Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that Family Courts do have power to waive the cooling of period in a divorce by mutual consent under Indian Divorce Act.

From Paras 8-10,

8.The only point that arises for consideration is whether the mandatory waiting period of one year from the date of separation has to be compulsorily
sat through by the parties, who have already decided to part ways, by filing a mutual consent divorce petition. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Anup Disalva’s case, took note of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Saumya Ann Thomas vs Union of India reported in 2010 SCC Online Kerala 5197 and held that the stipulation of a period of two years being a minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and that the said two year period has to be read as one year, taking into account the one year period stipulated in similar legislations namely the Special Marriage Act ( Section 28(1) ) Hindu Marriage Act ( Section 13B(1)) and Parsi Marriage Act (Section 32B(1)).
9.The Honourable Division Bench further took note of the fact that an application for divorce by mutual consent presented by both the husband and
wife reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The Honourable Division Bench taking note of the entitlement of a spouse to file a petition for divorce under Section 10 on other available grounds, without any waiting period and the entitlement and power of the Court to grant a divorce, even before the period of one year, subject to being satisfied with the ground seeking divorce being made out, held that, while that is the position even for a contested proceeding before the Court, there can be no spokes put, impeding the parties from seeking divorce by mutual consent. The Honourable Division Bench, in fact, declared the stipulation of one year period or more, for the purposes of filing a divorce by mutual consent under Section 10A, as violative of fundamental rights and declared it to be unconstitutional.
10.Though said judgment of the Kerala High Court may not have a binding precedentiary value before this Court, the judgment will definitely have persuasive value, for this Court to take note of the ratio laid down by the Honourable Division Bench.
11.Even otherwise, the Honourable Supreme Court, in Shilpa Sailesh’s case, has clarified the ratio laid down in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur,
reported in 2017 (8) SCC 746, and held that the Courts can always waive the cooling period of six months under the Hindu Marriage Act to enable the parties to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, earlier.
12.However, the Family Court has relied on Amardeep Singh’s case, to hold that the one year separation period is mandatory under section 13B(1) of
the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore similarly even under the Divorce Act the cooling period cannot be condoned or waived.

From Paras 16-18,

16.Even though there is no decision of this Court toeing the same lines of the Kerala High Court, striking down the provisions of Section 10A regarding the mandatory waiting period, considering the import of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh’s case as well as the Hon’ble Division Bench in the Kerala High Court, the Family Court is certainly entitled to waive the mandatory waiting period and cannot compel the parties to sit through the same before presenting a petition for divorce in the form of mutual consent, under Section 10A of the Divorce Act.
17.Independently, I also find that both the petitioners have filed separate affidavits even in this revision, affirming their decision to go separate ways. The interest of any children is also not involved in the present case, since the parties were not blessed with any issues and both the petitioners have categorically asserted that the relationship has become irreconcilable and distressing. In such circumstances, compelling the petitioners to wait for the mandatory period to expire would only further increase their agony. The petitioners have also stated that their decision is voluntary and only based on their free will and there is no fraud, collusion or undue influence brought upon them to file the mutual consent divorce petition.
18.In the light of the above, I am inclined to set aside the docket order of the Family Court, Coimbatore, and I direct the Family Court, Coimbatore, to
number DOP CFR.No.3726 of 2025, if it is otherwise in order. The Family Court, Coimbatore, shall not return / reject the petition on the ground that the parties have to wait for the mandatory period of one year from separation to pass off, before they are entitled to file an application for divorce by mutual consent.

Shivkarthik G.S and Anr Vs Nil on 04 Sep 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here.

K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Posted on September 21, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a non-cooperating wife with the Criminal trail who has been evading appearance before the Court,.

From Paras 3-6,

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 1st respondent is not cooperating with the trail and has been evading appearance before the Court, even though bailable warrants were issued against the 1st respondent. It is also submitted that the bailable warrants were cancelled soon after the 1st respondent filed a memo undertaking to appear.
4. Today, when the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submits that even the petitioner was also absent on the last date of hearing, when the matter was listed for trial.
5. It is further submitted that the matter is now fixed for trial on 22.04.2017, and the 1st respondent would appear in Court and adduce the evidence.
6. Considering the submission, the Criminal Petition is disposed off with an observation that the learned Magistrate should endeavor to complete the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferable within a period of six (06) months from the date of the receipt of this order.

