Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Posted on September 5, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Delhi High Court held as follows. Few declarations of overruled aspects of Maintenance cases are of interest in this Judgment.

From Para 11 and 12,

Distinction between Interim Relief/Maintenance and Ad-Interim Relief/Maintenance
11. In law, interim relief is a temporary relief granted by the Court after hearing both parties, pending final adjudication of the dispute. It is typically granted upon consideration of pleadings, replies, and after evaluating prima facie rights and urgency. In contrast, ad-interim relief is a provisional relief granted ex-parte or at the initial stage, often before the opposite party is served or has filed a reply. It is essentially an urgent measure granted to prevent irreparable harm, subject to further hearing and confirmation.
12. As far as maintenance is concerned, interim maintenance is an allowance granted to the aggrieved party during the pendency of proceedings and till final adjudication, such as under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or the Domestic Violence Act, generally after considering pleadings and material placed by both parties. Ad-interim maintenance, on the other hand, is a provisional maintenance granted at the preliminary stage, i.e. prior to adjudicating even the interim maintenance, to alleviate urgent hardship being faced by a dependent spouse or child, pending a more detailed consideration of the case. Thus, while both are temporary in nature, the key difference lies in the stage of grant, extent of hearing accorded before the relief is granted, and the prima facie opinion formed by the Court.

From Para 26 to Para 28,

26. Thus, in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra), it was directed that upon the filing of a maintenance petition, notice shall be issued to the respondent, who shall file a reply, and the pleadings shall be completed. Thereafter, both parties were required to simultaneously file affidavits of income, assets, and expenditure, to facilitate an informed and fair assessment of the claim. It was in this context that the Court permitted the grant of ad-interim maintenance, either on the basis of an admitted document, such as a salary slip already available on record by way of pleadings, or on the basis of admissions contained in the respondent‘s income affidavit. In the absence of any such material, the Court was required to hear both parties before determining any ad-interim amount. Thus, the clear mandate was that an ex-parte ad-interim maintenance order, without hearing the respondent or without there being any material indicating his admitted income, was not to be passed by a court of law.
27. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that in Rajnesh v. Neha: (2021) 2 SCC 324, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court directed that Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities would be filed by the claimant along with the maintenance petition/interim maintenance application. Similarly, the respondent would file his Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities along with the reply. Thus, the directions issued in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra) stood, in effect, overruled to this extent.
28. Therefore, it can be safely held that once the Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities has been filed by both the parties, or even if the respondent has not filed the same along with his reply to the maintenance petition, but there are documents on record showing some admitted income of the respondent, the Court can grant ad-interim maintenance to alleviate the hardship of the claimant, pending its decision on the grant of interim maintenance and determination of its quantum.

From Para 31 and 32,

31. However, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, in the decision in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), observed that a party claiming maintenance, whether as a spouse, partner in a civil union, live-in relationship, or common-law marriage, should file a concise application for interim maintenance, along with an Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities, as a mandatory requirement. The rationale was to enable the Court to make an objective and informed assessment of the financial capacities of the parties at the interim stage. Thus, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court emphasized that interim maintenance cannot be granted in a vacuum and solely on the basis of guess-work, and must be primarily based on the material placed before the Court through pleadings and affidavits from both sides.
32. Therefore, in view of the directions issued in Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), it has now been mandated by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court that a concise and specific application seeking interim maintenance should ordinarily be filed by the claimant, accompanied by the requisite affidavit of assets and liabilities.

From Paras 35-37,

35. Indeed, the distinction between interim and ad-interim maintenance lies in the delay – and that distinction is vital. In Rajnesh v. Neha (supra), the Supreme Court itself noted that applications for interim maintenance should ideally be decided within a period of 4 to 6 months. It is within this interim period before the adjudication of interim maintenance application that the grant of ad-interim maintenance assumes its true significance.
36. Just as interim maintenance is granted as a temporary measure pending adjudication of the main petition for maintenance, ad-interim maintenance, as recognized in judicial precedents, serves as a temporary measure pending adjudication of the application for interim maintenance
37. Thus, where the record already contains some admitted income documents such as salary slips, or where there is unreasonable delay in filing of income affidavits by the respondent, the Court may, in the interest of equity, step in and grant ad-interim maintenance – without there being any specific application for grant of ad-interim maintenance filed by the concerned party. Accordingly, for determining ad-interim maintenance, the procedure laid down in Kusum Sharma v. Mahinder Kumar Sharma (supra) would continue to govern the field, since till date, the observation regarding the same has neither been interfered nor set-aside by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court.

