If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Also read what is abetment u/s 107 IPC here.
A person abets the doing of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
3-Judge Bench of Supreme Court held that, for IPC 306 to be made out, necessary ingredients must be satisfied.
From Para 6, Learn the art and craft of Trail Courts in India, assuming certain sections apply to accused in the face of no direct evidence. Some of them are fit-for-nothing fellows…
6. The Trial Court then posed a question to itself as to why a young lady with two small children would commit suicide unless she has been pushed to do so, bythe circumstances in the matrimonial home. It was then observed that the expectation of a married woman will be love and affection and financial security at thehands of her husband and if her hopes are frustrated by the act or by wilful negligence of the husband, it would constitute abetment within the meaning of section107 IPC, warranting conviction under section 306 IPC. With such reasoning, the Trial Court concluded that Shinder Kaur committed suicide when her hopes were frustrated by the act of her husband or alternatively, by his wilful neglect. Thus, the Court itself wasuncertain on the nature of the act to be attributed to the appellant. Moreover, even while noting that no direct evidence of cruelty against the husband and thein-laws is available, the learned Court assumed that section 306 IPC can be applied against the appellant. With such conjecture, while acquitting all threeaccused of the charged crime under section 304B and 498A of IPC, the husband was convicted under section 306 IPC.
From Para 11, Rebutting the callous nature in which Trial Court used conjectures to lay conviction
11. Insofar as the possible reason for a young married lady with two minor children committing suicide, in the absence of evidence, conjectures cannot be drawn that she was pushed to take her life, by the circumstances and atmosphere in the matrimonial home. What might have been the level of expectation of the deceased from her husband and in-laws and the degree of her frustration, if any, is not found through any evidence on record. More significantly, wilful negligence by the husband could not be shown by the prosecution.
Then from Para 15,
15. As in all crimes, mens rea has to be established. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Sec 107 of the IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or show that the appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the deceased. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. However, what transpires in the present matter is that both the Trial Court as well as the High Court never examined whether appellant had the mens rea for the crime, he is held to have committed. The conviction of Appellant by the Trial Court as well as the High Court on the theory that the woman with two young kids might have committed suicide, possibly
because of the harassment faced by her in the matrimonial house, is not at all borne out by the evidence in the case. Testimonies of the PWs do not
show that the wife was unhappy because of the appellant and she was forced to take such a step on his account.
From Para 19, Supreme Court declared that Trail Court and High Court speculated. How horrible !!!
19. Proceeding with the above understanding of the law and applying the ratios to the facts in the present case, what is apparent is that no overt act or illegal omission is seen from the appellant’s side, in taking due care of his deceased wife. The evidence also does not indicate that the deceased faced persistent harassment from her husband. Nothing to this effect is testified by the parents or any of the other prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court and the High Court speculated on the unnatural death and without any evidence concluded only through conjectures, that the appellant is guilty of abetting the suicide of his wife.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/167656481/
Division bench of Supreme Court held that for a conviction to sustain, the following must satisfy.
From Para 8,
(8) The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.
From Para 9,
(9) In our considered view, in the case at hand, M.O.1-letter and the oral evidence of PW-1 to PW-5, would not be sufficient to establish that the suicide by the deceased was directly linked to the instigation or abetment by the appellant-deceased. Having advanced the money to the deceased, the appellant-accused might have uttered some abusive words; but that by itself is not sufficient to constitute the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. From the evidence brought on record and in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view the ingredients of Section 306 I.P.C. are not established and the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 306 I.P.C. cannot be sustained.
Citations : [2019 SCC 3 315], [2018 SCC ONLINE SC 2808], [2019 AIR SC 43], [2018 CRIMES 4 570], [2019 CUT LT 127 442]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65076410/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5c30a3f89eff432f24b9bc83
Justice Katju held that offending words to a member of SC/ST, are liable under the Act, only if made in any place in public view, but not otherwise. A big relief for those facing false cases.
From Paras 27 and 28,
27. Learned counsel then contended that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence does not come within the purview of section 3(1)(x) of the Act. In this connection it may be noted that the aforesaid provision does not use the expression ‘public place’, but instead the expression used is ‘in any place within public view’. In our opinion there is a clear distinction between the two expressions.
28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a ‘Chamar’) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression ‘place within public view’ with the expression ‘public place’. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.
