Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Posted on July 21 by ShadesOfKnife

Justice Shiv Narayan Dhingra ji has passed this Order around the definition of a Temporary residence as held by the Section 27 of the PWDV Act 2005.

9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the place of cause of action as a ground for invocation of jurisdiction of the Court. Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved person has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court. The expression “residence‟ means
“to make abode‟ – a place for dwelling. Normally place for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the residence means to dwell for length of time. The words „dwelling place‟ or abode are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of filing a case against another person.
10. I, therefore, consider that the temporary residence, as envisaged under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person is compelled to take shelter or compelled to take job or do some business, in view of domestic violence perpetuated on her or she either been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial home. This temporary residence does not include residence in a lodge or hostel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing a domestic violence case. This temporary residence must also be a continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the application under Section 12 is disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise does not reside there.
11. In the present case, the aggrieved person is residing with her sister and has filed the petition under Domestic Violence Act. It cannot be said that her residence with her sister was a fleeing residence or was a temporary residence acquired for lodging the complaint of domestic violence. Her sister‟s house is a place where she has taken shelter and temporarily resides. I, therefore, find that there is no force in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed with no orders to costs.

Citations: [2010:DHC:4306], [2010 9 Laws(DLH) 9]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106302060/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d56e4b014971117976a

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Posted on July 16 by ShadesOfKnife

A single bench Judge of Delhi High Court rightly remarked about how the abuse of Women-oriented laws is prevalent in our Country.

From Paras 3 and 4,

3. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that the impugned FIR is a complete abuse of process insofar as serious allegations of sexual misconduct have been levelled against petitioners no. 1 and 2, who are brothers-in-law of the complainant de facto. It is further submitted that marriage between the complainant de facto and brother of petitioner no. 1 took place on 08.07.2016, after which they were blessed with two children. On 18.09.2023, brother of petitioner no. 1 filed divorce case against complainant de facto, so out of vengeance she lodged this police complaint on 15.04.2024. It is submitted that in the impugned FIR, the complainant de facto did not make any allegation of rape, but it is subsequently in her statement under Section 164 CrPC for the first time on 15.06.2024 that she alleged having been raped in the year 2017. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that there is no whiff of explanation as to why the complainant de facto remained silent for so long.
4. I also find substance in the submission of learned Senior Counsel for petitioners that in the recent past, ever since the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the case of Arnesh Kumar vs State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273, which narrowed down the abuse of provisions under Section 498A/406 IPC as regards arrest, a trend is setting in where the complainants have started alleging such serious charges of rape, molestation and similar other sexual misconduct only to ensure that the in-laws of the complainant are compelled to settle the matrimonial disputes by paying hefty amounts.

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Posted on July 12 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not excepted , at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Further,

The mere initial grant of anticipatory bail for lesser offence, did not entitle the respondent to insist for regular bail even if he was subsequently found to be involved in the case of murder. Neither Section 437(5) nor Section 439(1) of the Code was attracted. There was no question of cancellation of bail earlier granted to the accused for an offence punishable under Sections 498A, 306 and 406 IPC. The Magistrate committed a irregularity by holding that “I do not agree with the submission made by the Ld.Prosecutor in as much as if we go by his submissions then the accused would be liable for arrest every time the charge is altered or enhanced at any stage, which is certainly not the spirit of law”. With the change of the nature of the offence, the accused becomes disentitled to the liberty granted to him in relation to a minor offence, if the offence is altered for an aggravated crime. Instead of referring to the grounds which entitled the respondent-accused the grant of bail, the Magistrate adopted a wrong approach to confer him the benefit of liberty on allegedly finding that no grounds were made out for cancellation of bail.

Finally,

We would reiterate that in cases where the offence is punishable with death or imprisonment for life which is triable exclusively by a court of Sessions, the Magistrate may, in his wisdom, refrain to exercise the powers of granting the bail and refer the accused to approach the higher courts unless he is fully satisfied that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001 (INSC)

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1067439/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ada1e4b0149711411eb9

Index of Anticipatory Bail Judgments is here.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 8 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court was surprised to know that fake judgments mentioned in NCLT Judgment were not caught by NCLAT.