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Citations: [2025:DHC:5114]

Other Sources:

Index of Maintenance cases under Section 125 CrPC here.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Posted on August 30, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Delhi High Court held as follows,

From Para 37,

37. Sub-clause (b) to sub-section (5) is rather ambiguously uses the expression “any official” without explaining what is meant by the said term. However, when we read sub-section (4) to Section 65B, the meaning to be given to the expression “any official” emerges. Subclause (b) applies when information is supplied to “any official” in the course of activities carried on by him, i.e., in the course of “official” activities with a view that the said information shall be stored and processed for the purpose of the activities carried on by that officer or official. It is also elucidated that the information could be beyond or otherwise in the course of the said activities. Even in such cases the information is treated as supplied in the course of the activities of the official. We clarify that the word “official”, as used in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 65B, is not intended to mean or be restricted to a person holding an office or employed in public capacity. It connotes, as exemplified by the use of the same expression (albeit in its adjective form) in sub-section (4), a person primarily responsible for the management or the use, upkeep or operations of such device. It would, thus, cover a computer device containing electronic records in the hands or control of a private individual or entity.

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Citations: [2015:DHC:9600-DB], [(2015) 11 DEL CK 0089], [2015 SCC Online Del 13647], [MANU/DE/3674/2015]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10902800/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5728e3ede56109277ee476fe

https://vlex.in/vid/kundan-singh-vs-the-654461357

https://www.courtkutchehry.com/Judgement/Search/AdvancedV2?docid=998850

Sreenivas Motupalli Vs Anjana Taggarse Motupalli on 15 Oct 2024

Posted on August 26, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Telangana High Court held that, ‘well educated and having so many properties and also having professional income doesn’t require interim maintenance‘.

From Para 17,

17. Petitioner herein made several allegations in the Divorce O.P which are to be decided after adducing of evidence by both the parties in the Divorce O.P as such this Court is not going into those aspects in detail. The issue before the Court is only regarding the granting of interim maintenance to wife and children before the trial Court. The respondent has no objection for granting of interim maintenance to the children and he is ready to pay the said amount but be he is not inclined to pay maintenance to the petitioner as she is well educated and having so many properties and also having professional income. Petitioner herself in her application stated regarding her qualifications, abilities and also regarding her professional career of 19 years she has represented many reputed clients as such it can be presumed that she has well established professional career. She also admitted that she was taking care of entire family with her own earnings. She herself stated that her mother gave two house properties in her name and she also stated that respondent transferred house at Jubilee Hills in favour of his father but still she is residing in the said house. Previously respondent was residing in one floor and in-laws in another floor but presently petitioner is residing with her children in the entire house property. She also stated that she is member of several clubs and she was teaching extracurricular activities in the clubs to her children. Even in the application, she stated that he was already paying the fee apart from that she requires interim maintenance of Rs.1,00,000/- and all the details of the expenses were given in the above paragraphs and it was also an admitted fact that respondent herein paid school fee and also incurred the expenses of the club for the children for the certain period. Respondent filed letter of withdrawal of nomination dated 03.03.2010 and extract of minutes of meeting of Board of Director of Krishna Godavari Power Utilities Ltd., held on 13.03.2010 to say that presently he is not working as Director. Even petitioner stated that he was not paid salary for seven years after the marriage as the company is a joint family company and father of the respondent is karta of the family. Petitioner did not state about the income details of the respondent on the ground that he has hidden certain factors from the beginning of the marriage. Trial Court granted interim maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month to the petitioner and Rs.15,000/- per month to each of the minor children i.e., Rs.50,000/- in total and also directed to pay the said amount from the date of petition i.e., from November, 2010 to be payable on or before 6th of every month till the disposal of the O.P. The said order was passed on 27.06.2013 against the said order, this revision petition is preferred on 27.09.2013 and it is brought to the notice of the Court that so far he has not paid any maintenance to the children and not complied the order of the trial Court. Previously, women were financially dependent on the husband as they are not educated and not earning as such it was mentioned in the Laws that she should be maintained by the husband but the days are changed women are also highly qualified, working and earning and they can maintain themselves, therefore, it cannot be said that they are dependent on husband. Even in this case, the petitioner/wife is not dependent on respondent/husband as such granting of interim maintenance to her by the trial Court is not on proper appreciation of the fact and is liable to be set aside. Regarding the maintenance granted to the children this Court finds no reason to interfere with the same. Now children became majors. However, this Court is inclined to direct the respondent to pay entire arrears of maintenance till they attain the age of majority.

