Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Posted on March 29, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Kerala High Court held that a deserter wife not entitled to claim maintenance.

From Para 6,

6. As stated already, M.C.No.354 of 2017 has been tried along with G.O.(P) Nos.1621 of 2016 & 1334 of 2017. As per the common order, the guardianship of the child was given to the petitioner. A reading of the common order would show that the petitioner specifically contended that the respondent left the matrimonial home without any reason on 16.11.2015, abandoning their 2½-year-old child there and never returned thereafter. The respondent has admitted that she left the matrimonial home on that day. But her contention is that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home and started to live separately due to the ill-treatment of the petitioner. The parties let in evidence regarding these rival contentions. The Family Court, after considering the evidence on record, concluded that the respondent left the matrimonial home leaving the child there without any reason. In paragraph 27 of the common order, there is a finding that even though the respondent has raised a contention that she left the petitioner due to ill-treatment, there is no evidence of any ill-treatment and there was not even a complaint by the respondent against the petitioner before any police. In paragraph 31 of the common order, there is a specific finding that the respondent left the matrimonial home with the definite intention to teach a lesson to the petitioner, and absolutely, there is no evidence to show that she was ill-treated by the petitioner as alleged by the respondent. Thus, there is clear evidence on record to show that the respondent has been living separately since 16.11.2015 without any sufficient reason. That apart, O.P.No.1618 of 2016, filed by the petitioner seeking divorce on the grounds of desertion and cruelty, was allowed on those grounds.

From Para 7,

7. The primary object of marriage, while varying across cultures and beliefs, often encompasses forming a legal and social unit providing companionship and emotional support apart from procreation and raising of children. Marriage brings with it specific rights and liabilities for both husband and wife. Marriage involves a commitment to live together and fulfil the responsibilities inherent in the marital relationship. The primary
duty of parties in marriage is to live together and fulfil their marital obligations. The right to each other’s society, comfort and affection, often referred to as ‘consortium’ is a fundamental aspect of marriage. Withdrawal from society of the other would mean withdrawal from marital obligation by either spouse.

From Para 8,

8. A husband is legally and morally bound to provide maintenance to his wife. The right of the wife to be maintained by the husband stems from the corresponding obligation to perform marital duty. Section 125 (1) (a) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (1) (a) of BNSS) provides maintenance to the wife who is unable to maintain herself. However, the right of the wife to claim maintenance from her husband, who has sufficient means, is not absolute. It is subject to sub-section (4) of Section 125 (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). A wife who chooses to live separately without sufficient reason is disentitled to maintenance under Section 125(4) of Cr.PC (Section 144 (4) of BNSS). It is crucial to assess whether the wife’s decision to live separately is based on valid grounds. If valid grounds, such as cruelty or desertion, exist, she may still claim maintenance despite living apart. In cases where the wife refuses to live with the husband without any just cause and there is no evidence of ill-treatment by the husband, the wife is not entitled to maintenance.

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance Judgments us here.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Posted on March 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court passed this judgment…

From Para 3, (Madam is very planned: MOU signed with First Husband on 25-Nov-2005; Remarriage with Second Husband on 27-Nov-2005; And someone said our judges are blind-fucks)

3. The facts of the case reveal that Appellant No.1 before this Court – Smt. N. Usha Rani married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999 at Hyderabad. During the period of their wedlock, she gave birth to a male child, namely, Sai Ganesh on 15.08.2000. The couple lived together until disputes arose between them. Following their return from the United States of America in February 2005, they began living separately. Eventually, on 25.11.2005, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MoU’) was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage. Meanwhile, Appellant No. 1 got acquainted with her neighbour,the Respondent, and the couple got married on 27.11.2005.

From Para 10,

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record. The short question before us is whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.

