This is reportable judgment from Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel, regarding applicability of Amendment Act of Hindu Succession Act to the woman claiming share in the family property.
Author: ShadesOfKnife
IBA complaint against Justice Rohington Nariman
After the following order was passed by the Apex Court bench, IBA has filed this complaint.
Here is the IBA complaint, in total.
Kirti Nagpal Vs Rohit Girdhar on 12 February, 2019
The cunning knife tried to extort money from husband saying he earns in dollars and hence he should pay her interim maintenance under HMA 24 as she just earns in rupees. Hon’ble Delhi High Court has shown the door to the knife.
PS: The husband is working as Vice President in Infineon Technologies at Singapore.
Index of this couple’s cases is here.
Index of Section 24 HMA judgments is here.
Bhriguram De Vs State of West Bengal and others on 20 September, 2018
In this order from Calcutta High Court(appellate side),
Para 15,
According to the Law Lexicon, Third Edition (2012), the Latin Maxim “Suppressio veri, suggestio falsi” defines that the suppression of the truth is equivalent to the suggestion of falsehood. The suppression or failure to disclose what one party is bound to disclose to another, may amount to fraud. Where a person is found to be guilty of suppressio veri suggestio falsi for having concealed material information from scrutiny of the Court, he is not entitled for any equitable relief under order 39 of CPC (5 of 1908). [Arbind Kumar Pal v. Hazi Md. Faizullah Khan, AIR 2007 (NOC) 1035 (Pat) : (2006) 1 BLJR 430].
From Para 25,
I have no hesitation in saying that the doors of justice would be closed for a litigant whose case is based on falsehood or suppression of material facts. Fraud and justice never dwell together. They are alien to each other. Fraud pollutes the sanctity, regularity, orderliness and solemnity of the judicial proceedings. It is the bounden duty of the Court to keep the stream of justice absolutely clean.
Finally, from Para 29,
Before finally pronouncing my decision, I must state that this court, in all fairness gave an opportunity, after hearing and going through the documents produced by the respondents, to the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition (with liberty to file afresh with better particulars). However, Mr. Saktipada Jana appearing on behalf of the petitioner, refused and pressed the writ petition unabated. One is reminded of the saying, “you can take a horse to the well, but cannot force it to drink”. In view of the same, I dismiss the writ petition in limine. I am of the view that exemplary costs should be awarded. However, on a compassionate plea made by Mr. Jana, the order as to costs is limited to Rs.5,000/- only, payable to the West Bengal State Legal Services Authority, Kolkata, within two weeks from date.
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Ramrameshwari Devi and Ors Vs Nirmala Devi and Ors on 4 July, 2011
Justice Dalveer Bhandari at Supreme Court, held that,
From Para 4,
This is a classic example which abundantly depicts the picture of how the civil litigation moves in our courts and how unscrupulous litigants (appellants in this case) can till eternity harass the respondents and their children by abusing the judicial system.
From Para 14,
According to Dr. Arun Mohan, twenty minutes spent at that time would have saved several years in court proceedings.
From Para 21,
The learned Single Judge observed that the present appellants belong to that category of litigants whose only motive is to create obstacles during the course of trial and not to let the trial conclude. Applications after applications are being filed by the appellants at every stage, even though orders of the trial court are based on sound reasoning. Moreover, the appellants have tried to mislead the court also by filing wrong synopsis and incorrect dates of events.
From Para 22,
Those litigants or their advocates who mislead the courts by filing wrong and incorrect particulars (the list of dates and events) must be dealt with heavy hands.
From Para 26,
It may be pertinent to mention that the appellants also moved transfer application apprehending adverse order from the trial judge, which was also dismissed by the learned District Judge. This conduct of the appellants demonstratesthat they are determined not to allow the trial court to proceed with the suit. They are creating all kinds of hurdles andobstacles at every stage of the proceedings.
From Para 30,
It is abundantly clear from the facts and circumstances of this case that the appellants have seriously created obstacles at every stage during the course of trial and virtually prevented the court from proceeding with the suit. This is a typical example of how an ordinary suit moves in our courts. Some cantankerous and unscrupulous litigants on one ground or the other do not permit the courts to proceed further in the matter.
