Here is the Kerala Dowry Prohibition Rules, 2004
An amendment to these 2004 Rules was passed in 2021 in the following terms.
Main Central Act is here.
Index of State Rules are made available here.
A single judge of Allahabad High Court held as follows,
From Para 14,
14. In this case, the Investigating Officer, investigated the matter and found that, no case has been made out against the wife/accused-applicant under Sections 504 and 507 I.P.C., and thereafter, he prepared the police report/final report (closure report) on 19.06.2024 under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Section 193(3) BNSS) and submitted the report in the court of Magistrate, without a written complaint of offence committed under Section 177 and 182 IPC (Corresponding Section 212 and 217 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) in respect of furnishing false information, as provided under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (Corresponding Section 215(1)(a) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).
From Para 15,
15. Sections 177 and 182 IPC (Corresponding to sections 212 and 217 of B.N.S.) cannot be made redundant, that is to say that, in case any false information is furnished with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to injury of another person, the Investigating Officer shall also prepare a police report in form of complaint as provided/required under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 215(1)(a) BNSS). Thus, giving a false information to police to lodge an F.I.R. or N.C.R. attracts offence provided under Section 177 and 182 IPC (corresponding Section 212 and 217 BNS) and if after investigation, the Investigating Officer finds that no such incident occurred as alleged in the F.I.R. or N.C.R., the Investigating Officer is under statutory obligation, not only to submit a final report/closure report but also to submit a report of offence of Section 177 and 182 IPC (corresponding Section 212 and 217 BNS) in form of complaint as provided, under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. (corresponding Section 215(1)(a) of BNSS) for taking cognizance. Otherwise, the concerned police officers are liable for committing an offence as mentioned under Section 199 (b) BNS (corresponding Section 166A(b) of Cr.P.C.).
From Para 18,
18. The offence is always against the State therefore, if the Investigating Officer is submitting police report/final report(closure report) under section 193(3) BNSS (corresponding Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.), he shall also submit police report in form of written complaint under section 212 and 217 BNS (Corresponding Sections 177 and 182 IPC), against the informant and witnesses. The format of police report, in form of written complaint under section 212 and 217 BNS (Corresponding Sections 177 and 182 IPC) as provided under Section 215(1)(a) BNSS (Corresponding Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C.), in case of false information, to police to use his lawful power to injury any person, in Hindi language as well as in English language are delineated below.
From Para 21,
21. In case of false first information report, if a written complaint against the informant and witness under section 215(1)(a) BNSS (corresponding section 195(1) (a) Cr.P.C.) is not filed by the Investigating Officer, under section 212 and 217 BNS (corresponding section 177 and 182 of I.P.C.) for giving false information to the police then it will amount that the Investigating Officer, Station House Officer, Circle Officer of the area and the prosecuting officer concerned are not discharging their official duty and liable to departmental proceedings as well as contempt proceedings.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index
A single judge bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held as follows,
From Paras 5 and 6, (Lies about adopting a child!)
5. The evidence brought on record clearly demolishes the case now being sought to be set up by the petitioner. The petitioner had taken a plea that she had adopted a child, who happens to be the daughter of her real sister; however, she has specifically admitted in her cross-examination that the respondent had never given his consent for the said adoption. Admittedly, neither there is any documentary evidence or ceremony performed for the alleged adoption, nor any application was moved to change the details in the official records of the said child to demonstrate that the petitioner’s name was recorded or shown as the mother and the respondent’s name was recorded as a father of the said child.
6. The above-said fact clearly demonstrates the mala fide intent of the petitioner to mislead the Court and seek undue sympathy, which stand belied by her own admissions during cross-examination.
From Paras 7 and 8, (Multiple sources of Income)
7. Further, as regards her entitlement for maintenance, the petitioner has concealed the material facts that she was duly recorded as an employee of Markanda Oil Store. Though it has been vehemently argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was never an employee of the said firm, however, in her cross-examination she admitted that she had availed various medical insurance benefits on the basis of the entries recorded in Markanda Oil Store, showing her as an employee. Moreover, the petitioner was also working as a teacher in a school, namely St. Joseph School, Ambala City; however, she failed to disclose the same in her affidavit of income and expenditure.
8. Furthermore, the petitioner has admitted that she holds various Kisan Vikas Patras and a Public Provident Fund account, wherein, the account balance exceeds Rs. 15 lakhs. Apart from these accounts, the petitioner also maintains other bank accounts, which were duly considered by the learned Trial Court, which clearly demonstrate that there was no distress or immediate financial hardship necessitating the grant of maintenance to the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner deliberately concealed these facts from the Court. She further admitting a separate salary account with Axis Bank, however, she neither produced proof thereof nor disclose the balance lying therein. Despite a specific suggestion being put to her, she knowingly withheld details regarding her income.
