Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From para 9,

9. Inability to maintain herself is the precondition for grant of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her. In her evidence, the appellant wife has stated that only due to help of her retired parents and brothers, she is able to maintain herself and her daughters. Where the wife states that she has great hardships in maintaining herself and the daughters, while her husband’s economic condition is quite good, the wife would be entitled to maintenance.

Sunita Kachwaha and Ors Vs Anil Kuchwaha on 28 Oct 2014

Citations: [AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 554]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/3786357/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af48e4b01497114160aa

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Posted on April 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, the petitioner deliberately avoided employment to maximize Interim maintenance claims.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Evidence was adduced showing the petitioner‟s previous employment as an Audit Associate at KPMG Dubai, subsequent work as a Human Resources Manager in her father‟s business, and entrepreneurial venture importing semi-precious jewellery. The respondent referred to her LinkedIn profile confirming her employment history and the learned Principal Judge noted that while the petitioner simply mentioned “Graduate” and “Post Graduate” in her affidavit without specifying details, she concealed her professional qualifications and previous employment history.
30. The learned Principal Judge relied on various precedents holding that prima facie evidence reveals that the petitioner deliberately avoided employment to maximize maintenance claims, referencing the WhatsApp conversation dated 31st December, 2020, i.e., prior to her petition filed on 24th June, 2021. It was further observed that although the petitioner claimed in her petition to be actively seeking employment, she failed to substantiate any job search efforts. The Court below found merit in the respondent’s contention that the petitioner, despite high educational qualifications and work experience, was strategically remaining unemployed.

From Paras 38-40,

38. It is settled that while adjudicating an application for grant of interim maintenance, the Court concerned must be prima facie satisfied whether such case is made out or not.
39. In the instant case, despite the contentions made by the petitioner that she was earlier residing at her maternal home, pursuant to which she started residing with her maternal uncle, who is old and unable to support her, along with the fact that she is unemployed and dispute is existing with respect to her father’s properties, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the petitioner is admittedly a well-qualified and able-bodied person. Furthermore, the whole situation where the petitioner was staying with her parents and now with maternal uncle indicates that she wants to convince the court that she is unable to earn.
40. It is trite to observe that it is the duty of the husband to maintain his wife despite the circumstances, however, for grant of interim maintenance, prima facie satisfaction is necessary to determine whether the wife is genuinely in need of maintenance and the factors leading to such need of maintenance.

From Paras 33-34,

43. Regarding the prima facie evidence of deliberate unemployment, the WhatsApp conversation between the petitioner and her mother, legitimacy of which can be determined at the appropriate stage of trial, wherein the mother advises that employment would jeopardize alimony claims, is particularly telling. This communication, preceding the maintenance petition, strongly suggests a deliberate attempt to remain unemployed to seek maintenance claims.
44. Furthermore, it has been rightly observed by the learned Principal Judge that while the petitioner claims that she cannot sit idle and is trying to search for a job, she has not placed any evidence on record regarding her efforts to secure employment or resume her business activities either before the Court below or before this Court. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the mere assertion of job-seeking, without corroborative evidence, is insufficient to establish genuine efforts at self-sufficiency.

From Paras 46-47,

46. Here, it is imperative to mention that the petitioner’s reliance on Shailja (Supra), regarding the distinction between “capable of earning” and “actual earning”, the facts of the present case are distinguishable. In the present case, there is prima facie evidence suggesting deliberate avoidance of employment by the petitioner.
47. Taking into consideration the observations made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that qualified wives, having the earning capacity but desirous of remaining idle, should now set up a claim for interim maintenance. Section 125 of the CrPC carries the legislative intent to maintain equality among the spouses, provide protection to the wives, children and parents, and not promote idleness. In light of the same, this Court is of the considered view that a well-educated wife, with experience in a suitable gainful job, ought not to remain idle solely to gain maintenance from her husband. Therefore, interim maintenance is being discouraged in the present case as this Court can see potential in the petitioner to earn and make good of her education.

Finally, from Paras 49-50,

49. The petitioner herein has a master’s degree from Australia, she was earning well in a job in Dubai before her marriage, there are certain conversations between the petitioner and her mother which shows the ex facie mala fides on the part of the petitioner etc. The said factors, upon conjoint consideration to award interim maintenance, do not warrant any inclination of this Court. Moreover, this Court encourages the petitioner to actively look for a job to become self-sufficient as she already got wide exposure and is aware of the worldly affairs unlike other women who are not educated and are completely dependent upon their spouses for basic sustenance.
50. This Court is unable to comprehend the fact as to why, despite being able-bodied and well qualified, the petitioner has remained to choose idle since her return to India. Thus, it is held that the learned Principal Judge rightly passed the impugned order holding that the petitioner herein is not entitled to grant of interim maintenance considering the peculiar facts.