From Para 34,
According to Dr. Mohan, in our legal system, uncalled for litigation gets encouragement because our courts do notimpose realistic costs. The parties raise unwarranted claims and defences and also adopt obstructionist and delaying tactics because the courts do not impose actual or realistic costs. Ordinarily, the successful party usually remains uncompensated in our courts and that operates as the main motivating factor for unscrupulous litigants. Unless the courts, by appropriate orders or directions remove the cause for motivation or the incentives, uncalled for litigation will continue to accrue, and there will be expansion and obstruction of the litigation. Court time and resources will be consumed and justice will be both delayed and denied.
From Para 44,
In the instant case when the entire question of title has been determined by the High Court and the Special Leave Petition against that judgment has been dismissed by this court, thereafter the trial court ought not to have framed such an issue on a point which has been finally determined upto this Court. In any case, the same was exclusively barred by the principles of res judicata. That clearly demonstrates total non-application of mind.
From Para 48,
48. It is also a matter of common experience that once an ad interim injunction is granted, the plaintiff or the petitioner would make all efforts to ensure that injunction continues indefinitely. The other appropriate order can be to limit the life of the ex-parte injunction or stay order for a week or so because in such cases the usual tendency of unnecessarily prolonging the matters by the plaintiffs or the petitioners after obtaining ex-parte injunction orders or stay orders may not find encouragement. We have to dispel the common impression that a party by obtaining an injunction based on even false averments and forged documents will tire out the true owner and ultimately the true owner will have to give up to the wrongdoer his legitimate profit. It is also a matter of common experience that to achieve clandestine objects, false pleas are often taken and forged documents are filed indiscriminately in our courts because they have hardly any apprehension of being prosecuted for perjury by the courts or even pay heavy costs. In Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 668 this court was constrained to observe that perjury has become a way of life in our courts.
From Para 56,
These appeals are consequently dismissed with costs, which we quantify as Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs only). We are imposing the costs not out of anguish but by following the fundamental principle that wrongdoers should not get benefit out of frivolous litigation.
Sachida Nand Singh and Anr Vs State of Bihar and Anr on 3 February, 1998
Hon’ble Apex Court held that,
The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice ha been committed in respect of a document produced in Court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis.
It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also be treated as on affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the Court records.
Citation: (1998) 2 SCC 493
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1743953/
State (GNCT) of Delhi) Vs Babita on 10 April, 2013
Another braindead knife tried to rope in relatives that live far away from her matrimonial home at Delhi and rightly shown the door by Learned MM as well as the casual revision filed by State is gutted.
Frivolous litigations which eat into the judicial time have to be curbed and it is necessary for the Courts to impose a heavy costs on the Routine Litigation being filed by the State for wasting public time where other important judicial work can be taken care off. At this stage, the Ld. Public Prosecutor submits that due care would be taken in future by the Department so as to ensure the compliance of the directions of the Hon’ble High Court and hence it is on his persuasions that I am not imposing any cost in the present case.
Man Mohan Sharma Vs State of NCT of Delhi on 25 February, 2011
Knife came to court with baseless allegations and Dr Kamini Lau of Delhi District Court sent her packing.
it was revealed that at the time of the alleged incident dated 23.10.1998 as mentioned in Para 14 of the complaint, the revisionist Man Mohan Sharma was not in Delhi and was in fact posted at Mumbai being a government servant. This fact is also reflected from his service record certificate issued by the Commandant Director (Personnel) for Director General, Coast Guards, that the revisionist Man Mohan Sharma was posted at Mumbai in the Head Quarter, Coast Guard Region (West) as Deputy Regional Law Officer w.e.f. 31.10.1996 to 31.12.1998 and was thereafter posted at Port Blair in the Head Quarter, Coast Guard Region (A&N) as Deputy Law Officer w.e.f. 1.1.1999 to 15.8.2001. Though, at the time of filing of the chargesheet the said certificate showing the period and place of posting of the revisionist Man Mohan Sharma was not verified but now at this stage while hearing the revision petition, this court directed the investigating officer to confirm and verify the same and inform this court his place of posting in October, 1998. The investigating officer has got this aspect verified and has reported that as per the verification conducted from the Director (Personnel), Coast Guard Head Quarter, it stands confirmed that the accused Man Mohan Sharma was residing separately at Mumbai during the period 31.10.1996 to 31.12.1998 and at Port Blair thereafter till the year 2001. This being so, the incident dated 23.10.1998 as narrated by the complainant in her complaint does not stand confirmed.
