Based on the landmark judgment from Supreme Court is here, Allahabad High Court held against the Love Jihad marriages in India.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22354729/
Many such Love Jihad marriages are listed here, for awareness purpose, as nothing can be done to such legally major ladies.
Supreme Court has struck down the Section 8(4) as ultra vires to the Constitution which was in the following fashion,
(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) a disqualification under either sub-section shall not, in the case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, take effect until three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the court.
From Paras 19 and 20,
19. The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as member of either House of Parliament or as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of the Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature fromthe disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which thedisqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution.
20. Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibitParliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature.Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly subsection(4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution.
From Para 23,
…
Sitting members of Parliament and State Legislature who have already been convicted for any of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and who have filed appeals or revisions which are pending and are accordingly saved from the disqualifications by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act should not, in our considered opinion, be affected by the declaration now made by us in this judgment.
…
However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judgment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and /or sentence.
Citations : [2013 ABR 6 236], [2013 AD SC 10 655], [2013 AIR SC 2662], [2013 AWC SC 6 5458], [2013 BOMCR 5 261], [2013 CGLRW SC 2 339], [2014 CLT SC 117 284], [2013 JLJR 3 351], [2013 JT SC 9 419], [2013 KARLJ 5 1], [2013 KLJ 3 284], [2013 KERLT 3 296], [2013 LW 4 857], [2013 MLJ 5 463], [2013 OLR 2 941], [2013 PLJR 3 261], [2013 RCR CIVIL 3 713], [2013 SCALE 8 469], [2013 SCC 7 653], [2013 SCC L&S 7 811], [2014 WBLR SC 1 69], [2013 SCC CIV 3 678], [2013 SCC CRI 3 641], [2013 SCC L&S 2 811], [2013 SCC ONLINE SC 603], [2013 GUJ LH 2 408], [2013 GUJ LR 3 2209], [2013 ILR KERALA 3 203], [2014 CUT LT 117 284]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63158859/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af2ee4b0149711415be4
Supreme Court Landmark Judgment- Lilly Thomas v. Union of India
Section 437 of CrPC from Chapter CHAPTER XXXIII has the provision for getting Regular Bail in non-bailable cases.
Supreme Court of India
Index of all Bail matters is here.
Here is the latest version of the Police Act, 1861 which has the following helpful sections.
Section 10:
10. Police-officers not to engage in other employment.—No police-officer shall engage in any employment or office whatever other than his duties under this Act, unless expressly permitted to do so in writing by the Inspector-General.
Section 29:
29. Penalties for neglect of duty, etc. —Every police-officer who shall be guilty of any violation of duty or wilful breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or lawful order made by competent authority, or who shall withdraw from the duties of his office without permission, or without having given previous notice for the period of two months, or who, being absent on leave, shall fail, without reasonable cause, to report himself for duty on the expiration of such leave, or who shall engage without authority in any employment other than his police-duty, or who shall be guilty of cowardice, or who shall offer any unwarrantable personal violence to any person in his custody, shall be liable, on conviction before a Magistrate, to a penalty not exceeding three months’ pay, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding three months, or to both.
Orissa High Court held the NRIS Quota as an affront and unconstitutional.
11. Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that the NRIS category is an affront to the meritorious candidates who toiled day night to secure seats in NLUs through CLAT. The candidates belonging to the category of NRI/NRIS, who are very low ranked in the merit list often gets seat in the NLUs whereas the general candidates having secured better marks also lag behind the NRIS students and get disappointed. This is like the reservation for the elite class and this dubious category of quota is unconstitutional. The eligibility and selection under this category are unregulated, illegal and arbitrary. Even the apex court has observed in P. A. Inamdar vs. State of Maharashtra that admissions under this category is given to less meritorious students just because they could afford to pay the higher fees demanded by the University. The Consortium of NLUs, the Bar Council of India and all the stake holders involved in the process should revisit the so-called NRIS quota and prepare a proper regulation and system while implementing this quota. Several studies reveal that the selection process under this NRIS quota is quite vague, undefined and is based on inconsistent parameters. This Court calls upon the relevant stake holders especially the Bar Council of India, which is mandated to regulate the legal education in this country to ensure that a uniform and well-defined parameter are adopted so that the meritorious candidates do not suffer. The elitist approach to selected group in CLAT Admission process must be restricted. It is imperative that this issue needs to be settled within a shortest possible time to assuage the pains of the unselected due to poor rank.