Megha Khetrapal Vs Rajat Kapoor on 19 Mar 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments under 144 BNSS is here.

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Posted on April 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Telangana High Court held as follows,

On Limitation,

22. Moreover, it is a settled rule of construction that every effort should be made to iron the creases out in two conflicting enactments and the more liberal enactment should be adopted for resolving the conflict. Both the 1955 Act and the 1984 Act are special statutes designed to ensure efficient resolution of conflicts within the family without subjecting the parties to further procedural hiccups. We also take recourse to the principle of law that when two interpretations are found to be equally possible, the Court may reasonably accept that the Legislature intended to prescribe a larger period of limitation: Shivram Dodanna Shetty Vs. Sharmila Shivram Shetty2, Sonia Kunwar Singh Bedi Vs. Kunwar Singh Bedi3 and Chaudary Chetnaben Dilipbhai Vs. Chaudary Dilipbhai Lavjibhai4.

On Evidence for Divorce in first Marriage,

28. Admittedly, the respondent in the present case did not lead any evidence of the customary divorce between the respondent and his first wife. The impugned order dated 19.11.2024 reflects that despite conditional orders, the respondent neither appeared nor filed his evidence. This means that the respondent declined to lead evidence to prove customary divorce from his first wife or otherwise. Apart from a mere pleading that the respondent obtained divorce through customary practice, no other evidence of the existence of such a customary practice or a document showing that the divorce was indeed obtained through such a customary practice was produced by the respondent.

On impleadment of a co-respondent,

46. Further, Rule 8(3), which requires addition of a co-respondent in a petition under section 11 of the 1955 Act i.e., void marriages, cannot be equated to Rule 8(1) as the issue of whether the marriage is void is essentially a question of law rather than a question of fact. The presence or absence of a co-respondent, viewed from this angle, cannot be fatal to the outcome of the case.
51. We have considered the relevant Rules regulating the proceedings initiated under the 1955 Act and the decisions placed on the point of impleadment of a co-respondent in specific cases. We accept the contentions made on behalf of the appellant in favour of giving a comprehensive construction to the Rule. We are of the view that the presence of the respondent’s first wife as a co-respondent to the lis before us is not necessary since this is not a case where the respondent’s first wife would be required to be heard for preserving the principles of natural justice. This is also not a case where the adjudication would entail questions regarding her character, integrity or reputation. We must also take a practical view of the situation, since admittedly, the respondent’s first wife has been in a state of coma for a while.
52. The requirement of impleading the respondent’s first wife is hence dispensed with under an extended meaning given to the proviso to Rule 8(1) of the 1955 Rules. In other words, we do not find non-impleadment of the respondent’s first wife to be fatal to the petition under sections 11, 5 and 25 of the 1955 Act or in the Appeal before us.

On Desertion,

60. Moreover, the respondent has remained unrepresented in the present Appeal and the whereabouts of the respondent is not known to the appellant for over 4 years. As stated above, the notice addressed to the respondent in the present Appeal was returned with an endorsement “no such person in the address”. To put it simply, the respondent has made no effort to contest the Appeal or pursue the proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights filed before the Additional Family Court at Visakhapatnam.

Most importantly, On status of previous marriage,

67. There is a patent contradiction in the findings and reasons given by the Family Court. While the Court denied alimony to the appellant on the basis of the appellant being the second wife, the Court refused to come to any finding with regard to the status of the marriage between the respondent and his first wife. A finding on this was necessary in the context of the appellant’s petition seeking annulment of marriage under section 11 of the Act i.e., on the ground that the respondent had a surviving spouse on the date of his marriage with the appellant. To put it simply, the Trial Court failed to consider that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent, both Hindus, could not have been legally solemnized if the respondent had a spouse living at the time of the marriage.

On Income Affidavits,

69. Another unsubstantiated finding is that the appellant obtained divorce from her first husband with an alimony of Rs.50.00 Lakhs and is now claiming permanent alimony of Rs.1 Crore from the respondent. The Trial Court utterly failed to consider that the respondent was equally accountable to disclose his assets in order to resist the claim of alimony. The impugned order does not disclose any direction on the parties to file their affidavits disclosing their respective assets

Mudireddy Divya Vs Sulkti Sivarama Reddy on 26 Mar 2025

Index of Divorce/Nullity judgments is here.

