Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High court relying on two judgments, Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010 and Afia Rasheed Khan Vs Mazharuddin Ali Khan and Anr on 10 Oct 2022, held that New Delhi does not have jurisdiction under PWDV Act.

From Para 16,

16. A perusal of the above clearly indicates that the parties have not resided in Delhi at any given point in time during the alleged incidents for the cause of action to arise in the present jurisdiction. Thus, to state that due to the registration of marriage in New Delhi, the courts of Delhi would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes of domestic violence between the present parties. There is no cause of action that arose within the local limits of the Courts of Delhi.

Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of DV judgments is here.

Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, held as follows,

From Para 21,

21. The present domestic violence case has been filed by the answering respondent after the case filed by applicant no.3. The applicant no.1 also filed a case under Section 12(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Faridabad, Haryana on 25.3.2025. The record reveals that there appears to be dispute between the wife and husband and they are litigating against each other, but after a bare perusal of the complaint, other attending circumstances as mentioned above, the Court is coming to the conclusion that applicant nos.2, 3 and 4 of Application U/s 528 BNSS No.1774 of 2025, have no role in the present controversy, therefore, in view of law declared by the Supreme Court in Geeta Mehrotra (supra) and Kahkashan Kausar (supra), criminal proceedings are liable to be dropped against them under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. However, proceedings against applicant no.1 will continue. So far as proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are concerned, the same is also filed against the husband and evidence is to be led over there, therefore, at this stage, the Court cannot interfere in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as summon has been issued against the husband, who has to contest his case before the court below.

Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149060733/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Posted on July 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench Judge of Delhi High Court rightly remarked about how the abuse of Women-oriented laws is prevalent in our Country.

From Paras 3 and 4,

3. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is a complete abuse of process insofar as serious allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled against petitioners no. 1 and 2, who are brothers-in-law of the complainant de facto. It is further submitted that marriage between the complainant de facto and brother of petitioner no. 1 took place on 08.07.2016, after which they were blessed with two children. On 18.09.2023, brother of petitioner no. 1 filed divorce case against complainant de facto, so out of vengeance she lodged this police complaint on 15.04.2024. It is submitted that in the impugned FIR, the complainant de facto did not make any allegation of rape, but it is subsequently in her statement under Section 164 CrPC for the first time on 15.06.2024 that she alleged having been raped in the year 2017. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that there is no whiff of explanation as to why the complainant de facto remained silent for so long.
4. I also find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that in the recent past, ever since the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273, which narrowed down the abuse of provisions under Section 498A/406 IPC as regards arrest, a trend is setting in where the complainants have started alleging such serious charges of rape, molestation and similar other sexual misconduct only to ensure that the in-laws of the complainant are compelled to settle the matrimonial disputes by paying hefty amounts.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court was surprised to know that fake judgments mentioned in NCLT Judgment were not caught by NCLAT.

From Paras 15 and 16,

15. It is not in dispute that the judgments relied upon by the NCLT are non-existent, and some AI-generated paragraphs are wrongly attributed to genuine citations. An independent examination undertaken by us reveals the following about the judgments relied upon by the adjudicating authority: State Bank of India v. M/s Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341 (cited in para 44 of NCLT judgment) – Wrong citation of an existing reported judgment6 and a non-existent paragraph, Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 1 (cited in para 45 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but nonexistent paragraph, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 528 (cited in para 47 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176 (cited in para 49 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 228 (cited in para 51 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but non-existent paragraph and Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464 (cited in para 53 of NCLT judgment) – Non-existent citation.
16. Respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit indicating that the alleged judgments relied on by NCLT were not cited by its counsel at the bar. The affidavit also indicates that the so-called precedents relied on by the adjudicating authority were obtained through its own research. What about the Appellate Tribunal? The fake, non-existent judgments escaped scrutiny by the first statutory appellate tribunal. Today’s courts and tribunals implicitly trust lawyers when referring to precedents cited before them. Imagine the hardship of a situation in which the Court must verify the authenticity of each judgment cited by an advocate.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Posted on July 7 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of AP High Court held that Advocate services do not come under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act and as such litigation against such services is not maintainable.

From Para 4,

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy about the maintainability of the complaint against an advocate for alleged deficiency in rendering legal services, under the Consumer Protection Act.
5. The law is well settled that an Advocate/lawyer in connection with the service rendered by him in legal side is not covered under the Consumer Protection Act.