And relating to American cuss word Nigger,
30. In this connection it may be mentioned that in America to use the word ‘Nigger’ today for an African-American is regarded as highly offensive and is totally unacceptable, even if it was acceptable 50 years ago. In our opinion, even if the word ‘Chamar’ was not regarded offensive at one time in our country, today it is certainly a highly offensive word when used in a derogatory sense to insult and humiliate a person. Hence, it should never be used with that intent. The use of the word ‘Chamar’ will certainly attract section 3(1)(x) of the Act, if from the context it appears that it was used in a derogatory sense to insult or humiliate a member of the SC/ST.
And then Husband was held to have NOT insulted the respondent in public view,
34. However, a perusal of the F.I.R. shows that Swaran Singh did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the F.I.R. to show that any member of the public was present when Swaran Singh uttered these words, or that the place where he uttered them was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Hence in our opinion no prima facie offence is made out against appellant no.1.
Citations : [2008 SCC 8 435], [2008 SCC CRI 3 527], [2008 AIC SC 69 25], [2008 AIOL 938], [2008 AIR SC SUPP 441], [2009 BOMCR CRI SC 2 431], [2008 CRLJ SC 4369], [2008 JT 9 60], [2009 MPLJ SC 1 503], [2008 SCALE 11 346], [2008 SCR 12 132]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531612/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/575fd270607dba63d7e69106
Fisheries Department grabbed the land of Temple and run profit-making business. Temple Management committee fought back and won their lands back. At the end, Madras High Court passed these directions, to be complied within 6 months.
Therefore, this Court, in the interests of the subject temples, deems it fit and appropriate to issue the following directions:
(i)The Commissioner, HR&CE Dept., Chennai, shall initiate appropriate action to retrieve the subject lands, remove all the encroachments, if any, and maintain the same with utmost care and for beneficial interests of the subject temples.
(ii)It is made clear that the lands belonging to the subject temples shall not be alienated or leased or encumbered illegally and against the interests of such temples.
(iii)The HR&CE Dept. shall have the administration and entire control over the subject lands and shall deal with the same in accordance with law.
(iv)The HR&CE Dept. shall take steps to start construction by putting compound wall to secure and safety of the subject lands. Except temple related purposes, the lands shall not be used for any other purposes.
(v)Except the HR&CE Dept., no other private individuals / trustees shall claim any right over the lands possessed and enjoyed by the subject temples.
(vi)The Officer in-charge shall not permit any unauthorised shop / construction inside the temples’ premises.
(vii)The Officer in-charge shall ensure the unrestricted freedom of worship by the devotees to the subject temples.
(viii)The Officer authorised by the Commissioner, HR&CE Dept., shall maintain proper register with respect to the financial aspects of the subject temples and its properties and file the same before the authority concerned in regular intervals. If he/she fails to discharge his/her duties assigned, he/she is personally liable for such lapses and appropriate departmental action be taken against him/her.
(ix)The Commissioner, HR&CE Dept., shall order appropriate enquiry forthwith related to the missing documents and files connected to the respective temples and its properties and initiate action against erring officials responsible for the same.
(x)The Government shall provide necessary assistance to the HR&CE Dept., for proper maintenance and protection of the subject temples and its properties.
Wonderful judgment from 3-judge bench to arresting the misuse of SC/ST Act 1989.
From Para 13, the insult must be targeted as the member belonged to SC/ST
13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.
From Para 14, the insult must be in any place within public view
14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.
From Para 18, Offence will NOT be made out just because the member is from SC/ST
18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out.
Citations : [2020 SCC ONLINE SC 907]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111507500/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5fb6aa47b128b6ff2528fcf1
https://www.indianemployees.com/judgments/details/hitesh-verma-versus-the-state-of-uttarakhand-anr
In this wonderful Order from 1-judge Gwalior bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was held that parading suspects in the media/public is violative of Article 21 and the concerned officers are liable for the violation of fundamental rights including compensation.
Here is the Final Judgment… Some snippets follow…
From Paras 21, 22 and 23,
21. The Counsel for the State also could not point out as to how, the respondent no. 3 could have taken cognizance of the complaint made by the landlady. From the plain reading of the application, it is clear that She had prayed for recovery of arrears of rent as well as for eviction of the petitioner. By no stretch of imagination, the complaint filed made by the landlady can be said to have disclosed cognizable offence. Even a non-cognizable offence was not disclosed in the complaint. The entire complaint was beyond the jurisdiction of the police authorities but still cognizance of the same was taken.
