Bombay High Court held that since there is no natural calamity, there is no need to postpone, elections for Cooperative Societies.
Citations: [(
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In this landmark judgment, Supreme Court held that State Election Commission (SEC) is a Constitutional body and invariably, State Governments should support State Election Commissioner in conducting free and fair Local body elections. It also held that State Commission shall not put forward any excuse based on unreasonable grounds and not yield to situations created by vested interests to postpone elections. It is stated that except in exceptional circumstances of man-made calamities such as rioting or breakdown of law and order, or natural calamities, Election Commission would be justified in delaying the Election Process.
In this direction, it is necessary for all the State governments to recognize the significance of the State Election Commission, which is a constitutional body and it shall abide by the directions of the Commission in the same manner in which it follows the directions of the Election Commission of India during the elections for the Parliament and State Legislatures. In fact, in the domain of elections to the Panchayats and the Municipal bodies under the Part IX and Part IX A for the conduct of the elections to these bodies they enjoy the same status as the Election Commission of India.
From the reading of the said provisions it is clear that the powers of the State Election Commission in respect of conduct of elections is no less than that of the Election Commission of India in their respective domains. These powers are, of course, subject to the law made by Parliament or by State
Legislatures provided the same do not encroach upon the plenary powers of the said Election Commissions.The State Election Commissions are to function independent of the concerned State Governments in the matter of their powers of superintendence, direction and control of all elections and preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats and Municipalities.
Article 243 K (3) also recognizes the independent status of the State Election Commission. It states that upon a request made in that behalf the Governor shall make available to the State Election Commission “such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of the functions conferred on the
State Election Commission by clause (1). It is accordingly to be noted that in the matter of the conduct of elections, the concerned government shall have to render full assistance and co-operation to the State Election Commission and respect the latter’s assessment of the needs in order to ensure that free and fair elections are conducted.
Also, for the independent and effective functioning of the State Election Commission, where it feels that it is not receiving the cooperation of the concerned State Government in discharging its constitutional obligation of holding the elections to the Panchayats or Municipalities within the time
mandated in the Constitution, it will be open to the State Election Commission to approach the High Courts, in the first instance, and thereafter the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or such other appropriate writ directing the concerned State Government to provide all necessary cooperation and assistance to the State Election Commission to enable the latter to fulfill the constitutional mandate.
Citations: [(2006) 8 SCC 352], [2006 (9) JT 320], [2006 SCR SUPP 7 454], [2007 AIR SC 269], [2006 SCALE 10 438], [2007 BOMCR SC 4 414], [2006 AIOL 715]
Other Source links: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1736371/ and https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae35e4b01497114132f5
Couple of election-related judgments here and here.
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Citations: [
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Single-judge bench of Bombay High Court highlighted the grounds on which a Legal terrorism was intended to be unleashed on an innocent family u/s 498A IPC, and thwarted it royally.
From Paras 9 and 10
9 Admittedly, complainant (PW-1) led a very happily married life with accused no.1. Their date of marriage is 27th June 1990 and PW-1 left the matrimonial home on 28th March 2001. As per PW-1, accused was given lot of gold, household appliances and Rs.50,000/- within three months of her marriage, which means that these things were given in the year 1990. There is no explanation as to why the complaint was then lodged only on 4th January 2002. According to PW-1, accused no.1 demanded Rs.1 lakh when he saw the retirement benefits cheque in the hand of her father and her father retired on 28th February 2001. The complaint has been lodged on 4th January 2002. The delay is not explained. Moreover, complainant left the house leaving behind her children, who were on the date she left the house were 9 years and 6 years, respectively. PW-1 never filed any custody petition or any petition for divorce. PW-1 filed maintenance petition on 10th March 2003. The delay again has not been explained.
10 It is settled law that delay in lodging the complaint cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the complaint. At the same time, delay has the effect of putting the Court in its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory. If prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay, the delay could be fatal to prosecution.
