Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Posted on October 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court held that mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.

Solution is to use same evidence in maintenance case also, that was used in RCR proceedings and win the maintenance case. Simple…
The judiciary (could!) just delayed the inevitable. That’s all.

From Paras 29 and 30,

29. Thus, the preponderance of judicial thought weighs in favour of upholding the wife’s right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and the mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband’s behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard and it must invariably depend on the distinctive facts and circumstances obtaining in each particular case. In any event, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights secured by a husband coupled with non-compliance therewith by the wife would not be determinative straightaway either of her right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.
30. Another contention that was urged before us is that the findings in the judgment for restitution of conjugal rights by the Family Court, being a Civil Court, would be binding on the Court seized of the petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C, as they are to be treated as criminal proceedings. This specious argument needs mention only to be rejected outright. No doubt, in Shanti Kumar Panda vs. Shakuntala Devi20, this Court held that a decision by a Criminal Court would not bind the Civil Court while a decision by the Civil Court would bind the Criminal Court. However, maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in nature and the reason for inclusion of the provisions dealing therewith in the Code of Criminal Procedure was clarified by the Law Commission of India in September, 1969. Significantly, as long back as in the year 1963, in Mst. Jagir Kaur and another vs. Jaswant Singh21, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that proceedings under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the precursor to Section 125 Cr.P.C., are in the nature of civil proceedings; the remedy, being a summary one; and the person seeking that remedy, ordinarily being a helpless person. Therefore, even if non-compliance with an order for payment of maintenance entails penal consequences, as may other decrees of a Civil Court, such proceedings would not qualify as or become criminal proceedings. Nomenclature of maintenance proceedings initiated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, as those provisions find place therein, cannot be held to be conclusive as to the nature of such proceedings.

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Index of HMA judgments is here. Index of Maintenance Judgments is here.

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Posted on October 4, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Supreme Court did MCD settlement at 12 Crore rupees.

From Paras 14.4, 14.5 and 14.7,

14.4 In the instant case as well, the petitioner-wife has stated that the respondent-husband is a man of means with a net-worth of Rs.5,000 crores with multiple businesses and properties in USA and in India and that he had paid his first wife at least Rs.500 crores upon separation, excluding a house in Virginia, USA. Thus, she claims permanent alimony commensurate to the status of the respondent-husband and on the same principles as was paid to the first wife of the respondent. The respondent-husband on the other hand is willing to pay a reasonable amount to cover the difference in the income and expenditure of the petitioner-wife, which he feels should be in the range of Rs.20 to 40 lakhs as a one-time lump sum payment. Thus, there is a clear and significant divergence or “mismatch” between the offer and the desire.
14.5 We have serious reservations with the tendency of parties seeking maintenance or alimony as an equalisation of wealth with the other party. It is often seen that parties in their application for maintenance or alimony highlight the assets, status and income of their spouse, and then ask for an amount that can equal their wealth to that of the spouse. However, there is an inconsistency in this practice, because the demands of equalisation are made only in cases where the spouse is a person of means or is doing well for himself. But such demands are conspicuously absent in cases where the wealth of the spouse has decreased since the time of separation. There cannot be two different approaches to seeking and granting maintenance or alimony, depending on the status and income of the spouse. The law of maintenance is aimed at empowering the destitute and achieving social justice and dignity of the individual. The husband is under a legal obligation to sufficiently provide for his wife. As per settled law, the wife is entitled to be maintained as far as possible in a manner that is similar to what she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home while the parties were together. But once the parties have separated, it cannot be expected of the husband to maintain her as per his present status all his life. If the husband has moved ahead and is fortunately doing better in life post his separation, then to ask him to always maintain the status of the wife as per his own changing status would be putting a burden on his own personal progress. We wonder, would the wife be willing to seek an equalisation of wealth with the husband if due to some unfortunate events post-separation, he has been rendered a pauper?
14.7 But the petitioner-wife in the instant case has sought equalisation of status not just with the respondent-husband but also with the ex-wife of the respondent. In our opinion, this cannot be an acceptable approach. The fixation of alimony depends on various factors and there cannot be any straight-jacket formula for the same. Thus, the petitioner cannot simply claim an amount equal to what the ex-wife of the respondent had received or on the basis of the income of the respondent. The Court has to not just consider the income of the respondent-husband here, but also bear in mind other factors such as the income of the petitioner-wife, her reasonable needs, her residential rights, and other similar factors. Thus, her entitlement to maintenance has to be decided based on the factors applicable to her and not depend on what the respondent had paid to his ex-wife or solely on his income.