From Paras 10 and 11, (Surprise surprise!)
10. It is indeed strange that while earlier the petitioner was drawing a salary of Rs. 18,000/- per month but now she claims to be earning only Rs. 12,200/- per month, which appears highly improbable. This conduct clearly reflects an attempt to abuse the process of law merely to keep the respondent-husband entangled in continuous litigation and to extract money at her own convenience by misusing the judicial process.
11. The concept of grant of maintenance has been introduced to protect the dignity of women; however, it can’t be permitted to be used as a tool for unjust enrichment. The rising number of false and frivolous cases being filed today not only defeats the very object of the law but also inadvertently undermines a woman’s self-respect, dignity, and self-reliance. The petitioner cannot be permitted to play hide and seek with the Court and abuse the process of law. In the absence of any material to demonstrate that the petitioner is in dire need of financial assistance or maintenance, the very filing of the petition amounts to an abuse of the process of law.
From Para 12, (Settled proposition of law)
12. It is settled proposition of law that maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is payable only when the wife is unable to maintain herself. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai”, (2008) 2 SCC 316 has categorically held that a wife having sufficient independent income or means is not entitled to maintenance. This principle has been reiterated and streamline in “Rajnesh v. Neha”, (2021) 2 SCC 324 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized full disclosure of income and assets and clarified that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a measure to prevent destitution and not a source of unjust enrichment.
From Para 13,
13. Moreover, Section 125 Cr.P.C. has been enacted with a specific purpose to protect women and children and to prevent vagrancy and destitution among them. It provides speedy remedy to the destituted and helpless women to establish their claim, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that she is unable to maintain herself and her child but in the present case, the petitioner has concealed her employment and claimed his husband is earning handsome amount, her conduct in suppressing relevant information from the Court and the fact that she is not only qualified but is capable of earning good money. Furthermore, this Court also observed that when a person approaches a Court, he/she should approach the Court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. No litigant has a right to draught on the Court’s time and public money in order to get his/her affairs settled in the manner, he or she desires. Therefore, this Court does not find any error in the impugned order passed by the learned Family Court. Moreover, the petitioner has also failed to bring on record any cogent evidence to demonstrate that she was living separately from her husband on account of any situation created by the respondent-husband.
Citations: [2026:PHHC:002754]
Other Sources:
Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.
A division bench of Supreme Court held that Perjury applications shall continue, despite grant to divorce.
From Paras 28 to 30,
28. Now coming to the cases pending between the parties. All the cases pending between the parties, as mentioned in paragraph No.8.8, shall stand disposed of without any further action by them. However, the following applications filed by the parties raising plea of perjury shall continue because no one can be permitted to pollute the stream of justice, as emphasized by this Court in Kusha Duruka vs. The State of Odisha10. The cases being:
(i) Crl. M. A. No.42585 of 2019 in W. P. (Crl.) No.1025 of 2023 (under Section 340 CrPC)
(ii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iii) Application under Section 379 read with 215 BNSS filed in MT No.151 of 2021
(iv) Misc. Crl. No.7 of 2019 filed in MT No.853 of 2018
(v) Application under Section 340 CrPC in MT No.853 of 2018
29. It is clarified that if besides the cases mentioned in the paragraph 28, any other application(s) filed by the parties either under section 340 CrPC or under Section 379 read with 215 of BNSS, 2023, the same shall be dealt with on merits by the concerned Courts and will not be disposed of, in view of this order passed by this Court.
30. A copy of the order passed by this Court shall be sent to the Courts concerned for taking action as per the direction in this order. However, if there is any other case arising out of matrimonial dispute, though not mentioned in the list, but pending, the same shall also stand disposed of on production of copy of this order by the parties.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of Perjury Judgments is here.
