Landmark judgment from Apex Court which struck down Sec 497 IPC as ultravires with Articles 14, 21 of Constitution of India.
Citations :
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Author: ShadesOfKnife
Inder Singh Vs Sumitra on 05 August, 2019
Do you know how to misinterpret laws? Don’t know? Learn from this judgment from Delhi High Court.
From Paras 12-16,
12. Second proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates grant of interim maintenance. Reading of second proviso does not in any manner indicate that making of an application seeking interim maintenance is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance.
13. The Third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C. stipulates disposal of an application for grant of interim maintenance within a time bound manner.
14. If the second and third proviso to sub section (1) to Section 125 Cr.P.C are read keeping in view the very object of the statute, it shows that there is no requirement stipulated by the statute for making an application for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition under section 125 Cr.P.C. and the Court would be empowered to pass an order assessing interim maintenance even in a case where no such application has been filed by the person claiming maintenance. However, where such an application is made, the same would have to be disposed of by the Trial Court within the time stipulated therein.
15. If a narrower interpretation were to be given to the provision i.e. that an application is a pre-condition for grant of interim maintenance, the same would militate against the very object of the scheme of providing maintenance to a dependant, who is unable to maintain himself/herself, where the person who has sufficient means has refused or neglected to maintain the dependant. (Author: How?)
16. Keeping in view the beneficial object of the statute, it is held that the filing of an application seeking interim maintenance would not be a precondition for grant of interim maintenance pending consideration of the petition seeking maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.. It would be open to the trial court to grant interim maintenance, in the facts and circumstances of the case, pending consideration of the application for grant of maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.
Have you ever heard the words: misinterpreting, idiotic, biased, pre-judged, cunning? Sounds applicable to this judgment?
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Vyankates Dhonddeo Deshpande Vs Sou. Kusum Dattatraya Kulkarni and Ors on 27 September, 1978
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1035752/
Citations: 1978 AIR 1791, 1979 SCR (1) 955, 1979 SCC (1) 98
Anthonyswamy Vs M. R. Chinnaswamy Koundan (Deed) by LRs and Ors on 6 October, 1969
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187164/
Citations: 1970 AIR 223, 1970 SCR (2) 648, 1969 SCC (3) 15
CrPC 303 – Right of person against whom proceedings are instituted to be defended
CrPC 303. Right of person against whom proceedings are instituted to be defended.
Any person accused of an offence before a Criminal Court, or against whom proceedings are instituted under this Code, may of right be defended by a pleader of his choice.
R. Muthukrishnan Vs The Registrar General of The High of Madras on 28 January, 2019
Apex Court held that, the power to discipline/debar an advocate lies with Bar Councils and High Courts cannot usurp the same under the guise of Rules.
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/60397736/
Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 105, 2019 (2) SCALE 263
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T.C. Mathai and Anr Vs The District and Sessions Judge on 31 March, 1999
Apex Court held as follows, in last paragraph,
“Be that as it may, an agent cannot become a pleader for the party in criminal proceedings, unless the party secures permission from the court to appoint him to act in such proceedings. The respondent-couple have not even moved for such permission and hence no occasion has arisen so far to consider that aspect.”
Key passages from the judgment are,
The definition [of a Pleader u.s 2(q) of CrPC] envelopes two kinds of pleaders within its ambit. The first refers to legal practitioners who are authorised to practise law and the second refers to any other person. If it is the latter its essential requisite is that such person should have been appointed with the permission of the court to act in such proceedings. This is in tune with Section 32 of the Advocates Act 1961 which empowers a Court to permit any person, who is not enrolled as an advocate to appear before it in any particular case. But if he is to plead for another person in a criminal court, such permission should be sought for by that person.
It is not necessary that the pleader so appointed should be the power of attorney holder of the party in the case. What seems to be condition precedent is that his appointment should have preceded by grant of permission of the court. It is for the court to consider whether such permission is necessary in the given case and whether the person proposed to be appointed is capable of helping the court by pleading for the party, for arriving at proper findings on the issues involved in the case.………..
But if the person proposed to be appointed by the party is not such a qualified person the court has first to satisfy itself whether the expected assistance would be rendered by that person. The reason for the Parliament for fixing such a filter in the definition clause [Sec.2(q) of the Code] that prior permission must be secured before a non-advocate is appointed by the party to plead his cause in the court, is to enable the court to verify the level of equipment of such person for pleading on behalf of the party concerned.