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony judgments is here.

Sandeep Walia Vs Monika Uppal on 18 Jul 2022

Posted on October 2, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that

From Paras 7 and 8,

7. Ms. Sunita Arora, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-wife vehemently opposed the present revision and submitted that the instant case has to be considered from a different perspective. According to her the revisionist-husband is not truthful in his disclosure in affidavit of income filed before the Family Court. She has drawn the attention of this court to various paragraphs to show that the revisionist claiming himself to be jobless is still incurring a monthly expenditure of about Rs.35,210/- per month. She also points out that the revisionist has shown his mother to be dependent on him, however, has not disclosed that she is already getting a pension of Rs.25,000/- per month. She further states that in column No.26, which relates to a number of the bank account, the revisionist has shown only one account of ICICI Bank whereas he is maintaining a different joint account in the State Bank of India, which has been admitted by him in his cross-examination. She also points out that the revisionist in his educational and professional qualification column has mentioned only graduation, whereas, in his cross-examination, he unequivocally admits that he has done one year diploma in Graphic Designing. She also submits that the revisionist is maintaining a motorcycle and a car and is living in a 3-BHK Flat.
8. From the material available on record, including the cross- examination, she points out that there are various credit entries in the account of her husband. He has also invested amount in mutual funds and he is getting regular dividends therefrom.

From Para 12,

12. Under the aforesaid circumstances, as noted above, it can be safely concluded that the petitioner was not truthful in disclosure of his correct income. His employment as a Driver with his own maternal uncle is also highly unreliable. The lifestyle, which the petitioner is maintaining, would clearly demonstrate that he is capable of earning sufficient money to run not only his livelihood but of his wife also. The respondent-wife while placing documents on record has clearly proved that the petitioner is capable of earning a handsome salary. The petitioner also admitted that he had been earning about Rs.30,000/- per month.

Sandeep Walia Vs Monika Uppal on 18 Jul 2022

Citations: [2022:DHC:2655]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Nidhi Jain Vs Ankit Jain on 31 Jul 2025

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held that

5. Reliance is placed on settled legal precedents, including the Supreme Court’s judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha Criminal Appeal 730/2020 and the case of Sandeep Walia v. Monika Uppal CRL.REV.P. 179/2019, which recognize that when a husband conceals his income or assets, the court must take into account his true financial status for the determination of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Furthermore, the Petitioner cites the case of Vikas Ahluwalia v. Simran Ahluwalia FAO143/2013 and Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders Civil Appeal Nos. 2120 to 2122 of 1972, where courts have acknowledged that assets are often transferred in matrimonial disputes to avoid paying rightful dues. The Petitioner further asserts that the Respondent’s actions, including domestic violence, illegal retention of stridhan, and filing of frivolous litigations, are part of a larger scheme to deprive her of her legal entitlements.
17. No doubt, the petition was filed way back in the year 2013 and has not been disposed of till date and applications under Section 311 Cr. PC have been preferred at the stage of final arguments. However, power under Section 311 Cr.P.C can be exercised at any stage of enquiry, trial and other proceedings. Such power can be invoked even at the stage of final arguments.
18. Matrimonial litigation, particularly where financial dependency and concealment are alleged, demands a sensitive and pragmatic approach. The documents and witnesses sought to be introduced by the petitioner are not collateral or immaterial but rather, they directly affect the determination of maintenance which is a matter of subsistence. The Family Court ought to have adopted a more purposive interpretation of its enabling powers under Section 311 Cr.P.C., instead of taking a hyper-technical view.
19. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 07.06.2024 is set aside. The petition is allowed. The learned Family Court is directed to permit the petitioner to summon the concerned witnesses with the relevant record. However, it is directed that the remaining proceedings be conducted expeditiously and all out efforts be made to dispose of the case as early as possible and preferably within a period of next three months. Both sides are directed to cooperate with the trial Court in an effort to expeditiously dispose of the petition.

