(1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence,—
(a) on the date of the offence; or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.
Author: ShadesOfKnife
CrPC 467 – Definitions
For the purposes of this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, “period of limitation” means the period specified in section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence.
CrPC 468 – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation
(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be—
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.
Vanka Radhamanohari Vs Vanka Venkata Reddy And Ors on 20 April 1993
Supreme Court held that,
6. At times it has come to our notice that many courts are treating the provisions of Section 468 and Section 473 of the Code as provisions parallel to the periods of limitation provided in the Limitation Act and the requirement of satisfying the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of that Act. There is a basic difference between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 473 of the Code. For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whereas Section 473 enjoins a duty on the court to examine not only whether such delay has been explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such, whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the court has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice. While examining the question as to whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice, the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the class to which the victim belongs, including the background of the victim. If the power under section 473 of the code is to be exercised in the interests of justice, then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture, cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a deeper examination of such grievances, instead of applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim : vigilantibus, et non, dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws). That maxim cannot be applied in connection with offences relating to cruelty against women.
7. It is true that the object of introducing Section 468 was to put a bar of limitation on prosecutions and to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as it was thought proper that after a long lapse of time, launching of prosecution may be vexatious, because by that time even the evidence may disappear. This aspect has been mentioned in the statement and object, for introducing a period of limitation, as well as by this Court in the case of State Of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh 1981 3 SCC 34. But, that consideration cannot be extended to matrimonial offences, where the allegations are of cruelty, torture and assault by the husband or other members of the family to the complainant. It is a matter of common experience that victim is subjected to such cruelty repeatedly and it is more or less like a continuing offence. It is only as a last resort that a wife openly comes before a court to unfold and relate the day-to-day torture and cruelty faced by her, inside the house, which many of such victims do not like to be made public. As such, courts while considering the question of limitation for an offence under Section 498-A i.e subjecting a woman to cruelty by her husband or the relative of her husband, should judge that question, in the light of section 473 of the code, which requires the Court, not only to examine as to whether the delay has been properly explained, but as to whether “it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice”.
Citations: [1993 (2) BLJR 875], [1993 (2) Crimes 275 SC], [I (1994) DMC 172 SC], [JT 1993 (4) SC 17], [1993 (2) SCALE 570], [(1993) 3 SCC 4]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/849288/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ac8ce4b014971140f1d2
Asim Shariff Vs National Investigation Agency on 01 July 2019
Supreme Court has held that,
19. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the Court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.
Citations: [
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/33080905/ Earlier High Court order: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c4c63cb9eff4364f62e246c
Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 227 Cr.P.C. is here.
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs Girdharilal Sapuru And Ors on 11 February 1981
In this Landmark judgment, Supreme Court had held that,
5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the petition was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the CrPC enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceedings and, therefore it is revisable under Section 397(1), Cr.P.C and -Section 397(1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whimper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate.
Citations: [1981 ACR SC 161], [1981 AIR SC 1169], [1981 PLR 83 593], [1981 SCC 2 758], [1981 UJ 13 217], [1981 CRI LJ 632], [1981 CRLJ 0 632], [1981 SCC CRI 1 598], [1981 UJ SC 1 217], [1981 CAR 348], [1981 CRLR 275], [1981 SCC CR 598]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1790776/ or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609abf1e4b014971140db74
Anju and 6 Ors Vs State of U.P. and Anr on 02 December 2013
Allahabad High Court has cited a landmark judgment here to hold as follow,
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid verdict Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Girdharilas Sapuru and others (Supra) has held that the discharge order terminates the proceeding and, therefore, it is revisable under Section 397 (1) Cr.P.C. This Court while passing the order in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.11721 of 2012 (Supra) has held that an order refusing discharge is not an interlocutory order, inasmuch as if the said application is allowed, it would terminate the proceedings, therefore, the revision against the said order would be maintainable.
In view of the aforesaid decisions, the revision against dismissing the discharge application was very well maintainable before the learned lower revisional court and as such, the order passed by the learned lower revisional court is not sustainable in law.
Citations:
Other Source links: http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do?judgmentID=6568265 or https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e4224a93261a672e216f
Reproduced in accordance with Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act 1957 (India) from main.sci.gov.in/judgments, judis.nic.in, lobis.nic.in, indiacode.nic.in and other Indian High Court and District Court Websites such as ecourts.gov.in
Sushila Aggarwal and Ors Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 29 January 2020
A wonderful pronouncement indeed, of a 5-eminent judge Constitutional bench which decided that once Anticipatory Bail is granted u/s 438 CrPC by either a Sessions Court or High Court, it does not have any time limit to it regarding it’s effect. Further, here it was held, No need to get a Regular Bail once AB is granted.