From Paras 17 and 18, (Dripping and Simping Wokeism… Thuuu)

17. This encapsulates the full scope and gravity of considerations before this Court as we deliberate on the issue at hand. The present case does not concern a live-in relationship. The Family Court made a factual finding that Appellant No. 1 married the Respondent and that finding is not disputed by the Respondent. Instead, the Respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to Appellant No. 1 is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting. Two other pertinent facts must be considered: firstly, it is not the case of the Respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the Family Court makes a specific finding that Respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the Appellant No. 1. Therefore, Respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with Appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, Appellant No. 1 places before this Court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and Appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband. Therefore, barring the absence of a legal decree, Appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
18. In the opinion of this Court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s. 125CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to Appellant No. 1. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction and this understanding has been extended to maintenance since Ramesh Chander (supra). An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the Respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with Appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations. The only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the Appellant No.1 could claim dual maintenance–however, that is not the case under the present facts. We are aware that this Court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages (See Yamunabai (supra) and Bakulabai (supra)). However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable. It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband.

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 129]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/56187356/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67a987a7c254af19d96c5a16

Index of Maintenance Judgements is here.

Judgments about Look Out Circular Notices

Posted on March 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A short collection of judgments about Look Out Circular Notices.

Sumer Singh Salkan Vs Asstt Director and Ors on 11 Aug 2010 [DHC: issued certain guidelines to be followed for issuing Look Out Circulars]
S.Martin Vs The Deputy Commissioner of Police on 21 Feb 2014 [MadHC: LOC can be withdrawn by the authorities concerned, who issued the same. Indeed, the Criminal Court’s jurisdiction in cancelling LOC or affirming the same is quite in tune with the jurisdiction of cancellation of Non Bailable Warrant]
Rashmi Raikhy & Anr Vs The State of NCT Delhi & Ors on 1 Feb 2018 [DelhiHC: LOC cannot be mechanically issued in matrimonial disputes when accused are not absconding.]
Gattupalli Ujwal Vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors on 30 Oct 2019 [APHC: Follows Sumer Singh Salkan Vs Asstt Director and Ors on 11 Aug 2010]
Vikas Chaudhary Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Jan 2022 [DHC: No LOC may be issued when no proceedings under any penal law have, in fact, been initiated]
Noor Paul Vs Union of India and Ors on 05 Apr 2022 [PHHC: Non-supply of a copy of the LOC to the subject of the LOC at the time the subject is stopped at the airport for travel abroad, non-supply of reasons for issuing LOC , and absence of a post decisional hearing to the subject of the LOC, is not just, fair and reasonable procedure and therefore it is violative of Art.21 of the Constitution of India]
- However, the said directions are currently stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bank of India v. Noor Paul S.L.P.(C) No. 7733/2022. Last listing on 26-Sep-2022!) Jai ho, SCI!
Leena Rakesh Vs Bureau of Immigration on 20 Jun 2022 [KarHC: ]
Yerramilli Srinivas Vs State of Telangana and 2 Ors on 09 Jan 2023 [TSHC: Practice of Telangana Police in not sending delete LOC requests to BoI, after a competent Criminal Court grants bail to an accused]
Bagadi Santhosh Kumar Vs Union of India and Ors on 12 Mar 2025 [APHC : Look-Out Circulars cannot be issued routinely and directed withdrawal of LOC affecting personal liberty.]
Mohammed Azeem Vs Saheeba and Ors on 22 Sep 2025 [KarHC : Family Courts cannot issue Look Out Circulars for recovery of maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.]
Lagubeeru Venkata Arun Kiran Vs Union of India and Ors on 04 Feb 2026 [APHC: Look-Out Circulars could be issued in exceptional cases where the departure of the person concerned will be detrimental to the sovereignty, security and integrity of India or is detrimental to the bilateral relations with any country or to the strategic and/or economic interests of India or that person may potentially indulge in an act of terrorism or offence against the State, if such person is allowed to leave or where travel ought not be permitted in the larger public interest at any given point of time.]

MASTER INDEX is here.

Frequently Asked Questions – Look Out Circular (LOC) Jurisprudence in India

A Look Out Circular (LOC) is an alert issued by law enforcement authorities to immigration, police and border control agencies to prevent a person from leaving the country, usually where that person is an accused in a criminal investigation or trial. LOCs are intended to ensure that individuals do not evade court process or investigation.

Judicial decisions hold that LOCs should only be issued when there is reasonable apprehension that an accused may evade justice — for example:

The individual is absconding or likely to escape.
There is a pending investigation or trial under a penal statute.
Issuing an LOC without such circumstances is generally considered unjustified.

