Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Posted on August 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, ‘High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.‘.

From Para 32,

32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

From Para 35,

35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.

From Para 38, (Introspection!)

38. Before we part with this Judgment, we must mention here that one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J) is a party to a Judgment dated 27nd October, 2016 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition 2473 of 2016 in which the view taken is that remedy under Section 482 of the CrPC is not available for quashing the proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,2005. This view was found to be incorrect by a full Bench of the same High Court. As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our mistakes in properly constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the learning process always continues.

From Para 39,

39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 734]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110752030/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/682bfd4dcb7d8775a7b83f4e

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/shaurabh-kumar-tripathi-vs-vidhi-rawal

Index of DV Judgments here.

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP and Ors on 23 Jul 2025

Posted on August 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment on ‘Fraud vitiating everything‘.

From Para 50,

50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:
13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken …

From Para 60,

60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his favour by playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its presence. Thus, we find Vishnu’s core argument to be creditworthy and compelling for us to hold that judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.

From Para 107,

107. Yet again, the two-Judge Bench in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra) laid down fraud as an exception to the doctrine of merger while observing thus:
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand.

From Paras 138 and 139,

138. As already discussed above, due to fraud having been played by Reddy, the doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order is open to interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra). For reasons already discussed, the civil appeal has to be allowed and the impugned order set aside.
139. As a logical corollary of the impugned order being set aside, it would follow that the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra), upholding the same, which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be a nullity, and thus stand recalled in exercise of our inherent powers.

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP on 23 Jul 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/26257438/

‘Fraud is an exception to doctrine of merger’: Supreme Court recalls its own judgment obtained by fraud

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-736-vishnu-vardhan-vishnu-pradhan-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-298600

Orders Obtained by Fraud Not Protected by Doctrine of Merger

Index to Perjury Judgments here.

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 29, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court reiterated the procedure to be followed to report a cognizable crime.

From Paras 26-29,

26. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR. However, if such an information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned. It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance in accordance with Section 190 of the CrPC.
27. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the application filed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC dated 01.07.2005 would reveal that the informant therein had simply stated that an offence under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC have been committed and that the informant had approached the “police officials” several times but in vain, but the application is completely silent as to when did the informant approach the Police or the Superintendent of Police. The application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned. The mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable.
28. In Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P.7 it had been observed that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering the FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the person aggrieved to file an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate concerned. In other words, the court reiterated that the proper procedure has to be availed of and followed before moving the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.
29. It is well recognized in law that the person aggrieved must first exhaust the alternative remedies available to him in law before approaching the court of law. In other words, he cannot ordinarily approach the court directly.

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025

Posted on July 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court of India is funny…

First comes, Rajesh Sharma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 27 July, 2017 [2-judge Supreme Court Division Bench sets up Family Welfare Committees]
Then comes, Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India on 14 September, 2018 [3-judge Supreme Court Full Bench disbands Family Welfare Committees]
And now comes, this judgment. [2-judge Supreme Court Division Bench (includes CJI) endorses Family Welfare Committees]

Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025

I am sure, this Judgment will be rescinded as it violates the principle of precedence and goes against the 3-Judge decision and did not even mention the earlier higher bench decision.

Citations: [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 735], [2025 INSC 883]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/41565735/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/687f86f82bf7c50b2db30079

https://lawtrend.in/no-arrest-in-498a-ipc-case-for-2-months-sc-approves-guidelines-of-allahabad-hc-on-misuse-of-498a-ipc/

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. By order dated 02.09.2023, the Trial Court held that since the complainant was yet to be cross-examined, no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. It was also held that the amendment was in the nature of a typographical error, moved at an initial stage of the case. So holding the amendment was allowed.

From Para 9,

9. The learned counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish the judgement in S.R. Sukumar’s case (supra) by contending that in the said case amendment was sought and allowed at the pre-cognizance stage and as such the said case can have no application here. We are unable to countenance the said submission.

From Paras 15-19,

15. It will be appropriate to observe that amendments/alterations are not alien to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the power of Court to alter any charge and the concept of prejudice to the accused. No doubt when a charge is altered, what is altered is the legal provision and its application to a certain set of facts. The facts per se may not be altered. However, the section does throw some light in considering the issue of amendments.
16. It will be noticed that when a charge is altered, if there is no prejudice to the accused, the trial can be proceeded with. Further, if it is likely to prejudice, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial to such period. Section 217 of the Cr.P.C. grants liberty to the prosecutor and the accused to recall witnesses when charges are altered under the conditions prescribed therein. The test of ‘prejudice to the accused’ is the cardinal factor that needs to be borne in mind.
17. We have carefully perused the complaint and the application for amendment. The amendment was moved at a stage when after summons being issued to the respondents, the chief examination of the complainant had concluded and when cross-examination was awaited. The amendment made is also only with regard to the products supplied. According to the complainant, while what was supplied was “milk”, by an inadvertent error “Desi Ghee (milk products)” was mentioned. The error which occurred in the legal notice was carried in the complaint also.
18. On the facts of the present case and considering the stage of the trial, we find that absolutely no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. The actual facts will have to be thrashed out at the trial. As to what impact the amendment will have on the existence of debt or other liability is for the Trial Court to decide based on the evidence. It was a curable irregularity which the Trial Court rightly addressed by allowing the amendment. It could not be said that by allowing the amendment at a stage when the evidence of the complainant was incomplete, failure of justice would occasion.
19. The High Court completely mis-directed itself in delving into the aspects of leviability of GST which would be the concern of the appropriate authorities under the relevant statute. It could also not be said that the amendment altered the nature and character of the complaint.