A single judge of AP High Court, relying on A Subash Babu judgment from Supreme Court here (referred to a partially perverse decision of AP HC here), held as follows,
From Para 10,
10. Chapter XIV of Code of Criminal Procedure provides for conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. Section 198 Sub-Section (1) proviso (c) Cr.P.C. provides that for a prosecution of an accused for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C. it shall be initiated by a complaint made by the aggrieved
person namely the wife or on her behalf by her father, mother and other relations mentioned therein. Section 2(d) of Code of Criminal Procedure defines a ‘complaint’ showing that a complaint shall be made to a Magistrate and it does not include a police report. Thus, a complaint is different from police report. In terms of Section 198 of Code of Criminal Procedure, prosecution for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C. could be initiated only by a complaint filed before the learned Magistrate. In the case at hand, the proceedings that were initiated before learned Magistrate were not out of a complaint filed before him. The case emerged on a police report. On these suppositions, one could say that the very initiation of prosecution is incorrect and against law. However, State of Andhra Pradesh passed Act 3 of 1992. By virtue of that, entry relating to Section 494 I.P.C. as mentioned in Schedule-1 of Code of Criminal Procedure at Column Nos.4 and 5 certain changes were brought in. This amendment made the offence under Section 494 I.P.C. cognizable and non-bailable. Be it noted that in terms of Section 2(c) of Code of Criminal Procedure, a cognizable offence means a case in which a police officer is entitled to arrest accused without any warrant issued by the Court. Be it also noted that Section 198 Cr.P.C. was not amended for Andhra Pradesh State. A plain reading of these provisions give an impression that Section 198 Cr.P.C. bar still holds good and therefore a prosecution for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C. could be done only by a complainant through her complaint and not by way of a police report/charge sheet. It seems this view was followed in B.Parvathi v. State of Andhra Pradesh1. However, these aspects were clarified and law was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in A.Subhash Babu v. State of A.P.2. At para No.46 of the judgment, their Lordships have laid the law that by virtue of the said amendment for State of Andhra Pradesh carried out in the first schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the bar contained in Section 198 Cr.P.C. for the offence under Section 494 I.P.C. gets lifted. In that view of the matter, one could say that prosecution in this State for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C. is possible either by a complaint or by a police report.
Citations: [2023 Latest Caselaw 3883 AP]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/39334506/
https://www.latestlaws.com/judgements/andhra-high-court/2023/august/2023-latest-caselaw-3883-ap
Index of 494 IPC Judgments is here.
A single judge of Bombay High Court at Aurangabad Bench set aside the maintenance granted to a professor wife but did not initiate suo moto perjury proceedings. Be it so. My foot.
From Para 7,
7. On one hand, while asserting financial support from husband Respondent, Wife set up a case that, husband earns almost Rs.10,000/- per day from his practice and as such, he also earns Rs. 20,00,000/- from agriculture income apart from earning Rs.20,000/- from rental income of medical shop.
Further…
In affidavit, wife claims that, she has to expend Rs. 20,000/- towards house rent, medical expenses of son to the tune of Rs.5,000/- and Rs.30,000/- for her own transportation and conveyance. For child, she claims that, she is required to expend Rs.2,00,000/- towards school fees; Rs.30,000/- for his transportation charges per annum; Rs.20,000/- for his food & clothing and Rs.15,000/- for extra classes and tuition fees. In her affidavit, she also claims that, she has borrowed vehicle loan and she pays EMI to the tune of Rs.12,000/-, as well as she pays Rs.70,000/- for housing loan. However, except stating so in the affidavit, she has not placed on record, documentary evidence, more particularly, of housing loan to the tune of Rs.70,000/-. Though she claims to be spending Rs.20,000/- towards rent, her salary slip shows that, she is already a beneficiary of House Rent Allowance. On Court’s query, learned Counsel for Respondent-Wife informed that, she is spending Rs.30,000/- for her transportation to travel from Latur to the place of her job, but even details of the mode of conveyance and transportation are not supplied by her. Be it so.
Hahahaha…
Revision Petitioner Husband has placed on record before this Court salary slip of her wife for the month of August, 2025 i.e. post orders passed by Trial Court as well as learned First Appellate Court. This is neither refuted nor denied by Respondent Wife. Thus, as on today wife is shown to be receiving salary of Rs. 1,38,192/-.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of DV Judgments is here.
Similar to Pooja Saxena decision here, by same Judge, this judgment also holds that the dowry giver has protection from prosecution. Almost copy paste of the paras from previous judgment.
From Paras 6 and 8,
6. No doubt, as per Section 3 of The Act, giving or abetting to give dowry is a punishable offence, but the petitioner does have protection of Section 7(3) of the Act. Section 7(3) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by the person aggrieved by an offence under the Act shall not subject him to prosecution under this Act. In the instant case, it is obvious that respondent No.2 has filed his petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. only on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner Uma Devi in her complaint made to CAW Cell which formed basis for the registration of FIR No.218/2009 P.S. Keshav Puram under Section 498A/406/34 IPC against respondent No.2 and others as well as in her petition under Hindu Marriage Act and Domestic Violence Act. Thus, it is clear that FIR No.50/2009 registered against the petitioner under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is based upon the statements made by the petitioner in her complaint to CAW Cell and above noted petitions. Therefore, she is entitled to the protection of Section 7(3) of the Act, being the victim of demand of dowry.