Nidhi Jain Vs Ankit Jain on 31 Jul 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Posted on October 1, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of the Apex Court did settlement between parties at around 6 Crore rupees, but at least acknowledged and reproduced Delhi High Court observations. Thanks

From Paras 14 and 15,

14. In this case, the High Court observed that the appellant’s income, primarily from employment and investments, demonstrated his ability to provide for the wife and child’s maintenance adequately. The evidence revealed that the appellant earned over ₹4,00,000 (Rupees four lakhs only) per month
between 2007 and 2016. Although he claimed higher living expenses due to his residence in Mauritius, the High Court found his arguments to be unsubstantiated, as his financial resources allowed him to meet maintenance obligations without undue hardship. The High Court further noted several instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process. He withheld critical financial documents and selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth. The inquiry into the statutory forms of the appellant revealed that he had investments in mutual funds valued at ₹5.10 crores as early as 2009-2010, significant sums deposited in bank accounts, and other financial transactions that were not initially disclosed.
15. The High Court also identified false representations by the appellant regarding his property and income. He denied ownership of a property located at F-146, Richmond Park, Gurgaon, despite evidence of its ownership and rental income accruing to him. Additionally, the appellant misrepresented his association with Prasham Consultants LLP, wherein he continued to receive financial benefits until his father replaced him in 2016. These findings demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets by the appellant, aimed at minimizing his maintenance liability. Such conduct warranted judicial intervention to ensure justice and provide adequate financial support to the wife and child, reflecting principles of fairness, transparency, and equity. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interim maintenance that adequately addressed the needs of the wife and child, proportionate to his financial capacity and consistent with the obligations of a responsible spouse and parent.

From Paras 29

29. The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The issue of maintenance pendente lite is now infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony. The learned senior counsels for the parties have made submissions at length regarding the financial condition of both the parties. In order to establish the correct financial position of both the parties, they have filed their respective affidavits of income and assets as ordered by this Court.

From Para 34,

34. In the present case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years. We have perused the records of finances produced before us. Even though the records of the DEMAT accounts and the employment letters produced by the appellant are almost ten years ago or earlier, his financial position can be suitably ascertained from them.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Citations: [2024 INSC 961], [2024 LiveLaw (SC) 969]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/102090299/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/6759168762941119016e16ef

https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/permanent-alimony-shouldnt-penalize-husband-but-should-ensure-decent-living-for-wife-supreme-court-lists-out-factors-277959

Parvin Kumar Jain vs Anju Jain Divorce Case

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/parvin-kumar-jain-vs-anju-jain

https://lawbeat.in/supreme-court-judgments/marriage-be-dissolved-if-succumbed-due-long-standing-differences-supreme-court

PARVIN KUMAR JAIN vs. ANJU JAIN

https://www.lawtext.in/judgement.php?bid=1281

Supreme Court Upholds Financial Security in Marriage Breakdown: A Case Study

Alimony Decoded: 8 Critical Guidelines to Ensure Fair Settlements in Divorce Cases

The impugned Order from the Delhi High Court is below. Few relevant Paras from the said Order follow.