Sreenivas Motupalli Vs Anjana Taggarse Motupalli on 15 Oct 2024

Index of Maintenance judgments under HMA are here.

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Posted on August 25, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge of Madras High Court held that a ‘Wife Holding Immovable Properties & Substantial Income Does Not Need Interim Maintenance To Live Comfortably‘.

From Para 4,

4.Mr.T.Gowthaman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner/husband would submit that the respondent is financially not only self sufficient, but also affluent and there is no necessity for the petitioner to pay any interim maintenance to his wife. However, insofar as the maintenance to his son, the petitioner does not challenge the award of maintenance and the learned Senior Counsel states that it is being paid without any default. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the challenge is only in respect of the award of interim maintenance to the wife. He would further submit that the Family Court has passed a mechanical order, without appreciating the pleadings in the maintenance application and the evidence adduced by the parties. He would further state that the very object of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is only to ensure that the respondent is able to sustain herself for a basic and decent living, including meeting of the litigation expenses that have been fastened upon her by the husband.

From Para 5,

5.The learned Senior Counsel would also rely on the dividends received by the respondent as a Director of M/s.Roentgen Scan World Private Limited and also her conduct in approaching the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), seeking for a restraint order to not release dividends to her. In this
connection, the learned Senior Counsel would state that the conduct of the respondent/wife is clearly malafide and only in order to make the claim for maintenance against the petitioner, the respondent has not only suppressed the huge income received by her as dividends from the Company, but also her approaching the NCLT and seeking an order for not releasing the amounts payable to her, which amounts to a self restraint order only in order to entitle her to claim maintenance from the petitioner/husband.

From Para 15,

15.It is however contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that without even consulting the petitioner, the son has been admitted into an institution where the educational fees and expenses are sky high and for the arbitrary decisions of the respondent, the petitioner cannot be mulcted with liability. It is also seen that the respondent has properties standing in her name and even one of the properties that has been settled in her favour by her mother has been re-transferred to her father, pending the proceedings. The explanation offered by the respondent is that the father was the ostensible owner having brought to the property in the name of the mother and therefore, the respondent has settled the property in favour her father, does not appear to be bonafide. If really, the father was the ostensible owner having put in the entire sale consideration, while purchasing the property in the name of his wife, nothing prevented the mother to have straight away settled the property in favour of her husband, namely the father of the respondent. However, pending the proceedings, the settlement executed by the respondent in favour of her father clearly appears to be only in order to get over the objections of the petitioner that the respondent is affluent and owns valuable immovable properties. Even otherwise, the petitioner is having landed property in Thiruporur in the outskirts of city of Chennai where also the property prices have risen considerably.

From Para 16,

16.Further, the fact that the respondent has received substantial monies for the last three financial years is also not in dispute. The object of Section 24 is only for providing interim maintenance to the wife to enable her to get sufficient income to live a comfortable lifestyle. I do not see that the respondent is not possessed of such sufficient income already, warranting further monies from the petitioner by way of interim maintenance. In all fairness, the petitioner has stated that he is willing to meet the educational expenses of his son and has also complied with the order in I.A.No.2 of 2021. Even with regard to the award of Rs.30,000/- maintenance to the son, the petitioner has accepted the said order and has not even challenged the same. In the light of the above, I am not able to sustain the order of the Family Court awarding interim maintenance to the respondent/wife, which is wholly unnecessary in the light of the substantial income that has accrued to the respondent by way of dividends in Scan World and the fact that the respondent also owns valuable immovable properties.