Finally from Paras 9 and 10,

9. In Bar of Indian Lawyers (supra) the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission had taken a view that the deficiency of, in service rendered by an advocate fell under the Consumer Protection Act and that the compliant was maintainable. The Hon‘ble Apex Court held that the view taken was not correct and set aside the order of National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission. It was held as under:
―82. Accordingly, the view taken by the NCDRC to the effect that in respect of deficiency in service rendered by the lawyers, a complaint in Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 would be maintainable, is incorrect and stands overruled.
10. In view of the aforesaid, we are of view that the complaint filed by the writ petitioner against the lawyer/advocate under the Consumer Protection Act was not maintainable. The same has rightly been dismissed. No interference is required with all the three orders impugned in the writ petition.

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

The other aspect, in this case, is that the petitioner is an Advocate. He can be paid his fee by the Government, by a respectable man or a man who is not so respectable. An Advocate could be defending an accused who is indeed involved in a big scam or fraud but when fee is remitted by such an accused to his learned Counsel in account the money cannot be said to be proceeds of crime. It is the lawful remuneration of the learned counsel which would be duly earned after the engagement is discharged. If for the remittance of any sum of money, an Advocate’s account is frozen describing it as a cyber fraud or the money as proceeds of a cyber fraud or other crime it could become very difficult for Advocates to discharge their professional duties under the Advocates Act. The functioning of the Court itself would be embarrassed.
Let the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), U.P., Lucknow file his own affidavit within two weeks on the issue indicating how seizure of an Advocate’s account, made by sundry officers of the Police, is to be dealt with so as not to interfere with dispensation of justice itself in Courts. It would be quite a different matter, if an Advocate is himself involved in a criminal offence and has credits of money to his account that are proceeds of his own crime.

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://lawtrend.in/advocates-fee-cannot-be-treated-as-proceeds-of-crime-merely-because-client-is-accused-allahabad-high-court/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/allahabad-high-court/allahabad-hc-advocate-professional-fee-accused-not-proceeds-of-crime-bank-freeze-539449

Index

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court was not interested to interfere with the Delhi High Court Judgment.

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-refuses-to-interfere-with-delhi-hc-order-allowing-wife-to-seek-husbands-hotel-cdr-records-to-prove-adultery-539935

The following is the impugned Delhi High Court Judgment. The husband may have to have a serious discussion with his Counsel at Family Court, where the Reply was filed with certain admissions. Thoroughly self-sabotaging style drafting! Now, his only shield is Cross Examination Stage to bring out the truth. Hope it is handled at least now professionally and properly.

From Para 19,

19. … Moreover, in his written statement filed before the learned Family Court, the petitioner had taken a totally contrary stand claiming that he had gone to Jaipur on an official trip along with his female colleague for which purpose two rooms were reserved in Hotel Fairmont. This in itself, he contends is sufficient to prima facie show that the petitioner in order to conceal his adulterous acts is trying to take contradictory stands before the learned Family Court to somehow prevent disclosure of the details regarding his stay in the hotel being well aware that this disclosure would in itself show adultery on his part. In support of his plea, he seeks to place to reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.2385 and 2466 of 2018 titled K Srinivas Rao vs Nalam Naga Kamala.

From Para 32,

32. … Furthermore, what needs to be noted that the petitioner has taken contradictory stands regarding the presence of his lady friend in the hotel. While in his written statement he has stated that he was on an official trip to Jaipur, along with his female colleague and therefore, two rooms were booked for them in Hotel Fairmont, in response to the application he has claimed that he met the lady friend by chance in the hotel as she was also co-incidentally staying there. The respondent is the estranged wife of the petitioner who obviously does not has any direct evidence of her husband indulging in acts of adultery. By resort to Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, she is, only trying to seek production of evidence which she reasonably believes will prove her charge of adultery which by its very nature can be inferred only from circumstances.

From Para 39,

39. From the aforesaid, it is evident that it has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the right to privacy, as enshrined under Article 21, is not an absolute right. In the present case, the Court has on the one side, a husband who is taking contradictory stands in his pleadings…

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 10 May 2023

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Shikha Lall Vs Prince Agarwal on 7 Nov 2024

Pranjal Poddar and Ors Vs Shivani Gupta on 21 Apr 2026

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026