From Paras 15 and 16,

15. It is not in dispute that the judgments relied upon by the NCLT are non-existent, and some AI-generated paragraphs are wrongly attributed to genuine citations. An independent examination undertaken by us reveals the following about the judgments relied upon by the adjudicating authority: State Bank of India v. M/s Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 341 (cited in para 44 of NCLT judgment) – Wrong citation of an existing reported judgment6 and a non-existent paragraph, Everest Kento Cylinders Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 2 SCC 1 (cited in para 45 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but nonexistent paragraph, ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Ltd., (2019) 16 SCC 528 (cited in para 47 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, V.S. Dempo & Co. Ltd. v. Reliance Communications Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 176 (cited in para 49 of NCLT judgment) – Nonexistent citation, Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty & Anr., (2018) 16 SCC 228 (cited in para 51 of NCLT judgment) – Correct citation but non-existent paragraph and Sarbjit Singh v. Union Bank of India, (2022) 7 SCC 464 (cited in para 53 of NCLT judgment) – Non-existent citation.
16. Respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit indicating that the alleged judgments relied on by NCLT were not cited by its counsel at the bar. The affidavit also indicates that the so-called precedents relied on by the adjudicating authority were obtained through its own research. What about the Appellate Tribunal? The fake, non-existent judgments escaped scrutiny by the first statutory appellate tribunal. Today’s courts and tribunals implicitly trust lawyers when referring to precedents cited before them. Imagine the hardship of a situation in which the Court must verify the authenticity of each judgment cited by an advocate.

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Posted on July 7 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of AP High Court held that Advocate services do not come under the ambit of Consumer Protection Act and as such litigation against such services is not maintainable.

From Para 4,

4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy about the maintainability of the complaint against an advocate for alleged deficiency in rendering legal services, under the Consumer Protection Act.
5. The law is well settled that an Advocate/lawyer in connection with the service rendered by him in legal side is not covered under the Consumer Protection Act.

Finally from Paras 9 and 10,

9. In Bar of Indian Lawyers (supra) the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission had taken a view that the deficiency of, in service rendered by an advocate fell under the Consumer Protection Act and that the compliant was maintainable. The Hon‘ble Apex Court held that the view taken was not correct and set aside the order of National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission. It was held as under:
―82. Accordingly, the view taken by the NCDRC to the effect that in respect of deficiency in service rendered by the lawyers, a complaint in Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 would be maintainable, is incorrect and stands overruled.
10. In view of the aforesaid, we are of view that the complaint filed by the writ petitioner against the lawyer/advocate under the Consumer Protection Act was not maintainable. The same has rightly been dismissed. No interference is required with all the three orders impugned in the writ petition.

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

The other aspect, in this case, is that the petitioner is an Advocate. He can be paid his fee by the Government, by a respectable man or a man who is not so respectable. An Advocate could be defending an accused who is indeed involved in a big scam or fraud but when fee is remitted by such an accused to his learned Counsel in account the money cannot be said to be proceeds of crime. It is the lawful remuneration of the learned counsel which would be duly earned after the engagement is discharged. If for the remittance of any sum of money, an Advocate’s account is frozen describing it as a cyber fraud or the money as proceeds of a cyber fraud or other crime it could become very difficult for Advocates to discharge their professional duties under the Advocates Act. The functioning of the Court itself would be embarrassed.
Let the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), U.P., Lucknow file his own affidavit within two weeks on the issue indicating how seizure of an Advocate’s account, made by sundry officers of the Police, is to be dealt with so as not to interfere with dispensation of justice itself in Courts. It would be quite a different matter, if an Advocate is himself involved in a criminal offence and has credits of money to his account that are proceeds of his own crime.

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://lawtrend.in/advocates-fee-cannot-be-treated-as-proceeds-of-crime-merely-because-client-is-accused-allahabad-high-court/

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/allahabad-high-court/allahabad-hc-advocate-professional-fee-accused-not-proceeds-of-crime-bank-freeze-539449

Index

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Posted on July 6 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held that under section 311 of Cr.P.C. (read along with the Section 165 of Evidence Act), a Criminal Court has wide power to summon any person as witness, at any stage of the case, even after completion of defence evidence and argument stages.

From Para 9,

9. The very usage of the words such as ‘any court’, ‘at any stage’, or ‘of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings’, ‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case.