From Para 19,

19.Even applying the ratio laid down in Rajnesh’s case, I do not find that the respondent requires any further amounts by way of interim maintenance to lead a comfortable lifestyle. In view of the aforesaid discussions regarding her holding of immovable properties as well as the substantial income by way of substantial dividends of the Company. The Family Court has already awarded maintenance, considering all the expenses that have been set out by the respondent and fixed the maintenance amount of Rs.30,000/- in support of the minor son and the same has not been challenged by the wife, seeking enhancement as well. The petitioner has also accepted the said order and has been paying a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the son, apart from also meeting the amount of Rs.2,77,000/-. The Family Court, after taking into account the assets and liabilities filed by both the parties, has only focused its attention on the requirement of the son, A.Anirudh and without any reasons or even discussion with regard to the specific averments regarding the ownership of immovable properties and income accruing from the Company by way of dividends, has straight away proceeded to award a sum of Rs.30,000/- to the wife as well. In view of the above, I am inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Family Court.

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI CRP.No.2590 of 2025 & CMP.No.14720 of 2025 Dr.C.Amarnath ..Petitioner

Index of Maintenance cases is here.

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Posted on August 23, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held that, ‘High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.‘.

From Para 32,

32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

From Para 35,

35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.

From Para 38, (Introspection!)

38. Before we part with this Judgment, we must mention here that one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J) is a party to a Judgment dated 27nd October, 2016 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition 2473 of 2016 in which the view taken is that remedy under Section 482 of the CrPC is not available for quashing the proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,2005. This view was found to be incorrect by a full Bench of the same High Court. As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our mistakes in properly constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the learning process always continues.

From Para 39,

39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice.

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

Citations: [2025 INSC 734]

Other sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110752030/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/682bfd4dcb7d8775a7b83f4e

https://testbook.com/recent-judgements/shaurabh-kumar-tripathi-vs-vidhi-rawal

Index of DV Judgments here.

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP and Ors on 23 Jul 2025

Posted on August 15, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A full bench of Supreme Court passed this reportable Judgment on ‘Fraud vitiating everything‘.

From Para 50,

50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:
13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken …

From Para 60,

60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his favour by playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its presence. Thus, we find Vishnu’s core argument to be creditworthy and compelling for us to hold that judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.

From Para 107,

107. Yet again, the two-Judge Bench in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra) laid down fraud as an exception to the doctrine of merger while observing thus:
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand.

From Paras 138 and 139,

138. As already discussed above, due to fraud having been played by Reddy, the doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order is open to interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra). For reasons already discussed, the civil appeal has to be allowed and the impugned order set aside.
139. As a logical corollary of the impugned order being set aside, it would follow that the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra), upholding the same, which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be a nullity, and thus stand recalled in exercise of our inherent powers.

Vishnu Vardhan Vs State of UP on 23 Jul 2025

Citations:

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/26257438/

‘Fraud is an exception to doctrine of merger’: Supreme Court recalls its own judgment obtained by fraud

https://www.livelaw.in/sc-judgments/2025-livelaw-sc-736-vishnu-vardhan-vishnu-pradhan-v-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-298600

Orders Obtained by Fraud Not Protected by Doctrine of Merger

Index to Perjury Judgments here.

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 29, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court reiterated the procedure to be followed to report a cognizable crime.

From Paras 26-29,

26. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR. However, if such an information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned. It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance in accordance with Section 190 of the CrPC.
27. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the application filed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC dated 01.07.2005 would reveal that the informant therein had simply stated that an offence under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC have been committed and that the informant had approached the “police officials” several times but in vain, but the application is completely silent as to when did the informant approach the Police or the Superintendent of Police. The application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned. The mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable.
28. In Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P.7 it had been observed that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering the FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the person aggrieved to file an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate concerned. In other words, the court reiterated that the proper procedure has to be availed of and followed before moving the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.
29. It is well recognized in law that the person aggrieved must first exhaust the alternative remedies available to him in law before approaching the court of law. In other words, he cannot ordinarily approach the court directly.

Anurag Bhatnagar Vs State (NCT of Delhi) on 25 Jul 2025

Index of Judgments under Sec 156(3) Cr.P.C. are here.

Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025

Posted on July 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

Supreme Court of India is funny…

First comes, Rajesh Sharma and Ors Vs State of UP and Anr on 27 July, 2017 [2-judge Supreme Court Division Bench sets up Family Welfare Committees]
Then comes, Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another Vs Union of India on 14 September, 2018 [3-judge Supreme Court Full Bench disbands Family Welfare Committees]
And now comes, this judgment. [2-judge Supreme Court Division Bench (includes CJI) endorses Family Welfare Committees]

Shivangi Bansal Vs Sahib Bansal on 22 Jul 2025

I am sure, this Judgment will be rescinded as it violates the principle of precedence and goes against the 3-Judge decision and did not even mention the earlier higher bench decision.