The 3-judge bench again reiterated the usage and importance of Sec 313 CrPC, in this case where the parties very well knew they cannot get married due to their different religions and their parents are opposed to their marriage as they insisted that the marriage happen in a Temple Vs a Church !!!
From Para 6,
9. It stands well settled that circumstances not put to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him, and must be excluded from consideration. In a criminal trial, the importance of the questions put to an accused are basic to the principles of natural justice as it provides him the opportunity not only to furnish his defence, but also to explain the incriminating circumstances against him. A probable defence raised by an accused is sufficient to rebut the accusation without the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This Court, time and again, has emphasised the importance of putting all relevant questions to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
Supreme Court decided to assess how the Trail Courts are implementing the Practice Guidelines issued in a 2018 Judgment here.
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/134592336/
More time (of 4 weeks) is given to respondents to file (status) affidavits.
A division bench of Supreme Court held as follows in regards to the protection given to public servants from prosecution u/s 197 CrPC, mandating a sanction from Government.
8. The protection given under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them, in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if it chooses to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official capacity. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of the section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty: if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.
Citations : [2008 RCR CRI 1 1042], [2008 AIR SC 1486], [2008 BLJR 56 1000], [2008 SCC 11 289], [2008 ALD CRI 2 134], [2008 SCALE 2 303], [2008 AICLR 2 150], [2008 MLJ CRI 2 458], [2008 AD SC 3 153], [2008 CCR 2 203], [2008 JT 2 374], [2008 CRIMES 1 346], [2008 SLT 3 680], [2008 AIOL 155], [2008 AIR SC 1375], [2008 BOMCR CRI SC 2 131], [2009 SCC CRI 1 130], [2008 SCR 2 580], [2008 SUPREME 1 572], [2008 AIC SC 63 28], [2008 CRLJ SC 2054], [2008 AIR SCW 1375]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1809946/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae6ee4b0149711413d79
A 3-judge Full bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh had passed these guidelines for Municipal bodies in regards to Demolition of structures.
When the Corporation comes to the conclusion, keeping the above guidelines in view, that the construction in question is required to be demolished or pull down, it should follow the procedure indicated below:
(i) The demolition should not be resorted to during festival days declared by the State Government as public holidays excluding Sundays. If the festival day declared by the Government as a public holiday falls on a Sunday, on that Sunday also, the Corporation should not resort to demolition.
(ii) In any case, there should not be any demolition after sun set and before sun rise.
(iii) The Corporation should give notice of demolition as required by the statute fixing the date of demolition. Even on the said date, before actually resorting to the demolition, the Corporation should give reasonable time, depending upon the premises sought to be demolished, for the inmates to withdraw from the premises. If within the time given the inmates do not withdraw, the Corporation may proceed with actual demolition;
These guidelines are laid down in view of the fact that the Corporation is a public authority and its action must be tested on the touchstone of fairness and reasonableness.
Citations : [LQ 1994 HC 3056], [1995 AIR AP 17], [1995 ALD 1 1], [1994 SCC ONLINE AP 176], [1994 AP LJ 2 194], [1994 (3) ALT 73 (FB)]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1602396/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5608f72ee4b014971113f5be
https://www.legitquest.com/case/3-aces-hyderabad-v-s-municipal-corporation-of-hyderabad/36BCA
https://www.lawyerservices.in/3-ACES-HYDERABAD-VERSUS-MUNICIPAL-CORPORATION-OF-HYDERABAD-1994-09-02
In regards to the explanation given to section 197 CrPC, Karnataka High Court categorically held as follows,
20. The submission that the sanction is necessary, as the appellants are not facing the charges under the Sections enumerated in the newly inserted Explanation to Section 197 does not commend itself to us. The Memorandum explaining the modifications contained in the Criminal Law Amendment 2013 itself states that the Explanation to Section 197 is proposed to be inserted so as to clarify that no sanction is required for prosecuting a public servant, if the offence relates to crimes against woman. Such a clarification cannot be stretched to mean that the sanction for prosecuting a public servant is a must, if the offence alleged does not relate to a crime against woman.
Citations :
Other Sources:
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90130688/
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