Precedent used is here
Indiankanoon.org link: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1728750/
Citation: [1999 SCC 3 614], [1999 AIR SC 1385], [1999 AIR SC 1062], [1999 SUPREME 3 308], [1999 SCC CRI 455], [1999 CRLJ SC 2092], [1999 SCALE 2 359], [1999 ACR SC 1 915], [1999 ALT CRI 1 226], [1999 CTC 1 720], [1999 GLH 1 829], [1999 KLJ 1 879], [1999 KLT SC 2 156], [1999 LW CRL 2 658], [1999 RCR CRIMINAL 2 373], [1999 SCR 2 305], [1999 JT SC 2 494], [1999 AIR SCW 1062]
Uday Shankar Triyar Vs Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Anr on 10 November, 2005
Apex Court listed out defects routinely found in Vakalatnamas filed in courts
(a) Failure to mention the name/s of the person/s executing the Vakalatnama, and leaving the relevant column blank;
(b) Failure to disclose the name, designation or authority of the person executing the Vakalatnama on behalf of the grantor (where the Vakalatnama is signed on behalf of a company, society or body) by either affixing a seal or by mentioning the name and designation below the signature of the executant (and failure to annex a copy of such authority with the Vakalatnama).
(c) Failure on the part of the pleader in whose favour the Vakalatnama is executed, to sign it in token of its acceptance.
(d) Failure to identify the person executing the Vakalatnama or failure to certify that the pleader has satisfied himself about the due execution of the Vakalatnama.
(e) Failure to mention the address of the pleader for purpose of service (in particular in cases of outstation counsel).
(f) Where the Vakalatnama is executed by someone for self and on behalf of someone else, failure to mention the fact that it is being so executed. For example, when a father and the minor children are parties, invariably there is a single signature of the father alone in the Vakalatnama without any endorsement/statement that the signature is for ’self and as guardian of his minor children’. Similarly, where a firm and its partner, or a company and its Director, or a Trust and its trustee, or an organisation and its office-bearer, execute a Vakalatnama, invariably there will be only one signature without even an endorsement that the signature is both in his/her personal capacity and as the person authorized to sign on behalf of the corporate body/firm/ society/organisation.
(g) Where the Vakalatnama is executed by a power-of-attorney holder of a party, failure to disclose that it is being executed by an Attorney-holder and failure to annex a copy of the power of attorney;
(h) Where several persons sign a single vakalatnama, failure to affix the signatures seriatim, without mentioning their serial numbers or names in brackets. (Many a time it is not possible to know who have signed the Vakalatnama where the signatures are illegible scrawls);
(i) Pleaders engaged by a client, in turn, executing vakalatnamas in favour of other pleaders for appearing in the same matter or for filing an appeal or revision. (It is not uncommon in some areas for mofussil lawyers to obtain signature of a litigant on a vakalatnama and come to the seat of the High Court, and engage a pleader for appearance in a higher court and execute a Vakalatnama in favour of such pleader).
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Attorney Generals of India and their Tenure
List of Attorney Generals of India.
| Attorney General of India (Name) | Tenure |
| 1. M.C. Setalvad (longest term) | 28 January 1950 – 01 March 1963 |
| 2. C.K. Daftari | 02 March 1963 – 30 October 1968 |
| 3. Niren de | 01 November 1968 – 31 March 1977 |
| 4. S.V. Gupte | 01 April , 1977 – 08 August 1979 |
| 5. L.N. Sinha | 09 August, 1979 – 08 August, 1983 |
| 6. K. Parasaran | 09 August 1983 – 08 December 1989 |
| 7. Soli Sorabjee (shortest tenure) | 09 December 1989 – 02 December 1990 |
| 8. J. Ramaswamy | 03 December , 1990 – 23 November 1992 |
| 9. Milon K. Banerji | 21 November 1992 – 08 July 1996 |
| 10. Ashok Desai | 09 July 1996 – 06 April 1998 |
| 11. Soli Sorabjee | 07 April 1998 – 04 June 2004 |
| 12. Milon K. Banerjee | 05 June 2004 – 07 June 2009 |
| 13. Goolam Essaji Vahanvati | 08 June 2009 – 11 June 2014 |
| 14. Mukul Rohatgi | 12 June, 2014 – 30 June 2017 |
| 15. K.K. Venugopal | 30 June 2017 – till date |
| 16. new AGI |
Poonam Chand Jain & Anr Vs Fazru on 28 January, 2010
In this judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, the question which crops-up for determination by this Court is whether after an order of dismissal of complaint has attains finality, the complainant can file another complaint on almost identical facts without disclosing in the second complaint the fact of either filing of the first complaint or its dismissal.
And the conclusion was,
His Lordship held that an order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short ‘the Code’) is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it can be entertained only in exceptional circumstances. This Court explained the exceptional circumstances as (a) where the previous order was passed on incomplete record (b) or on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint (c) or the order which was passed was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or (d) where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings. This Court made it very clear that interest of justice cannot permit that after a decision has been given on a complaint upon full consideration of the case, the complainant should be given another opportunity to have the complaint enquired into again.
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