Rohitash Kumar and Ors Vs Om Prakash Sharma and Ors on 6 Nov 2012

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

Apex Court talks about Interpretation of Statutes:

Addition and Subtraction of words:
22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting the provisions of a Statute, it can neither add, nor subtract even a single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means, “From the words of law, there must be no departure”. A section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has committed a mistake; it must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to the court to add and amend, or by construction, make up for the deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron out the creases but while doing so, it must not alter the fabric, of which an Act is woven. The Court, while interpreting statutory provisions, cannot add words to a Statute, or read words into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same, produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148; Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1107; The Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 849; and Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).
23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that the legislature might have had in mind, or what the legislature is expected to have said, or what the legislature might have done, or what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause.
24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power to add or subtract even a single word, as it would not amount to interpretation, but legislation.

Citations : [2013 AIR SC 30], [2013 ALD SC 1 135], [2013 ALR 96 825], [2013 AWC SC 2 1245], [2013 FLR 136 92], [2012 JT SC 11 219], [2012 SCALE 11 30], [2013 SCC 11 451], [2012 SCR 13 47], [2013 SCT SC 1 537], [2013 SLJ SC 1 27], [2013 SLJ SC 2 16], [2013 SCC L&S 3 368], [2012 SCC ONLINE SC 922], [2013 AIC 121 163], [2012 AIOL 508], [2012 SLT 8 316], [2012 SUPREME 7 696], [2012 LLN 5 83], [2012 SCJ 8 534], [2012 AIR SC 6157], [2012 CLT 4 325], [2013 KCCR SN 1 19], [2012 AIR SCW 6157]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58524857/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609af20e4b0149711415afe

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Apex Court held as follows:

10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. (See J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan 2003 5 SCC 134.)
11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner 1846 6 Moo PC 1:
“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.”
The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P v. G.S Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel JT 1998 2 SC 253. Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the legislation, as noted in J.P Bansal case for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the “language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making.

State of Jharkhand and Anr Vs Govind Singh on 3 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 SCC CRI 1570], [2004 SCALE 10 174], [2005 CRIMES SC 1 49], [2005 AIR SC 294], [2005 SUPREME 1 477], [2005 SCC 10 437], [2004 JT SC 10 349]

Other Sources :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1029488/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae07e4b0149711412c03

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Posted on June 13, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A 5-judge Constitutional Bench held as follows regarding when the need of interpreting a statute arises.

The interpretative function of the Court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the Court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the Court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional.
It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the Legislature. The Courts always presume that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See \026 State of U.P. and others vs. Vijay Anand Maharaj : AIR 1963 SC 946 ; Rananjaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh and others : AIR 1954 SC 749 ; Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan : AIR 1957 SC 907; Nyadar Singh vs. Union of India and others : AIR 1988 SC 1979 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. : AIR 1961 S.C. 1170 and Ghanshyam Das vs. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax : AIR 1964 S.C. 766).
It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

Nathi Devi Vs Radha Devi Gupta on 17 Dec 2004

Citations : [2005 AIR SC 648], [2005 DRJ SUPP 80 518], [2005 JCR SC 2 71], [2005 JT SC 1 1], [2005 KLT SC 1 443], [2005 SCC 2 271], [2005 DRJ SUPPL 80 518]

Other Sources:

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/641119/

https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609adf2e4b01497114129b9

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

Posted on June 12, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

A division bench of Bombay High Court said that, FIR cannot be quashed against relatives living in far away places just on that ground, when there are allegedly specific allegations in the Complaint/FIR.

From Paras 8-10,

8. On going through the allegations made in the First Information Report, we find that the allegations are not vague in nature. They are not general in nature either and that they specifically assign a role to each of the applicants which they had performed while subjecting the respondent No.2 to cruelty and harassment.
9. It appears to us that the entire story of woes of respondent No.2 began, going by the allegations made against applicant No.1, after the applicant No.1 established extra marital relations with applicant No.6 and even performed second marriage with her clandestinely. The respondent No.2 got married to applicant No.1 in the year 2007 and the respondent No.2 also bore three children from out of the wedlock. Out of three children, one is son and two are daughters. The eldest daughter of respondent No.2 is aged about 14 years, second daughter is aged about 7 years and the son, who is the youngest, is aged about 4 years. It is further seen that the year 2017 proved to be a disaster for respondent No.2 as it was from this year and on wards the marital discord began. From this year hence, the applicant No.1 started harassing the respondent No.2. It is alleged that he even used to subject her to severe beating. Soon thereafter, it is further seen, the respondent No.2 learnt about the extra marital affair that applicant No.1 was having with the applicant No.6 and when questioned by respondent No.2, applicant No.1 would further subject respondent No.2 to cruelty. The acts of cruelty and harassment have been specifically stated by respondent No.2 in the FIR as well as in police statement. The respondent No.2 has also alleged that when she brought all these facts to the notice of remaining applicants, they being her in-laws and probably in a position to control and regulate the conduct of applicant No.1, unexpected reaction came from the remaining applicants. The remaining applicants instead of exercising proper control over the applicant No.1, according to respondent No.2, started instigating applicant No.1 against respondent No.2. As alleged by respondent No.2, these applicants even raised illegal demand of Rs.50,000/- from respondent No.2 and upon her failure to meet that demand, the respondent No.2 was subjected by all these applicants to verbal abuses. They even instigated husband i.e. applicant to drive respondent No.2 out of his house.
10. The afore-stated allegations, we do not think, could be called as vague and general. These allegations have been made not only against the applicant-husband but also against all the in-laws i.e. remaining applicants and they are all specific in nature. They disclose sufficiently commission of cognizable offence cruelty, punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. It also does not appear to us that they have been made with some hidden motive to just rope in all in-laws.

From Para 12,

12. This is a case wherein specific instances of involvement of not only the husband but also his relatives have been stated and therefore, with due respect, we would say that the case of Kahkashan Kausar would not assist the applicants in any manner. In the case of Kahkashan Kausar, it is also held that when there are general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute and if they are not checked, it would result in misuse of the process of law. As stated earlier, in this case, there are no general omnibus allegations made against all the applicants rather, these allegations make out a prima-facie case against all the applicants and therefore, on this count also the case of Kahkashan Kausar would not help the applicants.

Rajesh Pundkar and Ors Vs State of Maharashtra and Anr on 08 Jun 2022

TIP: Don’t waste money on Quash in such circumstances. Just file a 205 CrPC application on the EXACT same grounds and sit at home relax! Let the prosecution scrabble to prove their false allegations.

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016

Posted on June 7, 2022 by ShadesOfKnife

These are the Model Rules made by Central Government with regards to Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015, to be adopted/followed/enacted by State Governments.

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 (Eng at 176 pg)

Here are the earlier rules from 2007. No longer valid.

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007