41. The Husband disputes the aforesaid finding on concealment. On behalf of the Husband, it has been strenuously urged that the Family Court though takes note of the affidavit dated 11thMay, 2018 filed by the Husband however, it does not deal with the same. We have carefully gone through the said affidavit. In our view, the said affidavit was yet another attempt on the part of the Husband to mislead the Family Court and conceal particulars of his income as well as assets.
47. On behalf of the Husband, it has been vehemently argued that it is the Wife who has filed false affidavits before this Court to the effect that she lives in a rented house and is paying rent on a regular basis. It is further alleged that the Wife has filed a forged Rent Agreement to claim that she is paying monthly rent to one Ms Sudesh Bansal. It is submitted that the Wife has failed to disclose that the house in which she lives has been transferred by Ms Sudesh Bansal in favour of the Wife’s mother vide registered General Power of Attorney and Agreement to Sell dated 25th June, 2009. On the basis of the aforesaid averments, an application has been filed by the Husband under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C before the Family Court, which is yet to be decided.
49. In our view, the explanation offered by the Wife is plausible. A perusal of the Rent Agreement dated 13th December, 2011 shows that the Wife was paying rent of Rs.11,000/- per month. It is not the case of the Husband that the Wife owns the said property or that she has paid any amount towards the purchase of the said property. There is nothing placed on record which would have us believe that what was apparent was not real. The Husband, in our opinion, is seeking to muddy the waters. The Husband’s concealments have been alluded to above. The Husband’s contentions on this count are, therefore, rejected. In our opinion, this cannot be a ground to deny the lawful maintenance to the Wife.
50. It must be emphasized that the discussion above leaves no doubt in our minds that the Husband has grossly concealed the real income as well as his movable and immovable assets in order to avoid paying the rightful amount of maintenance to the wife. The Family Court has correctly returned findings with regard to the earnings of the husband as well as attempts on the part of the Husband to conceal his real income.

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 01 Aug 2024

Index of Maintenance and Alimony cases under HMA is here.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Posted on September 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Apex Court ruled that none of the offences in the FIR were made out against the Petitioners.

From Paras 8-12,

8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the FIR dated 06.02.2022 as well as the final report, we are of the considered opinion that the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants pursuant to the registration of offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code deserve to be quashed.
9. Before examining the FIR along with the complaint of the complainant, we may refer to the parameters that are to be borne in mind while entertaining the prayer for quashing of the FIR. If the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, quashing of the proceedings would be justified. Vague and general allegations cannot lead to forming of a prima facie case. As regards the ingredients for making out an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code is concerned, the requirement is that there has to be cruelty inflicted against the victim which either drives her to commit suicide or cause grave injury to herself or lead to such conduct that would cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health. The latter part of the provision refers to harassment with a view to satisfy an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security raised by the husband or his relatives. These aspects have been considered in detail in a recent decision in Digambar and Another (supra) (to which one of us, B.R. Gavai, J, as he then was, was a party).
10. A perusal of the FIR and its consideration in entirety indicates that statements of a general nature have been made therein as against the present appellants. The complainant states that on 07.08.2021 when she had gone to her parental house, she had received a call from her mother-in-law raising a demand for clothes and jewellery. When she returned to her matrimonial house on 30.08.2021, she had taken few clothes for the family members. Except this statement, all other statements are of a general nature as well as vague without any particulars. There are other omnibus statements made in the complaint without any particulars whatsoever. It is also to be noted that for the purpose of constituting an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Penal Code, cruelty as indicated in the Explanation to the said provision must be stated to be inflicted. The cruelty caused by the husband and his family members should be of such nature that it is inflicted with the intention to cause grave injury or drive the victim to commit suicide or inflict grave injury to herself. Such allegations are absent in the present case. We do not find that on a complete reading of the complaint, a prima facie case for proceeding under Section 498-A of the Penal Code has been made out against the appellants.
11. As regards the offence punishable under Sections 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code is concerned, it is seen that the allegations in this regard have been made only against the complainant’s husband and not against the present appellants. The entire tenor of the complaint in that regard seeks to implicate the complainant’s husband and all incidents stated therein relate to him. There is no allegation whatsoever in that context against the appellants that would require them to face trial on that count. The proceedings insofar as the present appellants are concerned, thus, deserve to be quashed in their entirety. In our view, the High Court failed to notice this aspect of the matter while declining to quash the proceedings against the appellants.
12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that on the touchstone of the law laid down in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others2, a case has been made out by the appellants for quashing of the criminal proceedings lodged against them under Sections 498-A, 377 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Continuation of these proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law and, hence, the appellants are entitled to relief.