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Posted on July 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 18,

18. In the present case, First Information Report No. 501 of 2019, under Sections 323, 354, 498A, 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Police Station Mandion, District Lucknow was lodged on 14.06.2019 by the opposite party No.4 and during the course of investigation, FIR and its consequential proceedings were challenged before this Court, and thereafter, matter was referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court with the consent of counsel for the opposite party No.4 on the first date and it was successfully concluded and presently opposite party No.4 is enjoying her matrimonial life and residing with her husband and children. As in the case of Ram Lal Yadav (supra), this Court held that Investigating
Officer can not be restrained from arresting the accused of a cognizable offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and Ramawatar (supra) already held that FIR and its consequential proceedings can be quashed (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.), therefore, this Court is of the view that impugned FIR and its consequential proceedings is liable to be quashed in terms of settlement agreement of parties before Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Ekta Kapur Vs Kunal Kapur on 21 May 2025

Posted on July 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

In a sweet twist of events, a well-reasoned contested Divorce Judgment (on the ground of cruelty) is converted into a nice MCD settlement by a division bench of the Apex Court…

From Para 3,

3. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant-wife against the impugned judgment dated 02.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi in MAT.APP.(F.C.) 321/2018, by which divorce has been granted under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to the respondent-husband.

but from Para 8,

8. Accordingly, we dispose of the present appeal in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties as noted above. The terms and conditions be strictly complied with by the respective parties within the time frame indicated in the settlement. Further, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court stands set aside and the parties are granted a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Registry to draw up a decree accordingly.

From Paras 11 and 12,

11. As the details of such cases/complaints are not specifically written in the settlement, we deemed it appropriate to ask the learned senior counsel, who have furnished the details of such cases/complaints. Accordingly, as per the list furnished by them, the following cases stand not only quashed but all observations made against any of the parties stand expunged:-
1. Petition u/s 125 Cr.P.C. filed by petitioner/wife against respondent-husband, bearing no.MT No.447/23 before Mr. Anil Kumar, PJFC, Dwarka, Delhi.
2. Petition u/s 12 of DV Act filed by petitioner/wife against respondent/husband and his family members, bearing no.MC No.712/23 before Ms. Surbhi, JMFC, Dwarka, Delhi.
3. Police complaint by petitioner/wife against respondent/husband and his parents at P.S. Dwarka (Dabri Moor), Delhi.
4. Police complaint by petitioner/wife against respondent/husband and his parents at P.S. Sector 56, Gurugram, Haryana.
12. Since we have expunged those remarks, in law, the said observations/remarks do not exist anymore and thus, any media link showing such expunged remarks will have to be mandatorily put down and if the same is not done, it is open for the parties to approach the concerned competent authority which shall ensure that the same are taken off the link.

Ekta Kapur Vs Kunal Kapur on 21 May 2025

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of AP High Court has set aside the 498A IPC conviction… one of the reasons being a Counterblast case.

From Para 23,

23) It is to be seen that, none of the witnesses clearly indicate as to when and also the nature of cruelty meted out to PW1. It is not as if A1 and PW1 lived only for a short period. The record shows that both of them lived together for more than three years. That being the position, some specific time period should have been mentioned with regard to the acts of harassment. Except saying that all the accused harassed, the evidence of PW1 to PW4 is silent as to the nature of harassment meted out to PW1. Whether it was beating or by any other method. The usage of word ‘harassed’ in loose manner, in my view, cannot be taken as amounting to cruelty, unless, the evidence disclosing the nature of the harassment falling within the meaning of cruelty as deposed in 498A IPC. Further, as observed earlier, the nature of harassment spoken to by PW1 to PW4 are inconsistent with each other. Each witness is improving the case. What is spoken to by one witness is not spoken to by another witness.

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Index of Quash judgments here.

Evidence Act Sec 65 – Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.––Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases:
(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power ––
of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or
of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or
of any person legally bound to produce it,
and when, after the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in 1[India] to be given in evidence;
(g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Posted on July 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A good judgment from this Magistrate, with legally-valid reasons and conclusions… and also directing perjury proceedings to be initiated…