Yes. Courts have repeatedly held that:

The authority that issued the LOC can withdraw it.
Criminal courts can cancel or affirm an LOC on application, similar to the manner in which non-bailable warrants can be cancelled.
This ensures judicial oversight over LOC issuance and helps protect fundamental liberties.

No. Decisions such as Vikas Chaudhary v. Union of India emphasise that an LOC cannot be issued in the absence of criminal proceedings, since there is no basis to believe the person is evading investigation or trial.

Yes. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Noor Paul v. Union of India held that non-supply of the LOC copy, lack of reasons for issuance, and absence of any hearing violate principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution of India (protection of life and personal liberty).

No. Courts have rejected the practice of issuing LOCs in contexts not grounded in criminal law, such as:

Maintenance enforcement under Section 125 CrPC (as reiterated by Karnataka High Court), and
Money recovery in civil or financial disputes.
LOC powers are for criminal process enforcement, not civil remedies.

Yes. In cases such as Yerramilli Srinivas v. State of Telangana, courts admonished police for not sending delete LOC requests to immigration authorities after bail has been granted, stressing that LOCs should not remain active once the accused appears or complies with court orders.

Yes. LOCs can restrict a person’s right to travel abroad, which is part of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution (right to life and personal liberty). Therefore, LOC issuance must satisfy reasonableness, fairness, and due process.

Some judgments (e.g., Lagubeeru Venkata Arun Kiran v. Union of India) state that LOCs may be justified only in exceptional circumstances, such as where departure of a person may be damaging to national security, sovereignty, or strategic interests — not as an ordinary procedural measure.

No. High Courts (e.g., Telangana High Court) have clarified that complainants do not have a fundamental right to insist upon issuance of an LOC — it is a discretionary executive/ investigative action guided by law, not by individual entitlement.

Constitutional courts have directed that:

LOCs must be withdrawn or deleted when they are no longer required.
Investigating authorities must regularly review LOCs and update immigration authorities.
Failure to do so can lead to judicial intervention or orders mandating LOC deletion.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Posted on March 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that, it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife.

4. Unfortunately, the trial court has committed a grave and fundamental error in rejecting the suit plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by relying upon the provision of Section 4 and repealed provision of Section 3(2) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act. When the impugned judgment was passed on 19.12.2016, what was, and is now applicable is the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 which became applicable w.e.f 1.11.2016. As per Section 2(9) of the Amended Act what is a Benami Transaction is stated/specified, and also those transactions which are not benami are are also stated/specified. As per the suit plaint/averments, in the present case the existence of the properties in the name of the respondent/defendant/wife will fall as an Exception to the prohibited benami transaction in view of Section 2(9)(A)(b) Exception (iii) inasmuch as it is legally permissible for a person to purchase an immovable property in the name of his spouse from his known sources, and in which position, the property purchased will not be a benami property but the property will be of the de jure owner/plaintiff/husband and not of the de facto owner (in whose name title deeds exist), being the respondent/defendant/wife in the present case.

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Citations: [2018:DHC:4920], [LAWS(DLH)-2018-8-124], [(2018) 08 DEL CK 0082]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/75898278/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b6ed88e9eff430e1391a346

https://lextechsuite.com/Manoj-Arora-Versus-Mamta-Arora-2018-08-07

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=108102076300&Title=MANOJ-ARORA-Vs.-MAMTA-ARORA

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/t/5102027-manoj-arora-vs-mamta-arora?s=&refine_search=&s_acts=Benami%20Transactions%20(Prohibition)%20Act,%201988

Manoj Arora v. Mamta Arora (2018) 258 Taxman 1 (Delhi)(HC)

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Posted on March 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court passed this landmark judgment, holding that alimony u/s 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can be sought only when any decree is passed under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