Citations: [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 735], [2025 INSC 883]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/41565735/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/687f86f82bf7c50b2db30079

https://lawtrend.in/no-arrest-in-498a-ipc-case-for-2-months-sc-approves-guidelines-of-allahabad-hc-on-misuse-of-498a-ipc/

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Posted on July 27, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows,

From Para 4,

4. By order dated 02.09.2023, the Trial Court held that since the complainant was yet to be cross-examined, no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. It was also held that the amendment was in the nature of a typographical error, moved at an initial stage of the case. So holding the amendment was allowed.

From Para 9,

9. The learned counsel for the respondents sought to distinguish the judgement in S.R. Sukumar’s case (supra) by contending that in the said case amendment was sought and allowed at the pre-cognizance stage and as such the said case can have no application here. We are unable to countenance the said submission.

From Paras 15-19,

15. It will be appropriate to observe that amendments/alterations are not alien to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 216 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the power of Court to alter any charge and the concept of prejudice to the accused. No doubt when a charge is altered, what is altered is the legal provision and its application to a certain set of facts. The facts per se may not be altered. However, the section does throw some light in considering the issue of amendments.
16. It will be noticed that when a charge is altered, if there is no prejudice to the accused, the trial can be proceeded with. Further, if it is likely to prejudice, the Court may either direct a new trial or adjourn the trial to such period. Section 217 of the Cr.P.C. grants liberty to the prosecutor and the accused to recall witnesses when charges are altered under the conditions prescribed therein. The test of ‘prejudice to the accused’ is the cardinal factor that needs to be borne in mind.
17. We have carefully perused the complaint and the application for amendment. The amendment was moved at a stage when after summons being issued to the respondents, the chief examination of the complainant had concluded and when cross-examination was awaited. The amendment made is also only with regard to the products supplied. According to the complainant, while what was supplied was “milk”, by an inadvertent error “Desi Ghee (milk products)” was mentioned. The error which occurred in the legal notice was carried in the complaint also.
18. On the facts of the present case and considering the stage of the trial, we find that absolutely no prejudice would be caused to the accused/respondents. The actual facts will have to be thrashed out at the trial. As to what impact the amendment will have on the existence of debt or other liability is for the Trial Court to decide based on the evidence. It was a curable irregularity which the Trial Court rightly addressed by allowing the amendment. It could not be said that by allowing the amendment at a stage when the evidence of the complainant was incomplete, failure of justice would occasion.
19. The High Court completely mis-directed itself in delving into the aspects of leviability of GST which would be the concern of the appropriate authorities under the relevant statute. It could also not be said that the amendment altered the nature and character of the complaint.

Bansal Milk Chilling Centre Vs Rana Milk Food Private Ltd and Anr on 25 Jul 2025

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Posted on July 24, 2025 by ShadesOfKnife

A single judge at Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court held as follows,

From Para 18,

18. In the present case, First Information Report No. 501 of 2019, under Sections 323, 354, 498A, 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Police Station Mandion, District Lucknow was lodged on 14.06.2019 by the opposite party No.4 and during the course of investigation, FIR and its consequential proceedings were challenged before this Court, and thereafter, matter was referred to the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court with the consent of counsel for the opposite party No.4 on the first date and it was successfully concluded and presently opposite party No.4 is enjoying her matrimonial life and residing with her husband and children. As in the case of Ram Lal Yadav (supra), this Court held that Investigating
Officer can not be restrained from arresting the accused of a cognizable offence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) and Ramawatar (supra) already held that FIR and its consequential proceedings can be quashed (u/s 482 Cr.P.C.), therefore, this Court is of the view that impugned FIR and its consequential proceedings is liable to be quashed in terms of settlement agreement of parties before Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this Court.

Ishwar Singhal and Ors Vs State of UP and Ors on 11 Jan 2022

Shades of Knife

True Colors of a Vile Wife

Author: ShadesOfKnife

Naveen Kumar Vs Kavita on 01 Jul 2025

Kundan Singh Vs State of (NCT) of Delhi on 24 Nov 2015

Sreenivas Motupalli Vs Anjana Taggarse Motupalli on 15 Oct 2024

C.Amarnath Vs J.Remabarathi on 22 Aug 2025

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs Vidhi Rawal on 19 May 2025

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