22. When a specific question was put to Shri Amit Sanghi, Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, that whether it is the official duty of the police to get the shops vacated without there being any orders of the Court, then it was rightly admitted by Shri Amit Sanghi, Superintendent of Police, Gwalior, that the police has no authority whatsoever under any law, to evict the tenants from the tenanted premises and the eviction can take place only under the decree of eviction issued by the Court of competent jurisdiction. However, it is submitted by Shri Sanghi, that the incident of 25-7-2020 took place
prior to his posting in Gwalior. Even the respondent no.3, in his return has categorically stated that the matter of eviction is a civil matter and police has no jurisdiction.23. Although the Counsel for the respondent no. 4 relied upon Section 23 of Police Act, but as a departmental enquiry is pending against the respondents no. 3 to 5, therefore, only undisputed facts and the stand taken by the respondents as well as the preliminary enquiry reports are being considered for deciding this petition. However, it is not out of place to mention here, that now the respondents no. 3 to 5 are involved in mud-sledging on each other, thereby placing certain documents on record, which were suppressed by the respondents no. 1 and 2.
From Para 24,
24. It is the case of the respondent no. 4 that it was the respondent no. 3, who had directed her to enquire the complaint made by the landlady, whereas it is the case of the respondent no. 3, that the copy of the complaint was given to him by respondent no. 4, only when he returned back to the police station at 16:00 and the endorsement made on the application thereby, directing the respondent no. 4 to enquire, does not bear his signatures. However, the return of the respondent no. 3 is beautifully silent as to whether such endorsement is in his handwriting or not? In para 8 of the return, the respondent no. 3 has pleaded that as per routine procedure when any complaint is submitted in Police Station, it is registered in Complaint register and is placed by the Police Station Munshi before the respondent no.3. Although it is the contention of the respondent no. 3 that he was
given the said application by the respondent no.4, only after he came back to the police station at 16:00, but his return is completely silent as to why he did not ask the respondent no. 4, that under whose authority, the endorsement of entrusting enquiry to the respondent no. 4 was written. In absence of such pleadings, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the respondent no.3, and it is held that endorsement made on the application dated 25-7-2020 made by the landlady is in the handwriting of the respondent no.3 and it was the respondent no.3 who had entrusted the enquiry to the respondent no.
Citations :
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19697017/
The following is a table listing granting and withdrawing of their ‘General Consent’ Granted To CBI To Investigate Cases In The State.
Some State governments innocently think by withdrawing ‘General Consent’ Granted To CBI To Investigate Cases In The State, they can stop CBI. Fools !!! Here why.
| State / Union Territory | Consent Granted on | Consent Withdrawn on |
| Andhra Pradesh | 3 Aug 2018 6 Jun 2019 | 16 Nov 2018 (Confidential GO) — |
| Arunachal Pradesh | ||
| Assam | ||
| Bihar | ||
| Chhattisgarh | 2001 | 10 Jan 2019 |
| Goa | ||
| Gujarat | ||
| Haryana | ||
| Himachal Pradesh | ||
| Jharkhand | 5 Nov 2020 | |
| Karnataka | ||
| Kerala | 4 Nov 2020 | |
| Madhya Pradesh | ||
| Maharashtra | 21 Oct 2020 | |
| Manipur | ||
| Meghalaya | ||
| Mizoram | ||
| Nagaland | ||
| Odisha | ||
| Punjab | 6 Nov 2020 | |
| Rajasthan | 19 Sep 2020 | |
| Sikkim | ||
| Tamil Nadu | ||
| Telangana | ||
| Tripura | ||
| Uttar Pradesh | ||
| Uttarakhand | ||
| West Bengal | ||
| Andaman and Nicobar Islands | ||
| Chandigarh | ||
| Dadra Nagar Haveli and Daman Diu | ||
| Delhi | ||
| Jammu and Kashmir | ||
| Ladakh | ||
| Lakshadweep | ||
| Puducherry |
On 6 Jun 2019, Andhra Pradesh granted General Consent.
*****
On 16 Nov 2018, Andhra Pradesh withdrew General Consent.
(Via Confidential GO and a Gazette notification)
*****
On 3 Aug 2018, Andhra Pradesh granted General Consent.