On the other hand, under the Hindu Marriage Act, in contrast, her claim for maintenance pendente lite is durated on the pendency of a litigation of the kind envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and her claim to permanent maintenance or alimony is based on the supposition that either her marital status has been strained or affected by passing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation in favour or against her, or her marriage stands dissolved by a decree of nullity or divorce, with or without her consent. Thus when her marital status is to be affected or disrupted the court does so by passing a decree for or against her. On or at the time of the happening of that event, the court being siezen of the matter, invokes its ancilliary or incidental power to grant permanent alimony. Not only that, the court retains the jurisdiction at subsequent stages to fulfil this incidental or ancilliary obligation when moved by an application on that behalf by a party entitled to relief. The court further retains the power to chance or alter the order in view of the changed circumstances. Thus the whole exercise is within the gammit of a diseased of a broken marriage. And in order to avoid conflict of perceptions the legislature while codifying the Hindu Marriage Act preserved the right of permanent maintenance in favour of the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dependent on the court passing a decree of the kind as envisaged under sections 9 to 14 of the Act. In other words without the marital status being affected or disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act the claim of permanent alimony was not to be valid as ancilliary or incidental to such affectation or disruption.
We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming to the view that when by court intervention under the Hindu Marriage Act, affection or disruption to the marital status has come by, at that juncture, while passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power subsequently to be invoked on application by a party entitled to relief.

Finally,

On the afore analysis we have been led to the conclusion that the step of the wife to move the court of Additional District Judge, Amritsar for grant of maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act was ill-advised. The judgment of the High Court under appeal could be no other than the one that it was in the present state of law and the facts and circumstances. It is still open to the wife to stake her claim to maintenance in other fora. The judgments of the High Courts earlier quoted, and others which have been left out, which are not in line with our view are over-ruled. The earlier and predominant view was the correct one and the later an aberration; something unfortunate from the precedential point of view. The appeals thus inevitably have to and are hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs.

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Citations: [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494], [(1993) 3 S.C.R. 954], [1993 INSC 216], [1993 SCC (3) 406], [1993 AIR SCW 2548], [1993 CRI. L. J. 2930], [1993 SCC(CRI) 915], [(1993) IJR 335 (SC)], [1994 BOM CJ 147], [1993 (2) UJ (SC) 356], [1993 (4) JT 22], [1993 MAH LJ 1731], [(1993) 2 DMC 110], [(1993) 2 HINDULR 203], [(1993) 2 MAHLR 866], [(1993) MARRILJ 459], [(1994) MPLJ 1], [(1993) 3 RECCRIR 545], [(1994) 1 RRR 574], [(1993) 3 SCJ 50], [(1993) 22 ALL LR 240], [(1993) 2 CIVLJ 902], [1993 LawSuit(SC) 494]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1162687/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8fe4b014971140f246

https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=MTk0MTQ=

Chand Dhawan Vs. Jawaharlal Dhawan

SMT. CHAND DHAWAN Vs JAWAHARLAL DHAWAN

https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?caseId=002991343000&title=chanddhawan-vs-jawaharlal

https://www.simplekanoon.com/family-law/smt-chand-dhawan-v-jawaharlal-dhawan-1509/

https://lawfyi.io/smt-chand-dhawan-vs-jawaharlal-dhawan-on-11-june-1993/

https://lawsuitcasefinder.com/casedetail?id=U2FsdGVkX1plo2GAY5xcebh78PQGFoZ2Mju1Jpebh78bGJ5ukMSE1YMgs5

Index to the Maintenance Judgments under Hindu Marriage Act here.

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Posted on March 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that an Order for Maintenance passed without adhering to the guidelines issued by Apex Court in Rajnesh Vs Neha is liable to be set aside.

From Para 6,

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner herein/husband would contend that no disclosure statement was filed by the respondent No.1 herein/wife and without the said statement, it is difficult to estimate the financial expenses of either of the parties to come to a conclusion as to how much amount is to be awarded to the respondent Nos.1 and 2 towards maintenance.

From Para 8,

8. A perusal of entire material on record coupled with the Order and Judgment passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, respectively, goes to show that either of the parties did not file disclosure statement. A disclosure statement in a Domestic Violence Case (DVC) refers to a document where a party involved in the case is required to provide detailed information about their financial assets and liabilities, including income, property ownership, bank accounts, and debt, as per the Court’s Order, usually to help in determining the appropriate maintenance or compensation amount in the case

From Para 10,

10. A plain reading of the above proposition of law, it is evident that while deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the Civil Court/Family Court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. The applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, to enable the Court to take into consideration the maintenance that was already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount and if the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding. In the case on hand, apparently, no disclosure statement was filed. It is mandatory that both husband and wife are supposed to file the disclosure statement before the trial Court. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the case in DVC No.27 of 2016 shall be remanded to the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class for trial of Prohibition and Excise Offences, Nellore, for fresh disposal.