Arun K.R Vs Arunima T.S on 24 Mar 2025

Posted on April 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Paras 7-9,

7. In the case at hand, the petitioner is categoric in her version that respondent treated her with cruelty. Unlike physical abuse, which is easier to prove, mental cruelty varies from case to case. When the petitioner/wife says that the respondent/ husband behaved in a manner so as to create an impression in her that she was totally neglected by the respondent, there is no reason for this Court to disbelieve the said version.
8. It is an admitted case that petitioner had earlier filed O.P.No.871/2019 and subsequently she had withdrawn it, since the respondent confided and promised to lead a family life with her. According to her, after withdrawing the said original petition, respondent again started to behave in the same manner as before.
9. The answers given by the respondent during his cross examination regarding his frequent visits to the temple by taking leave from the job fortifies the case of the petitioner that he is more interested in spiritual affairs than the family life.

Arun K.R Vs Arunima T.S on 24 Mar 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Posted on March 29, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Kerala High Court held that a deserter wife not entitled to claim maintenance.

From Para 6,

6. As stated already, M.C.No.354 of 2017 has been tried along with G.O.(P) Nos.1621 of 2016 & 1334 of 2017. As per the common order, the guardianship of the child was given to the petitioner. A reading of the common order would show that the petitioner specifically contended that the respondent left the matrimonial home without any reason on 16.11.2015, abandoning their 2½-year-old child there and never returned thereafter. The respondent has admitted that she left the matrimonial home on that day. But her contention is that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home and started to live separately due to the ill-treatment of the petitioner. The parties let in evidence regarding these rival contentions. The Family Court, after considering the evidence on record, concluded that the respondent left the matrimonial home leaving the child there without any reason. In paragraph 27 of the common order, there is a finding that even though the respondent has raised a contention that she left the petitioner due to ill-treatment, there is no evidence of any ill-treatment and there was not even a complaint by the respondent against the petitioner before any police. In paragraph 31 of the common order, there is a specific finding that the respondent left the matrimonial home with the definite intention to teach a lesson to the petitioner, and absolutely, there is no evidence to show that she was ill-treated by the petitioner as alleged by the respondent. Thus, there is clear evidence on record to show that the respondent has been living separately since 16.11.2015 without any sufficient reason. That apart, O.P.No.1618 of 2016, filed by the petitioner seeking divorce on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, was allowed on those grounds.

From Para 7,

7. The primary object of marriage, while varying across cultures and beliefs, often encompasses forming a legal and social unit providing companionship and emotional support apart from procreation and raising of children. Marriage brings with it specific rights and liabilities for both husband and wife. Marriage involves a commitment to live together and fulfil the responsibilities inherent in the marital relationship. The primary
duty of parties in marriage is to live together and fulfil their marital obligations. The right to each other’s society, comfort and affection, often referred to as ‘consortium’ is a fundamental aspect of marriage. Withdrawal from society of the other would mean withdrawal from marital obligation by either spouse.

From Para 8,

8. A husband is legally and morally bound to provide maintenance to his wife. The right of the wife to be maintained by the husband stems from the corresponding obligation to perform marital duty. Section 125 (1) (a) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (1) (a) of BNSS) provides maintenance to the wife who is unable to maintain herself. However, the right of the wife to claim maintenance from her husband, who has sufficient means, is not absolute. It is subject to sub-section (4) of Section 125 (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). A wife who chooses to live separately without sufficient reason is disentitled to maintenance under Section 125(4) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). It is crucial to assess whether the wife’s decision to live separately is based on valid grounds. If valid grounds, such as cruelty or desertion, exist, she may still claim maintenance despite living apart. In cases where the wife refuses to live with the husband without any just cause and there is no evidence of ill-treatment by the husband, the wife is not entitled to maintenance.

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments us here.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Posted on March 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…

From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)

3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.

From Para 10,

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.

From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)

17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 129]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Judgments about Look Out Circular Notices

Posted on March 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A short collection of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices.