In simple english, the above BOLD text is called as LIE.
And this is the last nail in the kunning knife’s coffin…
Lastly, I am compelled to observe that Section 498A IPC in the recent years has become consummate embodiment of gross human rights violation, extortion and corruption and even the Apex Court of our country had acknowledged this abuse and termed it as Legal Terrorism. The provisions of Section 498 A IPC are not a law to take revenge, seek recovery of dowry or to force a divorce but a penal provision to punish the wrong doers. The victims are often misguided into exaggerating the facts by adding those persons as accused who are un-connected with the harassment under a mistaken belief that by doing so they are making a strong case. Courts cannot be a party to any kind of exploitative situation and it is necessary for every complainant to remember that it is only an honest complaint which succeeds in law where contents are supported by facts on the ground and persons, who are not connected with the harassment, should never be arrayed as accused. The platform of the courts cannot be permitted to be used to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment and the tendency of the complainants to come out with inflated and exaggerated allegations by roping in each and every relation of the husband is required to be deprecated. The obligation of the court is to ensure that innocent persons are not put to harassment and to curtail the frivolous allegations at the earliest stage by looking for due corroboration from the facts.
(Ref.:- Savitri Devi Vs. Ramesh Chand & Ors., CRL (R) 462/2002 decided on 30.5.2003);
Criminal Appeal No. 339-41/05 dated 2.3.2010, Delhi High Court;
Arjun Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr., 2004 CLJ 2989;
Mukesh Rani Vs. State of Haryana, 2002 (1) RCR (Criminal) 163 and
Anu Gill Vs. State & Anr., 2001 (2) JCC (Delhi) 86.
One more para,
I may further add that in any matrimonial dispute, it is the primary duty of every court to ensure that for any fault of the husband, his other relatives including married sisters and brothers who may be living jointly or separately and the aged parents are not involved either out of vengeance or to curl out appropriate settlement.
State Vs Prem Kumar (Brother In Law) on 30 April, 2013
Dr Kamini Lau, has levied Rs.5,000 to be deducted from the salary of the officer of the Prosecution Department responsible for violating and ignoring the directions issued by the Delhi High Court. The Delhi Government PP had routinely approved to file a revision and got this treatment.
Excellent !!!
Guntamukkala Naga Venkata Kanaka Durga Nagamani Vs Guntamukkala Eswar Sudhakar on 19 October, 2012
Cunning knife did drama in court seeking huge alimony but learned Judges of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh showed her the door and levied costs for lying to court and filing false affidavits.
From Para 30,
On necessary analysis we find it difficult to accept these observations as it appears that the legislative intendment in framing Section 18 of HAM Act and Section 25 of HM Act are quite different. This is born out from the fact that Section 18 of HAM Act is intended for granting divorce to a wife when her marriage with her husband has been subsisting against her husband subject to the limitations provided therein, whereas Section 25 of HM Act is intended for granting maintenance to a divorced wife or husband subject to their conduct. No doubt, “wife” includes a divorced wife under normal parlance, but the question of awarding maintenance to her either as a wife or divorced wife should be within the legislative intendment or spirit. In other words, when the legislature framed Section 18 of HAM Act in the context of providing maintenance to a wife against her husband while their marriage has been subsisting, that is quite different from its intention in framing Section 25 of HM Act, the provisions of which are made applicable only to a divorced wife or husband subject to the conduct of himself or herself. The interpretation made in the decision cited to treat a wife who is not a divorcee and the wife who is a divorcee on equal footing for the purpose of awarding maintenance under Section 18 of HAM Act does not appear to be logical.