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband.

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases under section 12 of DV Act is here.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Posted on March 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court at Aurangabab held that

From Para 6,

6. Apart from this, the learned A.P.P. has also placed reliance on judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rupali Devi Vs. State of Uttar pradesh reported in AIR OnLine (2019) SC 394.

From Paras 9 and 10,

9. As regards Section 472 of the Cr. P. C, contention of the learned A.P.P. that offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong will have to be accepted, but only with a rider. Although the offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing wrong, it would not mean that limitation would continue to run perennially.The correct interpretation of the provision is provided in the matter of Arun Vyas and another Vs. Anita Vyas (supra) which sates that in case of offence under Section 498-A, a new starting point of limitation is start on every occasion when the wrong is committed and the period of limitation needs to be computed from the last such wrong. We may profitably quote paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads as under :-
“ The essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as defined in the explanation appended to that section. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on October 13, 1988 when, on the allegation made by the respondent in the complaint to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, she was forced to leave the matrimonial home. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472 the period of limitation commenced for offences under Sections 406 and 498-A from October 13, 1988 and ended on October 12, 1991. But the charge sheet was filed on December 22, 1995,therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c) Cr. P. C.’’
10. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further stated in paragraph No. 14 that in complaints under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be oppressed, who is subjected to cruelty and, therefore, Section 473 of the Cr. P.C should be construed liberally in favour of wife. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also cautioned that the words interest of justice employed in Section 473 of the Cr. P. C. cannot mean in the interest of prosecution and the true object of the provision is to advance the cause of justice by protecting the oppressed and punishing the offender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also referred to its earlier judgment in the matter of Onkar Radha Manohari (Smt) Vs. Venka Venkata Reddy reported in 1993 AIR SCW 3595 that while dealing with Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the Court should not only examine as to whether delay is properly explained, but also as to whether it is necessary to entertain a time barred matter in the interest of justice.

From Paras 13 and 14,

13. These observations have been made in the context of territorial jurisdiction. The judgment does not deal with the aspect of limitation. Provisions of Sections 468, 472 and 473 of the Cr. P.C did not fall for consideration in this case. As against this in the cases of Arun Vyas and another Vs Anita Vyas (supra) and Ramesh and other Vs. state of Tamil Nadu (supra), the question of limitation was directly involved and the same is answered referring to the relevant statutory provisions. It is settled legal principle that judgments of the Courts have to be interpreted in the backdrop of facts of the particular case. Ratio of a case has to be understood and appreciated in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment is delivered. The law laid down in the judgment cannot be divorced from the facts of the case in which it is delivered. A judgment cannot be interpreted like a statute. It cannot be applied uniformly every where like Euclid’s theorems of geometry. Therefore, while dealing with aforesaid three judgments cited during the course of hearing, we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in the matters of Arun Vyas and Ramesh which directly deal with the question of limitation will have to be accepted. The judgment in the matter of Rupali Devi is relating to territorial jurisdiction of a Court to deal with offence under Section 498-A of the IPC.
14. In the light of above, we are of the opinion that limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC shall commence from the last act of cruelty. Offence under Section 498-A of the IPC is a continuing offence implies that each act of cruelty would offer new starting point of limitation. Limitation for prosecution under Section 498-A does not continue for indefinite period. Such interpretation will render Section 468 of the Cr. P.C. nugatory or otiose for the purpose of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which does not appear to be the intention of legislature. Had there been intention to exclude Section 498-A of the IPC from the sweep of Section 468 of the Cr. P.C express provision could have been made for the said purpose.