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Citations: [AIR 1991 SC 1346], [1991 CRILJ 1521], [1991 (1) CRIMES 818(SC)], [1991 (33) ECC 18], [1992 (61) ELT 521(SC)], [1991 (1) SCALE 401], [1991 SUPP (1) SCC 271], [1991 (2) UJ 43 (SC)], [1991 SCC(CRI) 595], [1992 CRIAPPR(SC) 73], [1991 (1) SCR 712], [1991 (1) GUJLH 11], [1991 (3) JT 17], [(1991) ALLCRIR 725], [(1992) SC CR R 51], [1991 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 286], [1992 CHANDLR(CIV&CRI) 421], [(1992) 1 CHANDCRIC 78], [(1991) 33 ECC 18], [(1991) 2 GUJ LR 974], [(1991) 3 RECCRIR 182], [(1991) MADLW(CRI) 284], [(1997) 68 ECR 783]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/171510013/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac6be4b014971140ed29

Index

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Posted on July 4 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court was not interested to interfere with the Delhi High Court Judgment.

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-refuses-to-interfere-with-delhi-hc-order-allowing-wife-to-seek-husbands-hotel-cdr-records-to-prove-adultery-539935

The following is the impugned Delhi High Court Judgment. The husband may have to have a serious discussion with his Counsel at Family Court, where the Reply was filed with certain admissions. Thoroughly self-sabotaging style drafting! Now, his only shield is Cross Examination Stage to bring out the truth. Hope it is handled at least now professionally and properly.

From Para 19,

19. … Moreover, in his written statement filed before the learned Family Court, the petitioner had taken a totally contrary stand claiming that he had gone to Jaipur on an official trip along with his female colleague for which purpose two rooms were reserved in Hotel Fairmont. This in itself, he contends is sufficient to prima facie show that the petitioner in order to conceal his adulterous acts is trying to take contradictory stands before the learned Family Court to somehow prevent disclosure of the details regarding his stay in the hotel being well aware that this disclosure would in itself show adultery on his part. In support of his plea, he seeks to place to reliance on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.2385 and 2466 of 2018 titled K Srinivas Rao vs Nalam Naga Kamala.

From Para 32,

32. … Furthermore, what needs to be noted that the petitioner has taken contradictory stands regarding the presence of his lady friend in the hotel. While in his written statement he has stated that he was on an official trip to Jaipur, along with his female colleague and therefore, two rooms were booked for them in Hotel Fairmont, in response to the application he has claimed that he met the lady friend by chance in the hotel as she was also co-incidentally staying there. The respondent is the estranged wife of the petitioner who obviously does not has any direct evidence of her husband indulging in acts of adultery. By resort to Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, she is, only trying to seek production of evidence which she reasonably believes will prove her charge of adultery which by its very nature can be inferred only from circumstances.

From Para 39,

39. From the aforesaid, it is evident that it has been repeatedly held by the Apex Court that the right to privacy, as enshrined under Article 21, is not an absolute right. In the present case, the Court has on the one side, a husband who is taking contradictory stands in his pleadings…

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 10 May 2023

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Posted on July 2 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 22,

22. The fact that the present complaint which ultimately culminated in the impugned order was filed by the complainant subsequent to the grant of divorce between the first accused and the complainant’s daughter, is a fact discernible and indisputable. This had occurred in Canada. A perusal of the final report would reveal that even after the investigation no material whatsoever worthy to connect the appellant with the offences was seen collected. Therefore, the question is whether the vague, and at the same time, highly exaggerated versions of FIR and the proceedings subsequent thereto can be permitted to be proceeded against accused Nos.5 and 6. In short, on a careful consideration of FIR and the final report and materials we have no hesitation to hold that there is nothing on record to suggest, even prima facie that they would constitute the alleged offences against the accused No.6.