Sumer Singh Salkan Vs Asstt Director and Ors on 11 Aug 2010 [DHC: issued certain guidelines to be followed for issuing Look Out Circulars]
S.Martin Vs The Deputy Commissioner of Police on 21 Feb 2014 [MadHC: LOC can be withdrawn by the authorities concerned, who issued the same. Indeed, the Criminal Court’s jurisdiction in cancelling LOC or affirming the same is quite in tune with the jurisdiction of cancellation of Non Bailable Warrant]
Rashmi Raikhy & Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi & Ors on 1 Feb 2018 [DelhiHC: LOC cannot be mechanically issued in matrimonial disputes when accused are not absconding.]
Gattupalli Ujwal Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 30 Oct 2019 [APHC: Follows Sumer Singh Salkan Vs Asstt Director and Ors on 11 Aug 2010]
Vikas Chaudhary Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Jan 2022 [DHC: No LOC may be issued when no proceedings under any penal law have, in fact, been initiated]
Noor Paul Vs Union of India and Ors on 05 Apr 2022 [PHHC: Non-supply of a copy of the LOC to the subject of the LOC at the time the subject is stopped at the airport for travel abroad, non-supply of reasons for issuing LOC , and absence of a post decisional hearing to the subject of the LOC, is not just, fair and reasonable procedure and therefore it is violative of Art.21 of the Constitution of India]
- However, the said directions are currently stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of India v. Noor Paul S.L.P.(C) No. 7733/2022. Last listing on 26-Sep-2022!) Jai ho, SCI!
Leena Rakesh Vs Bureau of Immigration on 20 Jun 2022 [KarHC: ]
Yerramilli Srinivas Vs State of Telangana and 2 Ors on 09 Jan 2023 [TSHC: Practice of Telangana Police in not sending delete LOC requests to BoI, after a competent Criminal Court grants bail to an accused]
Bagadi Santhosh Kumar Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Mar 2025 [APHC : Look-Out Circulars cannot be issued routinely and directed withdrawal of LOC affecting personal liberty.]
Mohammed Azeem Vs Saheeba and Ors on 22 Sep 2025 [KarHC : Family Courts cannot issue Look Out Circulars for recovery of maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.]
Lagubeeru Venkata Arun Kiran Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Feb 2026 [APHC: Look-Out Circulars could be issued in exceptional cases where the departure of the person concerned will be detrimental to the sovereignty, security and integrity of India or is detrimental to the bilateral relations with any country or to the strategic and/or economic interests of India or that person may potentially indulge in an act of terrorism or offence against the State, if such person is allowed to leave or where travel ought not be permitted in the larger public interest at any given point of time.]

MASTER INDEX is here.

Frequently Asked Questions – Look Out Circular (LOC) Jurisprudence in India

A Look Out Circular (LOC) is an alert issued by law enforcement authorities to immigration, police and border control agencies to prevent a person from leaving the country, usually where that person is an accused in a criminal investigation or trial. LOCs are intended to ensure that individuals do not evade court process or investigation.

Judicial decisions hold that LOCs should only be issued when there is reasonable apprehension that an accused may evade justice — for example:

The individual is absconding or likely to escape.
There is a pending investigation or trial under a penal statute.
Issuing an LOC without such circumstances is generally considered unjustified.

Yes. Courts have repeatedly held that:

The authority that issued the LOC can withdraw it.
Criminal courts can cancel or affirm an LOC on application, similar to the manner in which non-bailable warrants can be cancelled.
This ensures judicial oversight over LOC issuance and helps protect fundamental liberties.

No. Decisions such as Vikas Chaudhary v. Union of India emphasise that an LOC cannot be issued in the absence of criminal proceedings, since there is no basis to believe the person is evading investigation or trial.

Yes. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Noor Paul v. Union of India held that non-supply of the LOC copy, lack of reasons for issuance, and absence of any hearing violate principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution of India (protection of life and personal liberty).

No. Courts have rejected the practice of issuing LOCs in contexts not grounded in criminal law, such as:

Maintenance enforcement under Section 125 CrPC (as reiterated by Karnataka High Court), and
Money recovery in civil or financial disputes.
LOC powers are for criminal process enforcement, not civil remedies.

Yes. In cases such as Yerramilli Srinivas v. State of Telangana, courts admonished police for not sending delete LOC requests to immigration authorities after bail has been granted, stressing that LOCs should not remain active once the accused appears or complies with court orders.

Yes. LOCs can restrict a person’s right to travel abroad, which is part of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution (right to life and personal liberty). Therefore, LOC issuance must satisfy reasonableness, fairness, and due process.