From Para 11,
11 In this case, there is not even an attempt by the prosecution to explain the delay. It appears that PW-1 had no problems living alone with her
parents but when PW-1 heard from her father that accused no.1 has married accused no.5 (which again has not proved), PW-1 decided to teach accused no.1 a lesson. It is unfortunate that in matters like this even the family members are getting dragged. Prosecution should refrain from dragging allfamily members unless there is enough specific evidence against the family members otherwise provisions of Section 498-A will unfortunately bemisused as a weapon.
Finally, in Para 15,
15 There is an acquittal and therefore, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to the accused under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless they are proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, accused having secured their acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. For acquitting the accused, the Trial Court rightly observed that the prosecution had failed to prove its case.
Citations: [2020 SCC ONLINE BOM 331]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63867796/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5e5cd685cfc07432f89ed3dc
AP High Court has rightly held the various counts of errors committed by the Trial Court magistrate in dismissing a Discharge Petition filed u/s 239.
Citations: [2014(1) Law Summary (A.P.) 266], [2014(1) ALD (Crl) 611 (AP)], [2014(2) ALT (Crl) 237 (AP)]
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Index of Discharge Judgments u/s 239 are here.
Supreme Court held the scope of 205 CrPC in this judgment as,
Second is that it is difficult, in the absence of other materials, to decide positively whether the order dated 28.4.2000 is an interlocutory order only.
The interdict contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test laid down by this Court through a series of decisions is this: If the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If it would,then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.
And
Section 251 is the commencing provision in Chapter XX of the Code which deals with trial of summons cases by magistrates. It enjoins on the court to ask the accused whether he pleads guilty when the accused appears or is brought before the magistrate. The appearance envisaged therein can either be by personal attendance of the accused or through his advocate. This can be understood from Section 205(1) of the Code which says that whenever a magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader.
17. Thus, in appropriate cases the magistrate can allow an accused to make even the first appearance through a counsel. The magistrate is empowered to record the plea of the accused even when his counsel makes such plea on behalf of the accused in a case where the personal appearance of the accused is dispensed with. Section 317 of the Code has to be viewed in the above perspective as it empowers the court to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused (provided he is represented by a counsel in that case) even for proceeding with the further steps in the case. However, one precaution which the court should take in such a situation is that the said benefit need be granted only to an accused who gives an undertaking to the satisfaction of the court that he would not dispute his identity as the particular accused in the case, and that a counsel on his behalf would be present in court and that he has no objection in taking evidence in his absence. This precaution is necessary for the further progress of the proceedings including examination of the witnesses.
“18. A question could legitimately be asked – what might happen if the counsel engaged by the accused (whose personal appearance is dispensed with) does not appear or that the counsel does not co-operate in proceeding with the case? We may point out that the legislature has taken care for such eventualities. Section 205(2) says that the magistrate can in his discretion direct the personal attendance of the accused at any stage of the proceedings. The last limb of Section 317(1) confers a discretion on the magistrate to direct the personal attendance of the accused at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. He can even resort to other steps for enforcing such attendance.
“19. The position, therefore, bogs down to this: It is within the powers of a magistrate and in his judicial discretion to dispense with the personal appearance of an accused either throughout or at any particular stage of such proceedings in a summons case, if the magistrate finds that insistence of his personal presence would itself inflict enormous suffering or tribulations to him, and the comparative advantage would be less. Such discretion need be exercised only in rare instances where due to the far distance at which the accused resides or carries on business or on account of any physical or other good reasons the magistrate feels that dispensing with the personal attendance of the accused would only be in the interests of justice. However, the magistrate who grants such benefit to the accused must take the precautions enumerated above, as a matter of course. We may reiterate that when an accused makes an application to a magistrate through his duly authorised counsel praying for affording the benefit of his personal presence being dispensed with the magistrate can consider all aspects and pass appropriate orders thereon before proceeding further.”