2025-03-27 K Sreekanth Naik Vs P Nalini and Anr on 27 Mar 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79857987/

Thanks to Adv Ram G for the below copy. He practiced law (all subjects) at Anantapur Courts and reachable on +91-90000-32896

2025-03-27 K.Sreekanth_Naik_vs_P_Nalini_-_2025_Supreme(Online)(AP)_3987_-_Supreme

Disclaimer: This is a case that I handled myself for the husband. This is my second reportable judgment.

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Posted on September 14, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 15,

15. First and foremost, it may be noted that the allegation of “arm twisting” the respondent by the petitioners is a fine piece of irony. In fact, if anyone is twisting arms here, it is the respondent herself. Of course, not in the literal sense she claims, but in the far more creative, metaphorical sense of using the criminal process as her personal pressure lever. The oblique motive is hardly a guess i.e. it is either to extract what she calls “maintenance,” which her husband has not paid, or to drag the petitioners all the way from Bijnor to Delhi, making them undergo the harassment and humiliation, until her husband succumbs to her demands on the dotted lines. The reasons are not far to seek as they are lying in plain sight. Let us examine how.

From Para 17,

17. The accused no.1 to 5 named in the above police complaint are Harish Yadav, Mangal Singh Yadav, Moorti Devi, Kusum Lata and Chander Pal. None of the petitioners is named therein. A bare perusal of the above makes it abundantly clear that there is not even a whisper of any role attributed to the petitioners, nor any suggestion that they were present at the scene, much less that they caused injury or instigated those who allegedly did during the incident of 18.12.2012. On this ground alone, the belated attempt to drag the petitioners into the proceedings through a subsequent complaint under Section 200 CrPC qua the same incident of 18.12.2012 reeks of pure afterthought on the part of the respondent.

From Para 20,

20. Significantly, it is not even the respondent’s case that her parents and sister were present during the alleged incident. Surprisingly, their depositions have not been placed on record. It is obvious that their evidence, therefore, is nothing but hearsay, dressed up as testimony. It may be reasonably presumed that far from being independent, they merely echoed the complainant’s version, word for word, as dictated and their testimony has minimal probative value.

From Para 28,

28. Before parting, I cannot but note the rather desperate attempt of the respondent’s leaned counsel to dissuade this Court from exercising jurisdiction, on the specious plea of statutory bar. The argument, though dressed in attractive garb, doe not withstand scrutiny. It reminds one of the age-old courtroom maxim: “if you have the facts, hammer the facts; if you have the law, hammer the law; if you have neither, hammer the desk”. Unfortunately for the respondent, in this case, facts do not support her, law does not sustain her case and desk-thumping cannot rescue her. On all three counts, the respondent fails.

Raj Kamal Yadav and Anr Vs Manju Yadav and Other on 7 Aug 2025

Index of Quash Judgments is here.

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Posted on September 13, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single Judge of Delhi High Court that, concealing actual income and withholding the most relevant documents which alone could establish her present financial incapacity should lead to adverse inference against wife.

From Paras 9-11,

9. At the outset, it will be apposite to note that Section 125 of the Cr.P.C is a beneficial provision, premised on a moral obligation of husband and father, and intended to prevent, inter alia, the wife and children from being subjected to the adversities of vagrancy and destitution. It is also trite that proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. are summary in nature and the Court has to take a prima facie view of the dispute between the parties.
10. In the above context, this Court has carefully examined the evidence on record as well as the findings recorded by the learned Family Court. Insofar as the wife’s claim for maintenance is concerned, it emerges that she had admitted in her cross-examination that she is employed in the Education Department at Khekra, Baghpat, though on a temporary basis. She further admitted that her salary slip of December 2016 reflected her salary as Rs. 33,052/- and her income tax return for the year 2017-2018 also disclosed an annual income of Rs. 4,00,724/-, though it is her case that thereafter, her services were terminated by way of judgment dated 25.07.2017 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after which she was working on a temporary basis. While she claimed that her current salary is only Rs. 10,000/- per month, she failed to produce any recent salary slip or Form-16 to substantiate the same, and thus, no recent salary certificate was placed before the learned Family Court despite opportunities given by the learned Trial Court. She also did not offer any plausible explanation in the evidence for withholding recent salary details.
11. The learned Family Court, thus rightly reached to a conclusion that such omission, without any cogent explanation, casts a doubt on the genuineness of her claim and justifies an adverse inference against her. The learned Family Court, therefore, rightly held that the wife had concealed her actual income and withheld the most relevant documents which alone could establish her present financial incapacity. This Court concurs with that view, as the primary ingredient for grant of maintenance to a wife under Section 125 Cr.P.C. – i.e. her inability to maintain herself – has not been satisfactorily proved, in absence of clear and reliable evidence of financial hardship, the claim of the wife becomes speculative and cannot be sustained.