From Para 26,

26. The first and foremost contention of the accused and their counsel is that FIR No: 488/2017 is barred by limitation, as such the court shall dismiss the proceedings and as per exhibit P1, the alleged last act of cruelty has taken place on 18.09.2012, so the limitation period was expired on 17.09.2015, but the report was given on 03.08.2017, therefore the proceedings are time barred u/s 468 Cr.P.C. while section 473 Cr.P.C provides an exception to bar of limitation, but its application is not automatic and there must be an explanation by the prosecution for such inordinate delay. Since the case is barred by limitation, the court is required to dismiss the proceedings. In support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments:
A. Kamlesh Kalra v. Shilpa Kalra & Ors. Reported in 2020 0 Supreme (SC) 605 wherein it was held that “ As regards, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of complaint/FIR filed under Section 498A IPC, we are of the firm opinion that the same does not call for interference. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time barred, having been filed much more than three years after the separation of Manish Kalra(husband) and Shilpika Kalra (wife) and the filing of the divorce petition by the husband, both in 2009. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court”.
B. Gudipati Mallikarjun Rao v. Gudiapati Saranya 2023 0 Supreme (A.P) 582 wherein it was held that “ In the circumstances, it would have to be held that the complainant, filed by the defacto complainant, is beyond the period prescribed under Section 468 of Cr.P.C”.
C. Arun Vyas & Anr. V. Anitha Vyas 1999 0 Crl LJ 3479 wherein it was held that “ the court cannot take cognizance of an offence under Section 498-A of IPC, if the FIR is time barred, unless the delay is properly explained and condoned under Section 473 of the CrPC”.
D. Korimerla Videesha Vs. State of A.P. wherein it was held that “ According to Rule 10 of the A.P. Dowry Prohibition Rules, any offence under Section 3 and 4 or any dispute under Section 6 of the Act shall be filed before expiry of one year and finalized within two years from the date of filing”.

From Para 28,

28. In the case on hand the alleged demand for additional dowry was finally made on 18.9.2012 and that is the last date of alleged harassment. Even if the evidence of P.W.1 that the matter is place before the elders in 2013 has taken into consideration, the report is given after 4 years of said incident. But the report was given on 03.08.2017 i.e after 4 years of alleged harassment. So it can be safely conclude that the report is barred by limitation and the court has no power to take cognizance.

From Paras 36-37,

36. He further submitted that the conduct of P.W.1 amounts to perjury and warrants initiation of appropriate proceedings u/s 340 Cr.P.C in order to uphold the rule of law and protect sanctity of justice delivery system. On perusal of the record it appears that after filing the petition under section 340 Cr.P.C., my learned predecessor in the office returned the petition with some objections and the said petition is represented. But the said petition is again returned with endorsement previous objections not complied with and at present the said petition is not pending before the court. Here it is pertinent to mention that after assuming charge of this court, the said petition did not come before me and I have not given any assurance to the
counsel for the accused as mentioned in his written arguments.
37. During the cross examination P.W.1 denied that she completed her B.Tech in the year 2012. As per the evidence of D.W.1, Professor and controller of examination, JNTU Kakinada, P.W.1 completed her engineering graduation in April 2012 and on 16.10.2012 the student collected her provisional certificate from the college and as per the college rules, they cannot produce the provisional certificate of the student unless it is applied by the student. The evidence of D.W.1 clinchingly proves that P.W.1 completed her B.tech in April 2012 from JNTU. The evidence on record shows she intentionally denied that she completed her B.tech in 2012 and she has given false evidence on oath. Hence, she is certainly liable for punishment for giving false evidence. Hence, the Superintendent of this court is directed to give report before 3rd Add. Chief Judicial Magistrate Court against P.W.1 for giving false evidence.

From Paras 39, 41 and 42,

39. Learned counsel for the accused further contended that despite clear admissions of P.W.1 about unregistered land sale deeds dated 31.05.2010, 27.06.2011, this court refused to mark the said photocopies solely on the ground that they were not originals and this refusal is patently erroneous and it is settled law u/s 65 (c) of Indian Evidence Act, the secondary evidence is admissible where the original is lost or not in the possession of the party and a proper foundation is laid.
41. To mark the photocopies of documents, the party who intends to mark shall explain where is the original and as to why he is marking the photocopies of the documents. If the document is with the other party, first he has to give notice to the other party and even after receiving notice the other party fails to produce the document, then he can mark the photocopy. If he lost the original then also he is entitled to mark the photocopy, but in the case on hand there is no material on record to show that the accused or prosecution has given notice to other party to produce the documents and that the originals were lost. Without complying the conditions of section 65 of Indian Evidence Act, blaming this Court that the decision of the court is erroneous is not acceptable.
42. Learned counsel for the accused mentioned in his written arguments that the non production of the original unregistered sale deeds was reasonably explained during cross examination and it was put to P.W.1 that since accused no longer had access to the original land sale deeds dated. 31.05.2010 and 27.06.2011 since the property was transferred to Ch. Appala Raju and the denial of suggestion does not itself negate the reasonable explanation offered by the accused. On perusal of entire cross examination of P.W.1 it appears no such suggestion was given to P.W.1. As such the
contention of counsel for accused that they have given reasonable explanation for not filing the originals is not at all acceptable.

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025

Index of perjury judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP and Ors on 23 Jul 2025

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Dudekula Khasim Vs State of Andhra Pradesh on 24 Mar 2020

Evidence Act Sec 65 – Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given

State of AP Vs Matham Vijaya Rao and Anr on 07 Jul 2025