*****
On 5 Dec 2017, Andhra Pradesh granted General Consent.
On 10 Jan 2019, Chattisgarh withdrew General Consent.
On 5 Nov 2020, Jharkhand withdrew General Consent.
On 4 Nov 2020, Kerala withdrew General Consent.
On 21 Oct 2020, Maharashtra withdrew General Consent.
On 19 Sep 2020, Rajasthan withdrew General Consent.
On 6 Nov 2020, Punjab withdrew General Consent.
Sitting on a Division Bench of Apex Court, Justice Katju held as follows,
From Para 11,
11. In this connection we would like to state that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering his FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C., then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. before the learned Magistrate concerned. If such an application under Section 156 (3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can also under the same provision monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation.
And then from para 17 and 18,
17. In our opinion Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is wide enough to include all such powers in a Magistrate which are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation, and it includes the power to order registration of an F.I.R. and of ordering a proper investigation if the Magistrate is satisfied that a proper investigation has not been done, or is not being done by the police. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., though briefly worded, in our opinion, is very wide and it will include all such incidental powers as are necessary for ensuring a proper investigation.
18. It is well-settled that when a power is given to an authority to do something it includes such incidental or implied powers which would ensure the proper doing of that thing. In other words, when any power is expressly granted by the statute, there is impliedly included in the grant, even without
special mention, every power and every control the denial of which would render the grant itself ineffective. Thus where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts or employ such means as are essentially necessary to its execution.
Then from para 24-28,
24. In view of the above-mentioned legal position, we are of the view that although Section 156(3) is very-briefly worded, there is an implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to order registration of a criminal offence and /or to direct the officer in charge of the concerned police station to hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper investigation including monitoring the same. Even though these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied in the above provision.
25. We have elaborated on the above matter because we often find that when someone has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the police station and/or a proper investigation is not being done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse to interfere in such matters, and relegate the petitioner to his alternating remedy, firstly under Section 154(3) and Section 36 Cr.P.C. before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, by approaching the concerned Magistrate under Section 156(3).
26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police station his first remedy is to approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) Cr.P.C. or other police officer referred to in Section 36 Cr.P.C. If despite approaching the Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. instead of rushing to the High Court by way of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Moreover he has a further remedy of filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Why then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions be entertained when there are so many alternative remedies?
27. As we have already observed above, the Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation,
and for this purpose he can monitor the investigation to ensure that the investigation is done properly (though he cannot investigate himself). The
High Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ petition or petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. simply because a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or after being registered, proper investigation has not been done by the police. For this grievance, the remedy lies under Sections 36 and 154(3) before the concerned police officers, and if that is of no avail, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate or by filing a criminal complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and not by filing a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court should not ordinarily interfere.
And finally from para 30 and 31,
30. It may be further mentioned that in view of Section 36 Cr.P.C. if a person is aggrieved that a proper investigation has not been made by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station, such aggrieved person can approach the Superintendent of Police or other police officer superior in rank to the officer-in-charge of the police station and such superior officer can, if he so wishes, do the investigation vide CBI vs. State of Rajasthan and another 2001 (3) SCC 333 (vide para 11), R.P. Kapur vs. S.P. Singh AIR 1961 SC 1117 etc. Also, the State Government is competent to direct the Inspector General, Vigilance to take over the investigation of a cognizable offence registered at a police station vide State of Bihar vs. A.C. Saldanna (supra).
31. No doubt the Magistrate cannot order investigation by the CBI vide CBI vs. State of Rajasthan and another (Supra), but this Court or the High Court has power under Article 136 or Article 226 to order investigation by the CBI. That, however should be done only in some rare and exceptional case, otherwise, the CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and would find it impossible to properly investigate all of them.
Citations : [2007 AIOL 1247], [2007 JT 13 466], [2008 SCC 2 409], [2008 AIR SC 309], [2007 CRIMES SC 4 338], [2008 SUPREME 8 226], [2007 SCR 12 1100], [2008 SCC CRI 1 440], [2007 SCALE 13 693], [2008 AIR SC 907], [2008 AIC SC 62 236], [2008 KERLT 1 724], [2008 AIR SCW 309], [2008 GUJ LR 2 1666]
Other Sources :
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1836621/
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae45e4b01497114135cc
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