Geeta and Anr Vs State and Anr on 10 Sep 2025

Index of Maintenance Judgments u/s 144 BNSS is here.

Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 02 Sep 2025

Posted on September 10, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows in a false rape case,

From Para 13,

13. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate committed an error in passing the summoning order. The High Court too overlooked the relevant aspects of the matter while rejecting the Section 482 application. It is very apparent on a plain reading of the complaint, more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations that the same doesn’t inspire any confidence. There is no good explanation offered, why it took four years for the respondent no.2 to file a complaint.

From Para 20,

20. The following steps should ordinarily determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-
(i)Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable quality?
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal – proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused. [(See: Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor (Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]

Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr on 02 Sep 2025

Citations: [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 880]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-880-pradeep-kumar-kesarwani-versus-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-303321

https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/supreme-court-quashes-false-rape-case-lays-down-four-step-test-to-quash-frivolous-criminal-complaints

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/sc-quashes-rape-complaint-filed-after-4-years-explains-when-promise-of-marriage-is-not-rape-1518116

https://www.theedulaw.in/content/judgements/235/Court-laid-down-a-structured-four-step-test-to-evaluate-applications-for-quashing-criminal-proceedings.-

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/pages/blog/supreme-court-unveils-four-step-test-to-quash-frivolous-criminal-cases/

SUPREME COURT FOUR STEP TEST FOR QUASHING PETITIONS CLARIFIES SECTION 482 CrPC

PRADEEP KUMAR KESARWANI VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (Supreme Court)

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Addl DG Adjudication DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Posted on September 10, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows,

From Para 40-43,

40. Applying the two maxims referred to above, this Court proceeded to take the view that though Section 65B4 is mandatory, yet it would all depend on the facts of each case, how the same could be said to have been duly complied with.
41. In the facts of the said case, this Court said that the respondents had done everything possible to obtain the necessary certificate which was to be given by a third party over whom the respondents therein had no control and, in such circumstances, must be relieved of the mandatory obligation contained in the said subsection.
42. We have already reproduced paras 51 and 52 respectively of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (supra) above.
43. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, we are of the view and, more particularly, considering the Record of Proceedings duly signed by the respondents, including the various statements of the respondents recorded under Section 108 of the Act, 1962, that there was due compliance of Section 138C(4) of the Act, 1962. When we say due compliance, the same should not mean that a particular certificate stricto senso in accordance with Section 138C(4) must necessarily be on record. The various documents on record in the form of record of proceedings and the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Act, 1962 could be said to be due compliance of Section 138C(4)of the Act, 1962.

From Para 46,

46. At this stage, we must also look into the observations made by this Court in the case of “Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar vs. State of Karnataka and Another,” reported in 2025 SSC online SC 1426 relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the revenue. We quote:-
“A certificate not given in the prescribed format per se will not make it invalid, especially when the authenticity of these marked documents is not in dispute.”

Addl DG DRI Vs Suresh Kumar and Co Impex Pvt Ltd and Ors on 20 Aug 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 1050]

Other Sources:

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-860-additional-director-general-adjudication-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-v-suresh-kumar-and-co-impex-pvt-ltd-ors-302591

https://www.supremecourtcases.com/additional-director-general-adjudication-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-v-suresh-kumar-and-co-impex-pvt-ltd-and-others/

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Posted on September 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows. Few declarations of overruled aspects of Maintenance cases are of interest in this Judgment.