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Resham Lal Dewangan Vs Suman Dewangan on 09 May 2025

Posted on September 28, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of High Court of Chhattisgarh held that once a divorce decree is granted on the ground that wife is living in adultery then, wife suffers from the disqualification to claim maintenance from her ex-husband.

From Paras 19-21,

19.Sub- Section 4 of Section 125 of the CrPC provides that if a woman lives in adultery, whose marriage is still subsisting, she is not entitled for
maintenance from her husband. Suppose, a decree for divorce is granted on the ground of her living in adultery, can it be said that the said disqualification of which she was suffering from all along, during the subsistence of the marriage, will cease to exist, because of the decree for divorce?. The prudent answer to this question shall be an emphatic – “No”. The decree obtained by the husband for divorce on proving the adulterous life of the wife cannot give a license to her to continue to live in illicit relationship and to get her right to claim maintenance revived. Therefore, I conclude that a divorced wife, who lives in adultery, viz., living in illicit relationship with man other than her former husband is disqualified from claiming maintenance, under Section 125 of the Code.
20.If once the decree for divorce is granted on the ground of adultery, such finding is relevant for deciding the issue of adultery in the present case. The decree is a decree passed on proof of the claim made by means of sufficient evidence which has not been challenged by the aggrieved party.
21.Considering the aforesaid legal proposition of law and considering the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the decree for divorce
granted by the family Court in favour of the applicant-husband is sufficient proof that the applicant-wife was living in adultery. When once such a decree is in force, it is not possible for this Court to take a different view contrary to the decree granted by the Civil court. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the decree granted by the Family Court clearly goes to prove that the applicant-wife is living in adultery and thus, applicant-wife suffers from the disqualification to claim maintenance from the petitioner.

Resham Lal Dewangan Vs Suman Dewangan on 09 May 2025

Index of Divorce judgments is here. Index of Maintenance judgments is here.

K.Harish Kumar Vs Vanathy Rajkumar on 24 Apr 2024

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Karnataka High Court held as follows,

From Para 8,

8. Having heard the learned counsels on either side, perused the entire material on record. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajnesh Vs. Neha1, if there is any dispute with respect to the declaration made in the affidavit of disclosure, the aggrieved party shall seek permission of the Court to serve interrogatories and seek production of relevant documents from the opposite party. The Court had elaborately discussed about the difficulties that the Court faces while granting interim maintenance and without material it is done on the guess work. As per the judgment of the Apex Court, they have to produce bank statements, income tax returns at least for two years prior to the application. Even if the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is taken into consideration that the bank account is a joint account, still the respondent have to disclose the statement which is two years prior to the closing date of the account and whatever is the income as per the bank statement or whatever are the details or the relevant factors, the duty is cast upon the wife to produce all these documents.
9. In that view of the matter, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of this writ petition directing the wife to produce income tax returns, bank statements two years prior to 26.08.2019. The husband shall cooperate with the Court below in deciding the application for interim maintenance. No further adjournments shall be granted by the Court. The Court below shall stick to the same schedule as per the orders passed in WP.No.3267/2024 dated 11.03.2024.