Citations: [2001 INSC 399], [2001 KHC 0 714], [2001 AIR SC 3625], [2001 UC 2 370], [2001 AD SC 6 612], [2001 SCC 6 339], [2001 AWC SC 4 2981], [2001 CRI LJ 4250], [2001 JIC 2 685], [2001 MPLJ 3 664], [2001 SUPREME 6 339], [2001 AIR SC 0 3413], [2001 JCC 2 127], [2001 ACR SC 3 2297], [2001 KERLT 3 307], [2001 JT SC 7 127], [2001 SCC 7 401], [2001 CRIMES SC 4 199], [2002 PLJR 4 95], [2002 MAHLJ 1 81], [2002 BOMCR CRI SC 190], [2002 BOMCR SC 2 265], [2002 ALT CRI 1 13], [2001 RCR CRI 4 137], [2003 JLJ SC 1 56], [2001 SCALE 5 503], [2001 CRLJ 0 4250], [2001 S SCR 2 219], [2001 SCC CR 0 1254], [2001 RCR CRIMINAL 4 137], [2001 DCR SC 602], [2001 OLR 2 613], [2002 LJ 1 161], [2001 CCR 0 208], [2001 SRJ 8 415], [2001 CRLR SC 0 481], [2001 SCC CRI 0 1254], [2001 CALCRILR 0 481], [2001 SLT 6 120], [2001 CCR 3 208], [2001 ALLMR CRI 0 1961], [2001 SCJ 3 176], [2002 BCR 2 265], [2002 MHLJ SC 1 81], [2001 ALD CRI 2 530], [2002 BCR CRI 0 190]
Other Source links:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1255592/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ad9ce4b0149711411db4
A division bench of Apex Court relying on Bhaskar Industries and Rameshwar Yadav, held as follows,
From Para 7,
7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned Judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as that of the learned Trial Court rejecting the application submitted by the appellant under Section 205 Cr.P.C. are hereby quashed and set aside and consequently the application submitted by the appellant to dispense with his appearance before the learned Trial Court on all dates of adjournments and permitting his counsel Sri Bharadwaj Reddy to appear on his behalf is here by allowed on the following conditions:
(1) That the appellant shall give an undertaking to the learned Trial Court that he would not dispute his identity in the case and that Sri Bharadwaj Reddy advocate who is permitted to represent the appellant, would appear before the learned Trial Court on his behalf on each and every date of hearing and that he shall not object recording of the evidence in his absence and that no adjournment shall be asked for on behalf of the appellant and/or his advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy;
(2) That the appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court for the purpose of framing of the charges and also on other hearing dates whenever the learned Trial Curt insists for his appearance;
(3) If there is any failure on the part of the advocate Sri Bharadwaj Reddy, who is to represent the appellant, either to appear before the learned Trial Court on each adjournment and/or any adjournment is sought on behalf of the appellant and/or if the learned Trial Court is of the opinion that the appellant and/or his advocate is trying to delay the trial, in that case, it would be open for the learned Trial Court to exercise its powers under Section 205 (2) Cr.P.C. and direct the appearance of the appellant on each and every date of adjournment.
Citations: [2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1622], [2019 INSC 1379]
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/15759089/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5dfbc5f53321bc3818f97bd7
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/puneet-dalmia-versus-central-bureau-of-investigation-hyderabad
Index is here.
A landmark judgment, where in Full-bench (5-Judge) of Allahabad High Court held that, Sessions Court and High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in matters of 438 CrPC (Anticipatory Bail) and that there is no rule that first option at Sessions Court ought to be exhausted before seeking audience at High Court, but can be done so under Special circumstances only.
Citations: [
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Magistrate Court at Ongole, Prakasam dismissed the DV Case based on Markapuram Sivarao case here, as the 498A IPC case was dismissed earlier which had same/similar allegations.
Citations: [2
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In this landmark decision from Supreme Court, seed for the following Police Reforms in India were sown by the Ex-DGP Uttar Pradesh Shri Prakash Singh ji.
Citations: [2006 JT 12 225], [2006 SCR SUPP 6 473], [2006 SCC CRI 3 417], [2006 SCALE 9 444], [2006 AIOL 639], [2006 SUPREME 8 470], [2006 SCC 8 1], [2011 SCC CRI 1 1023], [2006 KERLT 4 482], [2006 KLT 4 482]
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1090328/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae2de4b0149711413181
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