From Para 11 and 12,

Distinction between Interim Relief/Maintenance and Ad-Interim Relief/Maintenance
11. In law, interim relief is a temporary relief granted by the Court after hearing both parties, pending final adjudication of the dispute. It is typically granted upon consideration of pleadings, replies, and after evaluating prima facie rights and urgency. In contrast, ad-interim relief is a provisional relief granted ex-parte or at the initial stage, often before the opposite party is served or has filed a reply. It is essentially an urgent measure granted to prevent irreparable harm, subject to further hearing and confirmation.
12. As far as maintenance is concerned, interim maintenance is an allowance granted to the aggrieved party during the pendency of proceedings and till final adjudication, such as under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or the Domestic Violence Act, generally after considering pleadings and material placed by both parties. Ad-interim maintenance, on the other hand, is a provisional maintenance granted at the preliminary stage, i.e. prior to adjudicating even the interim maintenance, to alleviate urgent hardship being faced by a dependent spouse or child, pending a more detailed consideration of the case. Thus, while both are temporary in nature, the key difference lies in the stage of grant, extent of hearing accorded before the relief is granted, and the prima facie opinion formed by the Court.

From Para 26 to Para 28,

26. Thus, in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra), it was directed that upon the filing of a maintenance petition, notice shall be issued to the respondent, who shall file a reply, and the pleadings shall be completed. Thereafter, both parties were required to simultaneously file affidavits of income, assets, and expenditure, to facilitate an informed and fair assessment of the claim. It was in this context that the Court permitted the grant of ad-interim maintenance, either on the basis of an admitted document, such as a salary slip already available on record by way of pleadings, or on the basis of admissions contained in the respondent‘s income affidavit. In the absence of any such material, the Court was required to hear both parties before determining any ad-interim amount. Thus, the clear mandate was that an ex-parte ad-interim maintenance order, without hearing the respondent or without there being any material indicating his admitted income, was not to be passed by a court of law.
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that in Rajnesh v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court directed that Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities would be filed by the claimant along with the maintenance petition/interim maintenance application. Similarly, the respondent would file his Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities along with the reply. Thus, the directions issued in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra) stood, in effect, overruled to this extent.
28. Therefore, it can be safely held that once the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities has been filed by both the parties, or even if the respondent has not filed the same along with his reply to the maintenance petition, but there are documents on record showing some admitted income of the respondent, the Court can grant ad-interim maintenance to alleviate the hardship of the claimant, pending its decision on the grant of interim maintenance and determination of its quantum.

From Para 31 and 32,

31. However, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, in the decision in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), observed that a party claiming maintenance, whether as a spouse, partner in a civil union, live-in relationship, or common-law marriage, should file a concise application for interim maintenance, along with an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, as a mandatory requirement. The rationale was to enable the Court to make an objective and informed assessment of the financial capacities of the parties at the interim stage. Thus, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court emphasized that interim maintenance cannot be granted in a vacuum and solely on the basis of guess-work, and must be primarily based on the material placed before the Court through pleadings and affidavits from both sides.
32. Therefore, in view of the directions issued in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), it has now been mandated by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court that a concise and specific application seeking interim maintenance should ordinarily be filed by the claimant, accompanied by the requisite affidavit of assets and liabilities.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Indeed, the distinction between interim and ad-interim maintenance lies in the delay – and that distinction is vital. In Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), the Supreme Court itself noted that applications for interim maintenance should ideally be decided within a period of 4 to 6 months. It is within this interim period before the adjudication of interim maintenance application that the grant of ad-interim maintenance assumes its true significance.
36. Just as interim maintenance is granted as a temporary measure pending adjudication of the main petition for maintenance, ad-interim maintenance, as recognized in judicial precedents, serves as a temporary measure pending adjudication of the application for interim maintenance
37. Thus, where the record already contains some admitted income documents such as salary slips, or where there is unreasonable delay in filing of income affidavits by the respondent, the Court may, in the interest of equity, step in and grant ad-interim maintenance – without there being any specific application for grant of ad-interim maintenance filed by the concerned party. Accordingly, for determining ad-interim maintenance, the procedure laid down in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra) would continue to govern the field, since till date, the observation regarding the same has neither been interfered nor set-aside by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court.