K.Harish Kumar Vs Vanathy Rajkumar on 24 Apr 2024

Index of maintenance cases is here.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that IPC 420 and IPC 406 offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

From Para 21,

21. Furthermore, it is pertinent to mention that if it is the case of the complainant/respondent No.2 that the offence of criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of cheating as defined in Section 415, punishable under Section 420 IPC. This Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 690 observed that there is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making false or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriates the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver a property. In such a situation, both offences cannot co-exist simultaneously. Consequently, the complaint cannot contain both the offences that are independent and distinct. The said offences cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same set of facts as they are antithetical to each other.

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025

Index of Quash judgments is here.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Posted on September 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division Bench of Kerala High Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. A Division Bench of this Court in Saumya Ann Thomas v. The Union of India and others [MANU/KE/0255/2010] held that the stipulation of a period of two years as the minimum mandatory period under Section 10A is arbitrary and oppressive and the period of two years has to be read as one year. This was taking note of the one year period stipulated in Section 28(1) of the Special Marriage Act, Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 32B(1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act.

From Paras 6-7,

6. Divorce by mutual consent reflects the will of the parties to separate and get rid of the marriage. The legislature has put safeguards against impulsive decisions that may permeate such a decision by stipulating a gestation period before presenting a petition for divorce on mutual consent. This period will insulate possible peril that may ensue for the parties as a follow-up of the decision for mutual separation. In the Indian social context, though marriages are solemnized by two individuals, it is seen more as a union for laying the foundation for a strong family and society. Many laws have been made and many rights have been created based on familial relationships. The legislature, therefore, decided that a minimum period of separation must precede before presentation of a petition for divorce on the ground of mutual consent.
7. The problem presented in this case is when the waiting period itself would cause hardship to the parties. Can the law command parties to sit at the
fence and suffer the agony? The legislature in its wisdom contemplated possible repercussions of such fixation of minimum period that would result in
hardships to spouses and accordingly allowed the Courts to entertain a petition within the minimum period in exceptional cases. This is how Section
29 of the Special Marriage Act and Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, enabled the Courts to entertain the petition to be presented before one year had lapsed from the date of marriage. There is no corresponding provision in the Divorce Act for the Court to permit the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent until the mandatory period of one year has lapsed from the date of separation. The constitutional validity of the mandatory period is, therefore, questioned in the writ petition filed by the parties. This Court in Saumya’s case (supra) had no occasion to advert to the validity of the minimum mandatory period by which spouses are denied the remedy of approaching the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or from the date of separation.
The above reasoning of the Court would clearly show that the decision rendered and the conclusion arrived at was on a premise that the mandatory
minimum residence period of two years for Christians is discriminatory as there is no such prescription of two years under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act etc. This Court, however, considers the question in these cases on a different ground; whether in the absence of any provisions allowing the parties to a marriage to move the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or the date of separation. Can the provisions stand the test of constitutional scrutiny? The plea of arbitrariness would arise in this context of denial of judicial remedy to approach the Court before the lapse of one year from the date of marriage or separation.

From Para 11,

11. We hold that the fixation of the minimum period of separation of one year as stipulated under Section 10A is violative of the fundamental right and accordingly, strike it down.

Anup Disalva and Anr Vs Union of India on 09 Dec 2022

Index of Divorce Judgments is here.

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Rina Kumari Vs Dinesh Kumar Mahto and Anr on 10 Jan 2025

Rinku Baheti Vs Sandesh Sharda on 19 Dec 2024

Sandeep Walia Vs Monika Uppal on 18 Jul 2022

Nidhi Jain Vs Ankit Jain on 31 Jul 2025

Parvin Kumar Jain Vs Anju Jain on 10 Dec 2024

Sanjay D Jain and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Ors on 26 Sep 2025

Resham Lal Dewangan Vs Suman Dewangan on 09 May 2025

K.Harish Kumar Vs Vanathy Rajkumar on 24 Apr 2024

Arshad Neyaz Khan Vs State of Jharkhand and Anr on 24 Sep 2025