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Citations: [2025:BHC-AUG:2858-DB]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/high-court/bombay-high-court/bombay-high-court-cruelty-498a-ipc-limitation-283107

https://lawtrend.in/limitation-period-for-ipc-section-498-a-to-commence-from-last-act-of-cruelty-bombay-high-court/

Limitation for offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC commences from the last act of cruelty: Bombay HC

https://www.verdictum.in/court-updates/high-courts/bombay-high-court/aurangabad-musin-babulal-thengade-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-bhc-aug-2858-db-limitation-1567184

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Posted on February 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment,

From Paras 10-12,

10.Ordinarily, Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. is invoked by the complainant when the police authorities decline to register a First Information Report. In such circumstances, a private complaint may be made in the court of the Judicial Magistrate and the complainant may pray that police investigation be ordered under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, it is the discretion of the concerned Magistrate whether to order police investigation under Section156(3) of Cr.P.C. or take cognizance upon the complaint and issue process or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. Over a period of time and in view of many decisions of this Court, if the officer in-charge of the concerned Police Station for some reasons declines to register the FIR, then the law has left it open for the complainant to file an appropriate application before the Magistrate and pray for police investigation. Once an order is passed for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., then it becomes a police case. At the end of the investigation the police may either file a charge-sheet or file an appropriate closure report.
11.However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint.

From Paras 24 and 25,

24.Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word ‘may’. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored.
25.In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

From Para 31,

31.A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:
a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge
the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate under Section 175(3).
b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.
c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions under Section 175(3).

From Paras 34-35,

34.In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.
35.Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Posted on February 22, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court passed this judgment whereby the marriage of parties is severed and Rs.25 Lakhs alimony was ordered to be paid to wife. Also since DV cases are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence/appearance of the appellant in these proceedings.

From Para 18,

18. In the afore-mentioned complaint case, an application10 was filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act against the appellant, her mother-in-law, and their five other relatives. A notice was issued to the appellant vide order dated 21st July 2022. Subsequently, on 11th August 2022, the learned JMFC passed an interim order in favour of the respondent, prohibiting her eviction from the matrimonial home and directing the personal appearance of the appellant (respondent therein) and other respondents on the next hearing date. However, when the matter was listed again, the Court noticed that the appellant had not returned to India, and the concerned authorities were directed to initiate the extradition process against him.
We may observe that as the proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature, thus, there cannot be any justification to require the personal presence of the appellant in these proceedings. Thus, the learned Magistrate grossly erred while directing the appellant to remain personally present in the Court.

From Para 20,

20. It is apparent that the appellant’s inability to travel to India and appear in Miscellaneous Case No. 440 of 2022, filed by the respondent under Section 26 of the DV Act, stemmed from the impoundment of his passport, a circumstance beyond his control. Consequently, the order of the learned JMFC directing the initiation of extradition proceedings against the appellant as a consequence of his non-appearance, despite being aware of the fact of impounding of the passport of the appellant, is untenable and unsustainable in the eyes of the law. Otherwise also, as noted above, there is no requirement for the personal presence of any party in the proceedings under the DV Act, because they are quasi-criminal in nature and do not entail any penal consequences except when there is a breach of a protection order, which is the only offence provided under Section 31 of the DV Act.

From Para 26,

26. On the issue as to grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, this Court, in a very recent judgment of Rinku Baheti v Sandesh Sharda13, held that the factual analysis has to be undertaken in each case to determine as to what constitutes an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ while keeping in mind the non-exhaustive factors laid down in Shilpa Sailesh (supra).

From Para 31,

31. The filing of the aforesaid cases by the respondent-wife reflects her vindictive attitude towards the appellant and his family members and unambiguously reflects the bitterness that has seeped into the marital relationship. The tumultuous state of the marital relationship between the parties is quite evident, irrespective of the fate of the criminal complaints and the imputations made by the parties against each other. The passport of the appellant was also impounded by the concerned authorities, pursuant to the pending cases filed by the respondent.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Whatever may be the justification for the spouses living separately, with so much time having passed by any marital love or affection that may have developedbetween the parties seems to have evanesced. This is a classic case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged and multiple litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile are evidence enough to establish beyond all manner of doubt that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and that there is no scope whatsoever for marriage to survive. Thus, no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship. On the basis ofthe above factual matrix, the present appears to be a case of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
36. Apart from the irreconcilable status of the relationship between the parties, in the present case, another factor that has weighed with this Court in favour of the exercise of the power under Article 142(1)of the Constitution of India is that there is no child born from the wedlock and therefore, any direction to allowthe parties to part ways would only affect the parties themselves and not any innocent child.
37. Thus, this is a fit case warranting the exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage between the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

