Domestic Violence Act or the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act or the provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, where the right to claim maintenance is recognized, the Courts cannot straight away pass an order awarding some amount towards maintenance payable by the husband. When the wife is financially sound and in case where the income of the wife is more than that of the husband and where no other liabilities are found on part of the wife, like looking after the children, Courts should not be inclined to pass an order granting maintenance on the ground that women are required to be maintained by men or wife is required to be maintained by her husband. It should be borne in mind that only when it is shown that the wife has no financial sources to maintain herself according to the standards of her husband, then only Courts are required to award maintenance either interim or final.

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/karnataka-high-court/wife-income-higher-than-husband-no-maintenance-unless-wife-unable-to-maintain-herself-539208

https://courtbook.in/posts/karnataka-hc-says-wife-earning-more-than-husband-cannot-claim-interim-maintenance-without-financial-need

https://mynation.net/docs/2327-2026

https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/karnataka-hc-maintenance-only-when-wife-cannot-maintain-herself-to-husband039;s-standard

https://thelexpedia.com/judgements/sri-ravi-s-at-jeevan-s-v-smt-sahana-devi-a-others-2026

Index of Maintenance under Judgments under PWDV Act is here.

Is Bigamy (under sections 494, 495 IPC and now Section 82 BNS) a Cognizable and non-bailable offence, as much as it applies to State of Andhra Pradesh?

Posted on June 27 by ShadesOfKnife

While I am fighting ‘legally’ to get a FIR registered against the OP for her crimes of Bigamy here, I decided to pick up on one of my legal goals. If State of AP made sections 494, 495 IPC cognizable and non-bailable offences through a State Amendment here, it sure must now evaluate the Section 82 BNS and decide if a State Amendment is again required. Begin with the standard steps.

Sent representations to Home and Law Departments on 11-Jun-2026 which were delivered on 15-Jun-2026.

2026-06-10 Representation 1 to Home - Regd State Amendment to New Criminal Laws

On 17-Jun-2026, the representation sent to Home Department was forwarded to DGP Office, Mangalagiri for his ‘remarks’ about the issues raised in my representation.

Index to my Life Goals is here.

Advocates Act 1961 Section 18 – Transfer of name from one State roll to another

Posted on June 27 by ShadesOfKnife

18. Transfer of name from one State roll to another.―

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 17, any person whose name is entered as an advocate on the roll of any State Bar Council may make an application in the prescribed form to the Bar Council of India for the transfer of his name from the roll of that State Bar Council to the roll of any other State Bar Council and, on receipt of any such application the Bar Council of India shall direct that the name of such person shall, without the payment of any fee, be removed from the roll of the first mentioned State Bar Council and entered in the roll of the other State Bar Council and the State Bar Councils concerned shall comply with such direction:
Provided that where any such application for transfer is made by a person against whom any disciplinary proceeding is pending or where for any other reason it appears to the Bar Council of India that the application for transfer has not been made bona fide and that the transfer should not be made, the Bar Council of India may, after giving the person making the application an opportunity of making a representation in this behalf, reject the application.
(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that where on an application made by an advocate under sub-section (1), his name is transferred from the roll of one State Bar Council to that of another, he shall retain the same seniority in the latter roll to which he was entitled in the former roll.

Are BCI and State Bar Councils Statutorily empowered to Levy Fees for Transfer of Enrollment?

Posted on June 27 by ShadesOfKnife

After this case here, now again, I am conflicting with Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh (BC-AP) and Bar Council of India (BCI) regarding their charging of illegal Fees for Transfer of Enrollment from one State Bar to another. This violates the Section 18 – Transfer of name from one State roll to another of Advocates Act 1961.

In total both Bar Council usurped a total of Rs.7750/- from me to do a task for which the Parliament set a fee. Zero.

1. Fees charged by Bar Council of AP to provide me the NOC : Rs.2000/- (Bankers Check. No. 631280 in the name of Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh)
2. Fees charged by Bar Council of India to provide me the Transfer Order : Rs.5000/- (D.D. No. 631341 in the name of Secretary, Bar Council of India)
3. Fees charged by Bar Council of AP to issue an endorsement for me (in Original): Rs.750/- (D.D. No. 415310 in the name of Secretary, Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh)

It is frustrating to note that the people who run these statutory bodies, despite being fully aware what they are doing is illegal. No excuse or mercy to be shown to such unscrupulous people.

On 24-Jun-2026, I sent the secretaries of both Bar Councils an email demanding my fees to be returned. Of course, I am not in any delusion that they will comply with my demand. These lot are think skinned. This is just prerequisite before filing a Writ Petition.

2026-06-24 Return of fees illegally charged by AP Bar Council and Bar Council of India

Subsequently On 24-Jun-2026, I sent a representations to both Bars through Speed Post which were delivered on 29-Jun-2026. Now to wait for response, if any. Meanwhile the WP earlier prepared needs to be updated.