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:5114]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases under Section 125 CrPC here.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Posted on August 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37,

37. Sub-clause (b) to sub-section (5) is rather ambiguously uses the expression “any official” without explaining what is meant by the said term. However, when we read sub-section (4) to Section 65B, the meaning to be given to the expression “any official” emerges. Subclause (b) applies when information is supplied to “any official” in the course of activities carried on by him, i.e., in the course of “official” activities with a view that the said information shall be stored and processed for the purpose of the activities carried on by that officer or official. It is also elucidated that the information could be beyond or otherwise in the course of the said activities. Even in such cases the information is treated as supplied in the course of the activities of the official. We clarify that the word “official”, as used in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 65B, is not intended to mean or be restricted to a person holding an office or employed in public capacity. It connotes, as exemplified by the use of the same expression (albeit in its adjective form) in sub-section (4), a person primarily responsible for the management or the use, upkeep or operations of such device. It would, thus, cover a computer device containing electronic records in the hands or control of a private individual or entity.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Citations: [2015:DHC:9600-DB], [(2015) 11 DEL CK 0089], [2015 SCC Online Del 13647], [MANU/DE/3674/2015]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10902800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e3ede56109277ee476fe

https://vlex.in/vid/kundan-singh-vs-the-654461357

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=998850

Sreenivas Motupalli Vs Anjana Taggarse Motupalli on 15 Oct 2024

Posted on August 26, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Telangana High Court held that, ‘well educated and having so many properties and also having professional income doesn’t require interim maintenance‘.

From Para 17,

17. Petitioner herein made several allegations in the Divorce O.P which are to be decided after adducing of evidence by both the parties in the Divorce O.P as such this Court is not going into those aspects in detail. The issue before the Court is only regarding the granting of interim maintenance to wife and children before the trial Court. The respondent has no objection for granting of interim maintenance to the children and he is ready to pay the said amount but be he is not inclined to pay maintenance to the petitioner as she is well educated and having so many properties and also having professional income. Petitioner herself in her application stated regarding her qualifications, abilities and also regarding her professional career of 19 years she has represented many reputed clients as such it can be presumed that she has well established professional career. She also admitted that she was taking care of entire family with her own earnings. She herself stated that her mother gave two house properties in her name and she also stated that respondent transferred house at Jubilee Hills in favour of his father but still she is residing in the said house. Previously respondent was residing in one floor and in-laws in another floor but presently petitioner is residing with her children in the entire house property. She also stated that she is member of several clubs and she was teaching extracurricular activities in the clubs to her children. Even in the application, she stated that he was already paying the fee apart from that she requires interim maintenance of Rs.1,00,000/- and all the details of the expenses were given in the above paragraphs and it was also an admitted fact that respondent herein paid school fee and also incurred the expenses of the club for the children for the certain period. Respondent filed letter of withdrawal of nomination dated 03.03.2010 and extract of minutes of meeting of Board of Director of Krishna Godavari Power Utilities Ltd., held on 13.03.2010 to say that presently he is not working as Director. Even petitioner stated that he was not paid salary for seven years after the marriage as the company is a joint family company and father of the respondent is karta of the family. Petitioner did not state about the income details of the respondent on the ground that he has hidden certain factors from the beginning of the marriage. Trial Court granted interim maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month to the petitioner and Rs.15,000/- per month to each of the minor children i.e., Rs.50,000/- in total and also directed to pay the said amount from the date of petition i.e., from November, 2010 to be payable on or before 6th of every month till the disposal of the O.P. The said order was passed on 27.06.2013 against the said order, this revision petition is preferred on 27.09.2013 and it is brought to the notice of the Court that so far he has not paid any maintenance to the children and not complied the order of the trial Court. Previously, women were financially dependent on the husband as they are not educated and not earning as such it was mentioned in the Laws that she should be maintained by the husband but the days are changed women are also highly qualified, working and earning and they can maintain themselves, therefore, it cannot be said that they are dependent on husband. Even in this case, the petitioner/wife is not dependent on respondent/husband as such granting of interim maintenance to her by the trial Court is not on proper appreciation of the fact and is liable to be set aside. Regarding the maintenance granted to the children this Court finds no reason to interfere with the same. Now children became majors. However, this Court is inclined to direct the respondent to pay entire arrears of maintenance till they attain the age of majority.

Sreenivas Motupalli Vs Anjana Taggarse Motupalli on 15 Oct 2024

Index of Maintenance judgments under HMA are here.

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Posted on August 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that a ‘Wife Holding Immovable Properties & Substantial Income Does Not Need Interim Maintenance To Live Comfortably‘.