Some judgments (e.g., Lagubeeru Venkata Arun Kiran v. Union of India) state that LOCs may be justified only in exceptional circumstances, such as where departure of a person may be damaging to national security, sovereignty, or strategic interests — not as an ordinary procedural measure.

No. High Courts (e.g., Telangana High Court) have clarified that complainants do not have a fundamental right to insist upon issuance of an LOC — it is a discretionary executive/ investigative action guided by law, not by individual entitlement.

Constitutional courts have directed that:

LOCs must be withdrawn or deleted when they are no longer required.
Investigating authorities must regularly review LOCs and update immigration authorities.
Failure to do so can lead to judicial intervention or orders mandating LOC deletion.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Posted on March 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife.

4. Unfortunately, the trial court has committed a grave and fundamental error in rejecting the suit plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by relying upon the provision of Section 4 and repealed provision of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. When the impugned judgment was passed on 19.12.2016, what was, and is now applicable is the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 which became applicable w.e.f 1.11.2016. As per Section 2(9) of the Amended Act what is a Benami Transaction is stated/specified, and also those transactions which are not benami are are also stated/specified. As per the suit plaint/averments, in the present case the existence of the properties in the name of the respondent/defendant/wife will fall as an Exception to the prohibited benami transaction in view of Section 2(9)(A)(b) Exception (iii) inasmuch as it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife in the present case.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Citations: [2018:DHC:4920], [LAWS(DLH)-2018-8-124], [(2018) 08 DEL CK 0082]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75898278/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b6ed88e9eff430e1391a346

https://lextechsuite.com/Manoj-Arora-Versus-Mamta-Arora-2018-08-07

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=108102076300&Title=MANOJ-ARORA-Vs.-MAMTA-ARORA

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/5102027-manoj-arora-vs-mamta-arora?s=&refine_search=&s_acts=Benami%20Transactions%20(Prohibition)%20Act,%201988

Manoj Arora v. Mamta Arora (2018) 258 Taxman 1 (Delhi)(HC)

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Posted on March 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.

Finally,

On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246

https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=

https://www.shoneekapoor.com/chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan/

SMT. CHAND DHAWAN Vs JAWAHARLAL DHAWAN

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal

https://www.simplekanoon.com/family-law/smt-chand-dhawan-v-jawaharlal-dhawan-1509/

https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5

Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Posted on March 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an Order for Maintenance passed without adhering to the guidelines issued by Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha is liable to be set aside.

From Para 6,

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/husband would contend that no disclosure statement was filed by the respondent No.1 herein/wife and without the said statement, it is difficult to estimate the financial expenses of either of the parties to come to a conclusion as to how much amount is to be awarded to the respondent Nos.1 and 2 towards maintenance.

From Para 8,

8. A perusal of entire material on record coupled with the Order and Judgment passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, respectively, goes to show that either of the parties did not file disclosure statement. A disclosure statement in a Domestic Violence Case (DVC) refers to a document where a party involved in the case is required to provide detailed information about their financial assets and liabilities, including income, property ownership, bank accounts, and debt, as per the Court’s Order, usually to help in determining the appropriate maintenance or compensation amount in the case

From Para 10,

10. A plain reading of the above proposition of law, it is evident that while deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the Civil Court/Family Court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. The applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, to enable the Court to take into consideration the maintenance that was already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount and if the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding. In the case on hand, apparently, no disclosure statement was filed. It is mandatory that both husband and wife are supposed to file the disclosure statement before the trial Court. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the case in DVC No.27 of 2016 shall be remanded to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for trial of Prohibition and Excise Offences, Nellore, for fresh disposal.

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband.

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases under section 12 of DV Act is here.

Shades of Knife

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Frequently Asked Questions – Look Out Circular (LOC) Jurisprudence in India

1. What is a Look Out Circular (LOC)?+

2. When can an LOC lawfully be issued?+

3. Do courts have power to cancel or withdraw an LOC?+

4. Can LOCs be issued if no FIR or criminal proceeding exists?+

5. Do authorities need to provide reasons or procedural fairness before issuing an LOC?+

6. Can a family court or non-criminal forum issue an LOC in civil or maintenance proceedings?+

7. Is there any obligation on investigating officers after a bail order is granted?+

8. Do LOCs affect fundamental rights?+

9. Can LOCs be issued for national security or exceptional cases?+

10. Do complainants have a right to demand an LOC?+

11. How should authorities manage LOCs after they are no longer justified?+