From Paras 42-43,

42. Before we conclude our discussion, we must note that the act of impounding the passport of the appellant by the concerned authorities of the Government of India was ex-facie illegal in the eyes of the law. In the present case, the appellant’s passport was impounded on the mere premise that the respondent has filed numerous cases before the various courts in India.
43. The law regarding the impounding of a passport of an individual has been settled by this Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr.16, wherein it was held that the rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.

From Paras 45-46,

45. Further, this Court, in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P.17, while dealing with the question of arrest and fair investigation in a case alleging the offence of cruelty under Section 498A IPC, was of the view that in respect of persons ordinarily residing out of India impounding of passports or issuance of ‘Red Corner Notice’ should not be a routine.
46. Applying the afore-mentioned legal principles to the present case, we find that the act of impounding the appellant’s passport under Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1967, was carried out without granting the appellant an opportunity to be heard. This clear violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act of impounding the passport ex-facie illegal. Consequently, we hold that the concerned authorities should release the appellant’s passport within a period of one week from today.

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 254], [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97306350/

https://www.caseciter.com/vishal-shah-vs-monalisha-gupta-2025-insc-254-domestic-violence-act-passport-impounding-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage-permanent-alimony/

Index of Domestic Violence Judgments is here. Divorce Judgments are here. Passport judgements are here.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Posted on February 19, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Relying on one Apex Court decision here and two High Court decisions here and here, a single judge bench of Telangana High Court pass this short Order.

This Criminal Petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is filed to direct the lower Court i.e., Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date in the light of judgment reported in 2002 (1) Supreme Court Cases 253 and unreported Judgment of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of Syed Nazim Husain v. Additional Principal Judge in (W.P No. 56 of 2002) and the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Civil Application No.2939 of 2017 in W.P.No.14039 of 2017, dated 26.04.2018.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
3. An innocuous prayer has been sought for by the learned counsel for the petitioner to issue a direction to the Court below to dispose of the aforesaid Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016 at an early date.
4. Having regard to the same, the Criminal Petition is disposed of directing the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally Criminal Court, Hyderabad, to dispose of Crl.M.P.No.2956 of 2019 in C.C.No.505 of 2016, within a period of two (2) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, without granting any adjournment.

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Index of Perjury judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Paul George Vs Emarin Paul on 12 Mar 2025

N.Usha Rani and Anr Vs Moodudula Srinivas on 30 Jan 2025

Judgments about Look Out Circular Notices

Frequently Asked Questions – Look Out Circular (LOC) Jurisprudence in India

Manoj Arora Vs Mamta Arora on 7 Aug 2018

Chand Dhawan Vs Jawaharlal Dhawan on 11 Jun 1993

Kalavakuru Srinivas Kumar Reddy Vs Kalavakuru @ Revuru Sujatha and Ors on 05 Feb 2025

Musin Babulal Thengade and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 29 Jan 2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 16 Jan 2025

Vishal Shah Vs Monalisha Gupta and Ors on 20 Feb 2025

Mohd. Ghouse Khan Vs State of Telangana on 15 Oct 2019

Frequently Asked Questions – Look Out Circular (LOC) Jurisprudence in India

1. What is a Look Out Circular (LOC)?+

2. When can an LOC lawfully be issued?+

3. Do courts have power to cancel or withdraw an LOC?+

4. Can LOCs be issued if no FIR or criminal proceeding exists?+

5. Do authorities need to provide reasons or procedural fairness before issuing an LOC?+

6. Can a family court or non-criminal forum issue an LOC in civil or maintenance proceedings?+

7. Is there any obligation on investigating officers after a bail order is granted?+

8. Do LOCs affect fundamental rights?+

9. Can LOCs be issued for national security or exceptional cases?+

10. Do complainants have a right to demand an LOC?+

11. How should authorities manage LOCs after they are no longer justified?+