From Para 23,

23. A scanning of the FIR and the subsequently filed final report would reveal that the allegation against accused No.5, who is the wife of accused No.6, are also of the same nature. It is relevant to note that she is related to the husband of complainant’s daughter only through her marriage with cousin brother of the first accused viz., accused No.6. When the subject FIR and all further proceedings pursuant therefrom were quashed against the said cousin brother viz., accused No.6, the same reasons must apply to the case of accused No.5 as well. We are of the considered view that the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the subject FIR and all other proceedings therefrom in relation to accused No.5 viz., the wife of accused No.6 as well. To secure interest of justice in the circumstances obtained, we are of the considered view that filing of the chargesheet cannot be a reason for interfering with impugned order in respect of accused No.6 or rejecting the prayer of accused No.5 to quash the proceedings and to make them to argue or to raise the legal and factual issues at the stage of framing of the charges. It is evident that making them to face the trial based on the allegations or accusation as referred above would be nothing but an abuse of process of court.

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 896]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101620228/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67458986e8c0441261878a34

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/supreme-court/payal-sharma-v-state-of-punjab-2024-insc-896-over-implication-of-close-relatives-of-husband-in-alleged-dowry-cases-1559200

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/dowry-harassment-cases-supreme-court-stresses-courts-duty-check-exaggerated-versions

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/payal-sharma-vs-state-of-punjab

PAYAL SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB & Anr, (26 November 2024)

Karnataka High Court relied on this Judgment in Crl.Pet.No.13296/2024 to grant interim stay.

Index of Quash Judgements is here.

Antics of Bar Council of India or State Bar Councils

Posted on July 1 by ShadesOfKnife

Despite being a statutory bodies, there are many instances where the Bar Council of India or various State Bar Councils have crossed their statutory limits and embarked on a journey which is legally called as Colourable exercise of power granted by Parliament to them. The following is just a small list of cases that came to my notice.

From 1996 – 2000:

Dr. Haniraj L. Chulani Vs Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa on 8 Apr 1996 [SC: Cannot practice as an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 as well as a medical practitioner who does not want to give up his medical practice but wants simultaneously to practice law]

From 2016 – 2020:

Rishabh Duggal vs Bar Council of India on 12 Mar 2019 [SC: BCI imposed age limit]
Bar Council of Kerala Vs T.Koshy on 12 Apr 2018 [KerHC: Bar Council of Kerala does not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee]
Braj Mohan Mahajan Vs Bar Council of State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors on 11 Sep 2018 [MPHC: A person who is not convicted but merely accused cannot be denied entry into the State Bar Council rolls]
Bar Council of Kerala Vs Raju Y and Anr on 04 Jan 2019 [SC: Bar Council (of any State or India) do not have power to prescribe any fee for the enrolment, either in the form of enrolment fee or special fee.]

From 2021 – 2025:

Bar Council of India Vs Bonnie Foi Law College and Ors on 10 Feb 2023 [SC: BCI is empowered to conduct AIBE and it is a valid exam]
Are State Bar Councils Statutorily empowered to Levy Fees for Gaps in academics during Enrollment? [SC: Bar Council of AP charged me an additional Rs.7000/- as fees towards the gap in my academic, before enrollment and my case was transferred to Supreme Court and clubbed with many other such cases and eventually SCI held that Bar Councils cannot charge fees under any name beyond what is permitted in Advocates Act, 1961]

From 2026 – 2030:

Rajashekar Vs BCI and Anr on 27 Oct 2025 [KarHC: Persons can be admitted as advocates on a State roll even if they completed LL.B. outside the State]
Vijay Gopal Vs Bar Council of India and Anr on 29 Apr 2026 [TelHC: Membership with a Bar Association is not mandatory to practice Law in the State]
Are BCI and State Bar Councils Statutorily empowered to Levy Fees for Transfer of Enrollment?
1. KarHC:
2. APHC:

MASTER INDEX is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Sharad Kumar Pandey Vs Mamta Pandey on 1 Sep 2010

Vikram Kumar Jha Vs State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Anr on 10 Jul 2026

Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs N.C.T. Delhi and Anr on 23 Mar 2001

Pooja Ramesh Singh Vs JnK Bank and Anr on 02 Jul 2026

A.S.S.K.Durga Prasad Vs NCDRC and Ors on 24 Jun 2026

Ayush Bajpai Vs State of U.P. and Ors 25 Jun 2026

Mohanlal Shamij Soni Vs UOI and Anr on 22 Feb 1991

Sachin Arora Vs Manju Arora on 02 Jul 2026

Payal Sharma Vs State of Punjab and Anr on 26 Nov 2024

Antics of Bar Council of India or State Bar Councils