From now onwards, no need to covert Anticipatory Bail into a Regular Bail, upon closure of investigation by I.O. and filing of Charge sheet into a Trial Court.
Here is the Order passed.
And the 133-page jewel of judgment, endorsing the view taken by my favorite Justice Shri Dalveer Bhandavi in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre is below.
From Para 69 of the judgment of Justice Ravindra Bhat (On page 112),
69. Therefore, this court holds that the view expressed in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh, K.L. Verma, Nirmal Jeet Kaur, Satpal Singh, Adri Dharan Das, HDFC Bank, J.J. Manan and Naresh Kumar Yadav (supra) about the Court of Sessions, or the High Court, being obliged to grant anticipatory bail, for a limited duration, or to await the course of investigation, so as the “normal court” not being “bye passed” or that in certain kinds of serious offences, anticipatory bail should not be granted normally- including in economic offences, etc are not good law. The observations – which indicate that such time related or investigative event related conditions, should invariably be imposed at the time of grant of anticipatory bail are therefore, overruled. Similarly, the observations in Mhetre that “the courts should not impose restrictions on the ambit and scope of section 438 Cr.P.C. which are not envisaged by the Legislature. The court cannot rewrite the provision of the statute in the garb of interpreting it” is too wide and cannot be considered good law. It is one thing to say that as a matter of law, ordinarily special conditions (not mentioned in Section 438 (2) read with Section 437 (3) should not be imposed; it is an entirely different thing to say that in particular instances, having regard to the nature of the crime, the role of the accused, or some peculiar feature, special conditions should not be imposed. The judgment in Sibbia itself is an authority that such conditions can be imposed, but not in a routine or ordinary manner and that such conditions then become an inflexible “formula” which the courts would have to follow. Therefore, courts and can, use their discretion, having regard to the offence, the peculiar facts, the role of the offender, circumstances relating to him, his likelihood of subverting justice (or a fair investigation), likelihood of evading or fleeing justice- to impose special conditions. Imposing such conditions, would have to be on a case to case basis, and upon exercise of discretion by the court seized of the application under Section 438. In conclusion, it is held that imposing conditions such as those stated in Section 437 (2) while granting bail, are normal; equally, the condition that in the event of the police making out a case of a likely discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, person released on bail shall be liable to be taken in police custody for facilitating the discovery. Other conditions, which are restrictive, are not mandatory; nor is there any invariable rule that they should necessarily be imposed or that the anticipatory bail order would be for a time duration, or be valid till the filing of the FIR, or the recording of any statement under Section 161, Cr. PC, etc. Other conditions may be imposed, if the facts of the case so warrant.
Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 98], [2020 DLT SC 266 741]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123660783/
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sushila-aggarwal-and-others-versus-state-nct-of-delhi-and-another
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/sushila-aggarwal-and-others-versus-state-nct-of-delhi-and-another
5-judge bench holds no time limit could be fixed while granting anticipatory bail [Full report]
The life of this case is in detail available here.
Index of all Anticipatory Bail Matters is here and all Bail matters list is here.
S Nagalingam Vs Sivagami on 31 August 2001
Unless a valid marriage is proved, a second marriage stands invalid and no offence under section 494 IPC attracts.
Citations: [2001 AIR SC 3576], [2001 SCALE 6 42], [2001 JT 7 219], [2001 AIR SC 3372], [2001 SCC 7 487], [2001 SUPREME 6 772], [2001 SCC CRI 1273], [2001 OLR 2 648], [2001 ALD CRI 2 634], [2001 AWC SC 4 2998], [2001 ACR SC 3 2486], [2001 DMC SC 2 544], [2002 ALT CRI 1 69]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1386675/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ce4b0149711411daa
498A IPC Judgments
Here I will list all judgments both from Supreme Court of India and Various High Courts that may be used in the false cases filed u/s 498A IPC
Once you get hold of your case documents on First date of appearance in Court, see if there are any possible grounds to come out of false cases. This is possible in 2 ways.
- By filing a Discharge Petition u/s 239 CrPC at the Trial Court where this false 498A IPC case is filed.
- By filing a Quash Petition u/s 482 CrPC at the High Court in that State, where this false 498A IPC case is filed.
This page here contains the provisions available under the above provisions along with Judgments.
Supreme Court Judgments
- Girdhar Shankar Tawade Vs State of Maharashtra on 24 Apr 2002
- Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra on 11 Nov 2010
MASTER SITEMAP here.