….
8. The above observation of this Court obviously is an obiter and does not constitute a binding precedent for the reason that the provisions of The Act were not the subject-matter of dispute before the court in the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Neera Singh’s case. Moreover, in the aforesaid judgment, the Court has not taken into account the protection given to a victim of offence of dowry demand as provided under Section 7(3) of The Act. Thus, in my view, the above referred judgment is of no avail to respondent No.2. Further, on perusal of FIR No.218/2009, it transpires that as per the allegations in the complaint made by the petitioner, the demand for dowry was made by the father of respondent No.2 at the time of engagement ceremony of the petitioner when he allegedly asked the father of the petitioner to concede to his demand for dowry, failing which he would call off the marriage. From the aforesaid facts, it is obvious that the petitioner and her parents were confronted with the unenviable situation of either to concede to the demand or face the loss of honour of their family in the society, and if under that fear, the petitioner and her parents conceded to the demand for dowry, they cannot be faulted as they were victims of the circumstances. Given the aforesaid facts, Section 7(3) comes to the rescue of the petitioner and in terms of the aforesaid provision, she cannot be subjected to prosecution for the offence under Section 3 of The Act.
Citations:
Other Sources:
Index of DP Judgments is here.
After moving a PIL before AP High Court here, now I chose to approach Telangana High Court with same prayers.
As usual, we have the routine drill to file RTIs which was done in 2025 itself! The following are the RTI applications (along with First and Second Appeals)
RTI Application to Home Department (Prosecutions) of TS. Deemed Refusal.
First Appeal to Home Department (Prosecutions) of TS. Deemed Refusal. Again.
Finally the Second Appeal to Telangana State Information Commission.
2026-03-11:
PIL Filed and S.R. No. given. 11482/2026.


Index to all Goals here.
A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,
From Para 15,
15. Evidently, Section 91 of the Code does not itself prescribe any stage. The core issue remains whether invocation of power under Section 91 of the Code by the Trial Court is as per the manner contemplated/provided for in law. We are mindful that the underlying case in Sarla Gupta (supra)1 concerned the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. It is seen that State of Orissa v Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, relied upon by the High Court, was considered by a Bench of equal strength in Sarla Gupta (supra).
From Para 17,
17. The law is no longer res integra, having been lastly settled by the 3-Judge Bench in Sarla Gupta (supra), which provides clarity as to the relevant stage at which power under Section 91 of the Code may be invoked. In the underlying case in these appeals, such stage has not yet been reached, as defence evidence has not commenced.
A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,
From Para 17,
17. The core question before this Court is whether the Ld. Revisional Court was justified in directing the Advocates for the Petitioner to file Affidavits disclosing the source of the documents filed by them in Court.
From Para 22,
22. When a client hands over a document to their Advocate for the purpose of legal defense, the act of handing over and the information regarding the origin of that document, is part of the professional confidentiality. The primary responsibility for the documents filed in Court lies with the Party i.e. the Client. To compel an advocate to disclose that “Client X gave me this document”, is to compel the disclosure of the “source” of the documents is protected by Section 126 IEA. Such documents filed by the Counsel are at the behest of the client and for and on his behalf. By directing disclosure by the Advocate of the Petitioner to file the Affidavit regarding the proceedings in the Court, the Ld. ASJ has compelled the advocates to breach their professional duty, which falls squarely within the ambit of “communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment” and is protected by the Client-Advocate privilege under S.126 IEA.
From Para 25,
25. While a Court has the power to inquire into offences affecting the administration of justice, such an inquiry must be conducted within judicial contours. In the present case, the Petitioner has explained that the copies of 2011 Applications were served upon them in 2013, during proceedings before the Company Law Board in CP No. 110/2013, thereby demolishing the allegation of theft or illegal procurement, made by the Respondent No. 2.
Citations: 2026:DHC:228
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62702055/
https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/delhi-high-court/cant-compel-lawyers-to-reveal-source-of-documents-filed-on-clients-behalf-518595
https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/delhi-high-court/mcdonalds-india-ltd-v-state-of-nct-of-delhi-2026dhc228-compelling-advocate-disclose-source-violates-evidence-act-1604363
Index of Perjury judgments is here.
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