From Para 4,

4.Mr.T.Gowthaman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/husband would submit that the respondent is financially not only self sufficient, but also affluent and there is no necessity for the petitioner to pay any interim maintenance to his wife. However, insofar as the maintenance to his son, the petitioner does not challenge the award of maintenance and the learned Senior Counsel states that it is being paid without any default. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the challenge is only in respect of the award of interim maintenance to the wife. He would further submit that the Family Court has passed a mechanical order, without appreciating the pleadings in the maintenance application and the evidence adduced by the parties. He would further state that the very object of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is only to ensure that the respondent is able to sustain herself for a basic and decent living, including meeting of the litigation expenses that have been fastened upon her by the husband.

From Para 5,

5.The learned Senior Counsel would also rely on the dividends received by the respondent as a Director of M/s.Roentgen Scan World Private Limited and also her conduct in approaching the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), seeking for a restraint order to not release dividends to her. In this
connection, the learned Senior Counsel would state that the conduct of the respondent/wife is clearly malafide and only in order to make the claim for maintenance against the petitioner, the respondent has not only suppressed the huge income received by her as dividends from the Company, but also her approaching the NCLT and seeking an order for not releasing the amounts payable to her, which amounts to a self restraint order only in order to entitle her to claim maintenance from the petitioner/husband.

From Para 15,

15.It is however contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that without even consulting the petitioner, the son has been admitted into an institution where the educational fees and expenses are sky high and for the arbitrary decisions of the respondent, the petitioner cannot be mulcted with liability. It is also seen that the respondent has properties standing in her name and even one of the properties that has been settled in her favour by her mother has been re-transferred to her father, pending the proceedings. The explanation offered by the respondent is that the father was the ostensible owner having brought to the property in the name of the mother and therefore, the respondent has settled the property in favour her father, does not appear to be bonafide. If really, the father was the ostensible owner having put in the entire sale consideration, while purchasing the property in the name of his wife, nothing prevented the mother to have straight away settled the property in favour of her husband, namely the father of the respondent. However, pending the proceedings, the settlement executed by the respondent in favour of her father clearly appears to be only in order to get over the objections of the petitioner that the respondent is affluent and owns valuable immovable properties. Even otherwise, the petitioner is having landed property in Thiruporur in the outskirts of city of Chennai where also the property prices have risen considerably.

From Para 16,

16.Further, the fact that the respondent has received substantial monies for the last three financial years is also not in dispute. The object of Section 24 is only for providing interim maintenance to the wife to enable her to get sufficient income to live a comfortable lifestyle. I do not see that the respondent is not possessed of such sufficient income already, warranting further monies from the petitioner by way of interim maintenance. In all fairness, the petitioner has stated that he is willing to meet the educational expenses of his son and has also complied with the order in I.A.No.2 of 2021. Even with regard to the award of Rs.30,000/- maintenance to the son, the petitioner has accepted the said order and has not even challenged the same. In the light of the above, I am not able to sustain the order of the Family Court awarding interim maintenance to the respondent/wife, which is wholly unnecessary in the light of the substantial income that has accrued to the respondent by way of dividends in Scan World and the fact that the respondent also owns valuable immovable properties.

From Para 19,

19.Even applying the ratio laid down in Rajnesh’s case, I do not find that the respondent requires any further amounts by way of interim maintenance to lead a comfortable lifestyle. In view of the aforesaid discussions regarding her holding of immovable properties as well as the substantial income by way of substantial dividends of the Company. The Family Court has already awarded maintenance, considering all the expenses that have been set out by the respondent and fixed the maintenance amount of Rs.30,000/- in support of the minor son and the same has not been challenged by the wife, seeking enhancement as well. The petitioner has also accepted the said order and has been paying a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the son, apart from also meeting the amount of Rs.2,77,000/-. The Family Court, after taking into account the assets and liabilities filed by both the parties, has only focused its attention on the requirement of the son, A.Anirudh and without any reasons or even discussion with regard to the specific averments regarding the ownership of immovable properties and income accruing from the Company by way of dividends, has straight away proceeded to award a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the wife as well. In view of the above, I am inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Family Court.

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI CRP.No.2590 of 2025 & CMP.No.14720 of 2025 Dr.C.Amarnath ..Petitioner

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

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