08-July-2026
- Relocated to Bengaluru, this time to become as an Advocate, for many reasons. Can be closer to aged parents (Bengaluru is around 200 Kms away from Anantapur), High Court and 5-6 Trial Court Complexes in Bengaluru are just around 4-5 Kms away from each other, Higher Income prospect, Cooler climate, Telugu is known to almost everyone in Bengaluru, Suprajaa being already enrolled since 4 years here.
- Settled in the Tilaknagar, Jayanagar PG.
09-July-2026
- Visited Karnataka State Bar Council (KSBC) only to realize even these bastards are charging fees to process enrollment transfers. Time to screw them legally. It seems I am going to have a grand welcome in Karnataka.
- Gathered sample WPs and decided to send the representation first, as required by a High Court.
- Decided to do a dual-litigation with both State Bar Councils of AP and Karnataka as well as the Bar Council of India.
11-July-2026
- Sent the representation from Anantapur vide Consignment Number: EN537735595IN. It reached KSBC on 14-Jul-2026.
- 2026-07-11 Representation to KSBC
- Now to investigate if the fees came down to statutory Rs.750/- from Rs.7500/- or not. If no change, will file WP by upcoming Independence Day.
23-July-2026
- Through a friend, realized that KSBC has not moved away from the illegal fees of Rs.7500/- and that the split of the fees is Rs.2000/- goes to the bigboss at New Delhi, BCI, Rs.2000/- goes to this State Bar Council and the balance of Rs.3500/- is towards fees/premium of mandatory/forced Welfare scheme/scam. So, they will only listen to that language they understand well. I also met a clerk today at High Court who informed me that I need to wait only for 15 days before filing the WP, so 29-Jul-2026 is a good date to file the WP.
13-August-2026
- After few give-and-takes, the Writ Petition is filed before Karnataka High Court and awaiting scrutiny. WP(SR): 25940/2026. Thanks to my new clerk at Karnataka High Court, Mr. Hemant.
- Petition copy:
  2026-08-15 WP against Enrolment Transfer fees by KSBC v0.1
- Yet to re-file before AP High Court.
- Petition copy:
  2026-08-17 Writ Petition seeking FIR for 494, 495 IPC Offences v0.1
14-August-2026
- Objections. Every single one of them was cosmetic and trivial.
- After few nudges, the Writ Petition is re-filed before Karnataka High Court and was numbered. WP: 25961/2026. I was informed by my new clerk at Karnataka High Court, Mr. Hemant that this case will be listed on Thursday 03-Sep-2026. Phewwww!
03-September-2026
- Due to technical defect, my Counsel was not admitted into the VC so Judge proceeded to permit notice to Respondents and directed the case be listed after 2 weeks on 17-Sep-2026

07-September-2026
- As per my usual understanding requested my Counsel to send legal notices to both Respondents. The same are sent out. But later realized that up on payment of the process fees, the Court itself issues the notices to Respondents. New learning which was not faced by me at APHC.

09-September-2026
- Noticed that the Daily Orders portion was updated by the High Court staff on 07-September-2026 at 10:34:22. Good.

09-September-2026
- Process Fees paid on same date.

10-September-2026
- Counsel for BCI Smt. Anubha Srivastava reached out to my Counsel, for a soft copy of the Petition. Furnished the same.

11-September-2026
- A copy of the Petition was served to the Counsel for KSBC, Mr. Nataraj.

13-September-2026
- Learnt that the WP was moved from Court-10 to a different Court C31, Hon’ble Mr. Justice C M Poonacha. But thankfully the listing date is same 17-Sep-2026 at item/serial No. 29.

17-September-2026
- Fully prepared with remedies and backups for hearing on 17-Sep-2026

Index of Bar Council Antics here.

Index to my Life Goals is here.

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Posted on June 25 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Madras High Court held as follows,

From Para 5,

5. None can deny there is corruption in the Judiciary. There were and are corrupt Judges. While addressing a legal conference in Kollam, Kerala, former CJI Bharucha implied that 20 per cent of the Judges in this country were corrupt. The startling statement made by the Bhushans (father and son duo) is still in public memory. We would not go that far. We refuse to even endorse such sweeping statements. But, we do know and have come across instances of judicial corruption. The Full Court of the Madras High Court regularly shows the exit door to such black sheep. The Supreme Court acknowledged in High Court of Judicature at Bombay -vs- V.Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil (1997) 6 SCC 339 that the cancerous cells of corruption constantly keep creeping into the vital veins of the judiciary. It was also observed that the need to stem it out by judicial surgery lies on the judiciary itself by its self imposed or corrective measures or disciplinary action under Article 235 of the Constitution. Corruption in Judiciary cannot be committed without some members of the Bar becoming privy to the corrupt. The vigilant watch by the High Court is the sustaining stream to catch the corrupt and to deal with the situation appropriately.

From Para 15,

15. Judges need not be treated as holy cows. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men (Lord Atkin). But the lack of respect in the movie dialogues would not make any difference to us. In Sheela Barse -vs- Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 226, it was observed that criticism of judicial functioning is a healthy aid for introspection and improvement and that it is the privileged right of the Indian citizens to believe what he considers to be true and to speak out his mind, though not, perhaps, with the best of tastes; and speak perhaps, with greater courage than care for exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt from criticism. Judicial institutions are, and should be made of stronger stuff. Debates of public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. It may well include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant sharp criticism of Government and public officials (D.C.Saxena -vs- Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, 1996 (5) SCC 216). We would add by including Courts and Judges also. Judges are not above criticism. In Foundation Inc -vs- ANI Media (P) Ltd (2025) 10 SCC 353, it was suggested that Courts should welcome debates and constructive criticism.

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Antics of Bar Council of India or State Bar Councils

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025

Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026

Bhawna Rani Vs Gurdeep Singh on 27 Nov 2025

Ravi S Vs Sahana Devi A and Ors on 18 Jun 2026

Is Bigamy (under sections 494, 495 IPC and now Section 82 BNS) a Cognizable and non-bailable offence, as much as it applies to State of Andhra Pradesh?

Advocates Act 1961 Section 18 – Transfer of name from one State roll to another

Are BCI and State Bar Councils Statutorily empowered to Levy Fees for Transfer of Enrollment?

RS Tamilvendan Vs The Secretary and Ors on 21 May 2026